USAID | WEST AFRICA
FROM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

Funding Opportunity

Issuance Date: [June ***20, 2011 Accra Time***]
RFA Clarification Questions Due: [C.O.B. of July 14, 2011 Accra Time]
Closing Date and Time for Application Submission: [1400 hrs. of August 15, 2011 Accra Time]

Subject: Request for Applications (RFA) Number: USAID/WA - **RFA-624-11-00003** entitled **Peace through Development and Expanded Regional Stability (PEDERS)** program

Ladies and Gentlemen:

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) is seeking applications for Assistance Agreements from U.S. organizations for funding to support a program entitled "Peace through Development and Expanded Regional Stability (PEDERS)." The overall goal of this regional program is to reduce the risk of instability and increase resiliency to violent extremism in four countries in West Africa including Chad, Niger, Mauritania and Burkina Faso. The authority for the RFA is found in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended. Please refer to the Program Description attached for a complete statement of goals and expected results (See Attachment – A).

While for-profit firms may participate, pursuant to 22 CFR 226.81, it is USAID policy not to award profit under assistance instruments such as cooperative agreements. However, all reasonable, allocable, and allowable expenses, both direct and indirect, which are related to the grant program and are in accordance with applicable cost standards (22 CFR 226, OMB Circular A-122 for non-profit organization, OMB Circular A-21 for universities, and the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Part 31 for-profit organizations), may be paid under the Cooperative Agreement.

Applicants under consideration for an award that have never received funding from USAID will be subject to a pre-award audit to determine fiscal responsibility, ensure adequacy of financial controls and establish an indirect cost rate.

USAID expects to award [*one*] a Cooperative Agreement based on this RFA. Subject to the availability of funds, USAID intends to provide approximately $61,900,000 in total USAID funding to be allocated over the five (5) year period. USAID reserves the right to fund any or none of the applications submitted.

Award will be made to that responsible applicant whose application best meets the requirements of this RFA and the selection criteria contained herein. Issuance of this RFA does not constitute an award commitment on the part of the Government, nor does it commit the Government to pay for costs incurred in the preparation and submission of an application.

This RFA and any future amendments can be downloaded from http://www.grants.gov. Select "Find Grant Opportunities," then click on "Browse by Agency," and select the "U.S. Agency for International Development" and search for the RFA. In the event of an inconsistency between the documents comprising this RFA, it shall be resolved at the discretion of the Agreement Officer.

All guidance included in this RFA takes precedence over any reference documents referred to in the RFA. If there are problems in downloading the RFA from the Internet, please contact the Grants.gov help desk at 1.800.518.4726 or support@grants.gov for technical assistance.

U.S. Agency for International Development
West Africa Regional Program
No. 24 Fourth Circular Rd. CT
P.O.Box 1630, Accra-Ghana
Tel: 233-21-741200
Fax: 233-21-741365
www.usaid.gov/missions/warp

For the purposes of this RFA, the term "Grant" is synonymous with "Cooperative Agreement"; "Grantee" is synonymous with "Recipient"; and "Grant Officer" is synonymous with "Agreement Officer".

The applicant shall submit applications in electronic copy format as described in Section IV. Applications must be received within www.grants.gov by the closing date and time indicated at the top of this cover letter. Late applications will not be considered for award. Applications must be directly responsive to the terms and conditions of this RFA. Telegraphic or fax applications (entire proposal) are not authorized for this RFA and will not be accepted. Any clarification questions concerning this RFA should be submitted in writing to Mr. Naveen Srivastava, via email at nsrivastava@usaid.gov with a copy to Ms. Martina Wills, via email at mwills@usaid.gov by the deadline date listed above.

Sincerely,

Marjan A. Zanganeh
Supervisory Regional Agreement Officer

Attachments:

A. Program Description – PEDERS
B. Additional Guidance - SAMPLE BUDGET
C. Certificate of Compliance
D. Initial Environmental Examination (IEE) - USAID-WA_Peace_Security_IEE_Amend_092309
E. Standard Provisions for U.S. Nongovernmental Recipients

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I. Funding Opportunity Description

The USAID/West Africa Regional Mission desires to implement a set of activities to reduce the risk of instability and increase resiliency to violent extremism in four countries in West Africa including Chad, Niger, Mauritania and Burkina Faso. The program is designed to support USAID/West Africa's goals and objectives in countering violent extremism in the Sahel, which is part of the larger, multi-U.S. Government Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP). A regional program that is country-specific in its approach to activities on the ground, while maintaining strong organizational and management arrangements at the regional level to enhance coordination, cooperation, efficiency and achievement of regional objectives and results broadly stated as:

Decreased risk of extremism in the Sahel and increased resiliency in communities at risk of extremism through improved governance and youth empowerment at the local level.

See Attachment A for detailed Program Description.

II. Award Information

USAID expects to award [*one*] a Cooperative Agreement based on this RFA with an anticipated total federal funding amount of approximately $61,900,000. The period of performance is five years with an anticipated start date of November 1, 2011. USAID/WA reserves the right to determine the resulting level of funding for the Agreement award.

The Government expects to issue an award resulting from this RFA to the responsible applicant whose application conforming to this RFA are the most responsive to the objectives set forth in this RFA and present the greatest overall value. The Government may (a) reject any or all applications, (b) accept other than the lowest cost application, (c) accept more than one application, (d) accept alternate applications, and (e) waive informalities and minor irregularities in applications received.

The Government may make award on the basis of initial applications received, without discussions or negotiations. Therefore, each initial application should contain the applicant's best terms from a cost and technical standpoint. The Government reserves the right (but is not under obligation to do so), however, to enter into discussions with one or more applicants in order to obtain clarifications, additional detail, or to suggest refinements in the program description, budget, or other aspects of an application.

Neither financial data submitted with an application nor representations concerning facilities or financing, will form a part of the resulting agreement(s).

The Agreement Officer is the only individual who may legally commit the Government to the expenditure of public funds. No costs chargeable to the proposed award may be incurred before receipt of either a fully executed cooperative agreement or a specific, written authorization from the Agreement Officer.

A. USAID will be substantially involved during the implementation of this Cooperative Agreement in the following ways:

   1. Approval of the Recipient's Annual Work Plans:
   If at the time of the award the Program Description does not establish a timeline in sufficient detail for the planned achievement of the Program's milestones or outputs, USAID/WA may consider approval of the Recipient's implementation plan at a later date. USAID will not require approval of implementation plans more often than annually (but must be submitted no later than August 31 of each year for dovetailing with USAID work plan requirements), unless there are to be substantive changes as a result of the mid-term evaluation.

   2. Approval of Key Personnel:
   USAID/WA Agreement Officer's Technical Representative (AOTR) will approve "key personnel" for positions designated as "Key" to the successful implementation of the Program.

3. Agency and Recipient Collaboration or Joint Participation:
Since the Recipient's successful achievement of program objectives will benefit from USAID, and other USG TSCTP partners' technical knowledge (through USAID/WA, USAID/Washington and participating in-country USAID and U.S. Embassy personnel), collaboration between USG TSTCP partners and the Recipient is encouraged, as follows:

i. If deemed valuable by USAID and the Recipient, collaborative involvement in the selection of advisory committee members (i.e., selection of USAID and Embassy (State and DOD) assigned to the participating countries, USAID/WA and, if appropriate, non-USG representatives) will provide advice to the Recipient. Any such advisory committee(s), however, will deal only with programmatic or technical issues and not routine administrative matters.

ii. Concurrence on the substantive provisions of sub-awards. 22 CFR 226.25 requires the Recipient to obtain the Agreement Officer (AO)'s prior approval for the sub-award, transfer, or contracting out of any work under an award.

4. Agency Authority to Immediately Halt Construction Activities.
There will be no major construction activities undertaken under this program.

III. Eligibility Information

A. Eligible Applicants

All qualified U.S. organizations may apply.

B. Cost Sharing or Matching

There is no minimum requirement of cost share for this RFA. However, Cost share is encouraged. NGOs and development partners are encouraged to identify private, unrestricted resources for basic support costs to complement the program. Such funding may come from many sources including privately generated programming funds from domestic constituencies; commodities or other resources made available by other bilateral donors or private foundations; and international donors. Definite commitments from other sources for specific programs should be specifically mentioned and documented.

IV. Application and Submission Information

A. Applicants are expected to review, understand, and comply with all aspects of this RFA. This RFA is found on the internet at www.grants.gov. Grants.gov is your source to FIND and APPLY for federal grants *but you **MUST REGISTER** to APPLY.* Registration is a one-time process, and *Registration process* can take 3-5 business days or as long as two weeks if all steps are not completed in a timely manner. After you are registered, you shall be able to Download this RFA/grant application package to complete it offline and route it through your organization for review before submitting. After you have entered all the necessary information, checked the package for errors and saved your package, click the "Save & Submit" button for your application package to automatically be uploaded on www.Grants.gov and available for USAID to retrieve in response to this RFA.

B. Content and Form of Application Submission

1. Applications shall be submitted in two separate parts: (i) technical proposal including management plan, and (ii) cost or business application.

2. Each applicant shall furnish the information required by this RFA. The applicant shall sign the application and print or type its name on the Cover Page of the technical and cost applications. Erasures or other changes must be initialed by the person signing the application. Applications signed by an agent shall be accompanied by evidence of that agent's authority, unless that evidence has been previously furnished to the issuing office.

3. A confirmation screen will appear once the submission is complete. A Grants.gov tracking number will be provided at the bottom of this screen, as well as the official date and time of the submission. Record the tracking number so that you may refer to it should you need to Grants.gov for support.

4. Please note that grant applications submitted to Grants.gov may take up to 48 hours to process before they are available to agencies for download. Once a submission is received, Grants.gov sends two email messages to the applicant. The first email confirms receipt of the application by Grants.gov. The second email indicates that the application has either been successfully validated by Grants.gov or has been rejected due to errors. If the application was successfully validated by Grants.gov, and the submission has both been retrieved and acknowledged by the posting agency, the applicant will receive an additional email. This email may be delivered to the applicant several days or weeks from the original date of their submission, depending on when the posting agency acknowledges the retrieval of the application from Grants.gov.

5. Each applicant is responsible for its submissions, so please check for emails from Grants.gov for any errors. Allow yourself sufficient time to be able to fix such errors. If you discover an error in your transmission, please upload the material again. USAID does NOT have any control over the Grants.gov Application submission process. Late applications will not be considered.

6. Please do not send Application directly via email to the Agency contacts.

7. Should your organization **opt** to submit a hard copy application, applications shall be submitted as follows: technical portions of applications in original and two copies, and cost portions of applications in original and two copies including both technical and cost applications on a DVD ROM.

   Hard copies, though NOT required, of applications and modifications thereof (1 original and 2 copies of each technical and cost proposal) if submitted should be in sealed envelopes or packages with the RFA number, the name and address of the applicant, and whether the contents contain technical and/or cost proposals noted on the outside of the envelopes/packages to:

   Naveen Srivastava
   Senior Acquisition & Assistance Specialist
   Regional Acquisition & Assistance Office
   USAID/WA
   American Embassy,
   No. 24, Fourth Circular Road, Cantonments
   Accra, Ghana.

   Sending hard copies via regular mail to US Postal Address or via local or Hand delivery/Int'l Courier Address (including commercial courier) – please note Pouch can take up to two (02) weeks and also all mail is subject to US Embassy electronic imagery scanning methods, physical inspections, and is not date and time stamped prior to receipt by USAID/West Africa Regional Acquisition & Assistance Office. Applicants should factor these lead times when submitting hard copies of applications.

   Regardless of the method used Applicants are requested to submit applications both technical and business portions.

   Note: Delivery to the post office or air courier representative does not constitute meeting the requirement that applications are received on time at the designated office. For purposes of recording the official receipt of applications, the date/time stamp of the Regional Acquisition and Assistance Office at USAID/West Africa in Ghana will govern. Applicants shall retain for their records one copy of the application and all enclosures that accompany their application.

C. APPLICATION FORMAT

Technical applications should be specific, complete and presented concisely. The applications should demonstrate the applicant's capabilities and expertise with respect to achieving the goals of this program. Technical applications should take into account requirements of the program and evaluation criteria found in this RFA and/or attachment.

1. Instructions to Prepare Technical Application and Information Mandatory to be Included in the Technical Section ("Technical Application Guidelines")

The following technical guidelines should be used to prepare an application in response to this RFA.

The technical merit will be an important part of consideration in selection for award of the proposed activity. Technical applications should be specific, complete and presented concisely. The applications should demonstrate the Applicant's capabilities and expertise with respect to achieving the goals of this program. Technical applications shall take into account and be arranged in the order of the technical evaluation criteria.

a. Application Content: The technical application may contain the following sections, as more fully explained below: Cover Page, Table of Contents, Executive Summary, Technical Application/Application Program Description including an Illustrative Implementation Plan, First Year Annual Work Plan outline (detailed to be submitted within 45 days upon award) and Monitoring and Evaluation Plan, and Annexes (Curriculum Vitae/Resumes, Past Performance References, and Letters of Commitment from implementing partners, if any). The technical application must not exceed 30 pages exclusive of the annexes (curriculum vitae/resumes, past performance references, and letters of commitment from any implementing partners, if any), in New Time Romans 12 pt Font on A4 size paper and with single line spacing. All inclusive the technical application shall **not exceed 50 pages**.

(1) Cover Page:
Include proposed Project title, RFA No., name of organization submitting application, DUNS No., TIN No., authorized individual, telephone and fax numbers, e-mail, and physical address.

(2) Executive Summary
This section should be a succinct **one-page summary** and contain information that the Applicant believes best represents a summary of its proposed program and provides a justification and rationale for the project's scope of work, including all elements listed in technical guideline.

Guidance:
- Program locations
- The proposed start and end dates.
- The level of funding requested for the project and proposed cost-share amount.
- Estimated number of total population and primary beneficiaries in proposed target area(s):
- Summary of proposed program, including elements such as:
    - Program objectives and summary of key activities
    - Rationale for the proposed program, including a description of how the project fits within the overall goals and objectives.
    - Identification of local partner(s) involved in program implementation. Applicants should clearly distinguish between partners with whom they intend to enter into a sub-granting relationship and those with whom they intend to collaborate, but not transfer funds.

(3) Strategic/Technical Approach
This section should provide a clear picture of the proposed project and implementation strategies. Details on the proposed technical interventions and corresponding activities should be included. It is important to clearly define linkages with other counter-extremism and related development programs and activities in-country and describe how synergy between programs will be developed

and how proposed approaches will reach at-risk communities.

Guidance:

- Provide the goal and objectives of the proposed project.
- Describe in detail each of the activities proposed.
- Include a discussion of the decision-making process for the selected approach, articulating a strong rationale. The rationale should include an explanation of the geographic areas proposed for interventions and justification for the communities targeted.
- Describe the role of all relevant stakeholders (e.g., civil society organizations, local government bodies, the USAID and/or Embassy) in the selection of the site, interventions and strategies, and how you encouraged their involvement.
- Describe local partners' role and responsibilities in the proposed program and technical intervention areas.
- Clearly articulate how the proposed approach will empower youth, improve provision of local government services, expand civil society's effectiveness and programs in the at-risk communities, and improve media coverage to the communities.

Work Plan: In table format, please present a brief, one to two page work plan with a time line for activities for the first year, which reflects the overall program approach, and objectives.

(4) Personnel Capability and Experience

The core element of the PEDERS program is improving youth engagement, widening access to credible information sources, and improving community governance – while continuing to capitalize on and foster the established resiliencies of the populations and communities at risk of violent extremism. To accomplish this will require field staff in tune with the local communities they serve and familiar with best practices in community governance. Given the broad range of activities likely to be implemented, the recipient will equally need to exercise maximum flexibility in staff resources and capability to be able to provide adequate technical, training, managerial, and administrative support in response to program needs as they are identified and defined by community and youth.

USAID/WA believes that the quality, commitment, and capabilities of the staff in this program constitute the single most important variable to success. Understanding of the environment, ability to communicate effectively with a range of stake-holders, facilitation and negotiation skills, and commitment to the goals of the program all play as important a role as technical or managerial skills. Applicants need to show creativity, foresight, and flexibility in defining staff positions needed and identifying proposed individuals. The applicant should submit a staffing plan and organizational chart that describes how the applicant will address the conflicting needs for staff continuity and depth with the flexibility required to respond to a range of needs. Applicants should include staff training plans where appropriate, and describe how mentoring or other staff development techniques might be employed.

With the possible exception of senior US and country personnel and some finance and administrative personnel, staff proposed for this program should be dedicated full time to this program. To successfully manage the program the recipient will be expected to propose a Country Manager for each country(s) within the area of operation. Proximity to the communities being served is fundamental to the effectiveness of community development. Given that this is a regional development program focused on defined geographic areas, USAID will look critically at the extent to which applicants decentralize their operations and utilize staff, partners and other resources from the locality.

