



USAID | SENEGAL

FROM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

Issuance Date: December 4, 2009
Deadline for Receipt of Questions: December 28, 2009 (17:00 Dakar Time)
Closing Date for Submission of Applications: January 25, 2010
Closing Time for Submission of Applications : 5:00 PM (17:00)

Subject: USAID/Senegal Request for Applications (RFA) Number 685-10-A-03;
Supporting Democracy, Good Governance, and National Reconciliation

The United States Agency for International Development (hereinafter referred to as “USAID” or the “Government”) is seeking applications for an Assistance Agreement for funding a program for Supporting Democracy, Good Governance, and National Reconciliation in Senegal as described in Section C of this RFA. USAID anticipates awarding a four and a half (4.5) year performance-based Cooperative Agreement (CA), US \$ 20 million, subject to availability of funds, resulting from this RFA process. USAID reserves the right to fund any or none of the applications submitted.

Note: “Performance-based” is not an award type, but rather it is a focus on sub-results, activities and indicators for each of the four work components that comprise this award. Also, for planning/budgeting and clarification of period of performance, this award is to be based on:

Year 1 – 4/01/2010 (estimated) to 9/30/2011 (18 months)
Year 2 – 10/01/2011 to 9/30/2012 (12 months)
Year 3 – 10/01/2012 to 9/30/2013 (12 months)
Year 4 – 10/01/2013 to 9/30/2014 (12 months)

USAID/Senegal is seeking applications from qualified U.S. and Non-U.S. organizations and institutions, in the form of partnerships or teams (primes and subs) that include Senegalese organizations and are interested in providing the services described in this solicitation. This is a full and open competition, under which any type of organization, large or small commercial (for profit) firms, faith-based, and non-profit organizations in partnerships or teams from geographical code 935, are eligible to compete. In accordance with the Federal Grants and Cooperative Agreement Act, USAID encourages competition in order to identify and fund the best possible applications to achieve program objectives.

The authority for the RFA is found in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended.

The chosen Recipient will be responsible for ensuring achievement of the program objectives. Please refer to the Program Description for a summary and insight to the goals and expected results.

Pursuant to 22 CFR 226.81, it is USAID policy not to award profit under assistance instruments. However, all reasonable, allocable and allowable expenses, both direct and indirect, which are related to the agreement program and are in accordance with applicable cost standards (22 CFR 226, OMB Circular A-122 for non-profit organization, OMB Circular A-21 for universities, and the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Part 31 for profit organizations), may be paid under the agreement.

For the purposes of this solicitation, this RFA is being issued and consists of this cover letter and the following:

1. Section A – Application and Submission Instructions;
2. Section B - Selection Criteria;
3. Section C – Program Description;
4. Section D – Certifications, Assurances, and other Statements;
5. Section E – Annexes.

For the purposes of this RFA, the term "Grant" is synonymous with "Cooperative Agreement"; "Grantee" is synonymous with "Recipient"; and "Grant Officer" is synonymous with "Agreement Officer."

If an organization decides to submit an application, it should be received by the closing date and time indicated at the top of this cover letter at the place designated below for receipt of applications.

Applications received after the closing time may not be considered. The text of any application, less any essential annexes, cover pages, dividers, table of contents, executive summary, resumes and CVs, must not exceed 40 pages and the text on its own must be entirely responsive to all aspects of the RFA.

The preferred method of distribution of USAID RFA's is via Grants.gov, which provides a source for Federal government-wide competitive grant opportunities. This RFA and any future amendments can be downloaded from that Web Site. The address is <http://www.grants.gov>. In order to use this method, an applicant must first register on-line with Grants.gov. If you have difficulty registering or accessing the RFA, please contact the Grants.gov Helpdesk at 1-800-518-472 or via email at support@grants.gov for technical assistance.

If you decide to submit an application, it should be received (a) electronically directly to USAID by email, to bdaluz@usaid.gov and ptresch@usaid.gov, and; (b) hard copies delivered to the following address (international courier or by hand):

Bernadette Daluz
Sr. Acquisition & Assistance Specialist
USAID/Senegal
Derriere Hotel Ngor Diarama
Petit Ngor, Ngor
Senegal

Applications should be received by the closing date and time indicated at the top of this cover letter. Applications must remain valid for a minimum of 120 days.

Applicants are requested to submit both technical and cost portions of their applications in separate volumes. Award will be made to the responsible applicant whose application offers the greatest value to the U.S. Government based on this RFA.

Issuance of this RFA does not constitute an award commitment on the part of the Government, nor does it commit the U.S. Government to pay for costs incurred in the preparation and submission of an application. Further, the Government reserves the right to reject any or all applications received. In addition, final award of any resultant cooperative agreement cannot be made until funds have been fully appropriated, allocated, and committed through internal USAID procedures. While it is anticipated that these procedures will be successfully completed, potential applicants are hereby notified of these requirements and conditions for award. The applications are submitted at the risk of the applicant; accordingly, should circumstances prevent an award of a cooperative agreement, all preparation and submission costs are at the applicant's expense.

In the event of an inconsistency between the documents comprising this RFA, it shall be resolved by the following descending order of precedence:

- (a) Selection Criteria (Section B);
- (b) Application and Submission Instructions (Section A);
- (c) Program Description (Section C);
- (d) This Cover Letter.

Any questions concerning this RFA should be submitted in writing to: Bernadette Daluz, via the following email address: bdaluz@usaid.gov with a copy to Phillip S. Tresch at ptresch@usaid.gov. Prospective applicants need to submit their questions or request for clarifications of any part of the RFA not later than the deadline specified in the first page of this letter, in order to be included in a USAID response in the form of an RFA amendment (listing all questions received and USAID answers).

USAID/Senegal will not entertain any request for information by phone or in writing after the date indicated above.

Applicants should retain for their records, one copy of all enclosure which accompany their application.

Sincerely,



Phillip S. Tresch
Regional Agreement Officer

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SECTION A – APPLICATION AND SUBMISSION INSTRUCTIONS

General competition and “Conflict of Interest” Note: USAID has made a determination that there are no restrictions preventing organizations and/or individuals who contributed previously to assessments and/or draft designs from participating in this solicitation because 1) the program description has significantly changed from any previous assessments and drafts that have been prepared by parties outside of USAID; and 2) USAID has provided significant background information in order to “level the playing field” among applicants.

A.1 APPLICATION AND SUBMISSION GUIDELINES

All applications received by the deadline specified in the cover letter will be reviewed for responsiveness and programmatic merit in accordance with the specifications outlined in these guidelines and the following. Section B addresses the selection criteria.

Applications are to be submitted electronically via e-mail attachments formatted in Microsoft Word and/or Excel (version 2003) or PDF format with a 3MB limit per email. Because of USAID’s system restrictions (i.e. it routinely deletes and removes zip files), applicants are requested to avoid sending zipped files and to not use a “zip” extension as part of the file name.

Applications shall be submitted in two separate parts: (a) technical and (b) cost/business application. In addition to the email submission, applicants shall submit an original and two (2) copies of the technical portion of the application and an original and one (1) copy of the cost/business portion of the application to the address specified in the cover letter. Due to phone system limitations, faxed applications will not be considered.

The hard copies of application and modifications thereof shall be submitted in sealed envelopes or packages addressed to the office specified in the cover letter of this RFA, with the RFA number, the name and address of the applicant, and whether the contents contain technical and/or cost applications noted on the outside of the envelopes/packages.

The application should be prepared according to the formats set forth below in “Technical Application Format” and “Cost/Business Application Format”. Applications must be submitted no later than the date and time indicated on the cover page of this RFA, to the location indicated in the cover letter accompanying this RFA. Applications which are received late or are incomplete run the risk of not being considered in the review process. Late applications will be considered for award only if the Agreement Officer determines it is in the Government’s interest.

Applicants should retain for their records one copy of the application and all enclosures which accompany their application. Erasures or other changes must be initialed by the person signing the application. To facilitate the competitive review of the applications, USAID will consider only applications conforming to the format prescribed below.

Any prospective applicant desiring an explanation or interpretation of the RFA must request it in writing in the form of questions by the due date indicated on the cover page of this RFA (for the receipt of questions), to the email address set forth in the RFA cover letter. Non-written data or instructions given before award of a Cooperative Agreement will not be binding; also, any information (i.e. questions/answers) given to a prospective recipient concerning this RFA will be furnished to all other prospective recipients as a written/published amendment to this RFA.

Following are the procedures for **Submission of Applications, by Email:**

1. Before sending documents to USAID as email attachments, they must be converted into Microsoft Word 2003 (for narrative text), Excel (for tables), or PDF format.
2. If an application is sent by multiple emails, the **subject line of the email** must indicate whether the email relates to the technical or cost proposal and the desired sequence of multiple emails (if more than one is sent) and sequence of attachments (e.g. Organization X, Cost Proposal, Part 1 of 4, etc.). However, applicants are requested to consolidate as much as possible, the various parts of the technical applications into one technical application document and the various parts of the cost application into one cost application document.
3. Questions, applications and modifications thereof shall be submitted with the name and address of the applicant and the RFA number (referenced in the cover letter and above), inscribed thereon, via email, to both bdaluz@usaid.gov and ptresch@usaid.gov. Due to phone system limitations, faxed applications will not be considered.

Applicants are expected to review, understand and comply with all aspects of the RFA. Failure to do so will be at the applicant's risk. Each applicant shall furnish the information required by this RFA. On the hard copies of applications, the applicant shall sign the application and the certifications, and print or type its name on the Cover Page of the technical and cost applications. Erasures or other changes must be initialed by the person signing the application. Applications signed by an agent shall be accompanied by evidence of that agent's authority, unless that evidence has been previously furnished to the issuing office.

Applicants who include data that they do not want disclosed to the public for any purpose or used by the U.S. Government except for evaluation purposes should:

- (a) Mark the title page with the following legend:

“This application includes data that shall not be disclosed outside the U.S. Government and shall not be duplicated, used, or disclosed – in whole or in part – for any purpose other than to evaluate this application. If, however, a grant is awarded to the applicant as a result of – or in connection with – the submission of this data, the U.S. Government shall have the right to duplicate, use, or disclose the data to the extent provided in the resulting grant. This restriction does not limit the U.S. Government's right to use information contained in this data if it is obtained from another source without restriction. The data subject to this restriction are contained in pages _____.”; and

- (b) Mark each sheet of data it wishes to restrict with the following legend:

“Use or disclosure of data contained on this sheet is subject to the restriction on the title page of this application.”

Unnecessarily elaborate applications that include brochures or other presentations beyond those sufficient to present a complete and effective application in response to this RFA are not desired and may be construed as an indication of the applicant's lack of cost consciousness. Elaborate art work, expensive paper and bindings, and expensive visual and other presentation aids are neither necessary nor wanted.

Applicants shall confirm receipt of the RFA by written email notification to the contact person specific in the RFA cover letter. Applicants shall also acknowledge receipt of any amendment to this RFA by signing and returning the amendment. The Government must receive the acknowledgement by the time specified for receipt of applications.

A.2 GENERAL TECHNICAL APPLICATION FORMAT

The technical application will be the most important item of consideration in selection for award of the proposed activity. It should demonstrate the applicant’s capabilities and expertise with respect to achieving the goals of this program. Therefore it should be specific, complete, and presented concisely. It should take into account and be arranged in the order of the technical evaluation criteria in **Section B. Selection Criteria**.

The technical application must be submitted in English, and printed in single-spaced eleven point Times New Roman font on standard 8.5” by 11” paper. Pages must be numbered consecutively. The technical application is limited to 40 pages. **OVER 40 PAGES WILL BE NOT EVALUATED.** Note that cover pages, dividers, and certain components of the technical application (specifically, the Table of Contents, Executive Summaries, Draft Results Framework, Performance Plan, Sustainability Plan, *Curricula Vitae* (CVs) for key personnel, and Past Performance References) are not included in the 40-page limitation, and may be included as annexes to the technical proposal.

It is the applicant’s responsibility to confirm that the USAID/Senegal Mission has received the application – both technical and cost proposal.

A.2.1 Proposal Application

Technical Proposal

- Technical Approach 30 points
- Organizational Capability and Management Approach 20 points
- Personnel 30 points
- Past Performance 10 points

Cost Proposal

- Cost Proposal 10 points

Total Score 100 points

The technical application will be the most important item of consideration in selection for award of the proposed activity. It should demonstrate the applicant’s capabilities and expertise with respect to achieving the goals of this program. Therefore it should be specific, complete and presented concisely. It should take into account and be arranged in the order of the technical evaluation criteria specified in Section B. Selection Criteria.

Although no specific technical application format is mandated, the technical application should take into account the guidance below:

Technical Approach – must include a clear description of the approach and general strategy (e.g. methodology and techniques) being proposed and explain how the approach is expected to achieve the proposed objectives. Applicants should describe how they plan to approach achieving the selected outcomes, including to what extent they plan to provide technical assistance directly, involve local firms, and/or award sub-grants. Applicants are encouraged to propose innovative programs designed to reach

the desired higher level outcomes/results of the program. Applicants are advised not to repeat verbatim the illustrative activities in the Program Description, but to propose a focused and fine-tuned program which they determine is best suited to meet the overall outcomes and results expected. **Accordingly, applicant should both edit and enhance planned end products/indicators to illustrate the “robust and maximum” results that the applicant plans to achieve for the total funds available.**

The roles and responsibilities of all partner organizations must be clearly identified. Included in the program design should be an aggressive but realistic schedule of steps toward reaching proposed results. The implementation plan should clearly outline linkages between the proposed conceptual approach, activities, performance milestones and outcomes/results to be achieved. Technical applications will be evaluated based upon both the level of achievement proposed and the realism of the plan and timelines for reaching that level of achievement.

For additional guidance to applicants, the following is provided to assist with preparation of the technical application. References below are made to the relevant sections of the Program Description.

A.3 SPECIFIC TECHNICAL APPLICATION GUIDANCE

Section C. 5.1 Period and Place of Performance: The program is four and a half (4.5) year activity. Applicants should identify and propose a maximum of four pilot regions for the local level activities of components 1 to 3. Component 4 will be implemented entirely in the Casamance region with a satellite office located in Ziguinchor.

Section C.5.2 Results to Achieve: Applications should propose an abbreviated performance plan and results framework which will become a part of the recipient’s agreement. . Applicants must review the suggested results and indicators provided in Section C.5.3 and identify and propose “robust”, realistic and specific planned indicators and targets to be achieved at the end of each USG fiscal year over the life of the activity. Applicants should also provide baseline information to the extent this is available. In providing this information, USAID strongly encourages applicants to balance setting aggressive targets with applying best professional judgment to ensure that these targets are realistic and achievable. Any evidence that applicants are able to provide to demonstrate that the targets that they have set are achievable will strengthen the application.

Applicants should propose a reasonable number of indicators where data collection is possible and whose tracking will contribute to measuring performance, success, and impact in implementing the program. They should also include implementation milestones. The proposed indicators in the application should also allow them to demonstrate progress on improving both the overall enabling environment and building institutional capacity to sustain the desired improvements.

Please note that when setting results, applicants should also consider the following: (a) prospects for producing measurable results with clear relationships with the program’s overall objectives; (b) prospects for leveraging funds from national governments, other USAID programs, and other donors. Applicants should include in their applications a description of the process that they will use in coordination with USAID to finalize a monitoring and evaluation framework and their performance monitoring plan. The information requested above will become part of the recipient’s agreement and later part of the recipient’s comprehensive PMP.

Section C.5.3 Program Components: Applicants are expected to refine this USAID Program Description. They should apply their technical expertise, experience and understanding of the requirements to define what set of interventions and activities best responds to the goal and desired outcomes of the program. As part of this process, applicants are requested to use their best professional

judgment to determine how to divide up the level of effort and allocation of funds across all of the outcomes to best respond to the requirements of the performance-based program. For planning purposes USAID has allocated as a guideline, illustrative percentages to program and budget allocation as follows:

- 55% to component 1 – greater transparency and accountability
- 10% to component 2 – strengthened fiscal decentralization
- 10% to component 3 – fair and credible 2012 elections (i.e. not to exceed \$2 million)
- 25% to component 4 – Casamance peace process advanced (exactly \$5.15 million).

If the applicant believes that the funding is insufficient to support all components, component 2 can be eliminated as a separate outcome and addressed in a more limited way as part of component 1. Applicants should describe how they plan to approach achieving the selected outcomes including plans for technical assistance, involvement of local partners, and/or award of sub-grants.

Section C.5.3.2 Component 2: Strengthened Fiscal Decentralization: Applicants should ensure that any fiscal decentralization interventions proposed are not being addressed through other programs or other donor assistance, by consulting directly with the PNDL and targeted collectivités together with local and national civil society organizations to propose how the key bottlenecks (policies, systems, and procedural) could be addressed in order to further the decentralization process. Applicants should also consult with USAID’s Economic Growth, Health and Education programs to identify bottlenecks encountered in the fiscal decentralization/transparency activities of their technical programs. USAID/W published in June, 2009 a “Democratic Decentralization Programming Handbook” that is a recommended reference. This Handbook contains programming strategies and “best practices” in decentralization and can be found at:

http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/democracy_and_governance/publications/pdfs/pnacp339.pdf

Section C.5.3.3 Component 3: Free and Credible 2012 Elections: Applicants should also include in their proposals how they will engage with political parties, set reform priorities, work with the major parties in accordance with each party’s stage of development and level of commitment. Due to funding limitations, applicants should allocate funds to support this support this Component not to exceed the percentage mentioned in Section C.5.3..

Section C.5.3.4 Component 4: Casamance Peace Process Advanced: Applicants should consult the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) manuals on evaluation of conflict programming and the Berghof Handbook, an excellent resource for all things related to conflict resolution programming (www.berghof.handbook.net). Another useful reference is the conflict toolkits which can be found at: http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/crosscutting_programs/conflict/publications/toolkits.html Applicants should use their best judgment as to the time line for including activities for all “three Phases”, as mentioned in the program description.

Section C.5.4.2 Youth: Applicants should describe how youth will be included in political dialogue, training and capacity development activities, and what efforts will be made to prepare women and youth to assume leadership roles in civil society and other citizen groups. USAID encourages applicants to consider defining interventions that specifically focus on youth in their proposals across all components.

Section C.5.4.3 Gender: Applicants will propose gender specific indicators, and implementation activities that integrate gender, and encourage equitable participation of women and men in program implementation, with particular attention on how proposed activities will affect women both in terms of positive and negative impacts.

Section C.5.4.4 Grant Mechanism: Applicants who choose to utilize the grant mechanism to support the base program should include within their applications a description of a grant-making process, including discussions with such matters as the types of organizations to which grants would be made, the purposes of these grants, the approximate size range thereof, and the management processes they intend to use to support the grants. Applicants should also describe how they will monitor the implementation, track results, and close out the grants.

Section C.5.4.5 Synergies with USG and Donor Partners: Applicants are encouraged to explore opportunities to complement the other Democracy/Governance and technical programs supported by USAID/Senegal in the health, education and economic growth/natural resource management sectors as well as other USG agencies. Applicants should propose how linkages and synergies can be created between this and other relevant programs through sharing information, communications and learning on effective programming strategies that are working.

Section C.5.4.6 Environmental Compliance: Applicants should include in their applications a description of the process that they will use to review and mitigate any potential negative environmental impact from activities implemented under the program. USAID anticipates that a Categorical Exclusion will apply. However, if applicants determine that there is a positive determination then they will need to budget funds and include in their proposal the task of conducting such an assessment.

If a provision for sub-grants is included under this award, applicants should consider including in their applications the requirement to include an Environmental Review Form (ERF), or Environmental Review (ER) checklist using impact assessment tools to screen grant proposals to ensure the funded proposals will result in no adverse environmental impact. Use of the ERF or ER checklist is called for when the nature of the grant proposals to be funded is not known well enough to make an informed decision about their potential environmental impacts, yet due to the type and extent of activities to be funded any adverse impacts are expected to be easily mitigated.

Section C.5.4.7 Branding and Marking Strategy: The Apparent winning firm (not all applicants) must develop a Branding Implementation Plan (BIP) to describe how the program will be promoted to beneficiaries and host-country citizens. BIP should specifically address the issue of how the applicant will incorporate the message, “*This assistance is from the American people,*” in communications and materials directed to beneficiaries or provide an explanation if this message is not appropriate or possible. Applicants should develop a marking plan to enumerate the public communications, commodities, and program materials and other items that visibly bear or will be marked with the USAID identity.

Section C.5.5 Program Options: Applicants do not need to prepare any information at this time related to the Options described in the RFA; however, it would be helpful if applicants could very briefly mention in their application whether or not they have the institutional capacity to support the program options outside of Senegal. The RFA also contains option to 1) expand the work program in one or more of the existing components, as well as to possibly add a grant program to a work component(s), and 2) provide technical support to Guinea Bissau under the jurisdiction of the USAID/Senegal regional mission (See Section C.5.5. for details).

Section C.5.7: Staffing Structure and Key Personnel: Applicants should consider the most time and cost-effective staffing structure to respond to start-up and implementation of the program. Applicants should provide a complete staffing chart that identified the position titles and position grades on the Foreign Service or Foreign Service National scales of all proposed long term staff. The staffing plan and structure of the recipient will become part of the agreement. Applicants may propose up to five key personnel positions to manage the program.

Sustainability: Applicants should propose an illustrative summary sustainability plan for the program. A full sustainability plan will be required in by the recipient after the agreement is signed. It is expected to build upon and strengthen local capacity for sustainable program management and implementation. Applicants are required to develop partnerships with organizations that employ local personnel and facilities to the maximum extent possible to improve the likelihood of attaining quality results, achieve program sustainability and minimize recurrent costs. USAID/Senegal strongly encourages applicants to fully integrate the skills, capabilities and expertise of local organizations in a substantive way.

Organizational Capacity and Management Approach – Applicants must include a description of their organizational strength and experience in planning and implementing programs of a similar nature, including examples of similar programs that their organization has implemented which demonstrates that background experience. The management plan should provide evidence of the extent to which the proposed management structure and approach will ensure program effectiveness and efficiency will achieve maximum benefits and results. The application must specify the organizational structure (an organigramme should be included) and composition of the program team (including home office support) and describe the role of the Chief of Party, the Deputy Chief of party and key personnel. A brief scope of work for each is desirable.

Personnel Applicants must include CVs and/or resumés of proposed Key Personnel and other important managerial and technical personnel to be assigned to this program activity, including a minimum of three (3) references for each key staff with email addresses. In addition the Chief of Party and Casamance Senior Advisor may be required to be interviewed in both French and English during the application process. Proposed consultants not yet identified may be shown as “TBD” (to be determined), but it is desired that all proposed key personnel be identified. For Component 4 – the Casamance activity, key staff located in Ziguinchor will be expected to work in a highly sensitive environment, be autonomous, and be able to lead a team of experts working on the peace process. All other key personnel must have the requisite technical, management and representational skills for making significant programmatic and operational contributions in the course of Program implementation.

Past Performance Applications should include up to 10 U.S. donor funded contracts, grants, cooperative agreements, etc. received by the applicant’s organization involving programs similar to the program proposed in this application. Each award listed must include:

- Name of awarding organization or agency;
- Address of awarding organization or agency;
- Place of performance of services or program;
- Award number;
- Amount of award;
- Terms of award (start and end dates of services/programs);
- Name, current telephone number, current fax number and e-mail address (if one is available) of a responsible technical representative of that organization or agency;
- Brief description of the program; and
- Performance evaluation, if any, from the awarding organization or agency

A.4 COST/BUSINESS APPLICATION FORMAT AND GUIDANCE

- (a) The cost application must be completely separate from the applicant’s technical application and submitted by using SF-424 and SF-424A “Application for Federal Assistance”. These forms can be found under Section D and are downloadable online at:
http://www.grants.gov/agencies/aapproved_standard_forms.jsp

- (b) Applicants must provide an electronic copy of a budget (in Microsoft Excel), with calculations shown in the spreadsheet, and an electronic version of the narrative that discusses the costs for each budget line item (preferably in Microsoft Word).
- (c) The cost/business application must be for the period of the proposed program (up to 5 years) and use the budget format shown in the SF-424A. If the applicant proposes to charge any training costs to the USG as part of any proposed cooperative agreement, it must clearly identify them.
- (d) If the applicant is a consortium, the cost/business application must include documents that reflect the legal relationship among the parties. The document/s should include a full discussion of the relationship among the applicants, including the identity of the applicant that the USG will treat for purposes of administration of any cooperative agreement, identity of the applicant that will have accounting responsibility, how the applicant proposed to allocate effort under any cooperative agreement, and the express agreement of the principals of the applicant organization to be held jointly and severally liable for the acts or omissions of the other.
- (e) Applicants must complete the required Representations and Certifications under Section D with the cost/business application.
- (f) The applicant's proposed budget should provide estimates of the program based upon the total estimated costs for the agreement. The applicants proposed costs for the first three components should not exceed the funding levels indicated for Democracy and Governance. The proposed budget to support Component 4 must not exceed the funding indicated. In recognition of the modest funding for Component 4, applicants should be careful not to over-attribute shared administrative costs to Outcome 4. Applicants should minimize their administrative and support costs for managing the project to maximize the funds available for project activities.
- (g) The cost/business application should describe headquarters and field procedures for financial reporting and the management information procedure(s) to ensure accountability for the use of U.S. Government funds. Applicants must describe fully program budgeting, financial and related program reporting procedures.
- (h) Applicants must provide detailed budget notes or narrative for all costs, and explain how they derived costs, consistent with the following guidance on required information:
 - 1. The breakdown of all costs associated with the program according to costs of, if applicable, headquarters, regional and/or country offices;
 - 2. The breakdown of all costs according to each partner organization involved in the program;
 - 3. The costs, if any, associated with external, expatriate technical assistance and those associated with local in-country technical assistance;
 - 4. The breakdown of any financial and in-kind contributions of all organizations involved in implementing the cooperative agreement;
 - 5. Potential contributions of non-USG or private commercial donors to the cooperative agreement;
 - 6. Procurement plan for commodities if needed (although not encouraged); and
 - 7. Close-out costs: applicants must include in the required projected organizational budget any costs associated with terminating programmatic activities at the conclusion of the cooperative agreement.