Of the positions identified below, the Chief of Party, the Deputy and the Country Directors should all possess excellent English and French language oral and written communication skills. (Arabic and local language skills are a plus, particularly for relevant countries involved in PEDERS and relevant communities within each country.)

(5) Key Positions/Personnel

Following positions are suggestions for a core management and implementation team for the PEDERS program. However, it is up to the Applicant to provide/list positions that are **Key** to the successful implementation and accomplishment of PEDERS goals and objectives. USAID's policy limits this to a reasonable number of positions, generally no more than five positions or five percent of recipient employees working under the award, whichever is greater.

(a) Chief of Party/Senior Program Manager: This person will oversee/manage the Recipient's entire implementation team, as well as render technical services in the participating countries. This person will be the Recipient's principal officer for communicating with USAID/WA and other official USG representatives, as deemed appropriate by USAID/WA. The selection of the country in which this senior staff position will be placed should consider the following:

- Expected program size and staff demands of the resident country;
- Convenient "hub" location for traveling to the other countries covered by PEDERS;
- Operational costs to set up a field office;
- Availability of qualified staff at the local level.
- Management: Minimum 10 years managing diverse teams in developing countries, including at least four years with responsibility for grassroots, community-development work, with emphasis on youth empowerment and outreach, training, civil society development, local government and media development.
- Education: At least bachelor's degree in development-related field, preference for graduate degree
- Language (reading, writing, speaking): English fluency and at least an FSI 3-3 level in French or in a relevant local African language (Arabic or other)

(b) Deputy Team Leader/ Deputy Chief of Party: The specific country location of this position is subject to final negotiations with the selected recipient. This person will report to the Chief of Party/Senior Program Manager. USAID suggests that recipients consider focus on training/human resource development and capacity building of CSOs, youth, media and local government through PEDERS for participating countries. This person should have broad, high level expertise in training and international development that would be utilized to support achievement of the PEDERS' goals and objectives, as well as support for training and development of program staff.

- Management: Minimum 7 years managing diverse teams in developing countries, including at least four years with responsibility for grassroots, community-development work, with emphasis on youth empowerment and outreach, training, civil society development, local government and media development
- Education: At least bachelor's degree in international development-related field, preference for graduate degree
- Language (reading, writing, speaking): English fluency and at least an FSI 3-3 level in French or in a relevant local African language (Arabic or other)

(c) Senior Financial Manager

- Management: Minimum 10 years' experience in all aspects of financial project management duties.
- Education: Minimum of bachelor's degree in accounting, financial management, which can be adjusted based on work experience
- Language (reading, writing, speaking): English fluency and at least an FSI 3-3 level in French or in a relevant local African language (Arabic or other)

(d) Country Lead/Country Director Chad

- Management: At least 5 years' experience working on development-related, grassroots projects in Chad or another West African country
- Education: At least a high-school equivalent degree in development-related field

- Language (reading, writing, speaking): English working facility and at least an FSI 3-3 level in French or a relevant local African language (Chadian Arabic or other such as Hausa)

(e) Country Lead/Country Director Burkina Faso
- Management: At least 5 years' experience working on development-related, grassroots projects in Burkina Faso or another West African country
- Education: At least a high-school equivalent degree in development-related field
- Language (reading, writing, speaking): English working facility and at least an FSI 3-3 level in French or a relevant local language (i.e. Mossi, etc.)

(f) Country Lead/Country Director Niger
- Management: At least 5 years' experience working on development-related, grassroots projects in Niger or another West African country
- Education: At least a high-school equivalent degree in development-related field
- Language (reading, writing, speaking): English working facility and at least an FSI 3-3 level in French or a relevant local African language (i.e. Hausa or other)

(g) Country Lead/Country Director Mauritania
- Management: At least 5 years' experience working on development-related, grassroots projects in Mauritania or another West African country
- Education: At least a high-school equivalent degree in development-related field
- Language (reading, writing, speaking): English working facility and at least an FSI 3-3 level in French or a relevant local African language (i.e. Arabic or other)

(6) Administrative Support Staff
In the ensemble, staff must have relevant, region-specific skills and technical backgrounds in such areas as media dissemination, radio programming and broadcasting, youth development, civil society development, local government management (budgeting, management, communications), including ability to communicate effectively in speaking, writing and reading.

Country Leads or Directors: They would report to the Chief of Party/Senior Program Manager. Responsibilities would include oversight and day-to-day management of personnel and activities in the respective, participating country.

(7) Management Plan
The recipient will have prime responsibility to ensure that activities conducted under this program contribute to USAID/WA's Mission Plan and address Results One through Four.

Guidance:
Organizational Structure and Human Resources Management:
Describe the proposed management structure for this program and provide an organizational chart in the attachments. Include in the narrative a description of the responsibilities of all principal organizations and staff involved, reporting relationships, authority and lines of communication within and between each of these organizations. Include location(s) where key staff will be based. For any proposed sub-partners (specify those that are receiving funding through this program), include a clear plan for managing and oversight as well as sub-partner budgets aligned with project objectives and activities. Please include job descriptions and CVs of key staff (Chief of Party/Senior Program Manager, Deputy Team Leader/Training and Human Resources Development Officer, Country Leaders/Country Directors (Burkina Faso, Chad, Mauritania, Niger).

As stated in the section "A Regional Program Approach with Targeted Country-specific Interventions to Achieve Results", Applicants should propose a regional program that is both cross-border and cross-cutting.

(8) Past Performance

The U.S. Government will evaluate the quality of the applicant's past performance. This evaluation is separate and distinct from the Agreement Officer's responsibility determination. The assessment of the applicant's past performance will be used to evaluate the relative capability of the applicant to successfully carryout the program. Past performance of significant and critical subs and other types of partnership in applications will be considered to the extent warranted by their involvement in the proposed effort. The application of an applicant with no relevant past performance, may not represent the most advantageous application to the U.S. Government.

Applicants must submit a list of all contracts, grants, or cooperative agreements involving similar or related programs over the past five years. Reference information for at least five (5) must be provided and shall include the location, current telephone numbers, points of contact, and award/contract numbers if available. A brief description of work performed is also required. USAID reserves the right to solicit relevant information concerning an applicant's past performance and may consider such information in the review process.

(9) Monitoring and Evaluation

Guidance:

Discuss how progress towards program objectives will be measured. Identify which indicators will be measured and how data on these indicators will be collected, analyzed and used for program management. Ensure that objectives and indicators are consistent with the monitoring plan and data needs. Present indicators linked to specific project objectives in table format and include source of data and proposed frequency of collection. Indicators should include those related to technical intervention outcomes and process indicators used to track project progress.

(10) Other General Guidance Principles

(a) Sub-grantees and Partners

It is recognized that identification of specific teaming partners and sub-recipients and specific delineation of responsibilities and cost information is, in fact, often known at the time the application is being prepared. In order to reduce the post-award administrative burden of obtaining post-award approval for such sub-awards, and thereby, facilitate program implementation and the achievement of results in the timeframe of the award(s), applicants are strongly encouraged to identify such teaming arrangements and sub-recipients in the technical/programmatic and cost/budget/management sections of their application to the maximum practicable extent. When such organizations are identified, Letters of Intent, Letters of Agreement, or Memoranda of Understanding should be included in the application.

Applicants should demonstrate the full range of capabilities to undertake all the activities proposed in this program. Applicants may determine that to ensure the full range of capabilities required by this program they will partner with other US and local NGOs, universities, engineering or other technical support firms, training organizations, or other partners. Applicants may propose a consortium with other organizations; however, principal responsibility for implementation and ensuring cohesion of the program will rest with the recipient who will act as prime and have final responsibility for implementation and performance monitoring of the program. Further, for consortiums with multiple organizations USAID recommends that common space and equipment be utilized to ensure greater synergy and reduce administrative and management costs where feasible. If the applicant proposes teaming with other organizations the applicant should include a sub-grantee management plan that outlines the level and type of services envisioned, relationship with the prime, and lines of authority and reporting.

(b) Coordination

It will be incumbent upon the recipient to facilitate the establishment of representative community and cluster committees and use of these mechanisms for initiating community projects that exploit the availability of resources from a variety of sources to improve community life. The donor community is investing in a range of economic development

programs that offer opportunities for well-organized communities to utilize these funds for their benefit.

Since this RFA only covers part of USG's assistance in the targeted four countries and since USAID is only one donor agency among many in these countries, applicants are asked to describe their approach to coordination with USAID, its other partners and with other USG agencies, as well as with the Governments of four countries. Applicants should also describe their strategies to assist community and cluster committees to take advantage of resources available outside of this program.

2. COST APPLICATION FORMAT

The Cost or Business Application shall be submitted separately from the technical application. Certain documents are required to be submitted by an applicant in order for the Agreement Officer to make a determination of responsibility.

Instructions to Prepare Instructions to Prepare: The following sections describe the documentation that applicants for Assistance award must submit to USAID prior to award. While there is no page limit for this portion, applicants are encouraged to be as concise as possible, but still provide the necessary detail to address the following:

a. Include a budget with an accompanying budget narrative in MS Word to facilitate USAID's determination that costs are allowable, allocable, and reasonable. The applicants must provide an electronic copy of the budget (in Microsoft Excel) with calculations shown in the spreadsheet and an electronic version of the narrative discussing the costs for each budget line item (in Microsoft Word). Detailed budget notes and supporting justification of all proposed budget line items which provide in detail the total costs for implementation of the program your organization is proposing should be included [See **ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE - SAMPLE BUDGET** at attachment **B**]. In addition, a summary of the budget must be submitted using Standard Form 424 and 424A which can be downloaded from the USAID web site: http://www.usaid.gov/procurement_bus_opp/procurement/forms/sf424/.

   USAID seeks applications where the maximum amount possible goes to direct interventions and not to Operating Expenses. Preference will be given to applications that clearly demonstrate and innovatively propose how USAID funds can be best applied for maximum impact and results.

   The budget shall include:

   (1) The breakdown of all costs associated with the program according to costs of, if applicable, headquarters, regional and/or country offices;

   (2) The breakdown of all costs according to each partner organization or subcontractor/sub-grantee involved in the program;

   (3) The costs associated with external, expatriate technical assistance and those associated with local in-country technical assistance;

   (4) The breakdown of the financial and in-kind contributions of all organizations involved in implementing this Cooperative Agreement;

   (5) Potential contributions of non-USAID or private commercial donors to this Cooperative Agreement;

   (6) A procurement plan for commodities.

b. A copy of the latest Negotiated Indirect Cost Rate Agreement if your organization has such an

agreement with the US Government;

c. Applicants which do not currently have a Negotiated Indirect Cost Rate Agreement (NICRA) from their cognizant agency shall also submit the following information:

(1) Copies of the applicant's financial reports for the previous 3-year period, which have been audited by a certified public accountant along with the CPA certified proposed indirect rate(s);

(2) Projected budget, cash flow and organizational chart; and

(3) A copy of the organization's accounting manual.

d. Applicants should submit additional evidence of responsibility they deem necessary for the Agreement Officer to make a determination of responsibility. The information submitted should substantiate that the Applicant:

(1) Has adequate financial resources or the ability to obtain such resources as required during the performance of the award.

(2) Has the ability to comply with the award conditions, taking into account all existing and currently prospective commitments of the applicant, nongovernmental and governmental.

(3) Has a satisfactory record of performance. Past relevant unsatisfactory performance is ordinarily sufficient to justify a finding of non-responsibility, unless there is clear evidence of subsequent satisfactory performance.

(4) Has a satisfactory record of integrity and business ethics; and

(5) Is otherwise qualified and eligible to receive a cooperative agreement under applicable laws and regulations (e.g., EEO).

e. Required certifications, assurances, and other statements. These forms include:

- Assurance of Compliance with Laws and Regulations Governing –
- Nondiscrimination in Federally Assisted Programs
- Certification Regarding Lobbying
- Prohibition on Assistance to Drug Traffickers for Covered Countries
- Certification on Terrorist Financing
- Certification of Recipient
- Key Individual and Participant Certifications Narcotics Offence and Drug Trafficking
- Certification Of Compliance With The Standard Provisions Entitled “Condoms” And “Prohibition On The Promotion Or Advocacy Of The Legalization Or Practice Of Prostitution Or Sex Trafficking
- Survey On Ensuring Equal Opportunity For Applicants
- Applicant Information
- Procurement Information

f. Applicants that have never received a cooperative agreement, grant or contract from the U.S. Government are required to submit a copy of their accounting manual. If a copy has already been submitted to the U.S. Government, the applicant should advise which Federal Office has a copy.

g. Certificate of Compliance
The Applicant must submit a copy of their systems certification it submitted to USAID/M/OAA/OCC that their personnel, procurement, and travel policies are compliant with

applicable OMB circulars and other applicable USAID and Federal regulations. [See format at Attachment C]. Alternately, the Applicant may submit its latest annual A-133 audits report specifically which verifies the recipient's compliance with the government's requirements and the effectiveness of its internal management controls.

3. SUBMISSION DATES AND TIMES

Applications are due to USAID by date and time listed on the cover letter of the RFA.

(Applications which are submitted late or are incomplete run the risk of not being considered in the review process. "Late applications will not be considered for award" or "Late applications will be considered for award if the Agreement Officer determines it is in the Government's interest.")

The **preferred** method of submission of Applications is electronically via www.grants.gov.

To be eligible for award, the applicant must provide all required information in its application, including the requirements found in any attachments to the www.grants.gov opportunity. Final award of any resultant cooperative agreement cannot be made until funds have been fully appropriated, allocated, and committed through internal USAID procedures. While it is anticipated that these procedures will be successfully completed, potential applicants are hereby notified of these requirements and conditions for award. Applications are submitted at the risk of the applicant; shall circumstances prevent award of a cooperative agreement, all preparation and submission costs are at the applicant's expense.

4. OTHER SUBMISSION REQUIREMENTS

a. Unnecessarily Elaborate Applications – Unnecessarily elaborate brochures or other presentations beyond those sufficient to present a complete and effective application in response to this RFA are not desired and may be construed as an indication of the applicant's lack of cost consciousness. Elaborate art work, expensive paper and bindings, and expensive visual and other presentation aids are neither necessary nor wanted. Please note excessive documentation submitted under the annexes is neither necessary nor wanted.

b. Proprietary Information – Applicants which include data that they do not want disclosed to the public for any purpose or used by the U.S. Government except for evaluation purposes, should:

(1) Mark the title page with the following legend:

"This application includes data that shall not be disclosed outside the U.S. Government and shall not be duplicated, used, or disclosed - in whole or in part - for any purpose other than to evaluate this application. If, however, a cooperative agreement is awarded to this applicant as a result of - or in connection with - the submission of this data, the U.S. Government shall have the right to duplicate, use, or disclose the data to the extent provided in the resulting agreement. This restriction does not limit the U.S. Government's right to use information contained in this data if it is obtained from another source without restriction. The data subject to this restriction are contained in pages ___; and"

(2) Mark each sheet of data it wishes to restrict with the following legend:

"Use or disclosure of data contained on this sheet is subject to the restriction on the title page of this application."

c. Explanation to Prospective Applicants – Any prospective applicant desiring an explanation or interpretation of this RFA must request it in writing. Questions **must** be sent by the deadline for Questions/clarifications to allow a response to reach all prospective applicants timely before the submission of their applications. Oral explanations or instructions given before award of a Cooperative Agreement will not be binding. Any information given to a prospective applicant concerning this RFA will be furnished promptly to all other prospective applicants as an

amendment of this RFA, if that information is necessary in submitting applications or if the lack of it would be prejudicial to any other prospective applicants.

d. Telegraphic or faxed applications will not be considered.

e. Language – All applications must be in English.

5. QUESTIONS / CLARIFICATIONS TO RFA:
Any questions concerning this RFA shall be submitted in writing via email to nsrivastava@usaid.gov, with copy to mwills@usaid.gov giving reference the RFA number in the subject line by the Q&A deadline C.O.B. of **July 14, 2011 (local Accra Time)**. Answers to all questions received by the time specified will be issued as an amendment to the RFA. For all inquiries and questions, please provide a contact person's name, phone number and email address to allow adequate response timely.

V. Application Review Information

Below are the significant technical and cost factors. The Government will select application(s) that it determines is the most responsive to the objectives set forth in this RFA and presents the greatest overall value, cost and other factors considered, but reserves the right not to select any proposals for funding.

In accordance with ADS 303.3.6.3 Evaluation Criteria includes the Technical merits of the applications, Cost effectiveness and cost realism of the application, Past performance of the applicant, and Branding Strategy and Marking Plan.