- (i) Applicants must provide the following cost element details:
1. Salary and wages – applicants must proposed direct salaries and wages in accordance with their personnel policies;
 2. Fringe benefits – these benefits are non-wage compensation that an organization can provide to its employees in addition to their salaries. If the applicant has a fringe benefit rate approved by an agency of the U.S. Government, the applicant should use such rate and provide evidence of its approval. If an applicant does not have a fringe benefit rate approved, the application should propose a rate and explain how the applicant determined the rate; in this case, the narrative should include a detailed breakdown comprised of all items of fringe benefits (e.g. unemployment insurance, workers compensation, health and life insurance, retirement, FICA, etc.) and the costs of each, expressed in U.S. dollars and as a percentage of salaries;
 3. Travel and transportation – the applicant should indicate the number of trips, domestic and international, estimated as to carry out the proposed program description, and their estimated costs. Applicants must specify the origin and destination for each proposed trip, the duration of travel, and number of individuals who would be traveling. If applicable, applicants should base per diem calculations on current, published U.S. government per diem rates for localities concerned. Applicants may not use “Supporting Democracy, Good Governance and National Reconciliation” program funding to travel to conferences and international meetings unless expressly approved by the USAID AOTR.
 4. Other direct costs – applicants should detail any other direct costs, including the costs of communications, report preparation, passport insurance, visas, medical exams and inoculations, insurance (other than insurance included in the applicant’s fringe benefits), equipment office rent, etc.;
 5. Indirect costs – applicants should support the proposed indirect cost rate with a letter from a cognizant, U.S. Government audit agency, a Negotiated Indirect Cost Agreement (NICRA), or with sufficient information to determine the reasonableness of the rates. (For example, a breakdown of labor bases and overhead pools, the method of determining the rate, etc.)
 6. Cost sharing – details concerning the level of cost share the applicant’s organizations is proposing for this activity. USAID encourages applicants to contribute cost sharing. Cost sharing may be proposed from any available and interested local and international funding sources, including but not limited to, government and public institutions, individuals, corporations, NGOs and foundations. While there is not stated minimum required cost share amount, applicants are encouraged to give serious consideration to the amount they propose as a signal for the applicant’s commitment to the activity.
- (j) Applicants that have never received a grant, cooperative agreement or contract from the U.S. Government are required to submit a copy of their accounting and personnel policy manuals. Applicants must submit evidence of responsibility in order for the Agreement Officer to make a determination of responsibility. The information submitted must be provided in the third person and substantiate that the applicant:
1. Has adequate financial resources or the ability to obtain such resources as required during the performance of the award;
 2. Has the ability to comply with the award conditions, taking into account all existing and currently prospective commitments of the applicant – nongovernmental and governmental;

3. Has a satisfactory record of performance. Past relevant unsatisfactory performance is ordinarily sufficient to justify a finding of non-responsibility, unless there is clear evidence of subsequent satisfactory performance;
 4. Has a satisfactory record of integrity and business ethics; and
 5. Is otherwise qualified and eligible to receive a grant under applicable laws and regulations
- (k) Cost Control Plan: Especially since the total estimated cost (TEC) of the proposed 5 year cooperative agreement has been established in advance (up to \$20,000,000), the evaluation of the technical and cost applications is generally going to be based on “what is an offeror going to give/offer the USG/USAID for the TEC”. As Program Description targets and results, staffing skills and patterns and past performance give detailed insight to what is offered via the technical proposal, a cost control plan can guide/illustrate how financial management and control can significantly contribute to work/cost efficiency and enhancement of both award end results and overall sustainability. Following are examples of what USAID feels might possibly be included in such a plan.
- First of all, some people might feel that this could be just a computerized software package to help manage the accounting, financial, personnel, etc aspects of a large project; however, although this is an essential element, this is more of a “good practice system” than an individual element of a cost control plan.
 - Since a large percentage of the cost of a USAID award is typically related to personnel costs, an extremely important element is the cost differences between expat personnel and local/regional consultants/staff. For example, with full-time expat key personnel (salary, allowances, shipping, overhead, etc, etc) the cost per year is typically about \$250,000 (for 260 work days per year); whereas, local consultants who average \$250 a day will provide a total of roughly 1,000 work days per year of technical assistance). Accordingly, through the use of charts, tables, etc the offeror should discuss the use and cost of junior/middle/senior level expat staff versus local/regional staff. Note: USAID fully appreciates that some tasks need highly paid experts, but decisions about work tasks and skills needed should also seriously consider costs as part of the resource allocation and implementation process.
 - If a number of regional work offices are needed, one option that sometimes is beneficial is that instead of large numbers of hotels being used frequently, that a “guest house” arrangement might be used (i.e. rent a house in the desired area and while the living room and dining room can become a field office, the 38 bedrooms can be used for TDYers (consultants or local staff). Accordingly, M&IE might be paid but no costs incurred for lodging; therefore, a cost/benefit study might show that the above scenario could result in a significant cost savings.
 - If TDYs from the USA are needed, then to reduce the number of airline tickets, the TDYs could be of longer duration and work 6-days/week. Also, full-fare economy tickets are more expensive than economy tickets with a penalty for travel changes (i.e. even with paying the occasional penalty, this can still result in a significant cost savings

A.5 COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT AWARDS

The Government may award one (1) Cooperative Agreement resulting from this RFA to the responsible applicant whose application conforming to this RFA offers the best value (see Section B of this RFA). The Government may (a) reject any or all applications, (b) accept other than the lowest cost application,

(c) accept alternate applications, and (d) waive informalities and minor irregularities in applications received.

The Government intends to award the cooperative agreement on the basis of initial applications received, and may not conduct discussions or negotiations. Therefore, each initial application should contain the applicant's best terms from a cost and technical standpoint. As part of its evaluation process, however, USAID may elect to discuss technical, cost or other pre-award issues with one or more applicants. Alternatively, USAID may proceed with award selection based on its evaluation of initial applications received and/or commence negotiations solely with one applicant.

A written award mailed or otherwise furnished to the successful applicant within the time for acceptance specified either in the application or in this RFA (whichever is later) shall result in a binding cooperative agreement without further action by either party. Before the application's specified expiration time, if any, the Government may accept an application, whether or not there are negotiations after its receipt, unless a written notice of withdrawal is received before award. Negotiations or discussions conducted after receipt of an application do not constitute a rejection or counteroffer by the Government.

Neither financial data submitted with an application nor representations concerning facilities or financing, will form a part of the resulting cooperative agreement unless explicitly stated otherwise in the agreement.

To be eligible for award of a cooperative agreement, in addition to other conditions of this RFA, organizations must have a politically neutral humanitarian mandate, a commitment to non-discrimination with respect to beneficiaries and adherence to equal opportunity employment practices. Non-discrimination includes equal treatment without regard to race, religion, ethnicity, gender, and political affiliation.

A.6.AUTHORITY TO OBLIGATE THE GOVERNMENT

The USAID Agreement Officer is the only individual who may legally commit the Government to the expenditure of public funds. No costs chargeable to the proposed agreement may be incurred before receipt of either a fully executed Agreement or a specific written authorization from the Agreement Officer.

END OF SECTION A

SECTION B – SELECTION CRITERIA

The criteria presented below have been tailored to the requirements of this particular RFA and Program Description. Applicants should note that these criteria serve to:

1. Identify the significant matters which applicants should address in their applications; and
2. Set the standard against which all applications shall be evaluated.

To facilitate the review of applications, applicants are requested to organize the narrative sections of technical applications according to the evaluation criteria set forth below. Cost Applications will be evaluated for general reasonableness, allowability and allocability. The Award will be made to the responsible applicant(s) whose application best meets the requirements of the RFA.

The submitted technical information will be scored by a technical evaluation committee using the technical criteria shown below. When evaluating the various applications, the Government will consider the written qualifications and capability information provided by the applicants, and any other information obtained by the Government through its own research.

The evaluation of both the technical and cost proposal is worth **100 points**, and is computed by adding the scores for the subcategories listed below. The technical applications will be evaluated in accordance with the Technical Evaluation Criteria set forth below. The points below for sub-criteria represent how the committee will initially evaluate the applications during the first round. In the event of a second round of proposals, if there are new or revised allocations of sub-criteria it will be presented with the clarifications and questions to all applicants included in the second round.

The specific evaluation criteria are as follows:

B.1 Evaluation:

Technical Proposal

Technical Approach	30
Organizational Capability and Management Approach	20
Personnel	30
Past Performance	10

Cost Proposal

Cost	<u>10</u>
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Total Score **100**

Technical Approach – 30 points Sub-Total

10 Points

Responsiveness to the Program Description – The likelihood that the activities for which funding is sought will make a significant contribution towards achieving the overall goal and expected outcomes/results in this Program Description. Also, the quality, clarity, thoroughness, and reasonableness of the proposed approach.

10 Points

Demonstrated understanding of key issues, challenges and opportunities in democratic development, especially with regards to work in decentralization, transparency and anti-corruption, elections and political processes and peace building. Also, the proposed work/activities in application is technically sound, reflects the best principles and practices of democracy, governance and peace building, is consistent with target country priorities and policies, includes programming that will significantly benefit men, women, and youth and is designed for sustainability. Note: This includes alleviating existing gender imbalances and promoting the participation of girls and women in the program.

10 Points

Applicants should have fine tuned and focused their proposed activities/results/indicators (at the end of each component) so that the proposed work and end products can be achieved with the level of funding and time period proposed (i.e. very “robust” and demanding targets and indicators, but also realistic). Also, the performance plan and results framework is well-articulated, with ambitious but realistic targets and results identifying what they plan to accomplish by the end of the cooperative agreement.

Note: As an additional insight/reference to the above, in the Instruction to Applicants, the following statement was mentioned: Applicant should both edit and enhance planned end products/indicators to illustrate the “robust and maximum” results that the applicant plans to achieve for the total funds available.

Organizational Capability and Management Approach - 20 points Sub-Total

The demonstrated ability of the organization to carry out the implementation of program activities such as:

10 points

Applicant demonstrates depth, breadth and organizational experience in technical areas identified in the Program Description, and proposed backstopping is appropriate. Also, the proposed approach to management, organizational structure and implementation is efficient and realistic in terms of meeting program objectives and within the life of the activity.

10 points

A reasonable staffing pattern that enables successful management of all aspects of the program with an effective mix of staff that draws upon highly competent Senegalese professionals and professionals from the West Africa Region. The staffing pattern should demonstrate a relationship to the program description and management/cost efficiency, such as showing the total number of expatriates versus locals and the basic positions, (i.e. illustrate the total long-term and short-term technical assistance days and the general positions/skills, but cost details to be examined in the cost proposal).

Personnel - 30 points Sub-Total

The technical/managerial quality and experience of the Chief of Party and other personnel.

10 Points

The Chief of Party demonstrates the following technical qualifications:

At least 15 years managing complex and complicated programs technical leadership and intellectual leadership and operational experience in programmatic areas discussed in the Program Description; with specific technical expertise in at least one of the work components in the Program Description; experience managing the administrative, contracting, hiring, recruitment, financial and logistical aspects of the proposed contract, including general grants and sub-contracts management and qualities “desirable for all key personnel

staff” (i.e. track record building collaborative relationships in complex development environments, excellent interpersonal and communication skills, and excellent French/English language capability).

Note: Special instructions for COP position; a minimum of 5 references should be provided, USAID may request to interview the COP, and the interview may be conducted in both languages.

10 Points

The Casamance Peace Process Advisor should be an international/U.S. expatriate with the following qualifications:

At least 10 years managing conflict resolution and peace building programs in conflict zones, technical leadership and operational experience in peace process support programs, demonstrated negotiation skills and experience in negotiation and/or dialogue processes; experience managing administrative, contracting, hiring, recruitment, financial and logistical aspects for a satellite office in the Casamance, including general grants and sub-contracts management; excellent and proven bilingual language capability (French/English). Also, it is desirable to have knowledge of local languages, plus have the qualities listed above as “desirable for all key personnel staff”.

Note: Special instructions for Casamance Peace Process Advisor position; minimum of 5 references should be provided, USAID may request to interview the Casamance Peace Process Advisor, and the interview may be conducted in French/English.

10 Points

Key Personnel long term and short term Consultants. For key staff, relevance of professional qualifications and experience in implementing programs. Personnel with a good knowledge of French are required, and local languages are encouraged. Candidates with direct, practical, and managerial experience related to at least one of the work components are preferred. The inclusions of Senegalese candidates in the key personnel and/or Senior Management team are preferred. Other factors that are important with respect to Key Personnel are as follows: ability to operate in a cooperative, diplomatic manner while working with multiple institutions and organizations; sensitivity to cultural factors that affect implementation; experience in managing complex programs, particularly in West Africa, and an ability to manage a diverse team; experience and ability to understand and implement donor programs; and maximizing the use of Senegalese experts and advisors in order to build Senegalese capacity.

Note: Key personnel reference checks may include verifying technical qualifications, interpersonal and team-building skills, and ability to organize work to meet deadlines.

Past Performance – 10 points (not limited to 2 points for each sub-topic)

The quality of past performance based on assessment of 5-8 team/firm references submitted by the applicant for relevant past performance during the last three years (as well as other information available to the Technical Evaluation Committee).

The assessment provided by the TEC will focus on following typical five sub-topics:

- quality of product or service, including how cooperative and effective the Prime was in fixing problems;
- timeliness of performance, including adherence to contract schedules, time delivery of short-term technical advisors, and effectiveness of home and field office management to make prompt decisions and ensure efficient operation of tasks;
- cost control;

- customer satisfaction, including satisfactory business relationship to clients, prompt and satisfactory correction of problems, and cooperative attitude in fixing problems;
- effectiveness of key personnel, including effectiveness and appropriateness of personnel for the job, and prompt and satisfactory changes in personnel or deliverables when problems were identified either by the recipient or by the client.

Cost proposal – 10 points

A demonstrated ability to budget and manage cash flow while maintaining strict cost control measures, such as demonstrated use of local expertise where available instead of more costly expatriate labor. The cost proposal (including a cost control plan) will be evaluated for cost realism, reasonableness, allowability, allocability, and cost effectiveness. Applications that have more efficient operational systems that reduce operation costs will be more favorably considered. Sub-agreements should be cost-effective. For reference, see discussion of cost control plan at Section A.4.(k).

Note: Cost sharing will be considered generally in relation to the added value it represents to the program, but no points are assigned to this specific issue.

END OF SECTION B

SECTION C – PROGRAM DESCRIPTION

C.1 SUMMARY AND OVERVIEW

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) is seeking applications for a \$20 million base program plus two options: (a) up to a \$10 million option to support a program expansion and management of additional sub-grants and (b) \$6 million to support Guinea Bissau. For the Base Program, USAID anticipates approximately \$14.85 million to support the Democracy and Governance (DG) Outcomes 1 to 3 and \$5.15 million to support the Casamance Peace Process (Outcome 4). The period of performance is for approximately 5 years ending in 2015. The award will be a performance-based Cooperative Agreement to implement activities: Supporting Democracy, Good Governance, and National Reconciliation in Senegal.

The U.S. Government's (USG's) strategic goal in Senegal is to enhance democracy, good governance and national reconciliation. In Senegal, national reconciliation efforts are focused on resolving the 27 year old conflict in the Casamance.

The recipient will implement innovative approaches focused on achieving the following Outcomes:

- Outcome 1:** Greater transparency and accountability
- Outcome 2:** Strengthened fiscal decentralization
- Outcome 3:** Free and credible 2012 elections
- Outcome 4:** Casamance Peace Process Concluded

Attainment of the Outcomes will support the Government of Senegal (GOS) and contribute to two USG priority Objectives of the U.S. Foreign Assistance Framework: *Governing Justly and Democratically and Peace and Security*.

This ambitious program covers four Outcome/Components: (1) greater transparency and accountability; (2) support to strengthen fiscal decentralization; (3) support to free and credible 2012 elections; (4) and support to conclude the Casamance peace process. It will be implemented in a maximum of four regions to be recommended by the applicant including the Casamance region for component 4.

C.2 BACKGROUND

C.2.1 General Overview

Senegal is politically and economically one of the strongest countries in the sub-region with a population of about 13.7 million (over 40% of which is urban), growing at a rate of 2.6% per year. Close to 60% of the rural population and 45% of the urban population live on less than \$1 per day. Senegal's current economic growth rate is 1.6% per year. The adult literacy rate is about 40% while the primary school completion rate is almost 70%. Infant and maternal mortality have decreased but both remain high. Life expectancy at birth hovers at about 56 years up from 40 years in the early 1970s. Senegal's 2009 Human Development Index (HDI) is ranked at 166 out of 182 countries.

In the Casamance, the conflict is now one of Africa's longest running civil wars. Although not as lethal as some of the intractable conflicts on the continent, this low-intensity conflict has none the less cost an estimated 3,000 – 5,000 lives, created over 50,000 internally displaced persons and refugees, and wrought humanitarian, economic, political, and psychological havoc on the Casamance region. The Casamance region has a current population of one million. With abundant natural resources, high agricultural

potential, and a once blossoming tourism sector, 27 years of conflict has stymied the economic growth of the region. The social fabric of communities in the Casamance, especially in the Ziguinchor region, has also been greatly weakened.

Senegal is progressively threatened by the increasing narco-trafficking problem in West Africa. The sheer volume and scale of the problem could spill over into Senegal, threatening the country’s stability, rule of law and causing more disruption and instability in and around its borders and potentially within the country itself.

C.2.2 Political Context

C.2.2.1 Democracy and Governance (DG) – in Senegal

A good knowledge of Senegal’s political context is essential to understand the realities of the democracy and governance sector in this country and the basis for the program described herein. This program has been developed in consideration of these factors. A detailed overview of Senegal’s political and governance structures and related issues are provided in Section E - Annex 1.

C.2.2.2 Casamance Peace Process

One of the most difficult challenges that Senegal has faced over the past quarter century is the persistent conflict and instability in the southern part of the country; specifically in the Casamance region. Complex and difficult issues have created conflict, barriers to economic development and hardship to the Casamance people. An understanding of the history behind the conflict along with the current situation provides a useful, if not essential point of reference within which this program has been developed. Section E - Annex 2 provides the historical, current context and current developments overview for the Casamance region.

C.2.3 Constraints

Senegal has performed well when compared against its peers on the 17 MCC indicators. However, the data indicates that there are still constraints affecting the DG Sector. Additional analytic data is provided in Section E – Annex 3.

While not all-inclusive, the key constraints and issues relevant to this program illustrate the current context and are listed in the matrix below. They have been used as the rationale for the key illustrative results proposed by this program. More detailed information on constraints and barriers in each of these sectors is provided in Section E - Annex 4.

Sector	Summary of Key Constraints or Issues
Transparency and Good Governance Practices	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Inadequate application of existing laws; 2. Politicization of the state bureaucracy and weaknesses in the delivery of basic public services (e.g. water and electricity) 3. Weak internal and external accountability mechanisms. 4. Limited scope and capacity of civil society organizations involved in anti-corruption activities 5. Impunity for those involved in corrupt practices or irregularities 6. High tolerance for corruption on behalf of the Senegalese population combined with ignorance of the real impacts and costs of corruption

	<p>Parliament and/or National Assembly</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1.Capacity of Parliament and parliamentary support services needs to be increased to increase Parliamentary effectiveness 2. Analytical capacity of members of Parliament and officials of the National Assembly needs to be strengthened 3.Communications capacities of Parliament needs to be strengthened 4. The working conditions of members of Parliament needs to be reviewed and improved <p>Laws and Institutions</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1.The authorities and powers of office of the Inspector General and the <i>Cours des Comptes</i> need to be reviewed to improve their capacity, effectiveness and independence from the executive branch of government
Fiscal Decentralization	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1.There is a serious shortage of resources available to local bodies to cope with the demands and competencies transferred to them 2. Support organizations often do not function as well as they should 3. There is a poor understanding of the meaning of fiscal decentralization by local officials and local populations 4.There are government delays in making Local Government Investment Funds (FECLs) and Decentralization Funds (FDDs) available to local government; often resources don't reach local government at all 5. Capacity needs are major for such activities as planning and budget management 6. There is no tracking system to ensure accounts match and funds are not re-allocated 7. Parallel structures operate alongside government to provide needed public services which creates further complications in the financial management system
Elections and Political Processes	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1,Concerns exist over the validity of the voter registration lists and the process of registering new voters, especially immigrants, the Diaspora, and high numbers of undelivered voter registration cards 2. The President has appointed the 12 members of the Independent Electoral Commission which brings into question its independence 3. The Ministry of the Interior manages the organization of the elections; concerns exist about biased influence over the election process 4. Political parties are seen by 23% of citizens as corrupt; some lacking a true constituent base, and democratic internal procedures.
Casamance Peace Process (See Section E, Annex 3 for more detail)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1.Need for better strategies for re-opening honest, open and productive dialogue 2. Need for neutral facilitators to engage in the peace process 3. There is a need for a roadmap for a face saving exit and dignified end to the conflict 4. Civil society has not been successful to both lobby for peace and build consensus for a concerted dialogue 5.Better management of the many competing interests and spoilers around the conflict by the three main stakeholders (the MDFC, the GOS and civil society)

While not specific to the Casamance region, but of significant concern is the potential for conflict in other parts of the country. Senegal has not suffered severe violent political conflict in the past. A recent USAID conflict vulnerability assessment for Senegal was completed in August 2009 and examined areas of potential conflict outside of the Casamance. The assessment used an analytical tool called the Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF) and identified and summarized causes, conflict drivers, drivers for peace, and identified a general framework for a response. The assessment noted that many factors are present in the country that represents vulnerabilities for tension and conflict. Most of these sources of vulnerability for conflict focus on the rising costs of living, deteriorating public services versus potential sources of longer-term instability, which is more reflected in peripheral regions. Pockets of conflict is evidenced recently by frequent power outages, and growing economic inequality due in part to the current world economic crisis and in part by poor government policy and management (refer to Section E, Annex 4 for more detail).

C.3.0 STAKEHOLDERS

C.3.1 Democracy and Governance

(a) Government of Senegal

Overarching Senegalese governmental policies and objectives are based on Senegal's **Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) II**, which was finalized in 2006 after a participatory review process. This document "sets poverty reduction targets for the medium and long term, defines progress indicators and establishes annual and intermediate targets, and identifies the resources to be mobilized to achieve the priorities and desired "results" (<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2007/cr07316.pdf>). As such, the PRSP serves as a frame of reference for all poverty reduction interventions in Senegal, whether they are undertaken by Senegalese authorities, by donors or international organizations, or by other key stakeholders such as civil society or the private sector. The four pillars of the PRSP are (1) wealth creation for pro-poor growth; (2) accelerated development of access to basic social services; (3) social protection, prevention and management of risks and disasters; and (4) good governance and decentralized and participatory development.

Under Pillar No. 4, the PRSP states that the government's strategy, set out in the National Good Governance Program (PNBG), and the Country Financial Accountability Assessment (CFAA) and Country Program Assessment Review (CPAR) action plan, is intended to promote the rule of law in a democratic society, as well as efficiency and transparency in economic and social management. Priorities are cited in the link above.

(b) The Justice Sector Programme (JSP)

The JSP of the GOS is divided into three triennial actions plans (2005-2007); (2008-2010) and (2011-2013.) The JSP is a key element of the judicial governance component of the National Good Governance Programme (PNPG) and covers the entire judicial system as well as prisons administration and correctional education under the Ministry of Justice.

(c) Donor Organizations

Most of the donors working in DG are focused on decentralization, capacity building of civil society and support to the judicial sector. Few are working directly on issues of transparency and accountability or the upcoming 2012 elections. The European Union funds several programs to promote Good Governance through work to strengthen civil society in Senegal. The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) funds work under the Government of Senegal's (GOS) Programme National de la Bonne Gouvernance

and the World Bank funds work under the GOS' Programme National de Développement Locale to strengthen local governments. At present there is no donor group coordinating work in the area of Good Governance but efforts are underway to create one. There is, however, an active donor's working group coordinating Decentralization efforts.

In the Justice Sector, the GOS has sought the ADB's assistance to address some of the identified weaknesses. The World Bank has also started undertaking a Justice Sector Programme design which will also address some of these constraints and weaknesses. The French aid agency also works on developing judicial centers and institutions falling within the purview of the Ministry of Justice.

(d) Civil Society

The civil society movement and key organizations which form the citizens' movement in Senegal are presented in Section E - Annex 5.

(e) Other Stakeholders

The *Assises Nationales* ("National Audiences") merits special note as the movement is one of the most recent examples of a Senegalese citizen and political movement utilizing Senegal's strong tradition of dialogue and consultation as the preferred means of engaging in social and political discourse. The *Assises* were launched in June 2008 through extensive consultations in all 35 departments of the country and the Diaspora communities in France, the USA and Canada, to (a) examine the state of various fields and sectors of national and local life; (b) propose assessment methodologies for national policies; (c) reflect on conditions for rebuilding state institutions; and (d) discover a shared vision for Senegalese society. In May, 2009 the *Assises* published its Democratic Governance Charter (*Charte de Gouvernance Démocratique*). The Charter itself can be found at:

<http://www.afp-senegal.org/cp/Charte%20Assises%20Nationales%20-19-05-09-12h49.pdf>.

C.3.2 Casamance Peace Process

(a) Key Local Stakeholders

It is difficult to do an extensive listing of conflict actors. There are always countless hidden agendas and persons in a dynamic, fluid situation which can change drastically. The list does not take into account that these groups cannot be considered homogeneous entities (e.g. there are significant and serious divisions internally, especially within the MDFC). The following is a general listing of key stakeholder groups. It is by no means exhaustive:

GOS - includes Senior GOS officials, regional authorities, and locally elected officials such as mayors and rural community presidents

MFDC - includes political factions (Group de Contacte and others), military factions, and the Diaspora

Civil Society - includes the *Comité des Organisations non-gouvernementales pour l'Appui au Développement* (CONGAD), Alliance for Peace in the Casamance (Alliance pour la Paix en Casamance - APAC), the Group of Casamance Leaders (Collectif des Cadres Casamançais) and numerous local NGOs based in the Casamance

(b) International Institutions

There are many international institutions with activities in the Casamance, including but not limited to the World Bank, the African Development Bank, German Cooperation-GTZ/KFW, French Cooperation, UNDP, Italian Cooperation, Spanish Cooperation, Canadian International Development Agency, etc. All of these institutions focus on development in the Casamance interspersed with a few activities to address local level conflict resolution. The German Cooperation combines its development-focused work with peacebuilding/conflict resolution at the local level to address a definitive resolution to the Casamance conflict.

Unfortunately, no other organizations are working on the peace process in the same manner as USAID. There is a donor coordination group which aims to foster synergies between different international actors working in the Casamance that will be looking at opportunities for coordinating and leveraging development-focused programs to have a greater impact on the peace process.

C.4.0 USG PROGRAM OVERVIEW

C.4.1 General USG Strategy

Senegal is a key strategic partner for the United States Government (USG) in Africa. It is a moderating voice in the Islamic and African worlds as a democratic, predominantly Muslim, but secular country. The USG considers spurring equitable economic growth and strengthening Senegal's governance capacities at all levels key to maintaining the positive, stabilizing role it plays in the region, in Africa, and in the Muslim community. Senegal has progressed significantly in the past decade both politically and economically and while Senegal continues to compare favorably with many of the countries on the continent, over the last several years, concern regarding the Government's commitment to democratic values has grown. USAID assists Senegal to enhance the productivity of its people and, in so doing, creates jobs for unemployed youth, improves access to education and health care, and further institutionalizes democracy.

USAID Strategy

(a) Economic Growth and Agriculture

Nationwide, 50 percent of young people have no jobs. Senegal urgently needs growth, jobs, and the capacity to produce and manufacture goods rather than just trade them. USAID helps citizens generate income from local resources, connect to markets, and manage the country's natural resources. The Global Food Security Response, launched in 2009, supports efforts to increase food productivity in Senegal and reduce barriers to the movement and procurement of food throughout Senegal and to neighboring countries. Success in increasing agricultural productivity and improved resource management will ensure pro-poor economic growth and food security in rural areas.

(b) Health

Substantial improvements have been made in the health sector over the previous decades, including increased infant mortality and reduced maternal mortality. USAID seeks to further decrease child and maternal mortality and supports healthy families through birth spacing campaigns and promoting prenatal care. In order to limit the spread of HIV, USAID worked to increase access to and use of quality health services especially for high risk and vulnerable groups. USAID also works to reduce malaria-related

mortality by targeting children under five years of age and pregnant women. Senegal is a Presidential Malaria Initiative focus country with malarial activities implemented nationwide.

(c) Education

Over 50 percent of men and 70 percent of women over 15 years old are illiterate. USAID is determined to ensure that future generations are literate and better prepared for the global marketplace through improving the quality of middle school education (the seventh to ninth grades of Senegal's basic education cycle) and making it more accessible, especially for girls. USAID trains teachers and parents' associations as well as funding constructions of middle schools to increase access.

(d) Governing Justly and Democratically

While Senegal remains one of the few stable democracies in West Africa, it is increasingly becoming a highly centralized government where weak checks and balances undermine good governance. U.S. assistance will expand efforts to promote government-wide transparency and decreased executive influence on the legislature.

(e) Peace and Security

After more than two decades of conflict, a peace process which was gaining momentum in Senegal's southern Casamance region has recently deteriorated and there has been an increase in violence. USAID's Casamance program supports peace-building activities such as grassroots conflict resolution, peace process advocacy, and training to build local negotiation and conflict resolution skills. Additionally, USAID invests in youth as future leaders, by training young people in conflict resolution and providing them with leadership opportunities to share information with their communities.

Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC)

In September 2009, Senegal signed a five-year \$540 million MCC compact award aimed at reducing poverty and investing in economic growth which includes the construction of roads in the Casamance. To be eligible for this compact, Senegal had to demonstrate a commitment to policies that promote political and economic freedom, investments in education and health, the sustainable use of natural resources, control of corruption, and respect for civil liberties and the rule of law, as measured by 17 different policy indicators. Part of MCC's Irrigation and Water Resources Management Project involves a land tenure security activity to provide for, or maintain a secure land tenure environment for all of the residents who will be directly affected by the project's investments.

C.4.2 Relevant USAID Programs

Key USAID programs which have or are currently working in the DG sector and on the Casamance peace process are described in some detail in Section E – Annex 6.

C.5 PROGRAM DESCRIPTION

This Program is for a \$20 million performance-based award. The overall program will consist of a \$20 million Base Program plus an Option for \$10 million to support an expansion of the program and additional sub-grants and \$6 million to support Guinea Bissau (see Section C.5.5). For the Base Program, USAID anticipates approximately \$14.85 million to support the DG Outcomes 1 to 3, \$5.15 million to support the Casamance Peace Process (Outcome 4).

C.5.1 Period and Place of Performance

It is anticipated that the award will be for approximately four and a half (4.5) year period beginning approximately March 1, 2010. In the DG Sector, the project is expected to work at the national and local levels, ideally, where USAID has already established working relationships with governmental, administrative and technical offices as well as a variety of civil society organizations and stakeholders. Focusing activities in a limited number of geographic areas allows more in-depth support in building the capacity of organizations, leaders in the area of decentralization, and anti-corruption interventions for lasting impact.

Illustrative criteria to select proposed project sites could include:

- *Collectivités* where USAID is currently working to complement work in the education, health, economic growth and natural management programs;
- Urban or rural location/regions that are not already receiving large amounts of other donor assistance funding including those which are not supported through government transfers;
- *Collectivités* representing geographic diversity and/or those that are densely populated for the largest impact;
- Demonstrated CSO interest and existing coalitions are present on which to build;
- Evidence of political will from local governments to engage in civil society partnerships for civil monitoring and public participation.

In the Casamance Peace Process, the geographical focus of this program is limited to the Casamance region which includes the Ziguinchor, Sédhiou, and Kolda regions.

C.5.2 Results to Achieve

The goal of this performance-based program is to enhance democracy, governance, and national reconciliation, with specific performance measures established at the time of the award. The recipient is expected to select and implement Program interventions that have the greatest potential to contribute to the following higher level DG and Peace and Security measures.

Freedom House Indices

- Indicator 1: Political Rights

WBI Measures

- Indicator 2: Control of Corruption
- Indicator 3: Government Effectiveness
- Indicator 4: Voice and Accountability
- Indicator 5: Political Stability

TI Report

- Indicator 6: Corruption Perception results

The recipient will work in partnership with the GOS and Senegalese civil society to achieve the performance goal by focusing on the following four Outcomes below.

- Outcome 1: Greater transparency and accountability
- Outcome 2: Strengthened fiscal decentralization
- Outcome 3: Free and credible 2012 elections
- Outcome 4: Casamance Peace Process Concluded

Monitoring of results is a key element of USAID programs. USAID seeks data and information to improve the performance and effectiveness as well as to inform planning and management decisions. Accurate and timely monitoring will enable the project to adapt to changing conditions and make mid-course corrections as necessary. Data must also be available to demonstrate program impact.

The recipient will be required to prepare and implement a comprehensive Performance Monitoring Plan (PMP) (ref. Section C.5.12.2), including targets on standard indicators in Section E - Annex 7. Over the life of the award, the recipient will advise USAID with respect to any issues that arise concerning the definition and measurement of indicators, and work with USAID to make adjustments as required. Flexibility should be built into the monitoring and evaluation framework for adjusting monitoring requirements to any new USAID initiatives. The recipient will also be expected to contribute to any new USAID DG and/or Conflict Initiatives that are developed by USAID during the period of the award. This may require adjustments to the recipient's PMP.

C.5.3 Program Components

The Program Components described below are considered to have the greatest immediate and longer-term potential to 1) to resolve the constraints described in Section C.2.3 and more fully in Section E – Annex 4; and 2) to contribute to the outcomes and DG and Peace and Security measures described in Section C.5.2. This Program also attempts to build on the recommendations and conclusions of several assessments described in Section E – Annex 8.

The suggested program approach is to address not only the immediate bottlenecks but also the deeper determinants impeding good governance and the resolution of the 27-year old conflict in the Casamance. The program should therefore work simultaneously with government and civil society at the national and local levels of government and associations in ways that build support to improve policies, formal institutions, and transform values and attitudes to support the proper functioning of these institutions.

The four program components are intended to be mutually reinforcing and inter-related. As this is a performance-based Agreement, the recipient is expected to maintain a focus on the best way to achieve the desired Outcomes and impact the higher level DG and Peace and Security measures. Consequently, the recipient may request to modify the Agreement interventions over time if new opportunities arise and/or assumptions significantly change.

C.5.3.1 Component 1: Greater transparency and accountability

Greater transparency and accountability is essential for improving governance in Senegal. Although the Recipient will clearly need to prioritize, the range of Component 1 interventions that could be applied to support Outcome 1 is quite broad. A classic strategy includes strengthening the legislature, independent judiciary, and local government to operate more transparently as well as provide additional checks and balances in government. A second element is typically strengthening the functions of state organizations like the Programme National de Bonne Gouvernance (PNBG) and the Commission Nationale de Lutte Contre la non-transparence, la corruption et la concussion (CNLCC) (and could include officials of targeted *collectivités*) to diagnose and propose improvements so they can audit, publish findings, and sanction when there are violations. A third element is to identify and empower actors within the state who are interested in improving systems that encourage transparency and accountability. Finally, a fourth element is to build interest and momentum within civil society to advocate for improved transparency and accountability and to fight against corruption.

Much work still needs to be done to change public attitudes of tolerance and acceptance of corruption. Social marketing programs need to focus on concrete problems that directly impact the lives of citizens and affect their socio-economic well-being. This program should include efforts to build momentum for change by identifying champions (individuals, departments, or organizations) within government, professional organizations, civil society, and religious organizations who are in a position to encourage both increased awareness and encourage behavioral change related to transparency and accountability.

The Table below provides a comprehensive list of illustrative sub-results, activities, and indicators that could have the highest immediate potential to impact greater transparency and accountability in Senegal. The Program should build on and perhaps partner with other USAID funded programs in order to increase impact in this component.

Illustrative Sub Results	Illustrative Activities	Illustrative Indicators
<p>Increased internal capacity of government to monitor itself</p> <p>Increased external oversight of government policies and practices</p> <p>Increased public participation in public policy formulation</p> <p>Institutional improvements implemented to support transparent government processes</p> <p>Ability to advance judicial inquiries into corruption by the CNLCC</p>	<p>Provide technical assistance on priority policy interventions and how to improve institutional frameworks supported by the GOS</p> <p>Strengthen key national anti-corruption institutions of government (eg. Cour des Comptes, the CNLCC, the General State Inspectorate(IGE))</p> <p>Identify interested government officials and:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -work with them to implement public transparency initiatives; -set up systems to track internal processes to improve performance and accountability <p>Provide specialized training and technical assistance for government officials and local CSOs on public procurement rules and regulations</p>	<p>Number of improvements to implemented policy measure</p> <p>Number of improvements made to institutional frameworks</p> <p>Number of anti-corruption institutions strengthened</p> <p>Number of government officials and CSOs receiving specialized training on procurement rules</p>

<p>Increased access to information improved on government decisions, actions, and budget processes (national and local)</p> <p>Increased access to information about budgets and management decisions by the GOS</p>	<p>Support interested government officials in publicizing the status of actions being taken by their organizations and their efforts to improve the status over time</p> <p>Research what government organizations are currently doing in support of the Outcome</p> <p>Assist government officials, civil society organizations, and media to investigate and publish information on government activities including bodies such as the CNLCC, <i>Cours des Comptes</i>, and the IGE</p> <p>Assist national government and civil society organizations to obtain input informing national policies from local level initiatives through workshops, conferences and publications</p> <p>Support initiatives to monitor government action and policy development, act as watchdogs and establish a “call center” to report irregularities and abuses</p> <p>Support media (especially community radio), to effectively report on key issues of government decisions</p>	<p>Number of government officials and/or organizations publicizing information</p> <p>Number of different types of government information made newly available such as: number of reports on public expenditures and government performance</p> <p>Number of national policy events and publications on national and local good governance initiatives</p> <p>Number of CSOs receiving technical assistance on civic monitoring of transparency issues</p> <p>Number of investigative reports on corruption issues and cases</p>
<p>Increased awareness of citizen groups about the costs of corruption and what they can do to prevent corruption</p> <p>Greater awareness of the effects of corruption, importance of holding public officials accountable and their civic responsibilities in this regard</p>	<p>Conduct social marketing campaigns on the economic and social effects of corruption (e.g. possibly through surveys)</p> <p>Provide speakers to raise awareness on transparency and corruption issues among government, professional organizations, civil society, and religious organizations expressing interest. (Note: a nationwide campaign is not recommended – because of high cost/benefit ratio)</p> <p>Assist interested organizations</p>	<p>Number of events supported with corruption/transparency speakers</p> <p>Number of corruption/transparency trainings developed for interested organizations</p> <p>Number of organizations assisted in the development professional codes of conduct</p> <p>Number of CSOs and citizens reached through targeted awareness events</p>

	<p>develop training materials on corruption and transparency issues relevant to their organizations</p> <p>Assist interested organizations to develop professional codes of conduct relevant to their organizations (especially needed among those organizations perceived to be affected most by corruption)</p> <p>Support national anti-corruption CSO coalition to lobby national institutions on a good governance platform</p>	<p>Number of CSOs participating in anti-corruption coalitions</p>
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In years 2 to 5, the program could include interventions to strengthen the judiciary and Parliament; however, no immediate opportunities were identified in these sectors in the USAID commissioned reports. This was due to a perception that other donors were already involved with the judiciary and Parliament and that the program’s resources are insufficient to produce a significant impact on greater transparency and accountability through interventions in these sectors.

Another potential intervention over the longer term is supporting Senegal’s candidacy for validation in the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI), a tool for corruptive potential of the extractive industry. EITI promotes transparency and independent monitoring of the revenues and expenditures that the mining and other extractive industries bring. The U.S. Government is now the second largest donor to the EITI trust fund, with its contribution of \$6.0 million. At this time however, it appears that the GOS interest in this initiative is limited.

C.5.3.2 Component 2: Strengthened Fiscal Decentralization

This Program Component will target increasing fiscal decentralization in a very focused and technical manner. Strengthened decentralization is needed to operationalize good governance approaches across Senegal. Because USAID is working on decentralization in other sectors (e.g. health, education/youth, environment and water), this component will add value to these efforts (refer to Section E – Annex 6) and should be tied to local government capacity building. The GOS currently receives direct donor assistance from more than eight different donors – to support decentralization - notably the UNDP and the World Bank.

The Table below provides illustrative sub-results, activities, and indicators that appear to have the highest immediate potential to support Strengthened Decentralization.

Illustrative Results	Illustrative Activities	Illustrative Indicators
Value added to USAID sectoral programs supporting decentralization	<p>Develop consolidated reporting for USAID and the GOS on the priority policy interventions needed (and their implementation status)</p> <p>Provide technical assistance on priority policy interventions in support of USAID sectoral programs</p> <p>Consolidate DG results reporting from USAID sectoral programs</p>	<p>Qualitative report on the Status of Policy Measures</p> <p>Number of opportunities identified to assist USAID sectoral programs</p>
<p>Design and implementation of a unified GOS policy on decentralization</p> <p>Support to harmonization of legal texts in various ministries vis-à-vis fiscal decentralization</p> <p>Increased resources for local governments</p> <p>Resolution of current procedural problems related to fiscal transfers in a timely manner</p> <p>Increased citizen engagement in decentralization to serve as a conflict prevention technique</p>	<p>Identify the key bottlenecks on the fiscal side of decentralization from the national to local level and develop strategies to eliminate them</p> <p>Conduct training and technical assistance on strategic planning, increased revenue sources, resource management and service delivery, participatory budgeting and citizen engagement</p> <p>Sponsor peer-to-peer exchanges between <i>collectivités</i> to share experiences and strategies to improve governance mechanisms</p> <p>Training on Conflict Resolution techniques to support local government in their engagement with civil society</p>	<p>Number of policy, procedural, systems bottlenecks eliminated</p> <p>Number of local governmental officials trained</p> <p>Percent increase in locally generated revenue</p>

This component could also support a broad public dialogue including forums, workshops, conferences on fiscal decentralization, fiscal reforms, and priority actions to further decentralization. However, due to limited resources for the overall Program, efforts in this area will likely need to focus on where there are clear gaps or bottlenecks that are not being addressed by other partners supporting decentralization. For instance, in the health sector, user fees and cost recovery systems and donor support sustains the health system due to extreme difficulties in receiving funding from the “fond de dotation” which is either transferred very late or with major difficulties. The issues are related to policy, systems and inability of the system to respond in a timely fashion to the needs of the local governments. This component is an opportunity to increase citizen engagement in decentralization, particularly in the Casamance region,

where their involvement could serve as a conflict prevention technique. Greater faith in the process, more avenues of recourse and less of an imperative to utilize violence to voice grievances and greater participation by particular disenfranchised groupings could have a significant impact.

C.5.3.3 Component 3: Free and Credible 2012 Elections

Free and transparent 2012 elections is one measure of the health of the country’s democracy. As with any election, the stakes are high and the competition is expected to be fierce. All of Senegal, West Africa, and the international community are expected to take great interest in this election and observe it closely. This effort will be led by the GOS and supported by USAID and a host of other donors. It is not clear yet what the role of other donors will be to support elections.

Interventions could include helping to strengthen the autonomous electoral body CENA to perform its functions in a credible, independent and transparent manner. Another part of this component will be strengthening CSO capacity to advocate for a fair, transparent and credible electoral process. A third intervention will be strengthening political parties. This might include training them on how to utilize democratic internal procedures including more independent and transparent candidate selection processes; improve financial transparency and disclosure; develop participatory policy platforms; increase women’s participation in decision-making; develop long term strategic plans/manifestos; and implement voter-oriented effective campaigns that provide for open and transparent political competition.

The Table below provides illustrative sub-results, activities, and indicators that could have the highest immediate potential to support Free and Transparent 2012 Elections.

Illustrative Sub-results	Illustrative Activities	Illustrative Indicators
<p>Identify needs and plans to address <i>la Commission Electorale Autonome (CENA)</i> and other electoral bodies such as the Ministry of Interior’s General Directorate for Elections (DGE)</p> <p>Increased capacity of the CENA staff at the national and department level to carry out their supervisory/oversight role.</p>	<p>Report to USAID and the GOS on the priority policy interventions that might interfere with Free and Fair Elections (and their implementation status)</p> <p>Identify current weaknesses of the CENA;</p> <p>Identify key problems related to the voter registration rolls and voter registration procedures</p> <p>Provide technical assistance to improve the CENA’s internal regulations and procedures</p> <p>Assist in formulating an electoral calendar and operational plans</p> <p>Train CENA staff and polling workers on polling procedures</p> <p>Conduct voter outreach and liaise with civil society to provide awareness on elections procedures</p>	<p>Number of quality revised policy measures</p> <p>Number of technical assistance and training activities to strengthen the CENA and other electoral bodies</p> <p>Number of CENA staff and polling workers trained on polling procedures</p> <p>Number of citizen educational campaigns on voter registration and elections processes</p> <p>Increased public perception on the credibility and fairness of the electoral process</p>

	(suffrage is 18 years, so there will be an increase of new voters since the 2007 elections)	
<p>CSO capacity strengthened to advocate for a fair, transparent and credible electoral process</p> <p>Increased public debate of the electoral process and governance/democratic issues.</p>	<p>Support a broad advocacy campaign to engage citizens in public dialogue around electoral system reform, to promote the independence of the CENA and non-partisan review of voter registration lists</p> <p>Coordinate a national coalition of CSOs to conduct election monitoring</p> <p>Recruit and train a cadre of neutral Civil society election observers</p> <p>Support an independent hotline for early warning and response</p>	<p>Number of advocacy activities on electoral process reforms</p> <p>Number of civic monitors trained to conduct surveys and monitor elections</p> <p>Number of CSOs participating in the national coalition for election monitoring</p>
<p>Civil society’s ability strengthened to influence the political discourse during the electoral period</p>	<p>Sponsor citizen forums and media to identify key issues and conduct advocacy campaigns on election-related issues</p> <p>Provide financial support to independent media associations and community radio to promote balanced coverage of elections</p> <p>Support women and youth groups to increase their participation in the public discourse</p>	<p>Number of CSOs that promote dialogue with political parties</p> <p>Number of civic forums held by CSOs on issues of concern to citizens</p> <p>Number of CSOs and independent media receiving support to convey their messages</p> <p>Number of women and youth organizations supported</p>
<p>Increased public debate led by political parties on platform and issues</p> <p>Political party functioning (internal democratic procedures)</p> <p>Increased youth participation in political party leadership.</p>	<p>Build coalitions of political parties to have a more effective platform</p> <p>Provide training for internal party organizations</p> <p>Strengthen internal democratic procedures</p> <p>Provide leadership development training especially directed to women and youth</p> <p>Provide technical assistance for platform development</p>	<p>Number of political parties working in coalitions</p> <p>Number of political parties signed on to an ethics code</p> <p>Number of training programs and participants provided for political parties</p> <p>Number of political parties that have received USG supported technical assistance</p> <p>Number of women and youth engaged in political processes</p>

C.5.3.4 Component 4: Casamance Peace Process Concluded

The ultimate goal of Outcome 4 is a signed and even implemented Casamance peace accord. Resolving the Casamance conflict is considered to be the highest priority related to National Reconciliation in Senegal and is therefore the focus of the limited resources available to support this Outcome. A definitive resolution to the Casamance conflict is necessary because without peace the prospective for development is limited. Under Outcome 4, the recipient will be expected to focus efforts and the Outcome 4 resources in the Casamance, complementing the USG strategy and diplomatic efforts related to the Casamance. However, in the event of some type of unanticipated, serious conflict erupting in Senegal, there may be a need for USAID to broaden the recipient's mandate (and modify the program budget) to include national reconciliation efforts beyond the Casamance region. Interventions could include monitoring a potential conflict and/or responding to the eruption of an unanticipated conflict in some way.

Peace process and conflict resolution programs are by their nature focused on process; the out comes are far beyond the manageable interests of any one stakeholder, much less within the control of an external actor's programmatic intervention. Conflict resolution programs operate in a sometimes rapidly changing environment where relationships and obstacles are often times unforeseen.

Given the nature of conflict resolution, the challenge for program implementation is to work with all Senegalese stakeholders who are active in the search for peace to reach a negotiated settlement (most likely in the form of a peace accord) which brings a dignified end to the 27 year-old Casamance conflict. The program itself does not constitute a direct actor in the peace process with the ability to produce outcomes, rather the program is a neutral third party actor serving as a catalyst to help conflicting groups resolve their differences. For this component, the three main stakeholder groups are the MFDC, the GOS, and civil society—which has three levels (micro, mezzo, and macro.) Reaching this final Outcome can be broken into three Phases: re-starting dialogue, reaching and signing a peace accord, and implementing the accord.

Programming Approach. The Program, as designed, applies the **Concept of Theories of Change and the conflict assessment framework model** coming out of the USAID/W Conflict Management & Mitigation office (CMM) which utilizes clearly defined assumptions to guide programming.¹ There are two main assumptions going into the model: the first assumption is that the only viable solution to the conflict is through some type of dialogue. This is based on best professional judgment of conflict experts who have indicated that a military victory, weakening of the MFDC over time, or proceeding immediately into a demobilization, disarmament, and reinsertion (DDR) program will not resolve the underlying causes of the conflict. The second assumption is that it is possible to facilitate stakeholders in their efforts to bring about peace, and these strategic stakeholders can manage to bring about a definitive peace process even without being a direct party in the resolution process.

The Program seeks to apply the theory of negotiated settlement and key actor attitudes, which states (1) that given the “right” opportunity for dialogue, belligerent parties can and will work out their differences, and (2) decisions by key stakeholders are crucial to a peace accord (i.e., they have the possibility to implement change) and the attitudes behind these decisions can be positively influenced.

Supporting the Casamance peace process, is highly political and requires an acute understanding of roles and responsibilities in diplomatic relations between two countries in addition to the technical expertise in peace processes, conflict resolution, and confidence building. This component has been designed by USAID to support key stakeholders in their efforts for peace while taking advantage of being an external, neutral party which has a view of the larger picture and an understanding of relationships between key stakeholders and stakeholder groups. As an external party to the conflict, the recipient is expected to

¹ See Theories of Change. USAID/CMM

bring **neutrality, confidentiality, and not be invasive**. The very challenging issue of contributing to a process and not determining content requires continual attention to avoid becoming an unwitting player in the conflict. It is necessary that the recipient remain absolutely neutral, seeking to avoid even the appearance of partiality, and respect all aspects of confidentiality when working with all stakeholders. This perspective will allow the implementing partner to bring together actors at crucial moments and facilitate forward motion without determining outcomes.

The **role of diplomacy** in this Component cannot be underestimated. The Recipient will be complementing the USG efforts in the Casamance. Currently, formal track I diplomatic efforts have not been requested and there is reliance on “citizen diplomacy,” also known as track II and track III² diplomacy. Citizen diplomacy requires a wide range of stakeholders working in synergy. However, it is equally important to mention that the main roadblocks to peace are not with civil society, but rather with the main spoilers, including MFDC factions and the GOS response.

Another important feature of this component will be a sub-grants activity to support the various key actors in executing their roles throughout the various stages of the peace process. The **sub-grants mechanism**, while challenging to implement, can move the peace process forward by supporting track II and III citizen diplomacy efforts. Sub-grants are essential for the flexibility that the peace process support component requires. For example groups like the Alliance for Peace in the Casamance (APAC), CONGAD, and the Groupe de Contact have the potential to take action but need support. Sub-grant activities might also include carefully crafted advocacy campaigns carried out by local leaders and organizations that encourage the GOS and MFDC to make decisions that will result in a definitive and sustainable peace or they might also include strategically selected community level peace building efforts that focus on specific sub-populations, for example, a specific community which influences the MFDC, a specific individual/decision maker, a group of intermediaries, etc.. Equally there are other local actors, such as Kebankator, Usoforal, Ajac/Lukal, and AJAEDO, who could play critical roles. In conjunction with strong local leadership, these local actors have the initiative and networks to successfully implement local projects.

Component Phases

Illustrative Sub-results	Illustrative Activities	Illustrative Indicators
Phase I – Getting to Dialogue		
Working with key stakeholders to restart dialogue	Support process to lobby decision-makers to engage in dialogue	Number of strategic relationships build and/or strengthened with key stakeholders
Increased confidence between key stakeholders (inter and intra group)	Identify legitimate representatives with the proper mandate from the MFDC and GOS to engage in dialogue	Resumption of dialogue (formal or informal) Y/N Number of facilitated dialogues between conflicting parties
Successful advocacy for an end to current hostilities;	Identify strategies and techniques to approach MDFC and GOS in dialogue	Identification of windows of opportunity and effectively exploiting them (Y/N)
Successful advocacy to restart the dialogue		Number of successful advocacy campaigns/lobbying efforts that influence decision makers to move the peace process forward
Harmonization of the many		

² Please see http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/track2_diplomacy/ for more information on citizen diplomacy.