The criteria presented below have been tailored to the requirements of this particular RFA. Applicants should note that these criteria serve to: a) identify the significant matters which Applicants should address in their applications; and b) set the standard against which all applications will be evaluated. To facilitate the review of applications, Applicants should organize the narrative sections of their applications in the same order as the Selection Criteria. Applications will be evaluated in accordance with the Technical Evaluation Criteria identified below.

The cost/business applications of all Applicants submitting a technically acceptable application will be evaluated for general reasonableness, cost realism, allowability and allocability. Applicants are specifically advised that, until an agreement document is received and duly signed by a Grant or Agreement Officer, no program expenditures will be paid by USAID.

In sum, the Technical Evaluation Criteria and points allocations are indicative of USAID/WA Mission's desire to select a highly qualified, flexible, innovative organization(s) and staff, which can capitalize on and enhance the local institutions and human resource talents in the countries of Chad, Niger, Burkina Faso and Mauritania to ensure a greater degree of Program success and sustainability.

To make an objective evaluation possible, applications must clearly demonstrate how the organization and the application meet these criteria.

A. TECHNICAL EVALUATION CRITERIA

The technical application criteria are presented below. The relative importance of each criterion is indicated by the points allotted to the assigned score.

1. Strategic/Technical Approach (40 points)
The Applicant should propose activities that demonstrate a clear understanding of guiding principles. Activities should be ambitious and achievable, with the selected goals and objectives clearly presented. The decision-making process for the selection of approach should be clearly articulated, and the role of local partners clearly described and appropriate to achieving program objectives, including:

a. Rationale and justification provided for selection of geographic target area and choices of communities, reflecting local ownership and development partnerships;

b. A realistic timeframe for achievement of results, reflecting a context of changing parameters and opportunities.
c. Demonstrates best practices for working effectively in at-risk communities in the areas of youth mobilization, outreach and training, improving civil society capacity and performance, improved local governance services, and information dissemination through media.
d. Relevant stakeholders appropriately involved in the selection of sites, interventions and/or strategies.
e. The extent to which the application addresses gender, both in terms of how men and women might participate differently in the activities or how the activities may have different impacts on them.

2. Personnel Capability and Experience (30 points)

In assessing this factor, the Technical Evaluation Committee will consider the fit and strength of the key personnel positions and the actual candidates proposed by the applicant. Efforts to recruit local expertise will be noted. In addition to the weighted criteria below, the committee will also consider the references obtained for key personnel including information obtained from other than the sources provided by the applicant.

It should be noted that if letters of commitment are not provided for each key personnel candidates, the Technical Evaluation Committee can take this into account in evaluating this factor, including but not limited to, ignoring the qualifications and experience of the person proposed. A letter of commitment does not require an exclusive commitment, only that the candidate is committed to serving on the project. [Where appropriate additional points will be given for proposed key personnel with appropriate Arabic language or local language capabilities]:

a. Management experience of the proposed Key personnel in the implementation of similar or relevant community development, civil society support, local government and media expansion projects;
b. Technical, practical experience and level of education and skills of personnel proposed; especially in regards to deliver the required technical assistance, training, and funding for local development activities and youth skills development;
c. Proposed personnel's collective knowledge of the current social, political and economic circumstances in West Africa; demonstrated experience in West Africa, including ability to work and live in remote locations, and possession of French or local language skills.

3. Management Plan and Monitoring and Evaluation (15 points)

The management plan relates to the applicant's plan to manage the Cooperative Agreement efficiently and effectively, including, but not limited to, the general staffing of the Cooperative Agreement. This includes:

a. Soundness of the overall management plan and organizational structure to manage the award; this includes the positions that will be hired, the mix and balance of in-country and home office support, as well as the mix and balance of local and international hiring. The applicant must present a clear organizational, human resources and financial management structures in place, including clearly identified roles and responsibilities of key staff and project partners.
b. The applicant should demonstrate a comprehensive performance monitoring plan, including clear, achievable indicators and targets and a plan for sustainability.
c. Realism of the plan to produce documented, quantifiable, effective results and to carry-out performance monitoring and reporting.

4. Past Performance Criteria (15 points)

All applicants will be subject to a past performance review for demonstrated successful past performance in previous and/or existing projects (See section IV.C.1.a.(8)):

a. quality,
b. cost control,
c. timeliness,
d. key personnel and
e. customer satisfaction

Summary of Technical Rating	
Strategic/Technical	40 points
Personnel Capacity and Experience	30 points
Management Plan and Monitoring & Evaluation	15 points
Past Performance	15 points
Total	100 points

B. Cost Evaluation Criteria

1. **Cost Realism**:
Applicants must present a detailed budget including all sources of funds allocated and a narrative description ("Budget Notes") of the applicant's assumptions made for each budget line item.

2. **Cost Effectiveness and Efficiency**:
The cost effectiveness of the organization's approach and its ability to affect a wide base of beneficiaries includes:
   a. Effectiveness of proposed cost control structure;
   b. Reasonableness of proposed labor cost and Expatriate salary;
   c. Budget transparency to effectively track expenditures;
   d. Subcontracting/making methods are clearly defined;
   e. Cost efficiency of proposed Other Direct Costs (ODCs)
   f. Applicant's market competitive pricing estimates of tangible items to be used for performance;
   g. Competitive pricing estimates and sound purchase methods of international and in-country air travel and surface transportation.

C. Technical versus Cost Considerations

For this RFA, technical considerations are more important than cost and other administrative elements.

D. Review and Selection Process

In accordance with ADS **303.3.6.4** the applications shall be reviewed and evaluated by a Technical Evaluation Committee using the evaluation criteria stated above in section V of this Request for Applications (RFA).

E. Anticipated Announcement and Award Dates

The Government anticipates an award resulting from this RFA by November 4, 2011.

VI. Award Administration Information

A. Award Notices
Following selection of an awardee, USAID will inform the successful applicant concerning the award. A notice of award signed by the Agreement Officer is the official authorizing document, which USAID will provide either electronically or in hard copy to the successful applicant's main point of contact. USAID also will notify unsuccessful applicants concerning their status after selection has been made.

B. A description of any deviations from standard provisions
There are no standard provisions deviations contemplated under this award.

C. Reporting
The Recipient shall submit Annual Implementation Plans (Work plan) and Reports for the Program

within format, content and time schedule substantially as described in details in Program Description. Implementation Plans and reports shall be prepared to be available for public reference and limited distribution. Financial or other proprietary information can be provided in an Addendum for USAID and noted in the Implementation Plan or report.

For a full listing of required Reports and reporting please see Program Description at Attachment A.

D. Demobilization and close-out
Six months prior to the completion date, the Recipient shall submit a Demobilization Plan for AOTR approval. The plan will include, at a minimum, a draft Property Disposition Plan to the Agreement Officer; a plan for the phase-out of in-country operations; a delivery schedule for all reports or other deliverables required under the Cooperative Agreement; and a timetable for completing all required actions in closing-out the award.

E. The resulting award will be administered in accordance with 22 CFR 226, OMB circulars and the Standard Provisions for U.S. Non-governmental Recipients.

VII. Agency Contacts

Naveen Kumar Srivastava
Senior Acquisition & Assistance Specialist
Regional Acquisition & Assistance Office
USAID/WA
No. 24, Fourth Circular Road, Cantonments
Accra. Ghana
Phone number: +233 (0) 302 741147
Email: nsrivastava@usaid.gov

Ms. Martina Wills
Regional Agreement Officer
Regional Acquisition & Assistance Office
USAID/WA
No. 24, Fourth Circular Road, Cantonments
Accra. Ghana
Phone number: +233 (0) 302 741663
Email: mwills@usaid.gov

VIII. Other Information

A. CERTIFICATIONS, ASSURANCES, OTHER STATEMENTS OF RECIPIENT REQUIRED FOR COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT AWARD (2006)

Note: When these Certification, Assurances, and Other Statements of Recipient are used for cooperative agreements, the term “Grant” means “Cooperative Agreement”.

PART I - CERTIFICATIONS AND ASSURANCES

1. ASSURANCE OF COMPLIANCE WITH LAWS AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING NON-DISCRIMINATION IN FEDERALLY ASSISTED PROGRAMS

_____ (hereinafter called the "Applicant")
(Name of Applicant)

hereby assures that no person in the United States shall, on the bases set forth below, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be otherwise subjected to discrimination under, any program or activity receiving financial assistance from USAID, and that with respect to the grant for which application is being made, it will comply with the requirements of:

(1) Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Pub. L. 88-352, 42 U.S.C. 2000-d), which prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color or national origin, in programs and activities receiving Federal financial assistance;

(2) Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. 794), which prohibits discrimination on the basis of handicap in programs and activities receiving Federal financial assistance;

(3) The Age Discrimination Act of 1975, as amended (Pub. L. 95-478), which prohibits discrimination based on age in the delivery of services and benefits supported with Federal funds;

(4) Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (20 U.S.C. 1681, et seq.), which prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex in education programs and activities receiving Federal financial assistance (whether or not the programs or activities are offered or sponsored by an educational institution); and

(5) USAID regulations implementing the above nondiscrimination laws set forth in Chapter II of Title 22 of the Code of Federal Regulations.

If the recipient is an institution of higher education, the Assurances given herein extend to admission practices and to all other practices relating to the treatment of students or clients of the institution, or relating to the opportunity to participate in the provision of services or other benefits to such individuals, and shall be applicable to the entire institution unless the recipient establishes to the satisfaction of the USAID Administrator that the institution's practices in designated parts or programs of the institution will in no way affect its practices in the program of the institution for which financial assistance is sought, or the beneficiaries of, or participants in, such programs.

This assurance is given in consideration of and for the purpose of obtaining any and all Federal grants, loans, contracts, property, discounts, or other Federal financial assistance extended after the date hereof to the recipient by the Agency, including installment payments after such date on account of applications for Federal financial assistance which were approved before such date. The recipient recognizes and agrees that such Federal financial assistance will be extended in reliance on the representations and agreements made in this Assurance, and that the United States shall have the right to seek judicial enforcement of this Assurance. This Assurance is binding on the recipient, its successors, transferees, and assignees, and the person or persons whose signatures appear below are authorized to sign this Assurance on behalf of the recipient.

2. CERTIFICATION REGARDING LOBBYING (SEE 22 CFR 227)

The undersigned certifies, to the best of his or her knowledge and belief, that:

(1) No Federal appropriated funds have been paid or will be paid, by or on behalf of the undersigned, to any person for influencing or attempting to influence an officer or employee of any agency, a Member of Congress, an officer or employee of Congress, or an employee of a Member of Congress in connection with the awarding of any Federal contract, the making of any Federal grant, the making of any Federal loan, the entering into of any cooperative agreement, and the extension, continuation, renewal, amendment or modification of any Federal contract, grant, loan, or cooperative agreement.

(2) If any funds other than Federal appropriated funds have been paid or will be paid to any person for influencing or attempting to influence an officer or employee of any agency, a Member of Congress, an officer or employee of Congress, or an employee of a Member of Congress in connection with this Federal contract, grant, loan, or cooperative agreement, the undersigned shall complete and submit Standard Form-LLL, "Disclosure of Lobbying Activities," in accordance with its instructions.

(3) The undersigned shall require that the language of this certification be included in the award documents for all subawards at all tiers (including subcontracts, subgrants, and contracts under grants, loans, and cooperative agreements) and that all sub recipients shall certify and disclose accordingly.

This certification is a material representation of fact upon which reliance was placed when this transaction was made or entered into. Submission of this certification is a prerequisite for making or entering into this transaction imposed by section 1352, title 31, United States Code. Any person who fails to file the required certification shall be subject to a civil penalty of not less than $10,000 and not more than $100,000 for each such failure.

Statement for Loan Guarantees and Loan Insurance

The undersigned states, to the best of his or her knowledge and belief, that: If any funds have been paid or will be paid to any person for influencing or attempting to influence an officer or employee of any agency, a Member of Congress, an officer or employee of Congress, or an employee of a Member of Congress in connection with this commitment providing for the United States to insure or guarantee a loan, the undersigned shall complete and submit Standard Form-LLL, "Disclosure Form to Report Lobbying," in accordance with its instructions. Submission of this statement is a prerequisite for making or entering into this transaction imposed by section 1352, title 31, U.S. Code. Any person who fails to file the required statement shall be subject to a civil penalty of not less than $10,000 and not more than $100,000 for each such failure.

3. PROHIBITION ON ASSISTANCE TO DRUG TRAFFICKERS FOR COVERED COUNTRIES AND INDIVIDUALS (ADS 206)

USAID reserves the right to terminate this Agreement, to demand a refund or take other appropriate measures if the Grantee is found to have been convicted of a narcotics offense or to have been engaged in drug trafficking as defined in 22 CFR Part 140. The undersigned shall review USAID ADS 206 to determine if any certifications are required for Key Individuals or Covered Participants.

If there are COVERED PARTICIPANTS: USAID reserves the right to terminate assistance to, or take or take other appropriate measures with respect to, any participant approved by USAID who is found to have been convicted of a narcotics offense or to have been engaged in drug trafficking as defined in 22 CFR Part 140.

4. CERTIFICATION REGARDING TERRORIST FINANCING IMPLEMENTING EXECUTIVE ORDER 13224

By signing and submitting this application, the prospective recipient provides the certification set out below:

1. The Recipient, to the best of its current knowledge, did not provide, within the previous ten years, and will take all reasonable steps to ensure that it does not and will not knowingly provide, material support or resources to any individual or entity that commits, attempts to commit, advocates, facilitates, or

participates in terrorist acts, or has committed, attempted to commit, facilitated, or participated in terrorist acts, as that term is defined in paragraph 3.

2. The following steps may enable the Recipient to comply with its obligations under paragraph 1:

   a. Before providing any material support or resources to an individual or entity, the Recipient will verify that the individual or entity does not (i) appear on the master list of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons, which list is maintained by the U.S. Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) and is available online at OFAC's website : http://www.treas.gov/offices/eotffc/ofac/sdn/t11sdn.pdf, or (ii) is not included in any supplementary information concerning prohibited individuals or entities that may be provided by USAID to the Recipient.

   b. Before providing any material support or resources to an individual or entity, the Recipient also will verify that the individual or entity has not been designated by the United Nations Security (UNSC) sanctions committee established under UNSC Resolution 1267 (1999) (the "1267 Committee") [individuals and entities linked to the Taliban, Osama bin Laden, or the Al Qaeda Organization]. To determine whether there has been a published designation of an individual or entity by the 1267 Committee, the Recipient should refer to the consolidated list available online at the Committee's website: http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1267/1267ListEng.htm.

   c. Before providing any material support or resources to an individual or entity, the Recipient will consider all information about that individual or entity of which it is aware and all public information that is reasonably available to it or of which it should be aware.

   d. The Recipient also will implement reasonable monitoring and oversight procedures to safeguard against assistance being diverted to support terrorist activity.

3. For purposes of this Certification-

   a. "Material support and resources" means currency or monetary instruments or financial securities, financial services, lodging, training, expert advice or assistance, safehouses, false documentation or identification, communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel, transportation, and other physical assets, except medicine or religious materials."

   b. "Terrorist act" means-

   (i) An act prohibited pursuant to one of the 12 United Nations Conventions and Protocols related to terrorism (see UN terrorism conventions Internet site: http://untreaty.un.org/English/Terrorism.asp); or

   (ii) An act of premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents; or

   (iii) any other act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other person not taking an active part in hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.

   c. "Entity" means a partnership, association, corporation, or other organization, group or subgroup.

   d. References in this Certification to the provision of material support and resources shall not be deemed to include the furnishing of USAID funds or USAID-financed commodities to the ultimate beneficiaries of USAID assistance, such as recipients of food, medical care, micro-enterprise loans, shelter, etc., unless the Recipient has reason to believe that one or more of these beneficiaries commits, attempts to commit, advocates, facilitates, or participates in terrorist acts, or has committed, attempted to commit, facilitated or participated in terrorist acts.

e. The Recipient's obligations under paragraph 1 are not applicable to the procurement of goods and/or services by the Recipient that are acquired in the ordinary course of business through contract or purchase, e.g., utilities, rents, office supplies, gasoline, etc., unless the Recipient has reason to believe that a vendor or supplier of such goods and services commits, attempts to commit, advocates, facilitates, or participates in terrorist acts, or has committed, attempted to commit, facilitated or participated in terrorist acts.

This Certification is an express term and condition of any agreement issued as a result of this application, and any violation of it shall be grounds for unilateral termination of the agreement by USAID prior to the end of its term.