<p>civil society actors working to bring about peace</p> <p>Clear strategy for peace from both MFDC and GOS</p>	<p>Manage multitude of interests around the Casamance conflict by identifying them, developing strategies to address such interests</p>	
<p><u>Phase 2 – Peace Talks</u></p> <p>Increased capacity of negotiation teams</p> <p>Ensure civil society and MFDC participation in the peace process</p> <p>Effective communication to boast appropriate transparency about the peace process with the local population</p>	<p>Assist peace process actors to prepare for and complete negotiations</p> <p>Assist actors with joint agenda preparation</p> <p>Assist in facilitating dialogue between belligerent parties during negotiations</p> <p>Assist parties in overcoming obstacles to peace accord as they arise</p>	<p>Number of stakeholders trained in negotiations;</p> <p>Number of technical assistance sessions for peace talk preparation (joint agenda setting, etc.);</p> <p>Number of training sessions to increase capacity of civil society to influence peace process outcomes</p> <p>Number of facilitated dialogues between conflicting parties;</p> <p>Number of local leaders (traditional, religious, civil society) who participate in the peace process</p>
<p><u>Phase 3 – Peace Accord Implementation</u></p> <p>Effective communication about the accord, roles and responsibilities of all pertinent parties;</p> <p>Improved reconciliation at the local level;</p> <p>Participation in DDR program (reinsertion component)</p>	<p>Assist in the execution and implementation of the peace accord by realigning program staff, activities and budgets to support the process</p> <p>Monitoring peace accord implementation</p> <p>Helping with local and national reconciliation</p> <p>Contributing to a disarmament, demobilization and reinsertion (DDR) program;</p> <p>Alternatively, if there is no peace accord, identify strategy to address conditions and “road ahead”</p>	<p>Local stakeholders supported by USAID have a formal role in accord implementation (Y/N)</p> <p>DDR program is implemented on schedule (Y/N)</p> <p>Number of sub-grants awarded in support of all 3 phases</p>

Also an important part of the Program are the details of engaging, implementing and arriving at a peace accord provided in Section E – Annex 9. It includes a presentation of the methodology and process involved for this component.

C.5.4 Cross-Cutting Issues

C.5.4.1. Policy Issues

Policy recommendations and interventions are an important cross-cutting Component for achieving all the Outcomes. At the minimum, the recipient will be required to advise and periodically update USAID and the GOS on policy priorities related to the achievements of the Outcomes. Policy Interventions may also be part of the one or more of the program components. For instance, Senegal currently considers libel to be a criminal offense punishable with imprisonment. This law is very severe and could potentially be misused in ways that decrease Civil and Political Liberties.

C.5.4.2 Youth

Senegal has been identified as having a **youth** bulge that poses extreme risks to stability, with 50.2% of the adult population between the ages of 15-29. During the 1990s there was a significant rise in the participation of youth in politics and civic affairs, with the voting age lowered from 21 to 18. Disaffected urban youth was a significant factor in helping elect the current president and his Sopi coalition. One of the major arenas in which young people are exercising power and influence is in the rural councils which until the 1996 local government elections, were dominated by rural notables and elders. Young people are also very active in civic organizations in urban areas. While youth groups have become schools for democracy and often work to improve urban neighborhoods and villages, other large numbers of youth remain outside the system and suffer from high levels of unemployment (estimated at 47%), poor education, and drug use. Inclusion of youth in the political process is a key factor to ensure that democracy is “out there” for all and can provide an arena to prepare youth as the future leaders of this nation. The recipient will implement some activities that target youth in support of one to four of the Program Outcomes.

C.5.4.3 Gender

Senegalese **women** are an important voice in the democratic development of Senegal at all levels of civil society as they represent one-half of the nation’s human resources. Many national level and regional NGOs and associations represent women’s issues, however, they face some difficulties with regards to factionalized leadership and organizational capacity. In some cases women’s organizations are susceptible to political manipulation and need to have improved capacity to determine autonomous agendas and priorities. While there has been a significant rise in women’s participation and influence in politics, society and economic life, there is a need to strengthen leadership skills within women’s organizations and improve the ability of their work in collaboration with other organizations for a broader impact. There is a need for greater inclusion of women in political roles and public life as advocates of change, participants in political dialogue and leaders in the political arena. Women need to be some of the main beneficiaries of capacity development activities in the areas of networking, coalition-building, leadership skills, advocacy and organizational development.

USAID encourages the integration of gender considerations at all levels of strategic development, program planning, implementation and monitoring. Early in the course of implementation, the Recipient shall undertake a gender disaggregated baseline analysis from which to fine-tune their gender indicators and targets, which will enable them to take note of any differential impact of the interventions on women and men, explore their implications, report on them quarterly, and potentially modify their activities if required.

C.5.4.4 Sub-Grant Mechanism

A **sub-grant-making** facility should be included in the Program as a mechanism: 1) to support one or more of the Outcomes as part of the base Program and 2) to manage smaller USAID awards that may be exercised as part of the options described in Section C.5.5. For grants selected through USAID, the recipient will be required to track and monitor the implementation, results, and close-out of the awards. For the Casamance peace process component, the sub-grant component is required as described in Section 5.3.4 and further described under component 4 of this program description. For grants selected through USAID the recipient will be required to track and monitor the implementation, results, and close-out of the awards. For the Casamance peace process component, the sub-grant component is required as described in Section 5.3.4 and further described under component 4 of this program description.

C.5.4.5 Synergies with USG and Donor Partners

The recipient will need to harmonize efforts with USAID and other USG and donor programs. The recipient should coordinate with the governance/transparency component activities in the USAID/Wula Nafaa program, the USAID/PEPAM water and sanitation program, the Health Care Policy and Finance program and the Basic Education program. The recipient should explore potential linkages with other USAID programs especially under Component 2. Implementation of Casamance peace process support activities will include close and continual consultations with USAID and the US Embassy. Due to the sensitive political nature of the activity, frequent meetings with USAID and, as requested, with the US Embassy are anticipated.

C.5.4.6 Environmental Compliance

The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, Section 117 requires that the impact of USAID's activities on the environment be considered and that USAID include environmental sustainability as a central consideration in designing and carrying out its development programs. This mandate is codified in Federal Regulations (22 CFR 216) and in USAID's Automated Directives System Parts 201.5.10g and 204 (<http://www.usaid.gov/policy/ADS/200/>), which, in part, require that the potential environmental impacts of USAID-financed activities are identified prior to a final decision to proceed and that appropriate environmental safeguards are adopted for all activities. In addition, the Recipient must comply with host country environmental regulations unless otherwise directed in writing by USAID, in case of conflict between host country and USAID regulations, the latter shall govern.

No activity funded under this agreement will be implemented unless an environmental threshold determination has been reached for that activity, as documented in a Request for Categorical Exclusion, Initial Environmental Examination, or Environmental Assessment duly signed by the Bureau Environmental officer.

In the event of anything other than a Categorical Exclusion, the Recipient in collaboration with the USAID Agreement Officer's Technical Representative and Mission Environmental Officer, will review all ongoing and planned activities in its initial Implementation Plan and all Annual Work Plans thereafter to determine if the activities are within the scope of the approved Regulation 216 environmental documentation. If the Recipient plans any new activities outside the scope of the approved Regulation 216 environmental documentation, it shall prepare an amendment to the documentation for USAID review and approval. No such new activities shall be undertaken prior to receiving written USAID review and approval. No such new activities shall be undertaken prior to receiving written USAID approval of environmental documentation amendments. Any ongoing activities found to be outside the

scope of the approved Regulation 216 environmental documentation shall be halted until an amendment to the documentation is submitted and written approval is received from USAID.

Where environmental impact is unclear related to the Implementation of sub-grants, those activities cannot go forward until the ERF or ER checklist is completed and approved by USAID. The recipient will be responsible for ensuring that mitigation measures specified by the ERF or ER checklist process are implemented.

C.5.4.7 Branding and Marking Strategy

The recipient must adhere to ADS 320.3.2.1 (1/8/2007 revision), which sets out branding strategy requirements. All communication products and publications produced while implementing this program, whether for public events or for distribution, will be branded with the brand identity of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and will carry the message that assistance is provided by the American people. Such materials will also be branded with any program logo developed by the successful applicant and approved by USAID.

The level of visibility and media outreach for the program should be high. The establishment of Senegal brand recognition, in part through implementation of this branding strategy, will contribute greatly to this effort.

Branding Implementation Plan: A BIP outlines the events (press conferences, site visits, etc.) and materials (success stories, Public Service Announcements [PSAs], etc.) the recipient will organize and produce to assist USAID in delivering the message that the assistance is from the American people.

The BIP should deal with how to publicize the program, project, or activity in the host-country and a description of the communications tools to be used. Such tools may include the following: press releases, press conferences, media interviews, site visits, success stories, beneficiary testimonials, professional photography, (PSAs), videos, web-casts, e-invitations, or other e-mails sent to group lists such as participants, and training session blast e-mails or other Internet activities.

The key milestones or opportunities anticipated to generate awareness that the program, project, or activity is from the American people, or an explanation if this is not appropriate or possible. Such milestones may be linked to specific points in time, such as the beginning or end of a program, or to an opportunity to showcase publications or other materials, research findings, or program success. These include, but are not limited to, the following: launching the program, announcing research findings, publishing reports or studies, spotlighting trends, highlighting success stories, featuring beneficiaries as spokespeople, showcasing before-and-after photographs, securing endorsements from ministry or local organizations, promoting final or interim reports, and communicating program impact/overall results.

Marking Plan: As stated in ADS 320.3.2, USAID's policy is that programs, projects, activities, public communications, or commodities implemented or delivered under contracts and subcontracts exclusively funded by USAID are marked exclusively with the USAID Identity. Where applicable, a host-country symbol or ministry logo, or another U.S. Government logo may be added. Except for the manufacturer's trademark on a commercial item, the corporate identities or logos of contractors or subcontractors are not permitted on USAID-funded program materials and communications, unless specified in the USAID Graphic Standards Manual or approved in advance by the Principal Officer. The Principal Officer must obtain clearance from the Senior Advisor for Brand Management (LPA) before approving the use of the contractor's logo. The Marking Plan may include requests for exceptions to marking requirements, to be considered by the Agreement Officer.

C.5.4.8 Sustainability

A key strategy in this program is to plan for sustainability of program interventions. The Program must identify how sustainability will be addressed, how local partners will assume ownership and continue activities after the USAID's assistance has been completed.

C.5.5 Program Options

USAID/Senegal may expand the ceiling of this award through two options briefly described below. Option 1 is an expansion of up to \$10 million to accommodate a program expansion across one or more components and a small number of additional sub-grants supporting the outcomes of the program. Option 2, described in more detail below, is to support, with approximately, \$6 million, Democracy, Good Governance, and National Reconciliation in other countries where the Regional USAID/Senegal Mission is requested to provide support. One or more of the following Outcomes could be supported through the exercise of this type of Program Option:

- Outcome 1:** Greater transparency and accountability
- Outcome 2:** Strengthened decentralization
- Outcome 3:** Free and credible elections
- Outcome 4:** Enhanced National Reconciliation

USAID/Senegal is now moving towards becoming a regional mission, which will initially include responsibility for Guinea-Bissau, The Gambia, and Cape Verde. USAID/Senegal regional responsibilities may expand to other countries over time.

The types of interventions, sub-results, activities, and indicators under each Outcome would be similar to those described in Section C.5.3. A satellite office and at least one high level staff member would be required to implement this type of Option outside of Senegal. The intention would be to exercise the Options during the period of the Agreement.

Guinea Bissau Option. In the near term, the most likely opportunity is a \$6 million program in Guinea-Bissau. The US Ambassador in Senegal also is the Ambassador for Guinea-Bissau.

With its turbulent past and uncertain future, the small West African country of Guinea-Bissau is on the precipice of change, politically, economically, and socially. Much of its population of 1.5 million live in extreme poverty, with per capita GDP at \$600 and a ranking of 171 out of 177 countries in the 2008 Human Development Index. Although it has the potential for agricultural exportation as well as untapped natural resources, due to political instability, the economy of Guinea-Bissau has remained stagnant and largely depends on foreign assistance (bilateral and multilateral) and the relatively small export of cashews, fish, and peanuts. Rice is the major crop and staple food. Social sector indicators also reveal the country's long road towards development. While the adult literacy rate is about 40%, school life expectancy is only 5 years (4 years for women). Infant and maternal mortality have decreased from 173 in 1980 to 130 in 2002 but both remain unacceptably high. Life expectancy at birth is a dismal 45 years up from 35 years in the 1970s. Trafficking of children for forced begging in neighboring countries is common, and Guinea-Bissau has been placed on the Tier II Watchlist of the 2008 Trafficking in Persons Report. Longstanding conflicts have hampered social development at all levels. In addition to several coup d'états, clashes in 2006 with Senegalese separatists in the Casamance region have marked Guinea-Bissau's recent history.

Although 2009 began with the March assassination of the president, the country went on to hold presidential elections in June and a runoff election in July, both of which were deemed “free and fair” by international observers. Despite this success, Guinea-Bissau has a long road ahead toward sustained social and political development. It is among the lowest ranked countries on the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators. In Government Effectiveness, for example, which measures the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, Guinea-Bissau has been ranked in the 0-10th percentile for the past ten years. Also part of the Worldwide Governance Indicators, Control of Corruption in Guinea-Bissau has decreased from 2003 to 2008, going from 10.7 to 8.2 percentile rank. The Rule of Law ranking has also slipped to 5.7 in 2008, down from 8.8 percentile rank in 2003.

The Guinea-Bissau Option is proposed to focus on two Outcomes with the goal of promoting sustainable democratic political development and combating narcotics trafficking in this increasingly fragile state:

Outcome 1: Greater transparency and accountability

Outcome 2: Support Security Sector Reform

A complete assessment has not been conducted for Guinea Bissau. Any interventions proposed would need to complement the efforts of the United Nations, European Union, and INL supported programs in Guinea Bissau. A gap analysis is required to determine appropriate intervention areas. However, the following interventions have been identified through a rapid review of information on Guinea Bissau.

Support to Outcome 1, Greater Transparency and Accountability has been recommended. It is expected that this component will assist the Government of Guinea-Bissau in strengthening the judicial system and legislature through providing technical assistance and training to help improve its infrastructure and services to a more acceptable, sustainable condition.

Interventions could include working with the justice system to introduce new court administration and management systems to improve their effectiveness and efficiency. In support of Parliament, additional training could be provided to the National Assembly parliamentarians to help them work in a participatory manner with civil society, members of the government, and other stakeholders to revise critical policies and legal frameworks. Areas of interest for training include executive-legislative relations, policy formation and institutional development and conflict resolution. Interventions could also include public awareness campaigns and work with civil society and youth organizations to mobilize communities to advocate for improved transparency and accountability and to fight corruption and drug trafficking.

Support to Outcome 2, Security Sector Reform will involve working with the Government of Guinea-Bissau to create an effective, accountable, and civilian-controlled security sector that delivers a public service viewed as legitimate by the Bissau-Guinean population. Interventions could include providing technical assistance in public administration, criminal prosecutions, and legal frameworks. Interventions could also address the professionalization and accountability of law enforcement institutions including border security and internal defense and military forces. Interventions could also help establish the roles and mandates of the security forces, and the hierarchy of authority between them, the legislature and the executive. Lastly, interventions could also establish the principles and practices of good governance in the management of the security sector: transparency, accountability, and anti-corruption.

Both interventions would also help combat narcotics trafficking as a functioning government is critical to sustainably fighting against illegal activity.

C.5.6 Logistics

The recipient will need to locate its central office in Dakar, Senegal, but may propose satellite offices in the focus regions. The recipient shall hire the required staff and purchase equipment and supplies to furnish and operate the office(s). The recipient shall arrange for the logistic support for all long and short-term personnel under this award including travel within Senegal, international travel, accommodation, office space, communications, supplies, equipment and photocopying/printing, and so on. The Casamance peace process component will have its main office in Ziguinchor with an antenna office located in the main project office of the SGPB Program in Dakar.

C.5.7 Staffing Structure and Key Personnel

The Program is expected to maintain an office in at least Dakar and in the Casamance. Because there will be two offices, the management structure must ensure communication and coordination between them for both administrative and technical aspects. Program set-up should be as efficient and cost-effective as possible in order to devote as high a percentage of the budget as possible to programmatic activities (versus administrative/operational costs.) After the start-up phase, the recipient's operations in Senegal should be self-sufficient and able to respond directly to inquiries of various types in both French and English from both USAID and the participating Government of Senegal organizations.

Key Personnel. Key personnel can include up to five full-time and long-term professional personnel whose participation in the proposed activities is considered to be essential.

A senior staff member must also be located in the Casamance Office. This person must have extensive technical expertise in conflict resolution and peace process work. Key personnel working in Ziguinchor will be expected to work in a highly sensitive environment and be able to lead a team of experts working on the peace process. All other key personnel must have the requisite technical, management and representational skills for making significant programmatic and operational contributions in the course of program implementation. Further details concerning key personnel can be found under Section A.3 – Specific Technical Application Guidance.

Proposed long and short-term staff. Long term personnel with specialized experience in democracy, governance, transparency, elections, and conflict could be considered depending on the proposed approach. In the Casamance office, the technical experts will have skills sets in diplomacy and high-level interaction on the one hand and grassroots mobilization and working with civil society on the other hand. There is a need to mix international experts with local expertise in order to have both the outside perspective as well as the inside understanding that only Senegalese people can bring.

The preference is to have staff who can communicate at a highly proficient level in both French and English. USAID encourages the use of Senegalese nationals where possible. A supporting narrative should include brief descriptions of all long-term staff positions and level of experience and language capability required for each position. The narrative should also describe the role of short-term technical staff including the proposed level of effort and the process to be used for selecting short-term technical assistance staff and encouraging the development of emerging Senegalese firms and consultants.

C.5.8 USAID Management

The recipient shall report to the Agreement Officer's Technical Representative (AOTR), who is based in USAID/Senegal and is part of Senegal's General Development Office's Democracy and Governance Team. In terms of management requirements, the USAID AOTR will approve the annual implementation

plan, designation of key positions and technical approval of proposed candidates for key positions, approval of Performance Management Plan, and provide concurrence on the selection of sub-awardees during the Cooperative Agreement. USAID also anticipates assigning an Activity Manager who will be responsible for the Casamance and activities related to youth.

The Annual Work Plan will form the basis for a joint management review by USAID and program staff to review program directions (especially regarding potential uncertainties related to the 2012 presidential elections), achievement of the prior year work plan objectives, and major management and implementation issues, and to make recommendations for any changes as appropriate. Semi-annual management reviews will also be held to review progress. The recipient will address USAID feedback on performance and fine tune the strategies accordingly.

At any time during program implementation, USAID may conduct one or more evaluation(s) to review overall progress, assess the continuing appropriateness of the project design, and identify any factors impeding effective implementation. USAID will utilize the results of the evaluations to recommend any mid-course changes in strategy if needed and to help determine appropriate future directions. Site visits may occur anytime after the onset of the project.

C.5.9 Substantial Involvement

USAID shall be substantially involved during the implementation of this Cooperative Agreement in the following ways through the Agreement Officer's Technical Representative (AOTR):

1. Approval of monthly reports for the Component 4 and quarterly report for the other components, annual work plans, technical and financial reports and all modifications, which describe the specific activities to be carried out under the Agreement;
2. Approval of key personnel and any changes in key personnel;
3. Approval of monitoring and evaluation plans; (initial and annual)
4. Joint collaboration in review and selection of sub-awards, if any, to ensure that they fall within the Cooperative Agreement program description;
5. Coordination with other ongoing USAID programs; and
6. Annual modifications, updating/realignments

C.5.10 External Evaluations

USAID will conduct mid-term and final external evaluations to assess and substantiate performance and overall achievements under the project's objectives. The evaluation should include an analytical piece which shows the strengths and weaknesses of program design and implementation which can be used as a learning tool for similar programs. Program parameters which facilitate or hinder program success should be included. The external evaluations will be funded directly by USAID and will not be included in the funding of this Agreement.

C.5.11 Authorized Geographic Code

For the purposes of this cooperative agreement, the authorized geographic code will be 935, including motor vehicles. Purchases of motor vehicles from non-U.S. source or origin will be held to a minimum and carried out only when necessitated by required specifications, spare parts, and maintenance capabilities.

C.5.12 Reporting Requirements

The recipient will adhere to all reporting requirements listed below. All reports as required under Substantial Involvement shall be submitted by the due date. Additional reports requiring review and clearances, when necessary are listed under each requirement.

C.5.12.1 Annual Work Plan

The recipient shall submit an annual work plan to the USAID/AOTR. The work plan serves several purposes, including a guide to program implementation, a demonstration of links between activities, strategy objectives and intended results, a basis for budget estimates and the foundation for the monitoring and evaluation plan. Work plans function on the USG fiscal year (October-September). The work plan, as a minimum, should include:

- Brief situation analysis (including analysis of conflict, current events, and trends of the peace process and key stakeholders)
- Life-of-program results
- Milestones toward achieving those results
- Activities to be accomplished that year related specifically to the achievement of milestones
- Level of effort required in terms of staff time and financial resources
- Amount and intended use of counterpart contributions for that year to be provided (cash or in-kind)
- Partner involvement and contributions to achieving the results

The first annual work plan shall be submitted to the AOTR within 45 days of the award, and over the period from the award starting date through September 30, 2011. The proposed work plan should take into account activity parameters of budget and personnel constraints, and it should include realistic outline of what is possible to accomplish by the end of year 1. The work plan should include scenario planning for the Casamance component. Second year annual work plan and thereafter shall cover the USG fiscal year (i.e. from October 1, through September 30).

C.5.12.2 Monitoring and Evaluation Framework and Performance Monitoring Plan

After the agreement has been signed the recipient shall submit the draft plans within 45 calendar days after award to the USAID/Senegal AOTR. The recipient's monitoring and evaluation framework shall include a description of a proposed methodology for performing data quality assessments that ensure that data collected and reported pass the test of validity, reliability, timeliness, and integrity.

The PMP will serve as a management tool to assess and report progress toward achieving the targets of the Program. The Performance Monitoring Plan (PMP) should be aligned with Foreign Assistance Framework standard indicators and include performance measures that can be used to capture the overall expected results. The PMP will include the indicators and targets approved by USAID at the time of the award. However the full PMP will need to be expanded to include Foreign Assistance Framework standard indicators available at <http://www.state.gov/f/indicators/index.htm>. The PMP shall contain clear benchmarks and outputs for the indicators, as well as a timeframe for the results to be attained over the life of the award. Measurements should be qualitative and quantitative. Target numbers should also be included.

C.5.12.3 Quarterly and Annual Performance Reports

1. Technical quarterly reports are due one month after the end of each quarter according to the USG fiscal year. Thus, they are due on: January 31, April 30, July 31 and October 31.
2. The 4th quarter (July-September) quarterly report should include information specific to that quarter but also include a section which summarizes the year's accomplishments and challenges. This report is still due no later than on October 31 but would be welcome earlier than this date because USAID needs the information to write its own Operational Plan. In addition to the regular information (listed below), the 4th quarterly/annual report can be longer and more detailed. It should discuss the achievements of the entire year and contain a table displaying the indicators that the recipient is responsible for reporting on and the indicator values for the year, along with prior year values and future year targets. The format for the additional reporting may be provided by USAID.
3. Quarterly reports should generally be short and consist primarily of narrative text. Tables should be attached in an annex. Quarterly reports are designed for USAID management purposes and contain basic required information.
4. USAID will provide a basic outline for quarterly reports. However, the recipient should discuss the quarterly report format with the AOTR within the first quarter of this activity to come to agreement on a format.

Included in the quarterly and annual reports will be Performance Monitoring information, progress toward agreed performance targets every three (3) months, based on the Performance Monitoring Plan. This will include information on program activities undertaken in the reporting period and those planned for the following three (3) months. Reports must also include the following: (a) explanation of quantifiable output of the programs or projects, if appropriate and applicable; (b) reasons why established goals were not met, if appropriate; and (c) analysis and explanation of cost overruns or growing pipelines (recipients must immediately notify USAID of developments that have significant impact on award-supported activities). Furthermore, notification must be given immediately in the case of problems, delays or adverse conditions which materially impair the ability to meet the objectives of the award. These notifications must include a statement of the action taken or contemplated and any assistance to resolve the situation.

C.5.12.4 Monthly Performance Reports

For the Casamance component, monthly reports are required. These reports shall consist of 1 page summary of peace process current events, 1 page of analysis, 1 page of activity progress, and 1 page of any work plan adjustments.

Pertinent monthly and the annual report should include any curricula for training workshops, summary (1-2 pages within 2 weeks of the event) for each facilitated dialogue and technical assistance package. Timing for reports on sub-grants will be determined. All technical summary documents/reports for TW, FD, TA, and sub-grants will include pertinent information about the activity, including the rationale behind why it was held and with whom, expected results, and tracking of actual results. If peace talks take place, summary documents should outline the strategy, participants, and scenario planning regarding the possible dialogue paths. After each round/session of talks, a summary document will include the contents and process of the proceedings with a clear delineation as to what the Recipient's intervention consist of and its impact.

C.5.12.5 Financial Reporting

Financial reporting requirements will be in accordance with USAID’s policies and regulations. Two weeks before the end of each quarter (e.g. mid-June, mid-September, mid-December and mid-March) the Recipient shall submit accruals information to the AOTR. Financial reports must contain sufficient information on a sub-line item basis to review vouchers for approval.

C.5.12.6 Final Performance Report

The recipient shall submit no later than 90 days after the completion date of activities under this Cooperative Agreement, a final report in French and English, which includes:

- An executive summary of the recipient’s accomplishments in achieving results and conclusions about areas in need of future assistance;
- An overall description of the recipient’s activities and attainment of results during the life of the Cooperative Agreement;
- An assessment of progress made towards accomplishing the Objective and Illustrative Results;
- Significance of these activities;
- Comments and recommendations;
- A final report that describes how the recipient’s funds were used.