5. CERTIFICATION OF RECIPIENT

By signing below the recipient provides certifications and assurances for (1) the Assurance of Compliance with Laws and Regulations Governing Non-Discrimination in Federally Assisted Programs, (2) the Certification Regarding Lobbying, (3) the Prohibition on Assistance to Drug Traffickers for Covered Countries and Individuals (ADS 206) and (4) the Certification Regarding Terrorist Financing Implementing Executive Order 13224 above.

RFA/APS No. _____

Application No. _____

Date of Application _____

Name of Recipient _____

Typed Name and Title _____

Signature _____

Date _____

6. CERTIFICATION REGARDING DRUG-FREE WORKPLACE REQUIREMENTS

(a) Instructions for Certification

(1) By signing and/or submitting this application or grant, the recipient is providing the certification set out below.

(2) The certification set out below is a material representation of fact upon which reliance was placed when the agency determined to award the Cooperative Agreement. If it is later determined that the recipient knowingly rendered a false certification, or otherwise violates the requirements of the Drug-Free Workplace Act, the agency, in addition to any other remedies available to the Federal Government, may take action authorized under the Drug-Free Workplace Act.

(3) For recipients other than individuals, Alternate I applies.
(4) For recipients who are individuals, Alternate II applies.

(b) Certification Regarding Drug-Free Workplace Requirements

Alternate I

(1) The recipient certifies that it will provide a drug-free workplace by:

(A) Publishing a statement notifying employees that the unlawful manufacture, distribution, dispensing, possession or use of a controlled substance is prohibited in the applicant's/grantee's workplace and specifying the actions that will be taken against employees for violation of such prohibition;

(B) Establishing a drug-free awareness program to inform employees about--

1. The dangers of drug abuse in the workplace;
2. The recipient's policy of maintaining a drug-free workplace;
3. Any available drug counseling, rehabilitation, and employee assistance programs; and
4. The penalties that may be imposed upon employees for drug abuse violations occurring in the workplace;

(C) Making it a requirement that each employee to be engaged in the performance of the Cooperative Agreement be given a copy of the statement required by paragraph (b)(1)(A);

(D) Notifying the employee in the statement required by paragraph (b)(1)(A) that, as a condition of employment under the Cooperative Agreement, the employee will—

1. Abide by the terms of the statement; and
2. Notify the employer of any criminal drug statute conviction for a violation occurring in the workplace no later than five days after such conviction;

(E) Notifying the agency within ten days after receiving notice under subparagraph (b)(1)(D)1. from an employee or otherwise receiving actual notice of such conviction;

(F) Taking one of the following actions, within 30 days of receiving notice under subparagraph (b)(1)(D)2., with respect to any employee who is so convicted—

1. Taking appropriate personnel action against such an employee, up to and including termination; or
2. Requiring such employee to participate satisfactorily in a drug abuse assistance or rehabilitation program approved for such purposes by a Federal, State, or local health, law enforcement, or other appropriate agency;

(G) Making a good faith effort to continue to maintain a drug- free workplace through implementation of paragraphs (b)(1)(A), (b)(1)(B), (b)(1)(C), (b)(1)(D), (b)(1)(E) and (b)(1)(F).

(2) The recipient shall insert in the space provided below the site(s) for the performance of work done in connection with the specific Cooperative Agreement:

Place of Performance (Street address, city, county, state, zip code)

_____
_____
_____
_____

Alternate II

The recipient certifies that, as a condition of the Cooperative Agreement, he or she will not engage in the unlawful manufacture, distribution, dispensing, possession or use of a controlled substance in conducting any activity with the Cooperative Agreement.

7. CERTIFICATION REGARDING DEBARMENT, SUSPENSION, AND OTHER RESPONSIBILITY MATTERS -- PRIMARY COVERED TRANSACTIONS

(a) Instructions for Certification

1. By signing and submitting this application, the prospective primary participant is providing the

certification set out below.

2. The inability of a person to provide the certification required below will not necessarily result in denial of participation in this covered transaction. The prospective participant shall submit an explanation of why it cannot provide the certification set out below. The certification or explanation will be considered in connection with the department or agency's determination whether to enter into this transaction. However, failure of the prospective primary participant to furnish a certification or an explanation shall disqualify such person from participation in this transaction.

3. The certification in this clause is a material representation of fact upon which reliance was placed when the department or agency determined to enter into this transaction. If it is later determined that the prospective primary participant knowingly rendered an erroneous certification, in addition to other remedies available to the Federal Government, the department or agency may terminate this transaction for cause or default.

4. The prospective primary participant shall provide immediate written notice to the department or agency to whom this application is submitted if at any time the prospective primary participant learns that its certification was erroneous when submitted or has become erroneous by reason of changed circumstances.

5. The terms "covered transaction," "debarred," "suspended," "ineligible," lower tier covered transaction," "participant," "person," "primary covered transaction," "principal," "application," and "voluntarily excluded," as used in this clause, have the meaning set out in the Definitions and Coverage sections of the rules implementing Executive Order 12549. [4] You may contact the department or agency to which this application is being submitted for assistance in obtaining a copy of those regulations.

6. The prospective primary participant agrees by submitting this application that, should the proposed covered transaction be entered into, it shall not knowingly enter into any lower tier covered transaction with a person who is debarred, suspended, declared ineligible, or voluntarily excluded from participation in this covered transaction, unless authorized by the department or agency entering into this transaction.

7. The prospective primary participant further agrees by submitting this application that it will include the clause titled "Certification Regarding Debarment, Suspension, Ineligibility and Voluntary Exclusion--Lower Tier Covered Transaction," [5] provided by the department or agency entering into this covered transaction, without modification, in all lower tier covered transactions and in all solicitations for lower tier covered transactions.

8. A participant in a covered transaction may rely upon a certification of a prospective participant in a lower tier covered transaction that it is not debarred, suspended, ineligible, or voluntarily excluded from the covered transaction, unless it knows that the certification is erroneous. A participant may decide the methods and frequency by which it determines the eligibility of its principals. Each participant may, but is not required to, check the Non-procurement List.

9. Nothing contained in the foregoing shall be construed to require establishment of a system of records in order to render in good faith the certification required by this clause. The knowledge and information of a participant is not required to exceed that which is normally possessed by a prudent person in the ordinary course of business dealing.

10. Except for transactions authorized under paragraph 6 of these instructions, if a participant in a covered transaction knowingly enters into a lower tier covered transaction with a person who is suspended, debarred, ineligible, or voluntarily excluded from participation in this transaction, in addition to other remedies available to the Federal Government, the department or agency may terminate this transaction for cause or default.

(b) Certification Regarding Debarment, Suspension, and Other Responsibility Matters--Primary Covered Transactions

(1) The prospective primary participant certifies to the best of its knowledge and belief, that it and its principals:

(A)Are not presently debarred, suspended, proposed for debarment, declared ineligible, or voluntarily excluded from covered transactions by any Federal department or agency;

(B) Have not within a three-year period preceding this application been convicted of or had a civil judgment rendered against them for commission of fraud or a criminal offense in connection with obtaining, attempting to obtain, or performing a public (Federal, State or local) transaction or contract under a public transaction; violation of Federal or State antitrust statutes or commission of embezzlement, theft, forgery, bribery, falsification or destruction of records, making false statements, or receiving stolen property;

(C) Are not presently indicted for or otherwise criminally or civilly charged by a governmental entity (Federal, State or local) with commission of any of the offenses enumerated in paragraph (1)(B) of this certification; (D) Have not within a three-year period preceding this application/application had one or more public transactions (Federal, State or local) terminated for cause or default.

(2) Where the prospective primary participant is unable to certify to any of the statements in this certification, such prospective participant shall attach an explanation to this application.

PART II - KEY INDIVIDUAL CERTIFICATION NARCOTICS OFFENSES AND DRUG TRAFFICKING

I hereby certify that within the last ten years:

1. I have not been convicted of a violation of, or a conspiracy to violate, any law or regulation of the United States or any other country concerning narcotic or psychotropic drugs or other controlled substances.

2. I am not and have not been an illicit trafficker in any such drug or controlled substance.

3. I am not and have not been a knowing assistor, abettor, conspirator, or colluder with others in the illicit trafficking in any such drug or substance.

Signature: _____
Date: _____ (MM/DD/YYYY)
Name: _____
Title/Position: _____
Organization: _____
Address: _____
_____
Date of Birth: _____

NOTICE:

1. You are required to sign this Certification under the provisions of 22 CFR Part 140, Prohibition on Assistance to Drug Traffickers. These regulations were issued by the Department of State and require that certain key individuals of organizations must sign this Certification.

2. If you make a false Certification you are subject to U.S. criminal prosecution under 18 U.S.C. 1001.

PART III - PARTICIPANT CERTIFICATION NARCOTICS OFFENSES AND DRUG TRAFFICKING (SEE ADS 206)

1. I hereby certify that within the last ten years:

a. I have not been convicted of a violation of, or a conspiracy to violate, any law or regulation of the United States or any other country concerning narcotic or psychotropic drugs or other controlled substances.

b. I am not and have not been an illicit trafficker in any such drug or controlled substance.

c. I am not or have not been a knowing assistor, abettor, conspirator, or colluder with others in the illicit trafficking in any such drug or substance.

2. I understand that USAID may terminate my training if it is determined that I engaged in the above conduct during the last ten years or during my USAID training.

Signature: _____
Name: _____
Date: _____
Address: _____
_____
Date of Birth: _____

NOTICE:

1. You are required to sign this Certification under the provisions of 22 CFR Part 140, Prohibition on Assistance to Drug Traffickers. These regulations were issued by the Department of State and require that certain participants must sign this Certification.

2. If you make a false Certification you are subject to U.S. criminal prosecution under 18 U.S.C. 1001.

PART IV - "PROHIBITION ON THE PROMOTION OR ADVOCACY OF THE LEGALIZATION OR PRACTICE OF PROSTITUTION OR SEX TRAFFICKING (ASSISTANCE) (APRIL 2010)

(a) The U.S. Government is opposed to prostitution and related activities, which are inherently harmful and dehumanizing, and contribute to the phenomenon of trafficking in persons. None of the funds made available under this agreement may be used to promote or advocate the legalization or practice of prostitution or sex trafficking. Nothing in the preceding sentence shall be construed to preclude the provision to individuals of palliative care, treatment, or post-exposure pharmaceutical prophylaxis, and necessary pharmaceuticals and commodities, including test kits, condoms, and, when proven effective, microbicides.

(b)(1) Except as provided in (b)(2) and (b)(3), by accepting this award or any subaward, a nongovernmental Organization or public international organization awardee/subawardee agrees that it is opposed to the practices of prostitution and sex trafficking because of the psychological and physical risks they pose for women, men, and children.[9]

[9] The following footnote should only be included in awards to Alliance for Open Society International (AOSI), Pathfinder, or a member of the Global Health Council (GHC) or InterAction (with the exception of DKT International, Inc.):

"Any enforcement of this clause is subject to Alliance for Open Society International v. USAID, 05 Civ. 8209 (S.D.N.Y., orders filed on June 29, 2006 and August 8, 2008) (orders granting preliminary injunction) for the term of the Orders."

The lists of members of GHC and InterAction can be found at:
http://www.usaid.gov/business/business_opportunities/cib/pdf/GlobalHealthMemberlist.pdf

(b)(2) The following organizations are exempt from (b)(1): the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria; the World Health Organization; the International AIDS Vaccine Initiative; and any United Nations agency.

(b)(3) Contractors and subcontractors are exempt from (b)(1) if the contract or subcontract is for commercial items and services as defined in FAR 2.101, such as pharmaceuticals, medical supplies, logistics support, data management, and freight forwarding.

(b)(4) Notwithstanding section (b)(3), not exempt from (b)(1) are recipients, subrecipients, contractors, and subcontractors that implement HIV/AIDS programs under this assistance award,
any subaward, or procurement contract or subcontract by:

(i) providing supplies or services directly to the final populations receiving such supplies or services in host countries;

(ii) providing technical assistance and training directly to host country individuals or entities on the provision of supplies or services to the final populations receiving such supplies and services; or

(iii) providing the types of services listed in FAR 37.203(b)(1)-(6) that involve giving advice about substantive policies of a recipient, giving advice regarding the activities referenced in (i) and (ii), or making decisions or functioning in a recipient's chain of command (e.g., providing managerial or supervisory services approving financial transactions, personnel actions).

(c) The following definitions apply for purposes of this provision:

"Commercial sex act" means any sex act on account of which anything of value is given to or received by any person.

"Prostitution" means procuring or providing any commercial sex act and the "practice of prostitution" has the same meaning.

"Sex trafficking" means the recruitment, harboring, transportation, provision, or obtaining of a
person for the purpose of a commercial sex act. 22 U.S.C. 7102(9).

(d) The recipient shall insert this provision, which is a standard provision, in all subawards, procurement contracts or subcontracts.

(e) This provision includes express terms and conditions of the award and any violation of it shall be grounds for unilateral termination of the award by USAID prior to the end of its term.

PART V - SURVEY ON ENSURING EQUAL OPPORTUNITY FOR APPLICANTS

(The applicant's completion of the survey is voluntary. Applicants who volunteer to complete and submit the survey under a competitive or non-competitive action are instructed within the text of the survey to submit it as part of the application process.)

PART VI - SUPPORTING USAID'S DISABILITY POLICY IN COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS

"USAID Disability Policy - Assistance (December 2004)

(a) The objectives of the USAID Disability Policy are (1) to enhance the attainment of United States foreign assistance program goals by promoting the participation and equalization of opportunities of individuals with disabilities in USAID policy, country and sector strategies, activity designs and implementation; (2) to increase awareness of issues of people with disabilities both within USAID programs and in host countries; (3) to engage other U.S. government agencies, host country counterparts, governments, implementing organizations and other donors in fostering a climate of nondiscrimination against people with disabilities; and (4) to support international advocacy for people with disabilities. The full text of the policy paper can be found at the following website:

http://www.usaid.gov/about/disability/DISABPOL.FIN.html

(b) USAID therefore requires that the recipient not discriminate against people with disabilities in the implementation of USAID funded programs and that it make every effort to comply with the objectives of the USAID Disability Policy in performing the program under this cooperative agreement. To that end and to the extent it can accomplish this goal within the scope of the program objectives, the recipient should demonstrate a comprehensive and consistent approach for including men, women and children with disabilities."

PART VII - OTHER STATEMENTS OF RECIPIENT

1. AUTHORIZED INDIVIDUALS

The recipient represents that the following persons are authorized to negotiate on its behalf with the Government and to bind the recipient in connection with this application or grant:

Name	Title	Telephone No.	Email Address

2. TAXPAYER IDENTIFICATION NUMBER (TIN)

If the recipient is a U.S. organization, or a foreign organization which has income effectively connected with the conduct of activities in the U.S. or has an office or a place of business or a fiscal paying agent in the U.S., please indicate the recipient's TIN:

TIN: _____

3. CONTRACTOR IDENTIFICATION NUMBER - DATA UNIVERSAL NUMBERING SYSTEM (DUNS) NUMBER

(a) In the space provided at the end of this provision, the recipient should supply the Data Universal Numbering System (DUNS) number applicable to that name and address. Recipients should take care to report the number that identifies the recipient's name and address exactly as stated in the application.

(b) The DUNS is a 9-digit number assigned by Dun and Bradstreet Information Services. If the recipient does not have a DUNS number, the recipient should call Dun and Bradstreet directly at 1-800-333-0505. A DUNS number will be provided immediately by telephone at no charge to the recipient. The recipient should be prepared to provide the following information:

(1) Recipient's name.
(2) Recipient's address.
(3) Recipient's telephone number.
(4) Line of business.
(5) Chief executive officer/key manager.
(6) Date the organization was started.
(7) Number of people employed by the recipient.
(8) Company affiliation.

(c) Recipients located outside the United States may obtain the location and phone number of the local Dun and Bradstreet Information Services office from the Internet Home Page at http://www.dbisna.com/dbis/customer/custlist.htm . If a recipient is unable to locate a local service center, it may send an e-mail to Dun and Bradstreet at globalinfo@dbisma.com .

The DUNS system is distinct from the Federal Taxpayer Identification Number (TIN) system.

DUNS: _____

4. LETTER OF CREDIT (LOC) NUMBER

If the recipient has an existing Letter of Credit (LOC) with USAID, please indicate the LOC number:

LOC: _____

5. PROCUREMENT INFORMATION

(a) Applicability. This applies to the procurement of goods and services planned by the recipient (i.e., contracts, purchase orders, etc.) from a supplier of goods or services for the direct use or benefit of the recipient in conducting the program supported by the grant, and not to assistance provided by the recipient (i.e., a subgrant or subagreement) to a subgrantee or sub recipient in support of the sub grantee's or sub recipient's program. Provision by the recipient of the requested information does not, in and of itself, constitute USAID approval.

(b) Amount of Procurement. Please indicate the total estimated dollar amount of goods and services which the recipient plans to purchase under the grant:

$ _____

(c) Nonexpendable Property. If the recipient plans to purchase nonexpendable equipment which would require the approval of the Agreement Officer, please indicate below (using a continuation page, as necessary) the types, quantities of each, and estimated unit costs. Nonexpendable equipment for which the Agreement Officer's approval to purchase is required is any article of nonexpendable tangible personal property charged directly to the grant, having a useful life of more than one year and an acquisition cost of $5,000 or more per unit.

TYPE/DESCRIPTION (Generic)	QUANTITY	ESTIMATED UNIT COST

(d) Source, Origin, and Componentry of Goods. If the recipient plans to purchase any goods/commodities which are not of U.S. source and/or U.S. origin, please indicate below (using a continuation page, as necessary) the types and quantities of each, estimated unit costs of each, and probable source and/or origin. "Source" means the country from which a commodity is shipped to the cooperating country or the cooperating country itself if the commodity is located therein at the time of purchase. However, where a commodity is shipped from a free port or bonded warehouse in the form in which received therein, "source" means the country from which the commodity was shipped to the free port or bonded warehouse. Any commodity whose source is a non-Free World country is ineligible for USAID financing. The "origin" of a commodity is the country or area in which a commodity is mined, grown, or produced. A commodity is produced when: through manufacturing, processing, or substantial and major assembling of components, a commercially recognized new commodity results, which is substantially different in basic characteristics or in purpose or utility from its components. Merely packaging various items together for a particular procurement or relabeling items does not constitute production of a commodity. Any commodity whose origin is a non-Free World country is ineligible for USAID financing. "Components" are the goods which go directly into the production of a produced commodity. Any component from a non-Free World country makes the commodity ineligible for USAID financing.

TYPE/DESCRIPTION	QUANTITY	ESTIMATED GOODS	PROBABLE GOODS

PROBABLE
(Generic) UNIT COST COMPONENTS SOURCE COMPONENTS ORIGIN

(e) Restricted Goods. If the recipient plans to purchase any restricted goods, please indicate below (using a continuation page, as necessary) the types and quantities of each, estimated unit costs of each, intended use, and probable source and/or origin. Restricted goods are Agricultural Commodities, Motor Vehicles, Pharmaceuticals, Pesticides, Rubber Compounding Chemicals and Plasticizers, Used Equipment, U.S. Government-Owned Excess Property, and Fertilizer.

TYPE/DESCRIPTION QUANTITY ESTIMATED PROBABLE INTENDED USE
(Generic) UNIT COST SOURCE ORIGIN

(f) Supplier Nationality. If the recipient plans to purchase any goods or services from suppliers of goods and services whose nationality is not in the U.S., please indicate below (using a continuation page, as necessary) the types and quantities of each good or service, estimated costs of each, probable nationality of each non-U.S. supplier of each good or service, and the rationale for purchasing from a non-U.S. supplier. Any supplier whose nationality is a non-Free World country is ineligible for USAID financing.

TYPE/DESCRIPTION QUANTITY ESTIMATED PROBABLE SLUPPIER NATIONALITY RATIONALE
(Generic) UNIT COST (Non-US Only) for NON-US

(g) Proposed Disposition. If the recipient plans to purchase any nonexpendable equipment with a unit acquisition cost of $5,000 or more, please indicate below (using a continuation page, as necessary) the proposed disposition of each such item. Generally, the recipient may either retain the property for other uses and make compensation to USAID (computed by applying the percentage of federal participation in the cost of the original program to the current fair market value of the property), or sell the property and reimburse USAID an amount computed by applying to the sales proceeds the percentage of federal participation in the cost of the original program (except that the recipient may deduct from the federal share $500 or 10% of the proceeds, whichever is greater, for selling and handling expenses), or donate the property to a host country institution, or otherwise dispose of the property as instructed by USAID.

TYPE/DESCRIPTION (Generic) QUANTITY ESTIMATED UNIT COST PROPOSED DISPOSITION

6. PAST PERFORMANCE REFERENCES

On a continuation page, please provide a list of the most recent and/or current U.S. Government and/or privately-funded contracts, grants, cooperative agreements, etc., and the name, address, and telephone number of the Contract/Agreement Officer or other contact person.

7. TYPE OF ORGANIZATION

The recipient, by checking the applicable box, represents that -

(a) If the recipient is a U.S. entity, it operates as [ ] a corporation incorporated under the laws of the State of _____, [ ] an individual, [ ] a partnership, [ ] a nongovernmental nonprofit organization, [ ] a state or local governmental organization, [ ] a private college or university, [ ] a public college or university, [ ] an international organization, or [ ] a joint venture; or

(b) If the recipient is a non-U.S. entity, it operates as [ ] a corporation organized under the laws of _____ (country), [ ] an individual, [ ] a partnership, [ ] a nongovernmental nonprofit organization, [ ] a nongovernmental educational institution, [ ] a governmental organization, [ ] an international organization, or [ ] a joint venture.

8. ESTIMATED COSTS OF COMMUNICATIONS PRODUCTS

The following are the estimate(s) of the cost of each separate communications product (i.e., any printed material [other than non- color photocopy material], photographic services, or video production services) which is anticipated under the grant. Each estimate must include all the costs associated with preparation and execution of the product. Use a continuation page as necessary.

The recipient must obtain from each identified subgrantee and sub-contractor the required as necessary Certifications and statements pursuant to ADS 303.3.8 and 303.3.9 (herein listed above), and submit with its application/proposal.

B. ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE

1.a) The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, Section 117 requires that the impact of USAID's activities on the environment be considered, and that USAID include environmental sustainability as a central consideration in designing and carrying out its development programs. This mandate is codified in Federal Regulations (22 CFR 216) and in USAID's Automated Directives System (ADS) Parts 201.5.10g and 204 (http://www.usaid.gov/policy/ADS/200/), which, in part, require that the potential environmental impacts of USAID-financed activities are identified prior to a final decision to proceed, and that appropriate environmental safeguards are adopted for all activities.

1.b) In addition, recipients of USAID-funded awards must comply with host country environmental regulations unless otherwise directed in writing by USAID. In case of conflict between host country and USAID regulations, the latter shall govern.

Activities that will be implemented under the PEDERS program will be designed and monitored so as to remain compliant with the Programmatic Initial Environmental Examination (IEE) currently in place for the USAID/WA Peace and Governance Office - USAID-WA_Peace_Security_IEE_Amend_092309 (approved by the Bureau Environmental Officer on 09/23/09). IEE is at Attachment D.

Some activities described in the Program Description mentioned are determined to be Categorical Exclusions per 22 CFR 216.2 (c) (2) (i), education, technical assistance, training; (iii) analyses, studies academic research workshops or meetings; (v) document and information transfers; (xiv) studies to develop the capability of recipient countries to engage in development planning. These activities have no effect on the environment and are categorically excluded from further environmental review. However, implementation through sub-grants will require environmental review and screening. This may lead to environmental review reports. The IEE recommends a negative determination with conditions for sub awards per 22 CFR 216.3 (a) (2) (iii).

2.0 Conditions for small-scale infrastructure

For the rehabilitation of existing facilities, and for construction of facilities in which the total surface area disturbed is less than 10,000 square feet (1,000 sq meters), and where no protected or other sensitive environmental areas could be affected, the condition is that these activities will be conducted following principles for environmentally sound construction as provided in the Chapter 3: Small Scale Construction of EGSSAA *http://www.encapafrica.org/EGSSAA/Word_English/construction.doc*.

For the construction of any facilities in which the total surface area disturbed exceeds 10,000 square feet (1,000 square meters), the program shall conduct a supplemental environmental review according to guidance in Annex G (www.encapafrica.org/EPTM/AnnexG EPTM_Mar2005b.pdf) of the Africa Bureau Environmental Procedures Training Manual (EPTM) (http://www.encapafrica.org/eptm.htm). Construction will not begin until such a review is completed and approved by the Mission Environmental Officer or REA".

Applicants that propose small-scale construction per the definition above must state in their applications how they will comply with Chapter 3 of the EGSSAA. For those that propose construction in excess of 10,000 sq ft., must explain how they will comply with the requirement for the supplemental environmental review according to guidance in Annex G.

3.0 Conditions for sub-grants
Any sub-grants to support this project's activities must incorporate provisions that the activities to be undertaken will comply with the environmental determinations and recommendations of the IEE. This includes assurance that the activities conducted with USAID funds fit within those described in the approved IEE or IEE amendment and that any mitigating measures required for those activities be followed. In addition, environmental screening will be required.

The AFR Environmental Review Form and process, including supplemental NRM checklist, will be used for all PEDERS small grants made after the effective date of this IEE. The form is available at www.encapafrica.org/documents/AFR-EnvReviewForm-20Dec2010.doc.

Implementing partners will take into consideration potential environmental impacts during the design and implementation process to achieve an environmentally-sound project design and to promote program sustainability. They will screen proposed activities according to the *Africa Bureau Environmental Report Form Review Process*, which is described in the **Bureau's Environmental Procedures Training Manual,** "*Annex G: Umbrella IEEs and Subgrant Environmental Screening*," as well as in the **Africa Bureau Environmental Guidelines, Part III.** Both can be found at http://www.encapafrica.org/resources.htm (Attached to this IEE as Annex 1). As described there, the screening categories include the following: *Very low risk* - activities that would normally qualify for a categorical exclusion under Reg. 216; *Moderate risk or unknown risk* - activities that would normally qualify for a negative determination under Reg. 216; *High risk* - activities that have a clear potential for undesirable environmental impacts and typically under Reg. 216 require an Environmental Assessment; and *High risk – typically not funded* - activities that either USAID cannot fund or for which specific findings must be made in an Environmental Assessment prior to funding.

The USAID/West Africa shall be responsible for, first, clearing the implementing partner's category determination of sub-grant activities. Classifications of *Moderate or unknown risk or higher* will be referred to the Mission Environmental Officer along with any required Environmental Review Reports (ERRs). All classifications of *High risk* and their ERRs must be approved by the Bureau Environmental Officer (BEO).

When ERRs are necessary, implementing partners will observe recommendations in the ***Africa Bureau-EGSSAA*** for relevant sectors when developing mitigation actions and monitoring plans. Once the ERRs are approved, project implementers should ensure mitigation measures and monitoring procedures described therein are in place as they will be considered requirements.

Note: The full process as described on page 1 of the form must be implemented, and activities funded by the grant may not commence until the submitted form and entailed environmental review report, if any, is approved by the AOTR and Regional Environmental Advisor (REA). The PEDERS project is responsible for assuring, and grant activities may only commence, after grantees demonstrate their ability to undertake indicated mitigation and monitoring".

C. GOVERNMENT FURNISHED PROPERTY

USAID/WA anticipates transferring equipment, vehicles and other items from current project in these countries that is considered useful and suitable for PEDERS program management. A list of such items/equipment shall be provided at a later date to enable the recipients take stock of and budget accordingly.

D. BRANDING AND MARKING

1. Branding and Marking Requirements for PEDERS will conform to ADS 320.3.3 (effective 01/08/2007 and revised 05/05/2009). It is a federal statutory and regulatory requirement that all USAID programs, projects, activities, public communications, and commodities that USAID partially or fully funds under a USAID grant or cooperative agreement or other assistance award or sub award, must be marked appropriately overseas with the USAID Identity. USAID will require

the submission of a Branding Strategy and a Marking Plan by the apparent successful applicant under this RFA.

Applicants may want to consider any relevant exceptions to regular USAID branding and marking requirements. USAID's policy provides parameters and guidance on specific areas of consideration and may be relevant for the purposes of carrying out CVE activities in West Africa. Applicants should ensure that their illustrative budget(s) and costs proposals reflect their proposed branding and marking plan. For more information, see: http://www.usaid.gov/branding/assistance.html.

2. BRANDING STRATEGY AND MARKING PLAN - Pre-award Review and Approval:
USAID Agreement Officer is required to request, review and negotiate the Apparently Successful Applicant's Branding Strategy and Marking Plan and require any changes to the Branding Strategy and Marking Plan, approve the Branding Strategy and Marking Plan, and include the Branding Strategy and Marking Plan as part of the assistance award. USAID will not competitively evaluate the proposed Branding Strategy and Marking Plan.

   If the Apparently Successful Applicant fails to submit or negotiate an acceptable Branding Strategy and Marking Plan timely, that Applicant becomes ineligible for award.

E. GENDER ISSUES INTEGRATION/CONSIDERATIONS

Gender issues are central to the achievement of strategic plans and Assistance Objectives, and USAID strives to promote gender equality, in which both men and women have equal opportunity to benefit from and contribute to economic, social, cultural and political development; enjoy socially valued resources and rewards; and realize their human rights. USAID is committed to strengthening women's rights and strives to increase the contributions women make to economic, political, and social development.

Program activities under PEDERS should assess gender dynamics and women's roles as part of the resiliency framework that supports violence prevention and Applicants should develop appropriate gender analyses and program components in their proposals to fully address gender issues. In order to ensure that USAID assistance makes the optimal contribution to gender equality, performance management systems and evaluations at the project or activity levels must include gender-sensitive indicators and sex-disaggregated data [Please see ADS 203.3.4.3, Reflecting Gender Issues in Performance Indicators]. Project reports include narration of changes in gender norms and gender-related constraints to implementation or opportunities arisen. All people-level indicators must be disaggregated by sex.

F. MANDATORY STANDARD PROVISIONS

In accordance with OMB issued Interim Final Guidance in the Federal Register are included in full text at Attachment E.

1. CENTRAL CONTRACTOR REGISTRATION AND UNIVERSAL IDENTIFIER (OCTOBER 2010)
2. REPORTING SUBAWARDS AND EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (OCTOBER 2010)
3. TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS (OCTOBER 2010)
4. HOMELAND SECURITY PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE-12 (SEPTEMBER 2006)

ATTACHMENT A

PROGRAM DESCRIPTION – PEDERS

Peace through Development and Expanded Regional Stability Program (PEDERS)

LIST OF ACRONYMS

AO	Agreement Officer
AOTR	Agreement Officer's Technical Representative
AQIM	Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
BRIGHT	Burkinabe Response to Improve Girls' Chances to Succeed
CA	Cooperative Agreement
CAP	Capable Partners Program
CBO	Community Based Organization
CFR	Code of Federal Regulations
CE	Counter(ing) Extremism
CMSE	Civil Military Support Element
CSO	Civil Society Organization
CVE	Counter(ing) Violent Extremism
DG	Democracy and Governance
DOD	U.S. Department of Defense
DOS	U.S. Department of State
GIRM	Government of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania
GOBF	Government of Burkina Faso
HAP	Humanitarian Assistance Program
IDASA	Institute for Democratic Alternatives in South Africa
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organization
LSGA	Limited Scope Grant Agreement
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MIST	Military Information Support Team
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
ORB	Opinion Research Business
PD	Public Diplomacy Office of American Embassy
PDEV	Peace through Development Program
PEDERS	Peace through Development and Expanded Regional Stability Program
PIR	Project Implementation Review
PMP	Project Management Plan
RFA	Request for Application
TSCTP	Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USAID/WA	West Africa Regional Mission of USAID
USG	United States Government
VE	Violent Extremism

PURPOSE, GOALS AND OBJECTIVES

The USAID/West Africa Regional Mission desires to implement a set of activities through a five-year Cooperative Agreement to reduce the risk of instability and increase resiliency to violent extremism in four countries in West Africa including Chad, Niger, Mauritania and Burkina Faso.

The program is designed to support USAID/West Africa's goals and objectives in countering violent extremism in the Sahel, which is part of the larger, multi-U.S. Government Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP).

With this RFA, USAID/West Africa (USAID/WA) envisions a new regional program, entitled Peace through Development and Expanded Regional Stability (PEDERS) that builds on previous support to USAID's TSCTP activities in West Africa. The current program, entitled Peace through Development (PDEV), has a contract end date of September 26, 2011. With this RFA, USAID/WA intends to expand its efforts to support counter-extremism in the Sahel through a regional program focused on four key countries experiencing threats to stability and a resultant weak enabling environment to resist violent extremism.

Modification and expansion of the achievements and results of USAID's past and current TSCTP activities should be considered in the context of the changing political circumstances of the participating countries and the West Africa region as a whole. USAID is seeking a regional program that is country-specific in its approach to activities on the ground, while maintaining strong organizational and management arrangements at the regional level to enhance coordination, cooperation, efficiency and achievement of regional objectives and results broadly stated as:

Decreased risk of extremism in the Sahel and increased resiliency in communities at risk of extremism through improved governance and youth empowerment at the local level.