The final performance report shall be submitted to the AOTR, and the Agreement Officer. It is highly recommended that the final report be prepared before the end date of the Program since additional costs cannot be incurred after the program end date.

END OF SECTION C

SECTION D – CERTIFICATIONS/ASSURANCES/OTHER STATEMENTS

U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

The certifications and forms included on the links below are to be completed and submitted as part of the Cost/Business Application. Refer to instructions in Section A of the RFA.

PART I – FORMS PLEASE USE THE NEW FORM

Standard Form 424: www.grants.gov/techlib/SF424-V2.0.pdf ;

Standard Form 424A: <http://www.grants.gov/techlib/SF424A-V1.0.pdf>

Standard Form 424B: <http://www.grants.gov/techlib/SF424B.PDF>

Instructions for Standard Form 424A.



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PART II - CERTIFICATIONS AND ASSURANCES

1. CERTIFICATION REGARDING LOBBYING

The undersigned certifies, to the best of his or her knowledge and belief, that:

(1) No Federal appropriated funds have been paid or will be paid, by or on behalf of the undersigned, to any person for influencing or attempting to influence an officer or employee of any agency, a Member of Congress, an officer or employee of Congress, or an employee of a Member of Congress in connection with the awarding of any Federal contract, the making of any Federal Cooperative Agreement, the making of any Federal loan, the entering into of any cooperative agreement, and the extension, continuation, renewal, amendment or modification of any Federal contract, grant, loan, or cooperative agreement.

(2) If any funds other than Federal appropriated funds have been paid or will be paid to any person for influencing or attempting to influence an officer or employee of any agency, a Member of Congress, an officer or employee of Congress, or an employee of a Member of Congress in connection with this Federal contract, grant, loan, or cooperative agreement, the undersigned shall complete and submit Standard Form-LLL, "Disclosure of Lobbying Activities," in accordance with its instructions.

(3) The undersigned shall require that the language of this certification be included in the award documents for all subawards at all tiers (including subcontracts, subgrants, and contracts under grants, loans, and cooperative agreements) and that all subrecipients shall certify and disclose accordingly. This certification is a material representation of fact upon which reliance was placed when this transaction was made or entered into. Submission of this certification is a prerequisite for making or entering into this transaction imposed by section 1352, title 31, United States Code. Any person who fails to file the required certification shall be subject to a civil penalty of not less than \$10,000 and not more than \$100,000 for each such failure.

Statement for Loan Guarantees and Loan Insurance.

The undersigned states, to the best of his or her knowledge and belief, that: If any funds have been paid or will be paid to any person for influencing or attempting to influence an officer or employee of any agency, a Member of Congress, an officer or employee of Congress, or an employee of a Member of Congress in connection with this commitment providing for the United States to insure or guarantee a loan, the undersigned shall complete and submit Standard Form-LLL, "Disclosure Form to Report Lobbying," in accordance with its instructions. Submission of this statement is a prerequisite for making or entering into this transaction imposed by section 1352, title 31, U.S. Code. Any person who fails to file the required statement shall be subject to a civil penalty of not less than \$10,000 and not more than \$100,000 for each such failure.

2. PROHIBITION ON ASSISTANCE TO DRUG TRAFFICKERS FOR COVERED COUNTRIES AND INDIVIDUALS (ADS 206)

USAID reserves the right to terminate this Agreement, to demand a refund or take other appropriate measures if the Grantee is found to have been convicted of a narcotics offense or to have been engaged in drug trafficking as defined in 22 CFR Part 140. The undersigned shall review USAID ADS 206 to determine if any certifications are required for Key Individuals or Covered Participants.

If there are COVERED PARTICIPANTS: USAID reserves the right to terminate assistance to or take other appropriate measures with respect to, any participant approved by USAID who is found to have

been convicted of a narcotics offense or to have been engaged in drug trafficking as defined in 22 CFR Part 140.

3. CERTIFICATION REGARDING TERRORIST FINANCING IMPLEMENTING EXECUTIVE ORDER 13224

By signing and submitting this application, the prospective recipient provides the certification set out below:

1. The Recipient, to the best of its current knowledge, did not provide, within the previous ten years, and will take all reasonable steps to ensure that it does not and will not knowingly provide, material support or resources to any individual or entity that commits, attempts to commit, advocates, facilitates, or participates in terrorist acts, or has committed, attempted to commit, facilitated, or participated in terrorist acts, as that term is defined in paragraph 3.

2. The following steps may enable the Recipient to comply with its obligations under paragraph 1:

a. Before providing any material support or resources to an individual or entity, the Recipient will verify that the individual or entity does not (i) appear on the master list of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons, which list is maintained by the U.S. Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) and is available online at OFAC’s website :

<http://www.treas.gov/offices/eotffc/ofac/sdn/t11sdn.pdf>, or (ii) is not included in any supplementary information concerning prohibited individuals or entities that may be provided by USAID to the Recipient.

b. Before providing any material support or resources to an individual or entity, the Recipient also will verify that the individual or entity has not been designated by the United Nations Security (UNSC) sanctions committee established under UNSC Resolution 1267 (1999) (the “1267 Committee”) [individuals and entities linked to the Taliban, Usama bin Laden, or the Al Qaida Organization]. To determine whether there has been a published designation of an individual or entity by the 1267 Committee, the Recipient should refer to the consolidated list available online at the Committee’s website: <http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1267/1267ListEng.htm>.

c. Before providing any material support or resources to an individual or entity, the Recipient will consider all information about that individual or entity of which it is aware and all public information that is reasonably available to it or of which it should be aware.

d. The Recipient also will implement reasonable monitoring and oversight procedures to safeguard against assistance being diverted to support terrorist activity.

3. for purposes of this Certification

a. “Material support and resources” means currency or monetary instruments or financial securities, financial services, lodging, training, expert advice or assistance, safehouses, false documentation or identification, communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel, transportation, and other physical assets, except medicine or religious materials.”

b. "Terrorist act" means-

- (i) an act prohibited pursuant to one of the 12 United Nations Conventions and Protocols related to terrorism (see UN terrorism conventions Internet site: <http://untreaty.un.org/English/Terrorism.asp>); or
- (ii) an act of premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents; or
- (iii) any other act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other person not taking an active part in hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.

c. "Entity" means a partnership, association, corporation, or other organization, group or subgroup.

d. References in this Certification to the provision of material support and resources shall not be deemed to include the furnishing of USAID funds or USAID-financed commodities to the ultimate beneficiaries of USAID assistance, such as recipients of food, medical care, micro-enterprise loans, shelter, etc., unless the Recipient has reason to believe that one or more of these beneficiaries commits, attempts to commit, advocates, facilitates, or participates in terrorist acts, or has committed, attempted to commit, facilitated or participated in terrorist acts.

e. The Recipient's obligations under paragraph 1 are not applicable to the procurement of goods and/or services by the Recipient that are acquired in the ordinary course of business through contract or purchase, e.g., utilities, rents, office supplies, gasoline, etc., unless the Recipient has reason to believe that a vendor or supplier of such goods and services commits, attempts to commit, advocates, facilitates, or participates in terrorist acts, or has committed, attempted to commit, facilitated or participated in terrorist acts.

This Certification is an express term and condition of any agreement issued as a result of this application, and any violation of it shall be grounds for unilateral termination of the agreement by USAID prior to the end of its term.

Signed: _____ Date _____
 (Typed Name and Title)
 (Name of Organization)

4. CERTIFICATION OF RECIPIENT

By signing below the recipient provides certifications and assurances for (1) the Assurance of Compliance with Laws and Regulations Governing Non-Discrimination in Federally Assisted Programs, (2) the Certification Regarding Lobbying, (3) the Prohibition on Assistance to Drug Traffickers for Covered Countries and Individuals (ADS 206) and (4) the Certification Regarding Terrorist Financing Implementing Executive Order 13224 above.

RFA No. _____
 Date of Application _____
 Name of Recipient _____
 Typed Name and Title _____
 Signature _____ Date _____

5. KEY INDIVIDUAL CERTIFICATION NARCOTICS OFFENSES AND DRUG TRAFFICKING

I hereby certify that within the last ten years:

1. I have not been convicted of a violation of, or a conspiracy to violate, any law or regulation of the United States or any other country concerning narcotic or psychotropic drugs or other controlled substances.
2. I am not and have not been an illicit trafficker in any such drug or controlled substance.
3. I am not and have not been a knowing assistor, abettor, conspirator, or colluder with others in the illicit trafficking in any such drug or substance.

Signature: _____
Date: _____
Name: _____
Title/Position: _____
Organization: _____
Address: _____
Date of Birth: _____

NOTICE:

1. You are required to sign this Certification under the provisions of 22 CFR Part 140, Prohibition on Assistance to Drug Traffickers. These regulations were issued by the Department of State and require that certain key individuals of organizations must sign this Certification.
2. If you make a false Certification you are subject to U.S. criminal prosecution under 18 U.S.C. 1001.

6. PARTICIPANT CERTIFICATION NARCOTICS OFFENSES AND DRUG TRAFFICKING

1. I hereby certify that within the last ten years:

a. I have not been convicted of a violation of, or a conspiracy to violate, any law or regulation of the United States or any other country concerning narcotic or psychotropic drugs or other controlled substances.

b. I am not and have not been an illicit trafficker in any such drug or controlled substance.

c. I am not or have not been a knowing assistor, abettor, conspirator, or colluder with others in the illicit trafficking in any such drug or substance.

2. I understand that USAID may terminate my training if it is determined that I engaged in the above conduct during the last ten years or during my USAID training.

Signature: _____
Name: _____
Date: _____
Address: _____
Date of Birth: _____

NOTICE:

1. You are required to sign this Certification under the provisions of 22 CFR Part 140, Prohibition on Assistance to Drug Traffickers. These regulations were issued by the Department of State and require that certain participants must sign this Certification.

2. If you make a false Certification you are subject to U.S. criminal prosecution under 18 U.S.C.1001.

7. SURVEY ON ENSURING EQUAL OPPORTUNITY FOR APPLICANTS

All applications must include the Survey on Ensuring Equal Opportunity for Applicants as an attachment to the RFA package. This survey can be found at the following website:

<http://www.usaid.gov/forms/surveyeo.doc>

8. HOMELAND SECURITY PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE -12 (HSPD-12) (Sept. 2006)

In response to the general threat of unauthorized access to federal facilities and information systems, the President issued Homeland Security Presidential Directive-12. HSPD-12 requires all Federal agencies to use a common Personal Identity Verification (PIV) standard when identifying and issuing access rights to users of Federally-controlled facilities and/or Federal Information Systems. USAID is applying the requirements of HSPD-12 to applicable assistance awards. USAID will begin issuing HSPD-12 “smart card” IDs to applicable recipients (and recipient employees), using a phased approach. Effective October 27, 2006, USAID will begin issuing new “smart card” IDs to new recipients (and recipient employees)

requiring routine access to USAID controlled facilities and/or access to USAID's information systems. USAID will begin issuance of the new smart card IDs to existing recipients (and existing recipient employees) on October 27, 2007. (Exceptions would include those situations where an existing recipient (or recipient employee) loses or damages his/her existing ID and would need a replacement ID prior to Oct 27, 2007. In those situations, the existing recipient (or recipient employee) would need to follow the PIV processes described below, and be issued one of the new smart cards.)

Accordingly, before a recipient (including a recipient employee) may obtain a USAID ID (new or replacement) authorizing him/her routine access to USAID facilities, or logical access to USAID's information systems, the individual must provide two forms of identity source documents in original form and a passport size photo. One identity source document must be a valid Federal or state government-issued picture ID. (Overseas foreign nationals must comply with the requirements of the Regional Security Office.) USAID/W recipients (and recipient employee) must contact the USAID Security Office to obtain the list of acceptable forms of documentation, and recipients working in overseas Missions must obtain the acceptable documentation list from the Regional Security Officer. Submission of these documents, and related background checks, are mandatory in order for the recipient (or employee) to receive a building access ID, and before access will be granted to any of USAID's information systems. All recipients (or employees) must physically present these two source documents for identity proofing at their USAID/W or Mission Security Briefing. The recipient (or employee) must return any issued building access ID and remote authentication token to USAID custody upon termination of the individual's employment with the recipient or completion of the award, whichever occurs first.

The recipient must comply with all applicable HSPD-12 and PIV procedures, as described above, as well as any subsequent USAID or government-wide HSPD-12 and PIV procedures/policies, including any subsequent applicable USAID General Notices, Office of Security Directives and/or Automated Directives System (ADS) policy directives and required procedures. This includes HSPD-12 procedures established in USAID/Washington and those procedures established by the overseas Regional Security Office. In the event of inconsistencies between this clause and later issued Agency or government-wide HSPD-12 guidance, the most recent issued guidance should take precedence, unless otherwise instructed by the Agreement Officer.

The recipient is required to include this clause in any subawards (including subcontracts) that require the subawardee or subawardee employee to have routine physical access to USAID space or logical access to USAID's information systems.

PART III – OTHER STATEMENTS OF RECIPIENT

1. AUTHORIZED INDIVIDUALS

The recipient represents that the following persons are authorized to negotiate on its behalf with the Government and to bind the recipient in connection with this application or grant:

Name: _____
Title: _____
Telephone No. _____

2. TAXPAYER IDENTIFICATION NUMBER (TIN)

If the recipient is a U.S. organization, or a foreign organization which has income effectively connected with the conduct of activities in the U.S. or has an office or a place of business or a fiscal paying agent in the U.S., please indicate the recipient's TIN:

TIN: _____

3. DATA UNIVERSAL NUMBERING SYSTEM (DUNS) NUMBER

(a) In the space provided at the end of this provision, the recipient should supply the Data Universal Numbering System (DUNS) number applicable to that name and address. Recipients should take care to report the number that identifies the recipient's name and address exactly as stated in the proposal.

(b) The DUNS is a 9-digit number assigned by Dun and Bradstreet Information Services. If the recipient does not have a DUNS number, the recipient should call Dun and Bradstreet directly at 1-800-333-0505. A DUNS number will be provided immediately by telephone at no charge to the recipient.

The recipient should be prepared to provide the following information:

- (1) Recipient's name.
- (2) Recipient's address.
- (3) Recipient's telephone number.
- (4) Line of business.
- (5) Chief executive officer/key manager.
- (6) Date the organization was started.
- (7) Number of people employed by the recipient.
- (8) Company affiliation.

(c) Recipients located outside the United States may obtain the location and phone number of the local Dun and Bradstreet Information Services office from the Internet Home Page at <http://www.dbisna.com/dbis/customer/custlist.htm>. If an offeror is unable to locate a local service center, it may send an e-mail to Dun and Bradstreet at globalinfo@dbisma.com.

The DUNS system is distinct from the Federal Taxpayer Identification Number (TIN) system.

DUNS: _____

4. LETTER OF CREDIT (LOC) NUMBER

If the recipient has an existing Letter of Credit (LOC) with USAID, please indicate the LOC number:

LOC: _____

5. PROCUREMENT INFORMATION

(a) Applicability. This applies to the procurement of goods and services planned by the recipient (i.e., contracts, purchase orders, etc.) from a supplier of goods or services for the direct use or benefit of the recipient in conducting the program supported by the grant, and not to assistance provided by the recipient (i.e., a sub-grant or subagreement) to a sub-grantee or subrecipient in support of the subgrantee's or subrecipient's program. Provision by the recipient of the requested information does not, in and of itself, constitute USAID approval.

(b) Amount of Procurement. Please indicate the total estimated dollar amount of goods and services which the recipient plans to purchase under the grant: \$ _____

(c) Nonexpendable Property. If the recipient plans to purchase nonexpendable equipment which would require the approval of the Agreement Officer, please indicate below (using a continuation page, as necessary) the types, quantities of each, and estimated unit costs. Nonexpendable equipment for which the Agreement Officer's approval to purchase is required is any article of nonexpendable tangible personal property charged directly to the grant, having a useful life of more than one year and an acquisition cost of \$5,000 or more per unit.

TYPE/ DESCRIPTION (Generic)	QUANTITY	ESTIMATED UNIT COST
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(d) Source, Origin, and Component of Goods. If the recipient plans to purchase any goods/commodities which are not of U.S. source and/or U.S. origin, and/or does not contain at least 50% component, which are not at least 50% U.S. source and origin, please indicate below (using a continuation page, as necessary) the types and quantities of each, estimated unit costs of each, and probable source and/or origin, to include the probable source and/or origin of the components if less than 50% U.S. components will be contained in the commodity. "Source" means the country from which a commodity is shipped to the cooperating country or the cooperating country itself if the commodity is located therein at the time of purchase.

However, where a commodity is shipped from a free port or bonded warehouse in the form in which received therein, "source" means the country from which the commodity was shipped to the free port or bonded warehouse. Any commodity whose source is a non-Free World country is ineligible for USAID financing. The "origin" of a commodity is the country or area in which a commodity is mined, grown, or produced.

A commodity is produced when, through manufacturing, processing, or substantial and major assembling of components, commercially recognized new commodity results, which is substantially different in basic characteristics or in purpose or utility from its components. Merely packaging various items together for a particular procurement or relabeling items do not constitute production of a commodity. Any commodity whose origin is a non-Free World country is ineligible for USAID financing. "Components" are the goods, which go directly into the production of a produced commodity. Any component from a non-Free World country makes the commodity ineligible for USAID financing.

TYPE/DESCRIPTION PROBABLE (Generic)	QUANTITY UNIT COST	ESTIMATED COMPONENTS SOURCE	GOODS COMPONENTS ORIGIN	PROBABLE GOODS COMPONENTS ORIGIN
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(e) Restricted Goods. If the recipient plans to purchase any restricted goods, please indicate below (using a continuation page, as necessary) the types and quantities of each, estimated unit costs of each, intended use, and probable source and/or origin. Restricted goods are Agricultural Commodities, Motor Vehicles, Pharmaceuticals, Pesticides, Rubber Compounding Chemicals and Plasticizers, Used Equipment, U.S. Government-Owned Excess Property, and Fertilizer.

TYPE/DESCRIPTION (Generic)	QUANTITY UNIT COST	ESTIMATED SOURCE	PROBABLE ORIGIN	INTENDED USE
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(f) Supplier Nationality. If the recipient plans to purchase any goods or services from suppliers of goods and services whose nationality is not in the U.S., please indicate below (using a continuation page, as necessary) the types and quantities of each good or service, estimated costs of each, probable nationality of each non-U.S. supplier of each good or service, and the rationale for purchasing from a non-U.S. supplier. Any supplier whose nationality is a non-Free World country is ineligible for USAID financing.

TYPE/DESCRIPTION NATIONALITY RATIONALE	QUANTITY UNIT COST	ESTIMATED (Non-US Only)	PROBABLE SUPPLIER for NON-US
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(Generic)

(g) Proposed Disposition. If the recipient plans to purchase any nonexpendable equipment with a unit acquisition cost of \$5,000 or more, please indicate below (using a continuation page, as necessary) the proposed disposition of each such item.

Generally, the recipient may either retain the property for other uses and make compensation to USAID (computed by applying the percentage of federal participation in the cost of the original program to the current fair market value of the property), or sell the property and reimburse USAID an amount computed by applying to the sales proceeds the percentage of federal participation in the cost of the original program (except that the recipient may deduct from the federal share \$500 or 10% of the proceeds, whichever is greater, for selling and handling expenses), or donate the property to a host country institution, or otherwise dispose of the property as instructed by USAID.

TYPE/DESCRIPTION (Generic)	QUANTITY	ESTIMATED UNIT COST	PROPOSED DISPOSITION
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6. TYPE OF ORGANIZATION

The recipient, by checking the applicable box, represents that -

(a) If the recipient is a U.S. entity, it operates as a corporation incorporated under the laws of the State of, an individual, a partnership, a nongovernmental nonprofit organization, a state or local governmental organization, a private college or university, a public college or university, an international organization, or a joint venture; or

(b) If the recipient is a non-U.S. entity, it operates as a corporation organized under the laws of _____ (country), an individual, a partnership, a nongovernmental nonprofit organization, a nongovernmental educational institution, a governmental organization, an international organization, or a joint venture.

7. TYPE OF ORGANIZATION

The recipient, by checking the applicable box, represents that -

(a) If the recipient is a U.S. entity, it operates as a corporation incorporated under the laws of the State of, an individual, a partnership, a nongovernmental nonprofit organization, a state or local governmental organization, a private college or university, a public college or university, an international organization, or a joint venture; or

(b) If the recipient is a non-U.S. entity, it operates as a corporation organized under the laws of _____ (country), an individual, a partnership, a nongovernmental nonprofit organization, a nongovernmental educational institution, a governmental organization, an international organization, or a joint venture.

8. ESTIMATED COSTS OF COMMUNICATIONS PRODUCTS

The following are the estimate(s) of the cost of each separate communications product (i.e., any printed material [other than non-color photocopy material], photographic services, or video production services) which is anticipated under the grant. Each estimate must include all the costs associated with preparation and execution of the product. Use a continuation page as necessary.

SECTION E - ANNEXES

ANNEX 1 – POLITICAL CONTEXT OF SENEGAL

In DG, Senegal has enjoyed a reputation for being a model of democracy and political stability. Unlike many African countries, Senegal has had a long tradition of democratic institutions dating back to the nineteenth century. The 2008 Afro-barometer Senegal reading, which gauges popular attitudes toward democracy, indicates that overall demand for democracy is high. Senegal is one of the few African states that has never suffered a political coup.

Senegal's 2001 **constitution** lays down the basic rules of law governing Senegal's political system and defines the powers of the respective branches of government and the relationships between the different branches. The Executive, headed by an elected president is chief of state and commander in chief of the armed forces. **The Legislative Branch** consists of a bicameral Parliament with a 150 member National Assembly and a 100 member Senate, 65 appointed by the president and 35 elected by about 12,000 deputies and local councilors. **The Judicial Branch** contains the Constitutional Council (members are appointed by the President from senior magistrates and eminent academics and attorneys, the Court of Final Appeals and a Council of State). The constitution provides for extensive human and civil rights and freedoms. Between 2000 and 2008 there have been constitutional amendments approximately one every six months. The 2001 constitutional referendum reinforced and expanded presidential powers and increased presidential authority over much of the political, legal and institutional apparatus of government.

Current government operations and decisions in Senegal are highly centralized, with many key decisions made by the executive and decreed by the office of the presidency. The **chief of state**, President Abdoulaye Wade, has been in office since April 1, 2000. Prime Minister Souleyemane Ndene Ndiaye is the head of the government. He has held the post since May 1, 2009. The last presidential election which was held on February 25, 2007 was deemed to be free and fair. President Wade was re-elected with 55.9% of the vote.

The **legal and institutional arrangements** in Senegal reveal that many good laws and institutions are in place to fight corruption. For instance supporting good governance, the law in Senegal provides for criminal penalties for official corruption, and Senegal has ratified the UN Convention Against Corruption. Following the 2000 elections, the GOS passed a number of very useful laws and created new agencies and national institutions to promote good governance and combat corruption such as the the National Program for Good Governance – PNBG (*Programme Nationale Pour la Bonne Gouvernance*) and the Commission Against Non-Transparency and Corruption – CNLCC (*Commission Nationale De Lutte Contre la Non-Transparence la Corruption et la Concussion*). Legal reforms such as the 2007 *Code de Passation des Marchés Publiques* have recently been passed to improve the public procurement process to engage in meaningful anti-corruption reform. The GOS also established independent internal auditing processes through the General State Inspectorate (IGE) and the *Cours des Comptes*.

The constitution and the 1992 Electoral Act provide the legislative framework for **elections** in Senegal and lay down how they should be organized and who should organize them. This covers issues from the delineation of electoral district boundaries and the registration of voters to the actual running and supervision of elections. Three electoral bodies have been created since 1998; the General Directorate of Elections (DGE), under the Ministry of the Interior, the National Elections Observatory – ONEL (*Observatoire Nationale pour Les Elections*), and a newer body, the Autonomous National Election Commission (CENA) created by law in May, 2005 with broader powers than its predecessor the ONEL. The CENA's budget is voted for by the Parliament and has direct responsibility for control and supervision of the registration and electoral processes.

In 2006, the GOS launched a new process of registration for both population and electoral purposes which involved issuing biometric cards to some 3 million Senegalese citizens. Both the voter registration system and the voter cards have been a point of contention by opposition political parties in recent elections, some claiming that multiple registration cards have been issued, leading to multiple voting and thus concern that voting results might have been skewed. In spite of these concerns, the 2007 national elections were considered to be free and fair by participants and observers.

Senegal's principal **political party** was for 40 years the Socialist Party (PS). Its domination of political life came to an end in March 2000, when Abdoulaye Wade, the leader of the Senegalese Democratic Party (PDS) and leader of the opposition for more than 25 years, won the presidency. Twice-postponed parliamentary elections took place on June 3, 2007, but most of the major opposition parties boycotted them, allowing the ruling Senegalese Democratic party (PDS) and its allies to capture 131 of the 150 seats in the National Assembly. In the March 22, 2009 local elections, the opposition and their coalition partners made substantial gains. While there were an estimated 73 registered political parties in June 2009, there are probably only 15 along with their coalition partners that are viable contenders for the upcoming 2012 presidential and legislative elections.

The 1996 **decentralization** code transferred considerable formal powers and authority to regional and local government units to manage and deliver public services. There are currently 14 regions, 153 urban areas (*communes*) and 377 rural communities (*communauté rurales*). In addition to decentralized delineations, there are territorial (deconcentré delineations with 45 departments and 120 *arrondissements* which fit within the regional landscape. *Gouverneurs, préfets, and sous-préfets*, who are appointed officials, serve as representatives of the central government. Locally elected officials at the level of the *régions, communes* and *communautés rurales*, represent the local population. Nine areas of responsibility were transferred to the local governments: local government planning, land management, land administration, urban planning and housing, health, education, environment and natural resource management, youth and sports, and culture. The 1996 reform also established a decentralization fund (*Fonds de Dotation à la Décentralisation, FDD*), which was to transfer funds to local communities to carry out these nine responsibilities. The GOS supports decentralization through the *Ministère des Collectivités Local et de la Décentralisation* although this has changed with successive government shuffles. The GOS has an umbrella program, the *Program National de Développement Local (PNDL)* which acts as executive secretary of the national committee overseeing decentralization efforts by prioritizing and executing support for the development of local government. The PNDL also provides direct financial support to local governments.