Subject to the availability of funds, USAID anticipates that approximately $62 million over five years will be available for this new, high-profile assistance program.

BACKGROUND

To effectively address the critical threat of terrorism and terrorist recruitment in the Sahel region of Africa, USAID, in conjunction with the DOS and DOD, initiated an interagency effort called the Trans Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP). This program seeks to contain and marginalize terrorist groups in the region such as al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)

The TSCTP program promotes four broad strategic goals in the region: 1) build military and law enforcement capacity; 2) counter violent extremism; 3) foster regional cooperation; and 4) enhance public diplomacy and strategic communication. The interagency components are military, counter-terrorism, development assistance and public diplomacy. USAID focuses on denying support and sanctuary through strategically targeted development assistance and promoting good governance.

For USAID/WA, TSCTP focus countries include Chad, Niger, Mauritania and Burkina Faso. The DOD and State Department's TSCTP strategy also includes Algeria, Mali, Morocco, Nigeria, Senegal and Tunisia. The designation of focus countries was based on two primary criteria: first, the level of threat as identified by DOD and the intelligence community, and second, the relative paucity of funds for development inputs in the priority countries.

USAID targets isolated and/or neglected regions of the focus countries, as well as groups most vulnerable to extremist ideologies by working to support youth, strengthen local governance capacity, increase youth and community engagement through skills development, capacity building and training, education and vocational training for at-risk youth to support increased youth and community engagement through community mobilization efforts with local government officials, and improve traditional and non-traditional educational services. TSCTP efforts are informed by a series of joint assessments and ongoing planning with interagency partners.

A History of USAID Programs under TSCTP

In 2006, USAID began programming under what was then known as the Trans Sahel Counter Terrorism Initiative. Initial program activities consisted of pilot activities in Chad and Niger. The start-up phase was relatively modest in scope and was implemented through several small awards of up to two years in duration to multiple partners. In Chad, the main implementing organization operated under an Associate award under the Capable Partners Program (CAP) and a small grant. The main focus of this award was general community development in the targeted region of Kanem working through Chadian NGOs.

In Niger, the program had three main areas of focus: youth empowerment, support to decentralization at the communal level and community radio in three geographic regions, Agadez, Maradi and Tahoua. These pilot activities served as the foundation for a larger, multi-country effort that began in early 2008.

Early in fiscal year 2008, the USAID/WA Regional Mission designed a large, regional, multi-country counter-extremism program – the Peace through Development (PDEV) program – to build on pilot counter-terrorism activities in Chad and Niger and commence activities in Mauritania. The 3.5 year contract is anticipated to end on September 26, 2011.

The TSCTP program seeks to provide tangible benefits to populations – particularly youth at-risk for recruitment by Violent Extremism (VE) organizations and communities in at risk regions – through youth employment and outreach programs, vocational skills training, and community development and media activities. Activities also include bringing beneficiaries together from different communities, ethnic groups, and countries through outreach events to spur dialogue on religion and tolerance.

In part, due to the volatility of the West Africa region during the years that PDEV has been implemented, the program has experienced a number of delays and interruptions in the countries where it is currently operating.

In Chad, where program activities have been most fully implemented, USAID has been active throughout the life of the contract and activities have transitioned from the early pilot work. As a result of progress made and impact from USG support and the political maturation of the country through democratic elections and a slow, steady transition to democratic political rule, a foundation has been built in the communities where USAID is supporting Counter Extremism (CE) programs. As a result, by all accounts, program activities in Chad have had an impact and the beneficiaries and communities where USAID works are poised and ready to continue building on that foundation to enhance efforts to resist CE.

In Niger, over the course of 2009, former President Tandja took steps to perpetuate his rule over the country by undemocratic means. As result of the political upheaval and the lack of a democratically-elected government in place, the U.S. Government instituted policy sanctions. Sanctions permitted some activities to continue but did disrupt the P-DEV program as several components were suspended.

A bloodless coup was staged by the military in 2010 and President Tandja was removed from office. A transition government was quickly established by the military leadership and a full return to democratic rule was set in motion beginning with a referendum on a new constitution. In early April 2011 the USG lifted its policy sanctions on Niger after the country completed a remarkable transition and held a series of free and fair elections at the national, parliamentary and local level. A new, democratically elected president and parliament were sworn in on April 6, 2011.

In Mauritania, the USAID's TSCTP program was canceled before it could begin implementation of activities in late calendar year 2008 due to a coup. After the suspension of the constitution, plans to begin local governance and youth empowerment activities were suspended due to USG sanctions and the program was eventually cancelled. Mauritania held free and fair elections in late November 2009, the country has returned to democratic rule, and all USG sanctions have been lifted. USAID TSCTP program activities have not started due to on-going negotiations on a Limited Scope Grant Agreement between the U.S. Government and the Islamic Republic of Mauritania (GIRM).

Despite these setbacks, USAID's TSCTP program in West Africa, which is part of a complex interagency initiative that operates in challenging environments, has made some significant contributions to preventing the underlying conditions contributing to VE.

Within a time span of nearly three years, USAID's current TSCTP program has contributed to the goals of countering the drivers of VE in the following ways:

- Past and current USAID activities in Chad and Niger have built relationships and trust with individuals and associations in at-risk communities. The trust that the program has fostered provides a foundation upon which to build future activities.
- Peace and tolerance radio programming raises important, provocative issues confronting youth. Through listening groups, message development and subsequent debate on local issues, radio programming has become a rallying point for raising, debating and resolving local issues.
- By integrating youth in message development and as mediators of Listening Clubs, USAID has recognized and empowered youth with a voice in resolving community issues. The impact is two-fold: providing pertinent information on day-to-day issues, and building social cohesion through collective problem-solving around local issues.
- Broadcasting civic-minded radio programs to remote communities in the Sahel expands the dialogue and includes youth from around the country in discussions confronting their generation. These same broadcasts have become the subject of social messaging between rural, urban and peri-urban youth alike.
- Listening clubs provide a way for youth to share and debate important ideas resulting in more informed decision making and modifying risky behavior.
- Community projects strengthen social cohesion within communities by rallying all members to work together for the communities' benefit. Community-driven decision- making has cultivated local ownership and empowerment, and contributes to the sustainability of activities and messages.
- The promotion of peace and tolerance messaging through interfaith dialogues, conferences and radio emissions provides an important model of how to debate sensitive issues in a respectful, peaceful manner.

Specific findings and conclusions of recent assessments

- ❖ Communication has played an essential role in the positive impacts of USAID Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) programs. Field research Chad and Niger have indicated that programming in media has resulted in significant impacts in strengthening moderate voices and improving information flow among citizens on peace and tolerance. USAID desires to enhance this aspect of CVE programming by disseminating information to reinforce all aspects of its TSCTP activities including local governance and community development, youth engagement, interfaith dialogues and conflict prevention.
- ❖ The holistic approach of to CVE activities that integrates youth, governance and media activities concurrently in target communities should be pursued, where appropriate. Based on past experience, this integration of activities will have a mutually reinforcing effect on each of the separate components and would respond well to an integrated communication strategy. This observation may not hold true in Mauritania, where other TSCTP agencies and indeed the host government itself have well-established broadcasting and faith-based dialogue efforts. USAID may need to focus, at least initially, on complementing these on-going activities.

- ❖ It takes time to build the partnerships and understanding to address sensitive topics and venues in CVE programming in the Sahel. Past efforts have been successful in using a gradual approach to media messaging in Chad and Niger. As part of this methodology, USAID established a strong audience base and trusted programming by addressing less sensitive issues first, and then moving on to more controversial topics. This approach has allowed frank and effective programming on issues like violence, intra-religious conflict and extremist advocacy of violence that would not have been possible in early stages of broadcast. By strengthening "civic culture," the radio programs improved the quantity and quality of citizen participation and democratic expression, and created a platform for moderate voices (from the capital cities and from more remote regions) – thereby directly achieving USAID's TSCTP goals.
- ❖ <u>Current USAID TSCTP programming in media addresses "drivers" of negative behaviors</u> and may have prevented the emergence of more extreme and violent forms of expression from emerging. The gradual approach to building "civic culture" employed by the media teams in Chad and Niger helped to establish regular radio programs in at-risk communities. Those programs are now positioned to delve into new content areas (including more direct discussion of VE) with the experience of credible and culturally tailored programming to build on.
- ❖ <u>Developing local ownership is key</u>: The design of current TSCTP media activities has facilitated extensive community participation – ranging from the conception and creation of content to the

discussion of content in families and communities. The responsiveness of this approach has led to strong ownership of the programs by the audience – resulting in observed impact in terms of dialogue and attitudinal and behavioral changes in at-risk communities.

- High-quality market opportunities assessments should be conducted and effectively utilized to inform PEDERS' economic activities, and better target training and development, especially vocational training.
- The expected timeframe for the change needs to be realistic and be mindful of the constantly changing context: Programming needs to be nimble and flexible, with the ability and mechanisms to adapt quickly and easily to changing contexts. In these complex operating environments, it is critical to streamline understanding of program goals and management procedures as USAID endeavors to further refine how and in what ways development assistance can identify and strengthen resiliencies that help to prevent VE.
- Develop partnerships and local ownership of the programs: Previous activities have developed local partnerships and capacity of civil society organization (CSOs), key religious leaders, and enhanced media outlets. How this next phase of the TSCTP program activities under PEDERS will build on those partnerships raises a number of requirements and issues for further consideration and inclusion:

- Increasing capacity building of some local CSOs. Applicants should consider how they can assist local organizations to develop sustainability methods that will result in greater economic viability of local organizations;
- Developing greater host country capacity to plan, budget, communicate and deliver services and other public goods can help meet the needs of the people.

Summary of sources for the design

As the first large scale program in counter extremism, a variety of sources and methods are used to ensure that activities are informed by the best analytical and performance information available. In the initial phases of TSCTP programming in the Sahel, this was accomplished through interagency assessments of the risk of violent extremism, which were conducted in five of the nine TSCTP countries (Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Nigeria) between 2004 and 2007. In 2007 the USG began a multi-year effort to review the underlying hypothesis in the pilot programs and develop a guide for the role of development assistance as applied to counter extremism in sub-Saharan Africa. The two resulting guides *The Guide to the Drivers of Violent Extremism (VE)* and *Development Assistance and Counter-Extremism: A Guide to Programming* were finalized in 2009. These guides were utilized to conduct updated risk assessments in all of the countries listed above, as well as Burkina Faso.

In addition to the county risk assessments and program guides a field assessment of the pilot phase of the TSCTP programs was conducted in Niger and Chad in mid-2007 and more recently an assessment of USAID's operational strategy and its program results achieved to date was completed in early 2011. An independent impact evaluation of the programs in Chad, Niger and Mali was also completed in early 2011. The Report entitled "PDEV Program Assessment FINAL" at Annex 2 included as a reference to applicants.

In 2010, USAID's Bureau for Africa commissioned AMEX International and its subcontractor, the QED Group LLC, to conduct a mid-term evaluation of USAID's TSCTP activities in Africa including regional multi-sector Peace for Development (PDEV) program implemented by the Academy for Educational Development (AED) and community development activities in Mali, implemented by multiple partners. The Report entitled "Mid-Term Evaluation of USAID Counter Extremism Programming FINAL" at Annex 3 included as a reference to applicants.

All of these resources have fully informed the RFA for PEDERS, including recommendations and considerations for future implementation in each participating country.

Detailed Program Description

General characteristics

Broadly speaking, Chad, Niger, and Burkina Faso share similar challenges in the areas of governance, youth integration, and the need for strengthened community and media. As an Islamic republic with a stronger identification with the Arab Maghreb, Mauritania shares these challenges and more.

The latest research and analysis supported by a recent evaluation has refined the strategic objective of TSCTP programs in the Sahel to be "reducing the enabling environment" for extremism, which is the highest level goal for which USAID holds itself accountable. This focus on reducing the enabling environment for VE will continue to help the countries in the Sahel maintain a low level of risk for VE recruitment.

While early programming in VE focused on diminishing the number of recruits and delegitimizing terrorist ideology, the strategic objective of reducing the enabling environment for VE corresponds better to the level of threat in the Sahel, as well as where development assistance can have a discernable impact. In addition, recruitment into VE is not a prevalent issue in the Sahel, with the exception of limited activity in Mauritania, and support for terrorist ideology is also very low in the four Sahelian countries proposed for inclusion in the PEDERS program[1].

Nevertheless, the Sahel continues to be a major concern to USG policy makers as a possible staging area for violent extremists. These fears are becoming more pronounced as Mauritania and Niger have all experienced a worrisome uptick in kidnapping and killing of foreigners, while Chad continues to be plagued by chronic instability. The four countries each have had different levels of experience with, and exposure to, issues of violent extremism. The threat level in Chad remains negligible and interventions in Chad continue to be essentially preventative in nature. Likewise in Burkina Faso the current threat level for violent extremism is negligible, but since Burkina Faso shares borders with both Mali and Niger, there is a strong policy and programmatic impetus to begin TSCTP activities there; the northern areas are particularly vulnerable. In Niger the threat has grown since the early days of TSCTP activities under the pilot phase and the initial stages of USAID's TSCTP program, with kidnapping and killing of foreigners by violent extremists from outside the country. Meanwhile, in Mauritania the threat of violent extremism is low-moderate; and higher than in both Chad and Niger. In Niger, violent extremism is externally driven, but in Mauritania it appears that extremist groups have been establishing roots within the country.

Another critical evolution in programming for TSCTP in the Sahel seeks to view relationships, not as by-product of CVE activities, but as a core part of programming in fragile and volatile environments. Trust and relationship building is among the most valuable results of USAID's TSCTP activities and helps address the need to improve the enabling environment for VE prevention.

As part of the development response to violent extremism and insurgency, USAID will:

- Apply sound development principles – including host-country ownership, partnership, inclusive community-led development, selectivity and focus, division of labor, and sustainability when relevant – to ensure and deepen impact.
- Use a stabilization approach that:
  - is grounded in sound development principles and well-coordinated with other USG interagency actors,
  - focuses development assistance on specific drivers of violent extremism and insurgency through, for example, targeted support for at-risk sub-populations (e.g. disenfranchised, marginalized youth),
  - selects beneficiaries based on their relationship to making gains vis-à-vis the specific drivers targeted,
  - emphasizes implementation timelines that are typically, but not always shorter in duration,
  - requires more fluid implementation and redirecting as conditions change, and often a high resource to beneficiary ratio,
  - relies on perceptions and other measures to gauge specific effects of development activities on violent extremism and insurgency, and
  - is supported by measurement and monitoring practices that allow USAID to adapt quickly as conditions change.
- Strategically link programs implemented using a stabilization approach with those aimed at broader economic, social, security, and political development objectives. In some cases, development assistance implemented using a stabilization approach may precede and create the conditions and

[1] Annex 1 to the Program Description is a *Summary of Factors of Violence Extremism*, included as a reference to applicants.

platforms for longer-term programs. In other situations, this approach may need to be implemented concurrently with development assistance that is focused on longer-term, sector-based objectives.

Based on the latest assessments and research, low-risk, permissive environments will be most responsive to enhancing resiliency to support prevention of VE. For this reason, PEDERS will focus on increasing resiliency factors that promote prevention of violent extremism in at-risk communities in four countries in the Sahel by improving community relationships and the quality of governance in at-risk communities and increasing economic opportunities for youth through improving skills for at-risk youth, in particular.

The engagement with and utilization of local NGOs and community-based organizations for implementation of program grants, training courses, conferences, etc. should also focus on assistance towards the sustainability of those institutions, when deemed appropriate.

Development hypothesis

A development hypothesis for prevention of violent extremism and support for resiliencies, which decreases the risk of VE, has emerged from USAID's experience implementing TSCTP activities in West Africa over the course of the last five years. As shown in the various assessments summed up in the prior section, "A History of USAID Programs under TSCTP", the underlying causes prompting youth and other citizens to resort to extremist and violent solutions are weak economic performance and growth, and poor governance. That section describes a variety of local interventions that made differences in the quality of lives of the targeted communities at risk, effectively blunting the appeal of extremist rhetoric. The solutions to these problems are most effectively addressed at the local level, through community involvement, skills and vocational training for youth and young adults; greater awareness of options through improved sources of information through media; and increased economic opportunities for citizens. Hand in hand with these activities are effective efforts to help citizens mobilize through stronger civil society organizations and improved, more effective service provision by local governments. The approach is classically developmental, adapted to the unique environment and circumstances of individual communities. The development challenge is enhanced by the locations of these areas vulnerable to the extremist message in typically marginalized, remote and deprived areas of these countries. Finally, the principle of partnerships and local ownership has been shown to be the key to success. It is these factors that demonstrate the validity of the development hypothesis.



Figure 1: Overall Results Framework for Decreasing the Risk of Extremism

The PEDERS overall strategic objective is to strengthen community resiliencies through improved quality of governance in at-risk communities and increased economic opportunities for at-risk youth. Applicants should propose a set of activities that will lead to the achievement of the types of results identified below. It is important to note that not all results have to be achieved in each of the four countries. Rather, it will be incumbent upon the applicant to determine which results to pursue in each of the countries.

EXPECTED RESULTS AND ILLUSTRATIVE ACTIVITIES

Result 1: Youth More Empowered

The objective of empowering youth in target communities is to enhance and improve youth participation in and their value to their communities and increase their economic opportunities at home. Building on the success of previous activities, Applicants should propose activities that support youth involvement in all aspects of community life, support youth participation in community decision-making, helping youth to forge inter-generational linkages, and increased income earning potential for youth.

In addition, in some areas where youth are at-risk due to VE actions and threats, the situation has resulted in undermining viable, licit economic activities in key regions. Vocational skills development and formal primary and secondary educational opportunities could be expanded in areas where there are idle youth at-risk for recruitment into illicit activities and/or VE groups due to their lack of sufficient opportunity at home. Increased educational (formal, informal and vocational) opportunities have the potential to increase youth capacity to engage in their local communities and economies in a more meaningful and effective way. Schools and training centers are barely in existence, in the four countries where PEDERS will be implemented, though there is a wide variety among the four countries. The schools and training centers that do exist are often in great need of improved operations, teacher/instructor training, broader, more sustained youth engagement (especially by girls in some areas), enhanced communication, physical plant/infrastructure repair and development; not to mention basic schools supplies.

Potential Intermediate Results:

IR 1.1: Increased Youth Vocational Training and Skills Development

IR 1.2: Increased Access to Formal and Informal Education for At-Risk Youth

IR 1.3: Increased Youth Mobilization and Engagement

IR 1.4: Increased Youth Participation in Local Development

Illustrative Economic and Education Activities:

- Vocational skills development and entrepreneurship training for youth.
- Apprenticeships with local businesses and apprenticeship kits to support business start-up for selected youth graduates
- Micro-finance/micro credit training and assistance.
- Civic mobilization and community participation training for youth.
- Civic education and participatory skills development for youth.
- Life skills development and training for youth.
- Equipment and school supplies to support elementary, secondary, Koranic and other formal and informal educational opportunities in targeted areas.

Result 2: Increased Moderate Voices

In order to counter compelling narratives that support VE, USAID desires to increase moderate voices and decrease extremist messages in targeted communities at risk for VE. Access to credible information increases the potential for citizens to make informed decisions. It also enhances the quality of dialogue and discussion at the local level, thereby improving local decision-making. Increased access to quality information sources also improves community decision-making due to its emphasis on the quality of the information at the local

level. While the definition of "quality" is subject to interpretation, USAID's goal in this regard would be to provide an appropriate level of quality content and information to directly counter VE narratives. At the same time, enhancing community resiliencies by promoting peace, tolerance, community development, youth empowerment, and more accountable, participatory local decision-making. This may involve linking local messaging and media to national networks and the use of new media and social networking to improve access to inform decisions that affect the daily lives of people living in areas at risk of VE. USAID views media, access to information and messaging as highly cross-cutting and is looking for innovative approaches to address the specific challenges of creating and sustaining a moderate voices in areas at risk for VE.

Potential Intermediate Results:

IR 2.1: Increased Access to Credible Information
IR 2.2: Increased Access to Quality Information Sources

Illustrative Activities:

- Expand radio listening programming for good governance, and peace and tolerance.
- Increase media outlets in targeted communities.
- Assist community media outlets to develop and broadcast media content to reinforce good governance, peace and tolerance and increase community access to credible sources of information.
- Encourage the promotion inter and intra-faith dialogues.
- Train community reporters and journalists (including youth) to increase professionalism in reporting and communicating local issues.
- Radio programs for youth, developed by youth.
- Peace and tolerance messaging to counter VE voices and messages.
- Listening clubs led by youth to enhance communication in community.
- Media monitoring by youth to engage youth in promoting moderate voices and improve monitoring and evaluation of program activities (track contextual changes).
- Purchase of radios, radio equipment, such as batteries, satellite phones, repeaters and/or other related equipment, including for solar radio, to support increased moderate voices.

Result 3: Increased Civil Society Capacity to Address Community Issues
In areas where government has limited reach or limited capacity to provide services and meet the needs of the local population, civil society organizations (CSOs) and community based organizations (CBOs) have the potential to address community needs, challenges and concerns. Given their presence in the community and their make-up of community members, they are in a strong position to make positive contributions at the local level. At the very least these organizations can help to inform local authorities and leaders of communities' needs and challenges. Often, they serve as the only entities that provide community with services such as education, health and other social services, thereby replacing local public authorities. Many local community organizations are nascent in the areas where PEDERS will work. They are often loose coalitions with undefined membership and lack the organizational structure, capacity and leadership to articulate a clear agenda and carry out that agenda effectively. Increasing advocacy skills of local organizations will help them to channel pent-up demand more effectively. The goal of this aspect of PEDERS is to improve the capacity of CSOs and CBOs in targeted areas to clearly articulate and advocate community needs and work with their members, community leaders, youth and local officials to address those needs more effectively. Increased youth engagement with more effective local organizations will help increase the representativeness of local organizations, enhance community relationships and better inform community leaders of solutions to address youth needs and challenges; thereby strengthening community resiliencies.

Potential Intermediate Results:
IR 3.1: Increased ability of CSOs to formulate proposals for community action to address locally identified issues and challenges, especially for youth.

IR 3.2: Improved leadership skills of CSO leaders (including youth).

IR 3.3: Increased advocacy for greater accountability of local decision-making.

IR 3.4: Increased participation of youth in CSOs.

Illustrative activities:

- Training for local CSOs on basic organizational management and program implementation.
- Training for local CSO leaders and members in conflict resolution, leadership, and communications.
- Training for local CSOs in public accountability, transparency and how to conduct appropriate public oversight of local authorities.
- CSO-Youth-Local Government joint development planning and prioritization exercise.
- Community mapping by youth groups.
- Leadership training for youth in CSOs.
- Study tours to neighboring countries to learn about their successes and challenges with respect to building and sustaining resiliencies.

Result 4: Strengthened Local Government

The objective of strengthening local government is to improve the quality of governance at the local level; increase good governance practices such as greater community participation in decision making and greater transparency of local decisions and local processes; and to increase their responsiveness to community-expressed needs and the quality of the public services they provide to their constituencies.

Potential Intermediate Results:

IR 4.1: Improved capacity of local government officials to conduct local development planning and budgeting and improve service delivery.

IR 4.2: More participatory local development planning and execution.

IR 4.3: Increased transparency and accountability in local government decision-making and budgeting.

Illustrative activities:

- Training for local government officials and local community leaders in participatory decision-making processes.
- Training and technical assistance to local officials (government, CSO leaders and youth) to draft local development plans.
- Training in basic budget preparation, budget transparency and management for local officials.
- Training for local officials to improve their understanding of their role and function.
- Training for local CSO leaders and members in conflict resolution, leadership and communications.
- Small grant (in-kind and cash) to local communities and local governments for local development initiatives to support participatory practices at the local level.

A REGIONAL PROGRAM APPROACH WITH TARGETED COUNTRY-SPECIFIC INTERVENTIONS TO ACHIEVE RESULTS

While each country will have its own specific program, applicants are encouraged to consider establishing and enhancing regional aspects of the program to ensure the fullest possible sharing of ideas, training opportunities, success stories, joint training and conferences, as appropriate, to encourage cross-fertilization and sustainability and the achievement of the program's goals and objectives. Regular, regional program implementation meetings among partners and with USAID could help facilitate these linkages and build upon them in support of the achievement of USAID's and other USG and host country partners' TSCTP goals and objectives in West Africa.

Given the above, USAID does not expect that all results areas identified above and their corresponding illustrative activities in this RFA will necessarily be implemented by the Recipient in each of the four countries where PEDERS will be implemented. USAID is looking for Applicants to propose country-focused

programs and approaches that respond to the results and the goals of TSCTP, which address the challenges identified for communities at-risk for violent extremism in West Africa. The successful Applicant may want to assess the environment in each of the four countries prior to start-up of activities to fully understand and design specific interventions to identify and increase resiliencies in all four countries where PEDERS will be implemented and better target program activities geographically.

Because many of the issues cross borders and, therefore, are not country-specific, the Applicant(s) should also, in addition to the national programs such as those suggested below, ensure that their response is both cross-cutting and cross-border. PEDERS may have strong country specific components but it is a regional program and proposed approaches should reflect this reality. Creating linkages and sharing experiences provides an important synergistic approach that highlights lessons learned of value to country components. The Applicant is expected to create such linkages and take advantage of natural synergies.

COUNTRY LEVEL RECOMMENDATIONS

Chad

Recently completed program assessments and an evaluation of USAID's TSCTP activities in Chad have produced the programming recommendations below. Applicants may want to consider some of these recommendations in developing their programs.

- Build and strengthen relationships in communities and work with traditional and religious leaders, as well as formal authorities.
- Increase recognition of the role and value of youth in society, including fostering greater linkages between youth and the moderate Islamic establishment, and between youth and local authorities.
- Build and reinforce social, cultural and economic capital, and, most importantly, increase cross-sectoral linkages.
- Support community development project groups as important community infrastructure that will enrich the associational life of target communities.
- Encourage and provide training to youth groups interested in conflict mediation, among their major activities.
- Continue to support schools that seek to better integrate between the religious and public systems.
- Program messages and reduce extremist influences.
- Seek methods to encourage support for girls-only classes in the public school sector

Niger

As stated above, Niger's recently completed transition has buoyed prospects for democracy and stability.

Recently completed program assessments and an evaluation of USAID's TSCTP activities in Niger have produced the programming recommendations below. Applicants may want to consider these recommendations in developing their programs.

- Local governance capacity-building efforts may benefit from building on nascent activities begun in 2009, prior to USG sanctions against Niger, which have subsequently been lifted.
- Applicants should re-engage with careful attention to community attitudes and challenges in communities whose involvement was terminated when the USG sanctions were imposed.
- Based on "do no harm" principles, the successful applicant(s) is encouraged to work to regain trust between outside actors and youth and communities whose involvement was terminated by USG sanctions to ensure that development objectives can be met.
- After gaining an understanding of the dynamics of associational life within the university system and the ties of student and faculty with different political and religious movements, the successful applicant(s) will be encouraged to explore the possibility of working with University of Niamey students and faculty.
- Look for opportunities to link youth with local authorities.
- Youth in Maradi and Zinder would benefit from additional support for training in vocational and life skills to enhance their employment potential.

- Solar radio maintenance capacity development is needed to ensure that functional, reliable radio networks will be sustained. This could be a target skill area for youth vocational training.
- Greater focus on radio drama production capacity at the local level could help reinforce local ownership and support improved sustainability after PEDERS ends.
- Tillaberi and Diffa Regions are the new areas at risk of VE and should be seriously considered for inclusion in program activities under PEDERS.
- Youth in slum neighborhoods of Niamey are also increasingly at risk and would benefit and be responsive to involvement in PEDERS.
- Consider working with groups of younger adolescents.
- Consider a broader engagement with the target audience via listening clubs as a cost-effective and impactful means of engaging Nigeriens, particularly youth, and building on an existing tradition.
- Build on USAID's gradual approach to building relationship in communities at risk of VE to more directly tackle the issues of violence, causes and consequences of religious extremism, and methods for mitigation and control of extremism.
- Consider Working more directly with religious leaders, within USG legal and policy parameters;
- Consider support to rationalize and modernize Koranic school and post-Koranic school education, as well as programs to promote religious tolerance in Niamey, Maradi and Agadez regions.

Mauritania

Mauritania is a TSCTP core focus country. USAID led three separate interagency risk assessments in Mauritania, one prior to the 2006 coup, one in 2007 and one in mid-2008 just prior to the second coup. The findings, while shifting somewhat in geographic focus have had consistent recommendations for activities, results and objectives. USAID/WA envisions that TSCTP programming in Mauritania would focus on urban and peri-urban areas around Nouakchott, in the Tarza region (particularly Boutilimit), Kiffa, and Nima.

Due to the coup d'etat that took place on August 6, 2008, which ousted then-president Sidi Mohamed Quid Cheikh Abdallhi, the U.S. Government (USG) suspended all foreign assistance to Mauritania. As a result, nascent efforts by USAID to conduct TSCTP activities were stopped and never resumed.

As mentioned elsewhere, a signed Limited Scope Grant Agreement (LSGA) is still in process. However, Applicants are expected to develop a program of activities tailored to the Mauritanian context and best suited to achieve USAID's desired results and objectives for TSCTP in the Sahel. *Note: Until the LSGA is signed, applicants will have to consult with USAID/WA before beginning any work in Mauritania.*

The context continues to evolve in Mauritania and the new Government of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania (GIRM) has made progress in setting goals and development priorities for the country. Meanwhile, other USG entities are actively conducting TSCTP activities in consultation with the GIRM.

The recommendations below have emerged from a series of assessments in Mauritania. Applicants may want to consider these recommendations in developing their proposals.

- There is both political and popular will to openly discuss extremism, and issues related to extremism, and identify steps that could be taken to counter extremist tendencies, especially among Mauritanian youth. This openness represents a unique opportunity within TSCTP activities in West Africa to address some of the root and secondary drivers of extremism, such as the lack of employment opportunities and racial/ethnic tension.
- Intra-faith dialogue to strengthen the position of moderates, and outreach to non-violent, but otherwise extreme voices may represent the only way to reach those most alienated and prone to embracing a Salafist message in support of terrorism.
- Applicants should consider working on support for traditional education in madrasas through USAID's TSCTP activities, with the goal of quality education for all students.
- Youth participation and increased inclusion in good governance activities and anti-corruption are most likely to prove immediately appealing and gain optimal credibility among youth that could be vulnerable to extremist appeals.

- Other TSCTP activities conducted by the Department of Defense through its Military Information Support Team (MIST) and Humanitarian Assistance Program (HAP; also known as Civil Military Support Element (CMSE)), have worked intensively on countering extremism in Mauritania since 2006. These efforts are well integrated with State Department Public Diplomacy (PD) programming and supplemented by project funds managed by Embassy Nouakchott's Political/Economic section.
- Based on a 2010 assessment Arafat and Riyadh were identified as good candidates for appropriate TSCTP interventions; Sebhka was seen as at less risk of extremist influence than Dar Naim, another suburb of the capital. Each of these areas has a different profile vis-à-vis challenges to CVE, but all are densely populated with youth from low- to middle income status families. Very few NGOs (including local NGOs,) are working in Arafat and Riyadh. Dar Naim has an active Salafist population.
- Building on the lessons of two earlier CE programs, MIST is implementing a Life Skills campaign that targets at-risk youth within the city of Nouakchott and focuses on a peer-to-peer approach of teaching and participating. The approach uses a variety of media programming focused on citizenship and leadership concepts to unite against violent extremism.
- Public Diplomacy programs will conduct outreach events to local schools and Mauritanian institutions like the University of Nouakchott to promote film production/ photography as an outlet of expression, and broad interaction with the local media.
- In consultation with the Mauritanian government, the USG has developed two TSCTP-related youth activities in the capital and beyond including: vocational centers for madrasa school drop-outs in Boutilimit, Selibaby, and Nema, and; soccer field refurbishment in at-risk neighborhoods in Nouakchott, plus Aleg and Selibaby.
- The Mauritanian government has begun to implement its own CE activities, as part of its broader counter-terrorism efforts, which range from direct military and security interventions against AQIM to a new counter-terrorism law.
- "Radio Koran" was launched in August 2010, during Ramadan. The Ministry of Communication provides the technical means for broadcasting and the Ministry of Islamic Affairs determines the content. Only moderate Mauritanian scholars participate. Foreigners are not allowed on the station.
- Acceptance by the Mauritanian government of this program, and signature of the LSGA, will be aided by flexibility and ability to mobilize personnel immediately, to build trust and relationships there, paralleling other TSCTP efforts.

Burkina Faso

Very recent events in Burkina Faso have shifted thinking regarding the stability of the country. In 2009, Burkina Faso was added as a focus country to the Trans-Saharan Country Terrorism Partnership. However, it was still considered to be stable with a low threat level. In May 2010 a risk assessment was completed, which determined that Burkina Faso was at low risk for chronic VE, but at moderate risk for social instability. Over the past year, the risk for social instability has increased significantly, which is problematic not only due to issues arising from the current instability but also because such instability can make the country more vulnerable to VE.