Since the 1996 decentralization reforms, "**civil society and community organization**" groups at the grassroots level have been taking a more active interest in local government, participating more in monitoring local government activities, and providing candidates for public office. Human rights groups and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) operate with relative freedom in Senegal. Senegal has hundreds of community and village grassroots organizations, voluntary associations, national urban-based civil society and private sector organizations which operate in all sectors of society (see Annex 1 for more detailed information on Civil Society in Senegal). Academic freedom is also legally guaranteed and respected in practice.

Freedom of expression is generally respected, although there is a lot of self-censorship. Senegal has seen the growth of a dynamic and independent **media** since the late 1980s. Independent daily newspapers such as *Sud Quotidien, Wal Fadjri* and *Le Quotidien* are increasingly becoming watchdogs of democracy by reporting on a wide range of government actions. The press is becoming more professional, its contents more diversified, and journalists better skilled and organized to undertake investigative reporting. One of the weaknesses of the national press is the lack of coverage of non-political news taking place outside of

the capital. In spite of relative freedom of the press, there are increasing incidents where citizens or press organizations are summoned before the GOS for questioning due to public comments which are not appreciated by the GOS while senior management of media organizations tend not to publish/broadcast sensitive information for fear of a government backlash .

Religious freedom is respected. **Religious authorities** such as the leaders of Senegal’s Sufi Brotherhoods and the Catholic Church--have provided for a religious- based “civil society” by encouraging their followers to be both good Muslims or Catholics and good citizens, defending citizen interests, presenting societal concerns in the face of state actions, and contributing to the maintenance of political and social peace and stability. Senegalese religious authorities are also increasingly becoming involved in public issues and sometimes politics. While the highest religious leaders tend to take a neutral stance in public towards politics, some *marabouts* are becoming more directly involved as well as involving their followers. The Association of Imams has been active in a variety of issues concerning health, education, youth, etc. The Catholic Church has strongly supported transparency and fair elections and exhorted their members to exercise their rights as citizens. Muslim and Catholic religious leaders have also strived to promote peace in the Casamance.

Senegal’s **military** is highly regarded in the region and is considered to be very well trained and highly disciplined. They participate in peace-keeping efforts around the world.

ANNEX 2 – HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL CONTEXT OF THE CASAMANCE CONFLICT

Historical Context. The Casamance conflict began in 1982 via a peaceful protest march in Ziguinchor that ignited a GOS backlash against suspected Mouvement des Forces Democratiques de la Casamance (MFDC) members and supporters. The MFDC was originally created in 1947 as a political organization without secessionist goals and was “resurrected” in its current form in the early 1980s with goals for an independent Casamance region. A second more vigorous protest in March 1983 led to government forces opening fire and the death of protesters. Thereafter, armed combat between the MFDC and the GOS broke out in the early 1990s and reached its peak by the late 1990s. There were several rounds of peace talks in the Gambia and in Guinea Bissau during the decade, but all of them were unsuccessful for a variety of reasons.

In 1998, then President Diouf started what appeared to be a promising initiative which engendered dialogue while including civil society and local leaders/elders. When President Wade came to power in 2000, he changed the approach, cleared the slate of everyone working on the issue and selected a few new individuals to manage the problem. By 2002 the Senegalese Armed Forces (*Forces Armées Sénégalaises*-FAS) had clearly adopted a different military strategy, and fighting between the GOS and the MFDC decreased. At the same time, public dialogue about the conflict gradually took root in the Casamance as people’s fears of talking openly about the conflict slowly diminished. By 2004, the phrase most often used to describe the conflict was “a state of no peace no war” (“*ni paix ni guerre*”).

In December 2004, Abbe Diamacoune invited President Wade to come to Ziguinchor to sign a peace accord. Although the MFDC had long since fractionalized into multiple political and military wings, Abbe Diamacoune was the acknowledged leader of the MFDC. However, he only controlled one military faction. Similar to a cease fire agreement, the peace accord which was signed called for further dialogue and led to what is usually referred to as Foundiougne I in January 2005. Unfortunately, with neither preparation nor a joint agenda, Foundiougne I resulted in little more than a display of folk lore, and resumption of dialogue has not taken place since then.

From 2004 to mid-2009, the state of “no peace no war” continued with long periods of calm interspersed with sporadic, limited violence, including an attack on one MFDC faction by the Guinea Bissau army in collaboration with the two other MFDC military factions in 2006, MFDC in-fighting, and fighting between the MFDC and the GOS during a demining effort involving the Moroccan army in 2007. In addition, there were several large FAS sweeps (2007, 2008, and 2009) to reduce the production of marijuana (a source of income for the MFDC), to stop illegal immigration, to prevent drug trafficking (cocaine) from Guinea Bissau, and to reduce insecurity arising from incidents of armed banditry. There have also been attacks on civilians (alleged MFDC members) including two high profile assassinations and one highly unusual incident that led to 16 villagers getting their ear cut off for supposedly trespassing on prohibited territory.

Current Context. The current GOS’s strategy is perceived by many Senegalese stakeholders to be a mixture of tactics³. The **GOS** has approached the MFDC faction by faction via many ad hoc intermediaries bringing financial incentives to end the conflict; in the military arena, the FAS has maintained defensive positions currently alongside a civilian campaign to win the hearts and minds of the local population; and the GOS has also funded development projects to serve as a response to conflict causes as well as a catalyst to ending the conflict. Many Casamançais posit that there is an assumption that the MFDC will simply waste away and the conflict will take care of itself (“*pourrissement*”). Casamançais people in general (including the MFDC) state that the GOS strategy has caused more conflict than it has resolved, and *pourrissement* will not work, notwithstanding that more positive

³ See article X, Y & Z

gestures of assistance by the GOS towards the civilian population are applauded and that the local population has a less and less favorable view of the MFDC and their violent tactics.

The **MFDC** remains fractionalized, and since the death of Abbe Diamacoune in 2007, lacks any discernible leadership and suffers internal disaccord. Hostilities and sporadic fighting between the three armed factions does happen. There have been several recent calls for a large inter-MFDC meeting in order to address internal problems. Several MFDC leaders both civilian and military have stated their desire to go to the negotiating table. It appears that many armed rebels are exhausted and want out; they want the possibility of a family, a home, and the economic means to support themselves. At the same time, there are a multitude of interests wanting to continue the conflict for ideological, political or economic reasons. And, there are individuals who wish to take credit for bringing peace and to do so may sabotage the efforts of others. Although there is a clear tendency within the MFDC towards negotiations, a group of dissidents, which some posit are the younger generation of rebels, have stated that they want to negotiate or return to fighting and are currently agitating for action. This group is apparently responsible for the current outbreak of violence.

Civil society has played important and changing roles in the search for peace. Local entities have organized communities to better deal with the trauma and problems which conflict brings, and these organizations have also mobilized people to speak out for peace even when it was risky to do so. Civil society, either as individuals or groups has been involved in the political process to end the conflict in a variety of ways, some positive and some negative. Civil society has helped to build consensus, facilitate dialogue, pressure MFDC and GOS decision makers to take action, and to serve as intermediaries.

The **local population** has unequivocally said they want peace; people want an end to the fighting and a complete return to a normal life. It is the civilian population that has most suffered: loss of life, property and access to the land, living in a constant state of fear, limited freedom of movement, displacement, increased poverty, etc. Certain villages today continue to endure theft of their livestock, expropriation of their cashew orchards, and armed robbery of their small village enterprises. Although the population at one time largely supported the MFDC in its armed rebellion, this is no longer true. There is a lot of popular support for an end to the conflict through a negotiated dialogue between the GOS and a coalition composed of the MFDC and civil society.

Recent Developments. Since July 2009, there has been a marked **increase in violence** between the MFDC and the GOS and armed robbery of civilians. Recent fighting between the MFDC on GOS military has included ambushes and heavy artillery bombardment, both of which are signs of reengagement in a civil war. These recent clashes have created a rise in overall levels of fear for the civilian population as well as displaced populations. Curfews have been reinstated limiting travel on main roads after dark. The general level of insecurity has increased, and many people are anxiously watching the situation to see how it evolves. It is highly possible that a spiral of violence will ensue.

Recently, there have been a few positive signs at high levels within the GOS that they might change those components of their strategy which have not yielded the expected peace dividends. At the same time, the MFDC demand for negotiations is louder than ever. The increase in violence in the Casamance over the past three months has reignited debate about the need to resolve the conflict.

ANNEX 3 - ANALYTIC DATA AND SENEGAL GOVERNANCE DATA TABLES

Relevant to the overall health of the DG sector in Senegal are nine high level indicators: seven Ruling Justly MCC indicators, one additional World Bank Institute (WBI) indicator on Political Stability, and Transparency International (TI) Corruption Perception surveys:

Indicators 1 and 2: Freedom House Indices

- Political Rights (MCC)
- Civil Liberties (MCC)

Indicators 3 to 8: WBI

- Control of Corruption (MCC)
- Government Effectiveness (MCC)
- Rule of Law (MCC)
- Voice and Accountability (MCC)
- Political Stability (WBI)

Indicator 9: Transparency International (TI)

- Corruption Perception surveys (TI)


Freedom House ranks Senegal 109 of 195 in its 2009 Freedom of the Press survey. Senegal's civil liberties score remained at 3. The Freedom House report indicated that Senegalese citizens continue to accept democratic norms such as tolerance of political opposition, freedom of the press and association, citizen participation in decision-making and rule of law but characterized the press as "partly free". However, the political rights ratings declined from 2 to 3 from 2008 to 2009, and Senegal's overall classification was modified from Free to Partly Free

(<http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=22&country=7697&year=2009>).


The WBI's Worldwide Governance Indicators cover 1996 to 2008. Their collection involved consulting 35 different sources of data in 1998 and obtaining the views of private sector, citizen, and expert survey respondents as well as consulting survey institutes, think tanks, NGOs, and international organizations. The graphs which are shown below demonstrate the trends in Senegal for five indicators. In 2008, Senegal improved their percentile rankings for all of the indicators except voice and accountability. However, there is a downward trend line since 2005 with decreases in percentiles noted in parentheses for each of the indicators in order of significance: Control of Corruption (-12.9), Voice and Accountability (-10.9), Rule of Law (-2.2), Government Effectiveness (-0.9), and Political Stability (-0.7).

Senegal has been part of Transparency International's (TI's) annual assessment of the state of corruption around the world since 2005. This year Senegal's Corruption Perception Index overall ranking, slipped from 85 to 99 of 180 countries included in the survey. The survey questioned: "To what extent do you perceive the following sectors in this country/territory to be affected by corruption?" (1: not at all corrupt, 5: extremely corrupt). Senegal's average score across all sectors increased from 2.75 in 2005 to 3.6 in 2009.


In one TI survey that asked: "Which of these six sectors/organizations would you consider to be the most affected by corruption?" the judiciary and public officials both received 27 percent and political parties received 23 percent of the vote in Senegal. In another survey, 39 percent reported that someone in their household had paid a bribe in the last year. This number is the third lowest among the eight Sub-Saharan African countries surveyed. However, Senegal had the highest percentage (72 percent) among the same eight countries believing that the government was ineffective in the fight against corruption. While in 2006, only 28 percent considered the government to be ineffective. The Tables below also include data related to the TI data.




**Source: World Bank, Worldwide Governance Indicators*




**Source: World Bank, Worldwide Governance Indicators*




**Source: World Bank, Worldwide Governance Indicators*



**Source: World Bank, Worldwide Governance Indicators*



**Source: World Bank, Worldwide Governance Indicators*



**Source: Transparency International, 2006-2009*

ANNEX 4 – CONSTRAINTS IN THE KEY SECTORS OF THIS PROGRAM

Transparency and Good Governance Practices

The need for greater transparency and accountability in government is one of the most pressing development challenges facing Senegal. As described in Section 2.3 the DG measures related to Transparency and Good Governance practices, Government Effectiveness, Control of Corruption and Rule of Law improved in 2008 but do not yet demonstrate a sustained positive trend. And the data from TI is showing a negative trend. Before recently amending and implementing new procurement procedures, Senegal was issuing more government award by single tender than the 16 percent recommended by the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

USAID commissioned a comprehensive Senegal Corruption Assessment in 2007 which although never formally released by USAID is available on the internet. The report indicated that chronic corruption plagues the country in every-day life with “petty corruption” and in large financial transactions or “grand corruption”. The report, though now dated, includes Tables that note deficiencies in The Legal Framework for Anticorruption, Institutional Framework, and Anticorruption Institutions and Programs. The Assessment also provided an analysis of constraints in the justice, health, education, local government, natural resource management, private sector, and civil and political spheres.

In other words, corruption is encouraged by the lack of sufficient management and supervision, internal and external audits, and checks and balances. Many audits and/or inquiries to track performance and procedural adherence are not being published and hence lose a large part of their potential impact to improve governance.

Related to checks and balances, the justice sector and legislative branch are typically expected to provide checks and balances to the power of the executive. In the Justice Sector, the March 2006 African Development Bank (ADB) Country Governance Profile Report identified many constraints in the judiciary; namely (1) civil procedure law which enables litigants and their counsel to use delaying tactics, especially through the use of the remand procedure resulting in simple cases dragging on for years, which increases the costs of access to justice; (2) insufficient number of judges; (3) obsolete judicial infrastructure and poor data processing system for processing rulings and decisions; (4) inadequate computerization of court registries; (5) inadequate computerization of court registries; (6) and handful of judges who are no considered to be addressing corruption which seriously undermines the reputation of the judiciary.

The Parliament/National Assembly contains an overwhelming majority of members from the President’s PDS party and does not provide significant controls and balances to the executive power at this time. Nevertheless, the capacity building needs of Parliament are important for a well functioning legislative apparatus of government. According to the Africa Development Bank’s (ADB) March 2006 Country Governance Profile Report, Senegal is trying to consolidate the separation and independence of the separate arms of government and has identified a number of “needs” to sustain the capacities of Parliament. These include: (1) building the capacity of Parliament and parliamentary support services; (2) strengthening the analytic capacity of members of Parliament and officials of the National Assembly; (3) strengthening the communication capacities of Parliament; and (4) improving the working conditions of members of Parliament.

Related to laws or institutions without sufficient power, the IGE and *Cours des Comptes* have not been as effective as hoped. They need further capacity and institutional support in addition to greater independence from the executive branch.

The Freedom House 2008 Country Report for Senegal indicated that: “The National Commission to Fight Non-Transparency, Corruption and Government Fraud had no authority to investigate or prosecute. It remained inefficient in fighting corruption, and no government officials were prosecuted for the crime of corruption”. In addition, national NGOs have not succeeded in mobilizing people at the grassroots level to participate in anti-corruption campaigns and activities.

Decentralization

The data on Government Effectiveness and the Control of Corruption, which are influenced by the success of Decentralization, was described above in Section C.2.3.

The 1996 delegation of functions by the central government to decentralized and de-concentrated entities has not been accompanied by a sufficient reallocation of financial and human resources to permit local government to fulfill their new roles. The Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper II highlighted weaknesses in the GOS decentralization effort: (1) a serious shortage of resources available to local bodies to cope with the demands and competencies transferred to them; (2) support organizations that do not function; (3) poor understanding of the meaning of decentralization; and (4) government delays in making Local Government Investment Funds (FECLs) and Decentralization Funds (FDDs) available to local government.

There are several specific technical challenges for improved fiscal decentralization which are related to regulations/procedures, and from a systems point of view, related to the harmonization of multiple GOS ministries/agencies at national, regional, and local levels. For example, the investment budget (BCI) was recently decentralized, but the actual utilization rate of these funds by local communities was extremely low. There is also the need for harmonization of legal texts housed in different ministries vis-à-vis decentralization. Although current public finance reform efforts underway (using computerized data management systems [SIGFIB], planning tools [CDMST], etc.) will ultimately improve fiscal decentralization, there are still specific issues to be addressed in order to link these efforts to the decentralization process.

Although the delivery of the FDD and FECL represents progress in the decentralization process, the delay and inconsistencies of fund delivery poses a serious challenge to local governments. In addition to improving fiscal transfers, it might be auspicious to look at the legal texts and procedures for increasing revenues at the local level.

In a more broad sense, working relationships remain inefficient between the central government and local government representatives in many sectors, and the capacity is weak for planning and budget management. Fiscal accountability at the local level is poor. For instance, expenditure-tracking surveys find that resources transferred from the center may not always be spent on the intended objectives (e.g. health or education) or as budgeted. There is no tracking system to ensure accounts match and that funds are not re-allocated.

Although fiscal decentralization is the largest source of revenues for local government, there are other sources. Local governments can collect local taxes as a source of revenue for their programs and operations. However, financial management by local governments is often not transparent, and many citizens still do not understand or respect the role of local government which in turn hampers local revenue collection efforts. Because budget transfers from the central to the local government are insufficient to meet the requirements of local development plans, local revenue generation schemes are needed to support service delivery in key sectors such as education, health and natural resource management. Further complicating financial management, at the local level there are other actors (CBOs,

NGOs, donors, etc.) operating as parallel structures to provide needed services instead of seeking to effectively collaborate with local government officials.

Elections and Political Processes

The DG measure, related to Elections and Political Processes, is the Freedom House indicator on Political Rights and the WBI indicator on Voice and Accountability. Voice and Accountability is the only WBI indicator that did not show any improvement in 2008 and is at its lowest level since the World Bank began collecting this data in 1996 (see Annex 2).

The political scene in the next two years will be dominated by rivalries over who will be the next president in the 2012 elections. Already Senegalese are raising concerns about the independence and neutrality of the current electoral system. Some of the main concerns are over the validity of the voter registration lists and the process of registering new voters, particularly immigrants and the Diaspora, as well as the currently high number of undelivered voter registration cards. In addition, the President appointed all 12 members of the Independent Electoral Commission – CENA (*Commission Electorale Nationale Autonome*) in early June 2009, bringing into question the independence of the Commission. There is also strong concern over the possibility of biased influence which the Ministry of the Interior could have on the election process. The Ministry's Directorate of Elections is the permanent structure within the Ministry, answerable to the Minister, which manages the organization of all elections and referenda, manages voter registration and electoral events, and carries out training and civic education.

Political parties are problematic. As per the TI data, political parties are seen by 23 percent of the population to be the most affected by corruption. While some parties do not represent any true constituent base, most all political parties lack democratic internal procedures and are lead by autocratic but charismatic leaders. Although parties have platforms (socialist, liberalist, etc.), it is questionable to what extent these platforms are connected to the needs of everyday people. Politicians and political parties have a general reputation in Senegal of being a small group of elites who put their own needs first. Coalitions of parties are haphazardly put together before an election and unravel during or shortly thereafter. Capacity of political parties is weak as they appear to fragment easily and react to current events rather than carry out long-term strategic plans. Promotion of party leadership to ensure credible and peaceful electoral processes is also weak. Political parties in general do not implement voter-oriented campaigns that provide for open and transparent political competition.

Casamance Peace Process

In a broad sense, the obstacles to peace are divisions within the MFDC, ineffective GOS management of the peace process, and a disorganized civil society, all of which are underpinned by a deep mistrust between the Casamance population, the MFDC, and the GOS.

The following is an in-depth look at some of the key obstacles:

- Resumption in fighting and the resulting deaths of military and civilian population are creating an atmosphere of fear and more mistrust in the region thereby paralyzing efforts to take positive steps to resolve the conflict.
- There is not one representative with whom to negotiate within the MFDC as the rebel movement suffers from competing interests, fractionalization and a lack of leadership.
- The MFDC continues to inflict suffering on the local population hindering effort to continue dialogue and encouraging continued military responses.
- GOS intermediaries and competing interests have created additional mistrust and dissension between and within all parties and have not moved the peace process significantly forward since 2004.

- Although a majority of the population does not support armed conflict, there is still a strong sentiment of having suffered and continuing to suffer at the hands of “outsiders” usually referring to Northerners. Because the rebels are part of somebody’s family and community, there is hesitation to condemn them, although in some cases villagers are simply afraid to speak out. The cycle of violence also feeds the conflict: people who endured the injury or death of a family member or who lost their homes at the hands of government forces want retribution or an apology before they will work to end the conflict.
- The core grievances that started the conflict still exist. Although the Casamance region has received a relatively high amount of investment in comparison to other regions (except Dakar) by the GOS, the perception of discrimination and neglect continue to stem from a deep-seated mistrust and lack of confidence in the national administration. Local infrastructure and social services (for example, the hospital in Ziguinchor, the Ziguinchor university and the bridge in Kolda) still lag behind services offered in Dakar. The tourism and agriculture sectors continue to lack investment. Recent decisions by the GOS in the latest ministerial reshuffle, to dismiss the only two ministers from the region and to divide the Casamance from two into three regions, were not well-received in the Casamance.
- High unemployment among the relatively well educated youth in the Casamance create high levels of frustration, and there are clear cleavages for some youth between themselves and “*les nordistes*.”
- Civil society leaders have been ineffective in carrying out an advocacy role and a facilitation role because the actors, such as local and national NGOs/groups, traditional leaders, local and national politicians, etc., are not a homogeneous group and are plagued with difficulties in coordination and unhealthy competition. There is a lot of rivalry between different leaders and groups which causes confusion and diminishes overall impact of peace-related activities, with some groups profiting from the continued need for their services to help resolve the conflict in the Casamance.
- Getting to negotiations has its own set of constraints tied to finding a dignified, face-saving exit. A sovereign state naturally finds it unpalatable to be across the table from what is seen as an illegitimate entity and does not want to discuss independence with such an entity. On the other hand, the MFDC cannot leave the bush after 27 years without something to show for it. The challenge is how to create a face saving exit.
- The involvement of Guinea Bissau and the Gambia in a definitive resolution is crucial but which has hitherto been extremely difficult given diplomatic relations and sub-regional politics between the three countries.

While not specific to the Casamance region, but of significant concern is the potential for conflict in other parts of the country. While Senegal has not suffered severe violent political conflict in the past, a recent USAID conflict vulnerability assessment for Senegal was completed in August 2009 which looked at areas of potential conflict outside of the Casamance as well as an abbreviated conflict analysis of the Casamance. The assessment used an analytical tool called the Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF) and identified and summarized causes, conflict drivers, drivers for peace, and identified a general framework for a response. The assessment noted that many factors are present in the country that represents vulnerabilities for tension and conflict. Most of these sources of vulnerability for conflict focus on the rising costs of living, deteriorating public services as evidenced recently by frequent power outages, and growing economic inequality due in part to the current world economic crisis and in part by poor government policy and management.

ANNEX 5 - CIVIL SOCIETY IN SENEGAL

The proliferation of civil associations in Senegal has made it increasingly more difficult for the government or political parties to capture or dominate citizen organizations, economic and professional associations and youth groups.

Following is an example of the different types of civil associations that have emerged over the past decade in Senegal:

National urban-based advocacy, interest, and civic minded groups have grown in size, scale and professionalism. Many of these national-level associations have become forceful advocates for democracy, good governance, human rights, and social equality. Originally concentrated almost exclusively in the capital, some of these organizations have established branches at the regional level, increasing their communications with community-based grassroots organizations at the local level, and becoming more familiar with local conditions and priorities.

A wide range of national level associations are also forging coalitions to promote citizenship, monitor public policies in different sectors, and to fight corruption. In 2000, RADDHO, Forum Civile, *Environment et Developpement du Tiers-Monde* (ENDA), *Siggi Jiginn*, a women's group, and *Oxy-jeunes*, joined together to launch what proved to be a very successful voter registration campaign. In December 2003, eight major national level civil society organizations signed a protocol to define a framework for collaborating to promote the active participation of civil society in the elaboration, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of public policies. A month later, *Forum Civile* took the initiative to create a broad-based Coalition against corruption out of sixteen national level civil associations consisting of private sector associations, trade unions, NGOs, religious associations, and national organizations working on democracy and good governance issues.

National level organizations are no longer exclusively urban-based and organized around the interests and concerns of urban elites. In 1968 Leopold Senghor, the then President of Senegal, trucked in hundreds of rural citizens from the country-side to Dakar to demonstrate their support for him and his government, which had been under attack by students and workers in 1968. Thirty-five years later the CNCR mobilized over 30,000 citizens from all over the country to come to Dakar to peacefully express their demands for changes in the government's policies towards the rural world and to ask the government to open frank and sincere negotiations on their concerns.

Autonomous self-governing community-based associations are increasingly federating with similar groups in their sector and forming coalitions and working groups with other grassroots organizations to participate in development planning, local government and civic education activities. A few years ago, nine community radio stations formed the *Alliance des Radios Communautaires de Senegal* (ARC/Senegal) to pool resources and promote community radio. Neighborhood credit and savings associations are federating and pooling their resources. Representatives of grassroots associations are becoming increasingly active in participation in local government affairs and demanding more and better information.

The gap between national-level urban-based elitist associations and local grassroots community-based associations also seems to be diminishing. National level women's groups advocating an end to violence against women and female genital mutilation are discussing these issues in the larger interior towns and with village-based women's groups throughout the country.

Civil Society Umbrella Organizations

Citizens and organizations have formed umbrella groups to be more effective in their advocacy in terms of strength and resources. CONGAD, the Council of non-governmental organizations, is one such group which is comprised of both national and international NGOs, including those with religious backgrounds, and counts among its members more than 100 organizations with an interest in development. Another group is the Federation of NGOs – FONGS.

Organizations for Citizenship and Transparency/Accountability

Two organizations are on the front line – (1) Forum Civil which has a strong background in anti-corruption and political issues and works with the current GOS administration. They provide training on governance and participate in the public debate. Forum Civil plays a leading role in the *Assises Nationales*. Forum Civil participated in the coalition of civil society organizations which worked to secure the electoral process in 2000. Most of its members are participating in different groups, such as Senegal’s National Autonomous Election Commission (CENA), Commission National pour la Lutte Contre la Non-Transparence, la Corruption et la Collusion (CNLCC), etc. (2) Mouvement Citoyen is a young organization, founded in 2002. However, all its members have a great deal of experience in civil society, including the President, who has been involved in civil society since 1997. The organization focuses on intellectual and political leadership of youth and is another leading organization of the *Assises Nationale*. Mouvement Citoyen does a lot of work in civic education and capacity building of youth. It is a members of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) gender center. Mouvement Citoyen works with different mechanisms on good governance, democracy and conflict. These two organizations could achieve a great deal in the field of civic education.

ANNEX 6 - RELEVANT USAID PROGRAMS

In the DG sector, USAID previously supported a \$ 14 million program entitled “Décentralisation Gouvernance Local Progrès (DGL Felo)” that was implemented from 2000 – 2006 from which there are significant lessons learned. USAID added or is adding to the DG program four additional activities:

- 2009 – 2012 Civil Society Partnership for Improved Governance with Forum Civil
- 2009 – 2011 Civil Society Capacity Building with Réseau Africain pour le Développement Intégré (RADI)
- 2009-2011 Civil Society/Civic Participation with Synergie d’Action pour la Formation et le Développement (SYFAD)
- 2009 – 2011 Local Level Peace Building with World Education

In addition, governance/transparency activities are part of several sectoral USAID/Senegal programs operating to foster greater transparency and good governance at the sectoral level with a focus on decentralization, transparency and support to civil society. These programs, described below, also work with rural counsels in education/youth, health, environment, and water sectors.

In supporting the Casamance Peace Process, USAID previously had a separate program focused on the Casamance with a goal to advance the Casamance peace process. From 2000 - 2006, activities mainly focused on creating an enabling environment for peace by working with local populations to implement projects in their communities. As the conflict dynamics changed in mid 2004, the Casamance program scaled up some of its low-key peacebuilding activities to directly work with key stakeholders in the conflict, and in early 2005 implemented the first peace process support pilot activity. The pilot project then led to the \$ 3.1 million, 3 year Peace Process Support I (PPS I), implemented by AECOM, which recently ended on September 30, 2009.

A final evaluation of this program produced several findings which can be summarized as follows:

The project, implemented by AECOM, sought to “advance the peace process” in the Casamance in three ways. It worked to build the capacity of key stakeholders to “successfully carry out a peace process;” it promoted more effective participation by civil society in the peace process and it tried to help the GOS, MFDC and the other stakeholders to overcome obstacles to that process. To advance these project objectives, it enumerated obstacles and then used training workshops, facilitated dialogues, technical assistance and seed grants to try to overcome them. The project had an ambitious set of indicators which gauged the work of the program as well as progress within the peace process itself. The peace process did not advance as hoped for and hence benchmarks which were out of the program’s manageable interests were not met.

At the same time, the project did manage to achieve important intermediate goals in terms of capacity building of some key players and promotion of a peace and dialogue culture, especially in its work with civil society and via civil society with the MFDC. This should be set against a broader conflict analysis, where proximate trends and events dominate the peace process and do fall within the sphere of influence of the project: these are the absence of lobbying power for Casamance, development of civil society, lack of contact points, and the fragmentation of the MFDC. The evaluation concludes that the intervention was relevant to these drivers and did prove decisive for the negotiation environment.

A review of the project’s achievements suggests that AECOM has improved the context in which negotiations might at some point occur and has helped to build the capacity of actors and partners to address the question of a resumption of negotiations, but this may or may not translate into “moving closer” to negotiations.

The project accomplished several intermediate objectives by working with civil society. Important interpersonal relations have been strengthened and disparate initiatives for peace have been brought into the APAC framework to help align these earlier efforts and sensitize the public about pro-peace initiatives and how they can participate. Community forums were well received in the targeted locations and the discussions with MFDC members had a strong impact on the population by reminding the MFDC of the opposition of local people to the use of violence and by helping to rebuild social capital in the communities. CONGAD was able to increase the awareness of its member organizations about the conflict and impress on them that this is a Senegalese problem in Casamance and not just an issue confined to that part of Senegal south of The Gambia. Representatives from all three actors have learned much about negotiation strategies, peace mobilization, consensus building, social mapping, thinking strategically, planning and budgeting, etc. While it has not been possible to identify specific learning experiences and link them to the application of a new skill that resulted in a change constituting a sustainable impact for peace, the gradual accretion of pro-peace concepts, strategies and tactics – taken together – helps improve the general climate in which any peace process must operate.

The inability of project activities to overcome most of the identified obstacles is due to: a) obstacles beyond the ability of the project to influence; and b) the fundamental cause of the conflict being political, thus not in the perceived interests of some of the actors to resolve many of the defined “obstacles” due to their different priorities. The project work plans implicitly acknowledged the risk of this result by estimating the project’s ability to influence the obstacles

The evaluation recommendations for any follow on project include looking at different ways to help transform the conventional way that external assistance - of all types - is delivered by facilitating the close coordination of diplomatic, economic and peace building initiatives (including those promoting the peace process) that target the Casamance. This new architecture for peace could bring greater efficiencies, positive synergies and increased impact on the peace process⁴.

The core problem remains that the underlying economic and political drivers of conflict and now risk acceleration in a downward spiral. Therefore there was a strong recommendation that the people of Senegal, USAID and others continue the frustrating, often tedious, sometimes thankless but absolutely vital struggle for peace.

USAID also implemented a three-year \$925,000 Peace Education program, through World Education, from 2006 to 2009. World Education submitted a successful proposal to carry out community level peacebuilding activities that is expected to lead to a new award in the near future.

USAID plans to implement a two year program with World Education to support local level peacebuilding and reconciliation activities using community income generation projects, traditional approaches to reconciliation, dialogue, and other mechanisms. This program will target zones where the Casamance conflict has most impacted the communities and the need for reconciliation is greatest.

Democracy and Governance Programming

Décentralisation Gouvernance Local Progrès (DGL Felo) (2000 – 2006) –USAID previously supported the efforts of the GOS in the DG sector to ensure that local governments were viable, more

⁴ The AECOM COP and the USAID CTO in written comments on the first draft of this evaluation state that “the hypothesis that a new architecture for peace could bring greater efficiencies, positive synergies and increased impact on the peace process is unproven.” We agree that it is unproven, which is why it is a hypothesis. However, there is evidence from other conflict-affected countries to suggest that when as many drivers of peace as possible are aligned; the climate for a negotiated settlement can improve.

dynamic, and more effectively involving citizens in the management and oversight of local affairs. The DGL Felo program was implemented in 50 local governments in nine (Thiès, Diourbel, Kaolack, Louga, Saint-Louis, Matam, Tamba, Kolda, and Ziguinchor) of the then 11 regions of Senegal (there are now 14 regions). It was intended to (1) increase the capacity of local institutions; (2) increase access to financial resources; (3) increase participation of local populations in the management and supervision of local affairs; and (4) make more effective the implementation of decentralization policies and regulations. The project supported elected officials and citizens and provided technical services to implement community-defined initiatives, provided local incentive grants, disseminated legislative and regulatory texts and organized public debates on policy issues. The project was able to help local governments to develop participatory local plans, secure funds and implement planned activities, collect tax revenues, improve financial management, improve understanding of decentralization laws, increase payment of taxes and fees, increase central government representatives to participate in local problem solving, and improve problem solving skills. Two of the many lessons learned from this project are that: (1) greater sustainability could have been achieved by partnering with, or having as a lead, a local Senegalese organization anchored in Senegalese society and systems, such as the system of local government; and (2) the need to work at the local and national levels simultaneously, so that there is senior level support and policy reform in synergy with capacity building at the local government level. The program budget was \$14.0 million over five years and was implemented by the Association for Rural Development (ARD) Inc.

Civil Society Partnership for Improved Governance (2009-2012). This new activity is being implemented by Forum Civil through a USAID Cooperative Agreement. It aims to promote a better integrated and more effective governance of public and local affairs through greater citizen control. It was initiated to address shortcomings and weaknesses in the management of public affairs at both the central (administration) and decentralized (local community) levels. This plan revolves around three components: (1) managing change in the conduct of public affairs through the development of national integrity systems for a participatory monitoring of public affairs management in all areas; (2) organizing the contribution of non-government actors to the co-development of public policies; and (3) supporting decentralization by promoting good local governance for the establishment and promotion of a label of transparency and integrity within local communities *de facto* making elected officials and local governments accountable and enabling citizens to have their say on local governance issues. The program's budget is \$1,311,383. The program has national coverage.

DG Development Grants. USAID will be supporting two D&G grants:

1) **Civil Society Capacity Building** in order to promote greater participation in the democratic process. The grant will be implemented by the Réseau Africain pour le Développement Intégré (RADI) over a two year period. The budget is \$149,898.

2) **Civil Society/Civic Participation** among civil society groups in the Sedhiou Region. The grant will be implemented by the Synergie d'Action pour la Formation et le Développement (SYAFD) over a two year period. The budget is \$99,706.

USAID Technical Sector Programs. USAID's technical programs which have governance/transparency components also work in the Casamance Region. This represents a development investment in the governance/transparency sector totaling approximately \$ 12.1 million. They focus on economic growth, health and education.

Under USAID/Senegal's **Economic Growth** program the **Wula Nafaa Agricultural/Natural Resources Management** activity seeks to improve the capacity and performance of local government institutions to

better manage natural resources on a profitable and sustainable basis; and to increase transparency and accountability in how natural resources are managed. The key governance activities include:

- Capacity building of regional and rural councils in financial management and strategic planning;
- Strengthen the role and mandate of Village Development Committees and Local Fisheries Management Committees to manage resources;
- Strengthen the competencies of Regional Development Agencies;
- Develop a replicable model for community-based rights based sustainable fisheries;
- Prepare and gain necessary approvals for Local Conventions for community based natural resource management and sustainable fisheries with further development of control mechanisms;
- Promote agreements, approved plans or memoranda of understanding to solidify community rights to a resource;
- Strengthen local citizen/community groups to monitor, advocate and lobby for transparent transactions, planning and management of resources;
- Provide technical assistance to institutions that provide information on the role, obligation and performance of government, including the translation and dissemination of relevant laws and policies;
- Assist the ARD to develop regional resource priorities and policies;
- Assist local governments to hold public meetings/hearings to discuss budget and/or policy decisions in order to increase transparency; and
- Develop a process for third party neutral certification of management plans based on national and/or international standards.

This activity operates in Kolda, Kedougou, Tambacounda, Ziguinchor, and Koalak.

USAID/PEPAM is intended to improve sustainable access to **water supply and sanitation**, and promote better hygiene in targeted rural, small towns and peri-urban areas of Senegal. During the first year, the program will include a pilot phase in the Casamance. The program had four components: (1) strengthen participatory governance; (2) increased demand for sustainable water, sanitation and hygiene services and products; (3) strengthen the capacity of small-scale service providers, the private sector and water users associations; and (4) install and rehabilitate improved drinking water and sanitation infrastructure using a service delivery framework. The project began in July 2009 and will run for a five year period. Under the governance component, the program emphasizes improving governance and building capacity to support long-term improvement in participatory governance. It focuses on building trust and facilitating dialogue, strengthening decentralized institutions, empowering women to take leadership roles in community life, improving the information foundation for management decisions and strengthening institutional and organizational capacity to effectively engage in cooperative management of water resources and sanitation services. Building transparent, accountable effective and equitable governance systems at the local level also helps to balance tradeoffs in the allocation and use of water, ensuring human, economic and environmental needs will be met in the most optimal manner. The program will initiate a pilot in the Casamance.

USAID/Senegal's health program supports the Ministry of Health (MOH) and local communities to reduce maternal and child deaths, prevent infectious diseases and help people live healthier lives. In addition to fighting malaria, tuberculosis, and HIV/AIDS, USAID strengthens national and local health systems, supports family health planning programs to allow couples to have children when they want them, and helps communities plan and finance their own health services. Under the **health care policy and financing activity**, at the national level, USAID works closely with the MOH to negotiate and develop key policies and tools in the health sector to improve the health system and ultimately, public health. The Government of Senegal is being encouraged to provide additional resources to address public health issues and to ensure that these resources are used in an effective, transparent and participatory

fashion. At the local decentralized level, USAID helps locally-elected officials and civil society to develop and implement health plans that are funded by local revenues and decentralized MOH funds. Several issues are addressed such as: (a) how Health Committees can be most effectively brought to use receipts to fund a wider range of quality improvement activities, beyond essential drugs and (b) how Management Committees can be brought to effectively play their mandated roles. Technical assistance is also being provided to address transparency and accountability in Health and Management Committees. This program also supports civil society to assist local governments to advocate for more transfer of funds from the national to the local level. In 2008, USAID partners worked with 172 communities to develop health plans and budgets, with more than 280 participating community members. The program also gives assistance to mutual health organizations to assist people in financing their health; over 76,000 people were covered by such plans in 2008. The program, which runs from June 2006 to September 2011, is both national and regional - implemented in Ziguinchor, Kolda, Koalack, Louga and Thiès.

USAID/Senegal's **education sector** helps increase middle school enrollment and improve the quality and governance of middle school education. Since 2003, USAID and its partners, in close collaboration with the Ministry of Education, have built or rehabilitated 58 middle schools, especially in rural areas and helped improve the quality of the teaching and learning environment by carrying out nationwide training programs for teachers and principals in public and private middle schools. USAID's Enabling Quality, Access and Transparency in Education (EQUATE) program (referred to as Basic Education) works with and through non-governmental and community based organizations and with associations of koranic teachers to reach daara (koranic schools), vulnerable children and girls. Work is also underway with Commissions Nationales, Departmental Inspectorates, and teacher leaders to introduce new curricula and new approaches to quality (including the use of ICT), and with Parents' Associations, School Management Committees, and regional, municipal and rural community councils to improve governance and transparency. Gender considerations and equity are a high priority throughout these activities. The project works in Dakar, Louga, Saint-Louis, Matam, Fatick, Ziguinchor, Sedhiou, Kolda, Tambacounda and Kedougou.

USAID supported programs are utilizing national health accounts and national education accounts as tools to improve management, efficiency, and service delivery for improved health and education outcomes. These exercises will surely have an impact on decentralization in their respective sectors.

Casamance Peace Building Programs

Casamance Program: Peace Process Support I (2006 – 2009) In September 2009, USAID completed funding for a three year \$3.1 million dollar program to support the peace process. This Program is expected to build on what has been started, to incorporate lessons learned, and to take advantage of current windows of opportunities.

Peace Process Support I (PPS I) had five components:

- Facilitated Dialogues (FD) provided the opportunity and space for two or more groups/sub-groups and/or individuals to overcome a specific problem directly or indirectly tied to the peace process, or prepared for a specific facilitated dialogue with another group.
- Training Workshops (TW) provided skill training and/or capacity strengthening in areas such as conflict analysis, peacebuilding, negotiation, and mediation skills. TW subjects were based on the needs of a particular stakeholder group at a given moment.

- Technical Assistance (TA) sessions were the critical support to a specific group to address emerging challenges or take advantage of new opportunities. TA addressed a specific problem and targeted specific outcomes.
- Relationship Building covered efforts to gain stakeholders' trust and strengthen the relationships needed for the implementing partner to be perceived as a neutral facilitator. In addition, this component facilitated trust building among key project beneficiaries and significant stakeholders to contribute to the peace process. This was difficult to measure, but project leaders clearly succeeded in gaining the trust of many stakeholders at the national and regional level. They managed to work with a wide range of actors all of whom trusted them as a neutral and honest player.
- Seed Projects (SP) were small sub-grants provided to a group to enable the implementation of concrete actions that could advance the peace process. Sub-grants were awarded to 4 main groups (CONGAD, APAC, Groupe de Contact, and World Education.) These sub-grants were crucial to enabling local actors to directly intervene in the peace process to carry out their action plans.

The program targeted three stakeholders groups: (1) the GOS, composed of the national decision-makers and regional policy managers as well as locally elected officials; (2) the MFDC, composed of the civilian, political and military wings, with different factions and alliances in each wing; and (3) Civil Society, composed of three layers: Micro—individuals, informal organizations and associations; Meso—non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and individuals intervening at the regional level; and Macro—organizations, institutions, and actors intervening on the national level.

Working with the GOS, PPS I was successful in fostering relationships with regional authorities and tried to foster vertical connections between regional and national levels, and coordination between different GOS authorities (military, civil.) During the last 6 months of the program, more engagement at the national level started to take place with local partners. With the MFDC, PPS I included activities to assist the *Groupe de Contact* which is a group of political/civil representatives of ex-combatants. In turn, this group started an action plan to increase dialogue between the MFDC and the local communities.

Work with civil society was very successful with the creation of the Alliance pour la Paix en Casamance (APAC.) This is a group of senior ranking individuals and groups with the power to influence decision makers in the GOS and the MFDC. They carried out a series of action plans to help build consensus for peace talks. APAC facilitated dialogue between conflict parties within the MFDC. In addition, APAC reached out at the community level to mobilize people working on peace. Working with another civil society group, CONGAD, PPS I was effective in supporting efforts to increase public awareness and pressure for peace on a nationwide level after a series of forums that culminated in an advocacy campaign targeting senior decision makers.

Peace Education (2006 – 2009). World Education will complete a three year \$925,000 program in December 2009 which focuses on non-violent conflict resolution through peace education in middle schools. This project created and tested a curriculum which 80 middle schools in the Casamance used over the three years to train students, teachers and community members on how to prevent conflict as well as resolve conflict without violence. The program included a micro project component which gave youth the opportunity to apply what they had learned in either the school community, where much violence exists, or in the larger surrounding community. These projects were carried out with the assistance of local organizations or community groups.

Outcomes of the program include a statistical correlation between higher BFEM achievement rates and schools where the program was implemented. Students, teachers, and school authorities all attest to a less violent, less confrontational school environment wherever the peace education program has been implemented.

Training on the New Procurement Code While the World Bank and European Union have provided significant support to the central government to implement the new code, USAID has focused on reinforcing the capacities of local actors (staff of local governments, SME managers and NGOs) involved in procurement. At the request of the Procurement Regulation Agency (ARMP), USAID/Senegal undertook a training program for the regions of Ziguinchor, Kolda and Tambacounda. Program objectives were to:

- update and increase knowledge on the innovations introduced by the Code; and
- prepare models and tools to help implement effectively the new Code.

The program was able to reach 304 participants (compared to a target of 300 participants). Because it was a success, ARMP requested USAID to extend the program to four regions including Diourbel, Louga, St Louis and Matam.

ANNEX 7 – SUMMARY OF USAID STANDARD INDICATORS

Part 1: Illustrative Program Elements – Good governance advanced Indicators

2.2.3 Local Government and decentralization

-2.2.3 Number of individuals who received USG assisted training, including management skills and fiscal management

-2.2.3 Number of local mechanisms support with USG assistance for citizens to engage their sub-national government

2.2.3 -Number of local non-government and public sector associations supported with USG assistance

2.2.3 -Number of sub-national government entities receiving USG assistance to improve their performance

2.2.3 -Number of sub-national governments receiving USG assistance to increase their annual own-source revenues

2.4.1 Civic participation

2.4.1 -Number of civil society organizations using USG assistance to promote political participation

2.4.1 -Number of CSO advocacy campaigns supported by USG

2.4.1 -Number of policies that have been influenced by CSOs

2.4.1 -Number of USG assisted civil society organizations that engage in advocacy and watchdog functions

2.2.4 Anti-corruption reforms

2.2.4 Number of mechanisms for external oversight of public resources use supported by USG assistance implemented

2.2.4 Number of USG supported anti-corruption measures implemented

2.3.2 Elections and Political Processes .

2.3.2 Number of election officials trained with USG assistance

2.3.2 Number of Electoral Administration procedures and systems strengthened with USG assistance

2.3.2 Number of local CSOs strengthened that promote electoral reform and/or improvements in the electoral system

2.3.2 Number of local CSOs strengthened that promote political participation and voter education

2.3.3. Political Parties

2.3.3 Number of individuals who receive USG assisted political party training

2.3.3 Number of parties that comply with disclosure and/or political finance regulations as a result of USG assistance

2.3.3 Number of parties that use USG supported public opinion polling to design voter outreach strategies

2.3.3 Number of USG assisted political parties implementing programs to increase the number of candidates and members who are women, youth and from marginalized groups

Part 2 Conflict Mitigation/Peace & Reconciliation Processes in the Casamance

1.6.1 Conflict mitigation

1.6.1 Number of non-governmental constituencies built or strengthened with USG assistance

1.6.1 Number of people attending USG assisted facilitated events that are geared toward strengthening understanding and mitigating conflict between groups

1.6.1 Number of people from “at-risk” groups reached through USG-supported conflict mitigation activities

1.6.1 Number of people reached through USG-assisted public information campaigns to support peaceful resolution of conflicts

1.6.1 Number of people trained in conflict mitigation/resolution skills with USG assistance

1.6.2 Peace and Reconciliation

1.6.2 Number of community-based reconciliation projects completed with USG assistance

1.6.2 Number of grassroots or civil-society activities supporting high-level, official peace or reconciliation process negotiations supported by USG assistance

1.6.2 Number of media stories disseminated with USG support to facilitate the advancement of reconciliation or peace processes

1.6.2 Number of peace-building structures established or strengthened with USG assistance that engage conflict-affected citizens in peace and/or reconciliation processes

1.6.2 Number of people reached through completed USG supported community-based reconciliation projects

1.6.2 Number of public or educational events to teach the public about peace process support by USG assistance

Standard Indicators

- Number of formally organized sessions between conflicting parties, including sessions among MFDC factions, among GOS representatives, between and between civil society and either side, and finally between GOS and MFDC. (To be defined as formal meetings which do not have to be public; these are sessions organized by the IP or in which the IP plays a significant role.)
- # of knowledge sharing events, including training workshops, facilitated dialogues, and technical assistance
- # of peace building constituencies built and/or strengthened

ANNEX 8 – RELEVANT USAID ASSESSMENTS: CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS

	Conclusions	Recommendations
<p>Senegal Democracy and Governance Assessment – April 2004</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Good Governance – Senegal still highly centralized with patrimonial norms and values influencing leading political actors; neo-patrimonial norms undermine good governance practices <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ At national level – Can put pressure on the regime and political class for good governance through the independent media and segments of national society; ○ At local level – can promote good government in grassroots associations that make up local civil society and use pressure from below to transfer more resources to local government • Rule of law – Gaps include weak courts, prevalent corruption, laws and regulations that are “impractical, not applied, and contradict customary and Islamic law” <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ All sectors of society must define new policies and rules that are understandable, practical and do not contradict customary and Islamic laws • Senegal’s political class and national institutions unlikely to take the lead making reforms in these areas 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Focus on generating pressure for reform from below, on the role played by the media, national level civil society organizations, and local level civil society; does not encourage attempting to reform from the top • Working only at the national level will not produce worthwhile results, but working only at the local level will not produce powerful-enough motivation to influence national policymakers and implementers • Focus on improving public governance by enhancing financial management at both national and decentralized governance levels <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ National Level – expand the ability of national civil society to monitor public financial management and support a culture of accountability ○ Decentralized Level – Improve local financial management, the ability of citizens to monitor budgets and expenditures, and the attitudes and values of public officials and citizens towards good governance ○ Strategy does not only change formal institutions, but must also seek to transform values and attitudes – political culture must be changes from “one of permissive patrimonialism to one of participation and accountability” • Alternative, but less favorable, strategies: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ (1) Working through existing sectoral programs to improve public governance at national and decentralized governance levels ○ (2) Supporting only national level civil society and private sector transparency programs
<p>Strengthening Local Self-Governance in Senegal: DGL Felo (Decentralization, Local Governance, and Progress) Program Results and Lessons Learned – Final Report, December 2004</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Two areas of concern among all partner collectivities: mastering the budget process and understanding of the roles and responsibilities of various actors in decentralized governance; <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ DGL Felo developed 11 training and technical assistance modules designed to provide clear understanding of these fundamental components of local government ○ Also provided hands-on training of CL officials and staff in setting up professional, effective systems and procedures for filing and archiving records • Program supported elected councilors, citizens and technical services in local initiatives to resolve real-life service delivery 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Governance relations can be transformed through information and interaction <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Information is a source of power; equal access to information levels power relationships among actors, resulting in productive relationships and the empowerment of local actors • Attention to recipients’ management capabilities and absorptive capacity greatly enhances effectiveness of incentive grants <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Providing hands-on assistance to CLs who lack practical experience handling basic tasks results in an increase of absorptive capacity over time and ultimately improves local project execution • Demonstrating concrete results in improved local governance within the framework of the

	<p>or resource management problems; in doing so, demonstrated how good governance practices result in tangible community benefits</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Program also included a component to improve implementation of decentralized policy through public information, analysis and reform advocacy • Better understanding of roles and responsibilities in decentralization increases observance of norms and procedures prescribed by legislation; undertook activities to educate the public about decentralization policy, laws and best practices, using radio, television, illustrated publications, and public debates • Results: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Collectivities gained the ability to budget investments planned with participation of civil society actors and to realize many of those investments during a budget cycle ○ Collectivities increased local revenue collection ○ CBOs improved their financial management capabilities ○ Disseminate of decentralization legal texts to local officials and communities improved understanding of decentralization laws and policy ○ Understanding the budget system and sources of revenue changed relationship between civil society and local authorities, empowering citizens, enhancing political capital and increasing citizen willingness to pay taxes ○ Providing information and opportunities to interact on issues of mutual concern improved relationships between local elected officials and central government representatives ○ Problem-solving capabilities of local actors and recognition of the value added from working collectively were increased 	<p>1996 reforms is an effective way to advance decentralization reforms</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ DGL Felo’s work showed that improved local governance in terms of the management of public services and local resources is possible under the current legal framework; having such successful outcomes [when local actors come together to solve problems in concert with their local governments] result in an empowering effect that incites further improvement and popular demand for reform • The capacity to effect real and lasting improvements in local governance is rare <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Most Senegalese organizations are unable to operate in a demand-driven mode with strategies that facilitate positive experiences that empower local actors and build productive relationships; instead they work under an expert-driven mode of technical assistance; demand-driven mode builds the skills and knowledge of local leaders and produces sound, realistic, popular work plans and local initiatives, but training and orientation required for the shift to this model • Need for various technical services to support local governments; efforts to enhance local government capacity should create a market for these services; involves ensuring there are adequate resources and incentives to encourage local actors to seek out technical support services
<p>Corruption Assessment: Senegal – August 31, 2007</p>	<p>The Assessment addresses four major problems needed to encourage good governance and eradicate corruption:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Inadequate checks on executive decision-making – caused by tendency to concentrate power in presidency <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Implementing strategies: Strengthen capacity of judiciary and legislature; Strengthen local government <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Options: (1) Increase effectiveness of local government’s ability to control resources; (2) make good governance 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • USAID needs to prioritize its efforts based on the following principals: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Focus on program options that clearly relate to one or more of the core problems ○ Select an approach that is context-specific ○ Choose options that are logically linked to one another because they offer the possibility of addressing issues at different levels or sectors that are interlinked ○ Incorporate options that are based on “best practices” ○ Choose options to build on the major

	<p>program part of community-wide participation in financial management and control</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 2. Lack of transparency in government operations; lack of autonomy of control and regulatory institutions to monitor public expenditures <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Implementing strategies: Promote high-level diplomatic dialogue; Implement transparency initiatives <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Options: (1) Support the Anti-corruption Commission (CLNCC) to educate the public about public expenditures; (2) Create independent watchdog center to monitor public contracts and publicize findings; (3) Initiate and sustain on-going policy dialogue at the highest level concerning lack of transparency, private sector rules, taxation policies, and development of independent and functioning regulatory and auditing agencies 3. Lack of quality and accountability in delivery of public services (health, education, forestry and water) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Implementing strategies: Concentrate efforts in local level key sector programs; Promote effective decentralization <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Options: Support government officials' and employees' attendance of workshops discussing the public and national costs of petty and grand corruption and the promoting professionalism and professional ethics 4. Inadequate and ineffective public opposition to corruption <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Implementing strategies: Public education and diffusion of corruption's impact; Support citizen oversight of local government <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Options: (1) Develop culturally-relevant approach to understanding and resisting corruption (2) Encourage civil society to produce studies and collect data for forum discussions involving media and universities who can advocate for better control of public expenditures 	<p>existing concerns of donors and of the GOS</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Choose programs working with state, non-state and external stakeholders demonstrating interest in supporting reform • Recommends that USAID focus its anticorruption program on: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Strengthening local governance by developing culturally relevant concepts and tools ○ Adopting a more community-wide approach to addressing specific problems [like forestry management, school maintenance and management, and health center management] to mainstream transparency and corruption control into existing sectoral programs, adding value to governance aspects of these programs ○ Strengthening citizen demand for better governance, a more plural and balanced state decision-making process, and transparency and corruption control through a grants program, using further grants to spread the program's findings among the public ○ Improving quality of governmental services by assisting with the re-professionalization of civil servants in service delivery ○ Supporting the government's anti-corruption program by involving the National Anti-corruption Commission (CLNCC) in spreading the program's findings among the public ○ Supporting greater transparency in public market allocation through one or more of the following mechanisms: (1) Support and monitor the work of the tripartite Agency for the Regulation of Public Markets (ARMP) (2) Support the establishment of a politically, economically autonomous watchdog center to track public contracts at various levels (3) Support the proposed electronic database project and website to track public market contracts ○ Continuing the high level policy dialogue with regard to transparency in budgeting and procurement and in laws, rules and tax structures governing state and private sector business
<p>Draft Senegal Sub-regional Conflict Assessment – August 3, 2009</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Report used the Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF) and Illicit Practices Structures (IPS) methodologies to analyze recent developments in Senegal⁵ • Team found patterns of core grievances with potential to be the basis of an explosion of 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Recommendations for USAID/Senegal approaches and interventions: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Design programs in all sectoral programs that consult and give a voice to people and their leaders affected by the programs ○ Provide training and grants to civil society

	<p>popular discontent; could be exploited by politicians, opportunistic religious leaders and self-seeking profiteers; political stability threatened by the unchecked trend toward using violence to express frustration at perceived injustices</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Senegal’s traditions, societal patterns, and recent evolution of democratization processes indicate great resilience and the ability to prevent, manage, mitigate and resolve conflict • Team identified main windows of both vulnerability and opportunity: preparations for the 2012 presidential elections, deteriorating living conditions and economic opportunities <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Such windows provide scenarios and events that could trigger violence and political instability ○ Such windows are also opportunities for change, particularly due to President Wade’s desire to leave a positive legacy – could lead to real political dialogue and successful negotiations for electoral reform • Senegal society will avoid the worst-case scenario; has the potential for peaceful and meaningful political and economic reforms, as have occurred in the past 	<p>organizations in sectoral programs to identify and monitor causes of conflict and develop mechanisms for reporting and providing avenues for redress</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Build networks of conflict mediators within sectoral programs ○ Maintain regular contact with Embassy and collaborate in strategic planning, enlisting Embassy’s support to exert political pressure when development programs are unable to achieve their goals alone ○ Give greater attention to land tenure and access to natural resources issues, major sources of conflict in sectoral program areas; explore possibilities from MCC investments in the north, ECOWAS mining codes in Kédoudou, and plans from local populations for land use and mitigation of conflicts between pastoralists and farmers.
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ANNEX 9 – PHASES, PROCESSES AND METHODOLOGY USED IN THE CASAMANCE PEACE PROCESS

Phase 1 Getting to Dialogue. Restarting dialogue can be broken down into a series of smaller steps which include building confidence, lobbying decision makers, identifying legitimate representatives with the proper mandate from the MFDC and the GOS, overcoming spoilers, and managing the multitude of interests around the Casamance conflict. Currently there are many actors working to accomplish this, but without a strategic framework and a flexible approach, stakeholders are hard pressed to take advantage of opportunities when they arise.

Reopening dialogue will require engagement with the GOS and the MFDC, especially with senior-level decision makers from both civilian and military positions.

Phase 2: Peace Talks. This is a highly political phase of negotiating peace in which the belligerent parties must have the commitment to reach an agreement which is satisfactory to each party. Peace processes are a series of complex discussions about a wide range of issues pertinent to the conflict in question. The cultural context, political ramifications, historical variables, technical capacity, political will, and personalities all come into play. The results of this process are an iterative process which is not remotely within the manageable interests of this program. The programmatic aim of this component is to contribute to the process so that the outcome will be satisfactory to those who are signing the peace accord.

Research shows that a high percentage of countries fall back into violence during the post-conflict stage. For this reason, it is useful to look at the longer term context and see how actors involved in negotiations (as well as the getting to dialogue phase) might be the same actors in the same institutional structures that will work on reconciliation processes and reconstruction efforts in a post-conflict stage. Best practices in conflict programming show that working on institutional strengthening, relationship building between stakeholders, and processes for addressing conflict by local actors/conflict stakeholders themselves is very important; these are all long-term issues.

Although signing the Peace Accord is very important, it is important to note that this activity cannot only focus on the signing of a peace accord alone, nor should it be evaluated solely by this criterion, which is a tendency in conflict programming. A peace accord is at a certain level nothing but a piece of paper between decision makers in the two parties and cannot address the concerns of all stakeholders.

Phase 3: Peace Accord Implementation. In Phase 3, the recipient will be responsible for assisting in the execution of the peace accord, realigning Program staff, activities and budget to support this process. Peace accord implementation is highly dependent on what is included in the peace accord, which is unknown at this moment, and hence cannot be planned for at this stage of programming. Activities in this phase might likely include monitoring peace accord implementation (benchmarks/indicators for this should be included in the peace treaty), helping with local and national reconciliation, and perhaps contributing to a disarmament, demobilization, and reinsertion (DDR) program. Larger reconstruction and development programs will most likely be a part of the solution; however, the currently limited funding for this component doesn't allow for this type of activities.

Concerning the illustrative benchmarks and indicators, in peace programming there are benchmarks to measure success of the program and qualitative markers to track the advancement of the peace program and it is recognized that these markers are not to be used to evaluate program performance. Standard indicators are included in Section D - Annex 6.

Process & Methodology. Because the nature of this type of programming is focused more on process than on performance outcomes, it is important to carefully lay out in this RFA the expected methods and approach for implementing this component. Previous USAID programs have recently worked on the Casamance peace process and thus there is a programmatic foundation upon which to build and there is a wealth of knowledge about successful programming.

Interventions in this component will include but are not limited to training workshops, facilitated dialogues, technical assistance, sub-grants, and relationship building. **Training workshops (TW)** have the goal of increasing key stakeholders' understanding of how a peace process operates at whatever stage is appropriate for them as stakeholders. TW are most successful when very tailored to meet the needs of participants. **Facilitated dialogues (FD)** are a key to program success, and they have the goal of bringing together parties in conflict at strategic moments to work out specific issues which are blocking forward movement in the peace process. **Technical assistance (TA)** will consist of working with each stakeholder group to address events as they arise; this might include designing action plans, strategic analysis, clarification of interests, etc., but the goal is not to determine X versus Y outcome. In the event that the implementing partner is directly involved in the peace talks, then TA would be focused on helping to nurture the dialogue process. These activities should be woven together so that they are mutually reinforcing and complimentary. The challenge of using these types of activities is to identify when and with whom to address which specific issue. The parameters are determined by events and tendencies in the peace process at any given time, and they change over time.

Lastly, the **relationship building efforts** to be undertaken by the recipient are both the means and the end results of this activity. There are two kinds of relationships to build: (1) between the Recipient and key stakeholders and (2) amongst key stakeholders. Establishing relationships with key stakeholders is essential to the recipient's ability to successfully operate in a highly politicized and sensitive diplomatic environment. Key MFDC, GOS, and civil society stakeholders must have confidence and trust in the contractor. At the same time, a successful peace process fundamentally depends upon creating enough trust between the two sides to reach an agreement. This will happen through and will result in better relationships. In order for the peace process to advance, the mistrust that is rife within the MFDC and the competing forces within the GOS must be corralled or reconciled to allow for forward motion. The peace process, or any reconciliation process, is in itself a building of trust.

Program success will also require the ability to identify strategic alliances for peacebuilding. All conflict and peacebuilding programming is dependent on the identification of the right actors at the right time. Stakeholder analysis and stakeholder mapping are efficient tools to assist in identifying key actors and, in combination with a deep understanding of the conflict history, causes, current issues and dynamics, are used to guide programming. On another level, a person who is to be a successful peacebuilder or resolver of conflict will also move intuitively when faced with a set of variables in a given situation. The implementer of this component needs to have personnel and technical expertise to accomplish this. There are several known tools for conflict mapping: please see John Paul Lederach and Paul Wehr (<http://www.beyondintractability.org/>). USAID/DCHA/CMM has a variety of toolkits including the Peace Processes Toolkit which can be downloaded at: <http://inside.usaid.gov/DCHA/CMM/publications/toolkits/>.

Overall, this activity will focus on the capacity to manage and participate in a peace process while also addressing a plethora of obstacles which are sure to arise. Weak political will has and will be at the root of blockages at certain moments in the peace process. When there is insufficient will on behalf of leaders to move the peace process forward at a particular point in time, the skills gained from TW or technical strategies will not address this type of difficulty. This type of problem is addressed by incentives and/or consequences within a political (and ideological) framework, most of which are not within the manageable interests of this component. There are various tools to address this type of situation, including creative reframing of the issues, external pressure, incentives, etc. Senegalese peace process actors with support from the contractor will have to identify how to try and overcome these types of obstacles.

In conflict work, **scenario planning** is part of evolving program implementation. The nature of conflict and a peace process is very dynamic with many possible pitfalls, a few windows of opportunity, and many unexpected variables and events. For this reason, conflict programming to support a peace process must be equally flexible. There are several possible paths which this component might undertake. In the best case scenario, for example, the GOS and MFDC overcome difficulties to reopening talks within a relatively short period of time. Preparations for peace talks are thorough, negotiations begin, and an accord is reached. In the worst case scenario, both sides continue in their present state, with violence in the Casamance increasing. There are many possibilities in between.

Because the activity has a technical box with several tools, it is possible that a particular action will not be effective at a given moment, for reasons outside of USG/IP control, while other actions can continue to have an impact on the situation. Activity management must include scenario/contingency planning, and the Recipient must be able to advance in those areas where it is possible. Timing is crucial in peace process work because windows of opportunity are fleeting and often times brief in duration. When mapping out a work plan and outlining specific projects, the recipient shall continually analyze current events and gauge the best time and place for each activity and with whom. When unexpected windows of opportunity appear, the Recipient must be able to take advantage of current events as rapidly as possible. Systematic analysis of events and stakeholder mapping are necessary and might result in adjustments to program implementation.

In the best case scenario whereby negotiations start relatively quickly and an accord is signed, for contracting purposes, this will be considered a trigger event. Programmatically this would radically change the focus and activities of the program. A systematic analysis would be necessary in order to identify how best to reorient the program to support accord implementation and a post-conflict phase in the Casamance. At the conclusion of the analysis, the USAID will, if required, modify the agreement to address the dramatically changed situation using a different approach and set of tools.

ANNEX 10 – OTHER PROVISIONS

1. MARKING UNDER ASSISTANCE INSTRUMENTS

(a) Definitions

Commodities mean any material, article, supply, goods or equipment, excluding recipient offices, vehicles, and non-deliverable items for recipient’s internal use, in administration of the USAID funded grant, cooperative agreement, or other agreement or subagreement.

Principal Officer means the most senior officer in a USAID Operating Unit in the field, e.g., USAID Mission Director or USAID Representative. For global programs managed from Washington but executed across many countries, such as disaster relief and assistance to internally displaced persons, humanitarian emergencies or immediate post conflict and political crisis response, the cognizant Principal Officer may be an Office Director, for example, the Directors of USAID/W/Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance and Office of Transition Initiatives. For non-presence countries, the cognizant Principal Officer is the Senior USAID officer in a regional USAID Operating Unit responsible for the non-presence country, or in the absence of such a responsible operating unit, the Principal U.S Diplomatic Officer in the non-presence country exercising delegated authority from USAID.

Programs mean an organized set of activities and allocation of resources directed toward a common purpose, objective, or goal undertaken or proposed by an organization to carry out the responsibilities assigned to it.

Projects include all the marginal costs of inputs (including the proposed investment) technically required to produce a discrete marketable output or a desired result (for example, services from a fully functional water/sewage treatment facility).

Public communications are documents and messages intended for distribution to audiences external to the recipient’s organization. They include, but are not limited to, correspondence, publications, studies, reports, audio visual productions, and other informational products; applications, forms, press and promotional materials used in connection with USAID funded programs, projects or activities, including signage and plaques; Web sites/Internet activities; and events such as training courses, conferences, seminars, press conferences and so forth.

Sub-recipient means any person or government (including cooperating country government) department, agency, establishment, or for profit or nonprofit organization that receives a USAID sub-award, as defined in 22 C.F.R. 226.2.

Technical Assistance means the provision of funds, goods, services, or other foreign assistance, such as loan guarantees or food for work, to developing countries and other USAID recipients, and through such recipients to sub-recipients, in direct support of a development objective – as opposed to the internal management of the foreign assistance program.

USAID Identity (Identity) means the official marking for the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), comprised of the USAID logo or seal and new landmark, with the tagline that clearly communicates that our assistance is “from the American people.” The USAID Identity is available on the USAID website at www.usaid.gov/branding and USAID provides it without royalty, license, or other fee to recipients of USAID-funded grants, or cooperative agreements, or other assistance awards.

(b) Marking of Program Deliverables

(1) All recipients must mark appropriately all overseas programs, projects, activities, public communications, and commodities partially or fully funded by a USAID grant or cooperative agreement or other assistance award or subaward with the USAID Identity, of a size and prominence equivalent to or greater than the recipient's, other donor's, or any other third party's identity or logo.

(2) The Recipient will mark all program, project, or activity sites funded by USAID, including visible infrastructure projects (for example, roads, bridges, buildings) or other programs, projects, or activities that are physical in nature (for example, agriculture, forestry, water management) with the USAID Identity. The Recipient should erect temporary signs or plaques early in the construction or implementation phase. When construction or implementation is complete, the Recipient must install a permanent, durable sign, plaque or other marking.

(3) The Recipient will mark technical assistance, studies, reports, papers, publications, audio-visual productions, public service announcements, Web sites/Internet activities and other promotional, informational, media, or communications products funded by USAID with the USAID Identity.

(4) The Recipient will appropriately mark events financed by USAID, such as training courses, conferences, seminars, exhibitions, fairs, workshops, press conferences and other public activities, with the USAID Identity. Unless directly prohibited and as appropriate to the surroundings, recipients should display additional materials, such as signs and banners, with the USAID Identity. In circumstances in which the USAID Identity cannot be displayed visually, the recipient is encouraged otherwise to acknowledge USAID and the American people's support.

(5) The Recipient will mark all commodities financed by USAID, including commodities or equipment provided under humanitarian assistance or disaster relief programs, and all other equipment, supplies, and other materials funded by USAID, and their export packaging with the USAID Identity.

(6) The Agreement Officer may require the USAID Identity to be larger and more prominent if it is the majority donor, or to require that a cooperating country government's identity be larger and more prominent if circumstances warrant, and as appropriate depending on the audience, program goals, and materials produced.

(7) The Agreement Officer may require marking with the USAID Identity in the event that the recipient does not choose to mark with its own identity or logo.

(8) The Agreement Officer may require a pre-production review of USAID-funded public communications and program materials for compliance with the approved Marking Plan.

(9) Sub-recipients. To ensure that the marking requirements "flow down" to sub-recipients of sub-awards, recipients of USAID funded grants and cooperative agreements or other assistance awards will include the USAID-approved marking provision in any USAID funded sub-award, as follows:

"As a condition of receipt of this sub-award, marking with the USAID Identity of size and prominence equivalent to or greater than the recipient's, sub-recipient's, other donor's or third party's is required. In the event the recipient chooses not to require marking with its own identity or logo by the sub-recipient, USAID may, at its discretion, require marking by the sub-recipient with the USAID Identity."

(10) Any ‘public communications’, as defined in 22 C.F.R. 226.2, funded by USAID, in which the content has not been approved by USAID, must contain the following disclaimer:

“This study/report/audio/visual/other information/media product (specify) is made possible by the generous support of the American people through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The contents are the responsibility of [insert recipient name] and do not necessarily reflect the views of USAID or the United States Government.”

(11) The recipient will provide the Cognizant Technical Officer (CTO) or other USAID personnel designated in the grant or cooperative agreement with two copies of all program and communications materials produced under the award. In addition, the recipient will submit one electronic or one hard copy of all final documents to USAID’s Development Experience Clearinghouse.

(c) Implementation of marking requirements.

(1) When the grant or cooperative agreement contains an approved Marking Plan, the recipient will implement the requirements of this provision following the approved Marking Plan.

(2) When the grant or cooperative agreement does not contain an approved Marking Plan, the recipient will propose and submit a plan for implementing the requirements of this provision within [**Agreement Officer fill-in**] days after the effective date of this provision. The plan will include:

(i) A description of the program deliverables specified in paragraph (b) of this provision that the recipient will produce as a part of the grant or cooperative agreement and which will visibly bear the USAID Identity.

(ii) the type of marking and what materials the applicant uses to mark the program deliverables with the USAID Identity,

(iii) when in the performance period the applicant will mark the program deliverables, and where the applicant will place the marking,

(3) The recipient may request program deliverables not be marked with the USAID Identity by identifying the program deliverables and providing a rationale for not marking these program deliverables. Program deliverables may be exempted from USAID marking requirements when:

(i) USAID marking requirements would compromise the intrinsic independence or neutrality of a program or materials where independence or neutrality is an inherent aspect of the program and materials;

(ii) USAID marking requirements would diminish the credibility of audits, reports, analyses, studies, or policy recommendations whose data or findings must be seen as independent;

(iii) USAID marking requirements would undercut host-country government “ownership” of constitutions, laws, regulations, policies, studies, assessments, reports, publications, surveys or audits, public service announcements, or other communications better positioned as “by” or “from” a cooperating country ministry or government official;

(iv) USAID marking requirements would impair the functionality of an item;

(v) USAID marking requirements would incur substantial costs or be impractical;

(vi) USAID marking requirements would offend local cultural or social norms, or be considered inappropriate;

(vii) USAID marking requirements would conflict with international law.

(4) The proposed plan for implementing the requirements of this provision, including any proposed exemptions, will be negotiated within the time specified by the Agreement Officer after receipt of the proposed plan. Failure to negotiate an approved plan with the time specified by the Agreement Officer may be considered as noncompliance with the requirements is provision.

(d) Waivers.

(1) The recipient may request a waiver of the Marking Plan or of the marking requirements of this provision, in whole or in part, for each program, project, activity, public communication or commodity, or, in exceptional circumstances, for a region or country, when USAID required marking would pose compelling political, safety, or security concerns, or when marking would have an adverse impact in the cooperating country. The recipient will submit the request through the Cognizant Technical Officer. The Principal Officer is responsible for approvals or disapprovals of waiver requests.

(2) The request will describe the compelling political, safety, security concerns, or adverse impact that require a waiver, detail the circumstances and rationale for the waiver, detail the specific requirements to be waived, the specific portion of the Marking Plan to be waived, or specific marking to be waived, and include a description of how program materials will be marked (if at all) if the USAID Identity is removed. The request should also provide a rationale for any use of recipient's own identity/logo or that of a third party on materials that will be subject to the waiver.

(3) Approved waivers are not limited in duration but are subject to Principal Officer Review at any time, due to changed circumstances.

(4) Approved waivers "flow down" to recipients of sub-awards unless specified otherwise. The waiver may also include the removal of USAID markings already affixed, if circumstances warrant.

(5) Determinations regarding waiver requests are subject to appeal to the Principal Officer's Cognizant Assistant Administrator. The recipient may appeal by submitting a written request to reconsider the Principal Officer's waiver determination to the Cognizant Assistant Administrator.

(e) Non-retroactivity. The requirements of this provision do apply to any materials, events, or commodities produced prior to January 2, 2006. The requirements of this provision do not apply to program, project, or activity sites funded by USAID, including visible infrastructure projects (for example, roads, bridges, buildings) or other programs, projects, or activities that are physical in nature (for example, agriculture, forestry, water management) where the construction and implementation of these are complete prior to January 2, 2006 and the period of the grant does not extend past January 2, 2006.

2. IMPLEMENTATION OF E.O. 13224 -- EXECUTIVE ORDER ON TERRORIST FINANCING (MARCH 2002)

The Recipient is reminded that U.S. Executive Orders and U.S. law prohibits transactions with, and the provision of resources and support to, individuals and organizations associated with terrorism. It is the legal responsibility of the recipient to ensure compliance with these Executive Orders and laws. This provision must be included in all contracts/subawards issued under this agreement.

3. USAID DISABILITY POLICY - ASSISTANCE (DECEMBER 2004)

a. The objectives of the USAID Disability Policy are (1) to enhance the attainment of United States foreign assistance program goals by promoting the participation and equalization of opportunities of individuals with disabilities in USAID policy, country and sector strategies, activity designs and implementation; (2) to increase awareness of issues of people with disabilities both within USAID programs and in host countries; (3) to engage other U.S. government agencies, host country counterparts, governments, implementing organizations and other donors in fostering a climate of nondiscrimination against people with disabilities; and (4) to support international advocacy for people with disabilities. The full text of the policy paper can be found at the following website:

http://pdf.dec.org/pdf_docs/PDABQ631.pdf

b. USAID therefore requires that the recipient not discriminate against people with disabilities in the implementation of USAID funded programs and that it make every effort to comply with the objectives of the USAID Disability Policy in performing the program under this grant or cooperative agreement. To that end and to the extent it can accomplish this goal within the scope of the program objectives, the recipient should demonstrate a comprehensive and consistent approach for including men, women and children with disabilities.

4. FOREIGN GOVERNMENT DELEGATIONS TO INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES (JAN 2002)

Funds in this agreement may not be used to finance the travel, per diem, hotel expenses, meals, conferences fees or other conference costs for any member of a government's delegation to an international conference sponsored by a public international organizations, except as provided in the ADS Mandatory Reference "Guidance on Funding Foreign Government Delegations to International Conferences" or as approved by the Agreement Officer.

5. REPORTING OF FOREIGN TAXES (MARCH 2006)

APPLICABILITY: This provision is applicable to all USAID agreements that obligate or subobligate FY 2003 or later funds except for agreements funded with Operating Expense, Pub. L. 480 funds, or trust funds, or agreements where there will be no commodity transactions in a foreign country over the amount of \$500.

a. The recipient must annually submit two reports annually:

- (i) an interim report by November 17, and;
- (2) a final report by April 16 of the next year.

b. Contents of Report. The report must contain:

- (i) Contractor/recipient name.
- (ii) Contact name with phone, fax and email.
- (iii) Agreement number(s).
- (iv) Amount of foreign taxes assessed by a foreign government [each foreign government must be listed separately] on **commodity purchase transactions** valued at **\$500 or more** financed with USAID. (foreign assistance) funds under this agreement during the prior U.S. fiscal year.
- (v) Only foreign taxes assessed by the foreign government in the country receiving U.S. assistance are to be reported. Foreign taxes by a third party foreign government are not to be reported. For example, if an assistance program for Senegal involves the purchase of

commodities in South Africa using foreign assistance funds, any taxes imposed by South Africa would not be reported in the report for Senegal (or South Africa).

(vi) Any reimbursements received by the Recipient during the period in (iv) regardless of when the foreign tax was assessed plus, for the interim report, any reimbursements on the taxes reported in (iv) received by the Recipient through October 31 and for the final report, any reimbursements on the taxes reported in (iv) received through March 31..

(vii) The final report is an updated cumulative report of the interim report.

(viii) Reports are required even if the recipient did not pay any taxes during the report period.

(viii) Cumulative reports may be provided if the recipient is implementing more than one program in a foreign country.

c. Definitions. For purposes of this clause:

(i) “Agreement” includes USAID direct and country contracts, grants, cooperative agreements and interagency agreements.

(ii) “Commodity” means any material, article, supply, goods, or equipment.

(iii) “Foreign government” includes any foreign governmental entity.

(iv) “Foreign taxes” means value-added taxes and custom duties assessed by a foreign government on a commodity. It does not include foreign sales taxes.

d. Where. Submit the reports to:

Office of Financial Management;

And a copy to the Regional Acquisition and Assistance Office

e. Subagreements. The recipient must include this reporting requirement in all applicable subcontracts, subgrants and other subagreements.

f. For further information see <http://www.state.gov/m/rm/c10443.htm>

Subagreements. The contractor/recipient must include this reporting requirement in all applicable subcontracts, subgrants and other subagreements.

ANNEX 11 – STANDARD PROVISIONS

Mandatory Standard Provisions for U.S. NGO Recipients:

<http://www.usaid.gov/policy/ads/300/303maa.pdf>

Mandatory Standard Provisions for non U.S. NGO Recipients:

<http://www.usaid.gov/policy/ads/300/303mab.pdf>