Based on the current instability, the Applicant is encouraged to look at the location and rationale for such instability, drawing on links between general instability and the increased potential for VE. Although certain parts of the country, such as the north, have traditionally faced greater challenges, the current situation demonstrates vulnerabilities at several levels throughout the country. Relevant sources of the vulnerabilities and instability in Burkina Faso should inform the combination of activities and the Recipients' proposed approach to countering violent extremism.

An assessment in May of 2010 provides some program recommendations as follows:

- The most neglected region of any country should be regarded as potentially at-risk. In Burkina Faso, this is the Sahelian region, especially Oudalan, Seno and Soum services, borderland economies, proximity to both Mali and Niger, and the presence of cross-border populations (particularly Tuaregs) make the population inhabiting this quarter of Burkina Faso especially vulnerable.

- At-risk populations in Burkina Faso are neither ethnic nor religious in nature. Rather, the relevant categories are demographic and regional.
- The northern Sahel region (mostly Muslim, with harsh living conditions, high illiteracy rates and nomadic people) and the border areas adjoining Mali and Niger are the communities of greatest risk for VE.
- Due to on-going interest of al Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM) and other criminal groups linked with AQIM in kidnapping Westerners in the Mali-Niger-Burkina Faso border region, many fewer Western tourists now visit the Sahel. As a result, residents from those areas who relied on income from tourism are angry over the lost revenue, with some expressing anger at the West.
- Youth is the most at-risk group. Increasing land pressures, the allure of the city, limited employment opportunities, reduced international study options (to Europe), and insecurities arising from emigration (and inhospitable return migration) all contribute to pressures on youth that can lead to less than peaceable outlets.
- Applicants should consider development activities that provide livelihood and skills development opportunities to youth in the short- to medium-term.
- Activities that assist with improving the quality of democracy and governance (including appropriate traditional practices,) can help to vent frustrations and address their causes, and help enhance security.
- Activities that reinforce and demonstration of peace and tolerance in society through recognition of community, cultural and religious practices and approaches that support resiliencies could help prevent violent extremism from emerging.
- Radio programming should be used to reinforce, support and highlight the resiliencies of Burkinabe society including its noteworthy tolerance, and the attendant value to the nation at large.
- Non-state sanctioned Koranic schools have increased in both urban and rural areas and, unfortunately, many of them are giving radical indoctrination to their attendees.
- Education is a high priority for the Government of Burkina Faso. The Sahel region lags behind much of the rest of the country. Under the MCC-funded BRIGHT program, USAID has built over a hundred elementary schools throughout Burkina Faso. These students will not have an opportunity to continue their studies due to a lack of middle and vocational schools. As such, these individuals could be susceptible to groups wanting to engage them in illicit activities. There is already a network of potential venues for program-related activities – by utilizing the USAID-supported BRIGHT schools, which only have classes during weekdays. Those schools in some of the more vulnerable areas could serve as centers for night and weekend training, conferences and meetings as well as, with some minor investment, vocational training and sports. This would be an effective tool to reinforce the communities' capacity to deal with problems and provide hope and opportunities for the youth.
- Due to the GOBF's drive towards decentralization, there may be opportunities to build on or complement GOBF efforts to support decentralization, local governance and community development issues.

Gender analysis and programmatic opportunities

A recent assessment of USAID's current TSCTP activities highlighted the role that women play in helping to support and strengthen community resiliency for VE and are a key interlocutor in achieving development. Women are effective peace makers and can play a pivotal role in stabilizing communities. Program activities under PEDERS should assess gender dynamics and women's roles as part of the resiliency framework that supports violence prevention. Applicants should develop appropriate gender analyses and program components in their proposals to fully address gender issues and engage women in particular in violence prevention activities, where appropriate.

The program will consider how different roles between men and women in the communities, the political environment, the places of work and households affect the proposed work to be undertaken in those communities. It will be important that the program take into account the acknowledged differences in the roles and status of women and men, identifying inequalities or differences that could affect the achievement of program objectives.

The program design is based on multiple country-based risk assessments as well as a broader independent academic analysis that has identified which parts of the population are vulnerable to joining or supporting extremist organizations. These reports identified young men as most vulnerable due to multiple factors, from where radicalization generally takes place (public spaces frequented more by men) to the different response to limited economic opportunities. For example, young men leave rural areas for urban centers to find work, but fewer girls leave their rural homes.

The anticipated results of the program, a decreased risk of extremism, benefit both genders. While some of the tangible benefits, such as vocational training, may have more young men, girls will be included. The community development projects, as well as messaging, will benefit both genders. Some of the messaging may target social issues, such as child brides, that heavily impact girls, while others may focus on drug use that is more problematic for boys. The gender equality in this program would not be the same as gender parity.

PROGRAM DESIGN FOUNDATION, CORNERSTONE and PLANNING PARAMETERS

While USAID is looking to the Applicants to present a comprehensive program design and work plan, the following guiding principles and parameters should be considered:

- Given the recent significant disruptions in USAID's TSCTP programming to date through USAID's current program and earlier pilot activities, it is essential that the selected Recipient be able to mobilize very quickly, especially in the countries where USAID's TSCTP program is now active, i.e., Chad and Niger.
- Although there were no prior TSCTP activities in Burkina Faso, there is a strong desire and need to begin efforts there as soon as possible, especially given recent unrest.
- Explore the possibilities of integrating program components and resources from other USG, and specifically USAID activities in Niger, Chad and Burkina Faso to link USAID and USG resources and existing programs to maximize impact.
- As a way to keep the program operations as lean and efficient as possible and help build local ownership and capacity, the Recipient should consider utilizing local and/or international NGOs already established in the respective countries as partners – through grants or contracts – to engage technical services and support to achieve program objectives.
- USAID envisions a small management structure (as presented in the Illustrative Team Composition section below) which is complemented by its contract or grant relationships with established in-country or international organizations – i.e., USAID does not want to see a fragmented senior management structure.

Guiding Program Design Principles and Issues

In addition to the substantial experiential guidance from the above evaluations, assessments and specific policy guidance are available from USAID/Washington – all of which also will be made available to the Recipient. Consequently, based on those inputs and those of the USAID/WA Mission staff, the items below are intended as principal guiding parameters for the Applicants to use in the preparation of proposals.

USAID/Washington will make available upon release "*The Role of Development Assistance in Countering Violent Extremism and Insurgency*" which draws significantly from its prior development assistance and counter-terrorism guide, as well as utilizes examples from recent evaluations of programs in Africa. It is expected that its promulgation will formalize many of the concepts that USAID's Africa Bureau has experienced through the ongoing field programs. This document will be provided to the selected Recipient.

- In Chad and Niger, the northern regions, that are more difficult to access, are likely to be new geographic areas with targeted communities for TSCTP due to emerging VE threats.
- In Chad and Niger, where USAID has had on-going TSCTP programs for a few years in targeted communities, Applicant(s) are expected to build on successes and lessons learned to date in their approaches and proposed activities for current geographic locations, if and as VE threats still exist.
- As noted in the Burkina Faso section above – and is potentially applicable to the northern areas of Chad and Niger – Applicant(s) may want to consider the establishment of minimally and locally

staffed "satellite office(s)" in a remote area(s) for enhanced program implementation, cost savings, etc.

- An integrated, holistic approach of youth, governance and media activities occurring concurrently in target communities has produced results and impacts beyond the goals of existing and past USAID TSCTP activities and should be considered as part of the approach to implementing PEDERS, where appropriate.
- When considering where the programs are heading in the future, the traditional USAID sector that seems to encompass most of the program activities is democracy and governance (DG). However, the timeline for a full transition to a regular DG program is probably beyond the anticipated planning horizon for the PEDERS Program.
- Previous programs have successfully developed local partnerships and local capacity, such as civil society organization (CSO) partners, key religious leaders, and enhanced media outlets.
- Strengthening CSO linkages to local governments to enhance and further community-level efforts is of strong interest to USAID.
- Enhancing the role of youth associations/networks, community service and advocacy.

MONITORING AND EVALUATION (M&E)

USAID/WA takes a strong institutional view that learning by measuring progress is critical for high impact and sustainable development and therefore, must be an integral part of the thought processes from the onset of the development activities. Applicants will be required to demonstrate a commitment to integrate and use robust and comprehensive implementation to manage and report results. Applicants are requested to demonstrate this commitment in available technical capacity, leadership and functions to devote to M&E.

USAID/WA requests that the successful Applicant submit an initial monitoring and evaluation plan (M&E Plan) in a timely fashion – within 45 days of the date of the award. The plan must provide a description of M&E activities that systematically monitor performance during implementation and assess achievements and impact of the PEDERS program.

- It is important to note that the baseline assessment and the evaluation for PEDERS will be conducted by an external organization as further described below. It must reflect description of the results framework, describing the development hypothesis of the program as understood by the Applicant, and performance indicators to measure results and objectives.

USAID/WA also wishes to have the Application focus on measuring for impact. Achievements and performance indicators must reflect a balance in measuring outputs and real changes and impacts. In developing indicators, the Applicant will work closely with the selected external M&E organization. Indicators selected must capture results at an impact level to demonstrate impacts and real changes. As well, there must be evidence of integration of program evaluations into program designs to know what works and what does not, and identification of key evaluation questions at the outset of project implementation.

USAID/WA has benefited from regular surveys conducted over a period of two years to gain information on attitudes and perspectives of TSCTP program beneficiaries in countries where TSCTP activities have taken place in order to track the impacts of the program. To the extent possible, performance data reporting should use the same or similar survey questions, in order to facilitate performance reporting and results tracking across multiple countries over time. Any survey that is conducted should be flexible enough to incorporate indicators specific to individual countries' activities.

Additionally, for purposes of USAID/West Africa regional mission, its own internal semi-annual Project Implementation Reviews (PIRs) and timely reporting to USAID/Washington, USAID/WA will reach an agreement with the Recipient on the content and timing of its performance reporting to the Mission. USAID/West Africa will adhere to 5 CFR Pt. 1320 when requesting performance data from recipients.

Required Indicators:

As a participating agency within the joint TSCTP program involving USAID, the Department of State and the Department of Defense-implemented , USAID has a requirement to annually report on the following indicators under the Counter-Terrorism Program Element:

- Number of public information campaigns completed by USG programs.
- Number of community development projects completed by USG programs.
- Number of people from at-risk groups reached through USG-supported counter-terrorism activities
- Number of individuals who received USG-assisted training, including management skills and fiscal management, to strengthen local government and/or decentralization reached through the TSCTP program.

Due to the fact USAID's TSCTP activities have been conducted for several years in various phases and iterations, (pilot activities, full-fledged contract, etc.) a rich body of data and data analysis has been developed from which to draw and against which to measure. For example, the current activity utilized a baseline survey to measure several of the results of USAID's TSCTP activities. A subsequent survey was carried out as part of the mid-term review for the program. The key indicators in the sections below, organized by result, are intended to capture those aspects of the Performance Monitoring Plan that require data and data analysis.

Many of the illustrative indicators listed below are on the "output" level. Applicants are encouraged to develop other higher-level indicators for measuring progress and impact. Since most of these indicators are on the output level, the Applicant should focus on answering the "so-what" question to these indicators. E.g., if youth participate in greater numbers in civic activities, what is the effect of that enhanced participation?

Illustrative Indicators by Result:

Result 1 - Youth Empowerment Illustrative Indicators

- Increased % of youth participating in civic activities
- % of youth that obtained employment due to USG assistance
- Number of youths receiving training in economic enterprises
- Number of learners enrolled in USG-supported primary schools or equivalent non-school-based settings
- Positive changes in communities as a result of participation of youth in civic activities (to be captured by annual surveys)

Result 2 – Media and Messaging Illustrative Indicators

- Number of journalists trained with USG assistance.
- Number of non-state news outlets assisted by USG.
- Number of radio stations producing and broadcasting their own programs incorporating peace, tolerance, conflict mitigation and good governance messaging.
- Number of participants in USG-funded programs supporting participation and inclusion of traditionally marginalized ethnic minority and/or religious minority groups.
- Number of youth participating in program activities to deliver moderate messages more effectively and/or to reach wider audiences.
- Changes in citizen opinion on level of access to incredible and quality information' (Survey)
- Positive changes in people's behaviors and attitudes as a result of listening to media message

Result 3 - Civil Society Capacity Building Illustrative Indicators:

- Number of local CSOs receiving training with USG assistance.
- Number of people who have completed USG-assisted civic education programs
- Number of people trained in conflict resolution/prevention skills.
- Number of local organized engaged in local development planning with USG assistance.
- Citizen perceptions of increased local governance through increased community involvement. (Survey)

Result 4 - Strengthened Local Government Illustrative Indicators

- % of communities meeting targets in Local Government Capacity Index.

- Number of individuals who received USG-assisted training – including management skills and fiscal management – to strengthen local government and/or decentralization.
- Number of sub-national government entities receiving USG assistance to improve their performance.
- Improvement in community participation in local development planning' (Survey)

Applicants will be required to adhere to high standards in the quality of data used to report on performance indicators. In its initial M&E Plan, the Applicant will be required to develop management systems and approaches in place for collecting data to determine whether these produce the requisite quality data. To this effect, the plan will describe data quality assessment procedures to assure validity and precision of data. This plan should be reviewed on a periodic basis, in consultation with USAID/WA. The Applicant is expected to work closely with external stakeholders, such as the budget experts, rule of law experts. the selected external M&E organization, contracted to carry out key assessments and impact evaluations.

PROGRAM REVIEWS AND EVALUATIONS

Given the very nature of this type of program – and the experiences under previous and current USAID TSCTP programs – the USAID/WA Mission desires to have a robust M&E Plan which includes both external and internal monitoring and evaluations during the course of implementation. The baseline study will be developed externally. After the first full year of program implementation, USAID suggests that the Recipient conduct a "stock-taking exercise" in conjunction with USAID, in order to identify any possible mid-course corrections in the implementation. This will look at impact but also management issues, which may affect impact. Additionally, annual mini-surveys will be required to measure the qualitative performance indicators identified for each program results to supplement information captured by quantitative indicators.

As noted above, **the baseline assessment, yearly data collection, and the mid-term and final evaluations will be externally commissioned by USAID/West Africa**. They **will be developed separately and independently from this Program Description**. These exercises will be led by outside experts and implementing partners will not be responsible for evaluating their own activities. When combined with the stock-taking exercise, USAID expects that the following to take place as part of the M&E Plan:

1. Baseline assessment: USAID/WA requires that baseline data including variables that correspond to key outcomes and impacts be collected using high-quality methods and analysis to establish a reference point. Significant attention is required to ensure that baseline data are collected early in the project life span before any significant implementation occurs. Yearly data collection will take place in order to monitor achievements of results and changes from the baseline data,
2. After the first full year of program implementation, USAID suggests that a "stock-taking exercise" be carried out by key members of the Recipient's team in conjunction with USAID. The exercise will focus on the annual report draft and preparation of the draft work plan report, to gauge whether the program proceeding (the "mechanical" view) and if any mid-course corrections are needed. Actions, including any possible refinements to the agreement, would then be agreed to by all parties and taken, as appropriate, in accordance with an approved revised work plan.
3. The external mid-term evaluation will assess broader Recipient performance and program outputs, outcomes and impacts in order to determine if any fundamental changes are needed in the agreement and ensure the attainment of USAID's and the Recipient's joint objectives within the remaining period of the cooperative agreement. This effort should take place at approximately two and one-half years of implementation.
4. Within approximately one year prior to the end of the CA (i.e., in the October-December 2015 timeframe), the final project evaluation will take place, looking at impact as well as make recommendations for corrective actions.

These evaluations will be required to use methods that generate credible evidence attributable to USAID interventions. It is optimal to use a mix of qualitative and quantitative methods in these evaluations to yield valuable and optimal findings, recognizing experimental, quasi-experimental and observational designs, as may be appropriate.

REPORTING RESPONSIBILITIES AND REQUIREMENTS

The program will require close and frequent collaboration and communication between the program personnel and USAID/WA, as the program will help inform geographically broader counter-extremist efforts by the USG around the world.

Interface with USAID/WA:

The Recipient's designated Chief of Party will report to the USAID/WA AOTR in the Peace and Governance Office, located in Accra, Ghana. The specific methods and timing for such communications and meetings will be determined jointly within 30 days after the signing of the award.

Interface with Country-Specific USAID and U.S. Embassy Representatives:

The modus operandi for the interrelationships between the country-specific Team Leaders vis-à-vis the USAID and U.S. Embassy representatives within each country will be established within 30 days after the signing of the award, in concert with the Program's Chief of Party and the USAID/WA.

Reports

The Recipient is required to provide the following reports.

- Annual Work Plans: This plan will serve as a guide for program implementation, a demonstration of links between activities and objectives, a basis for budget estimates, and the foundation for the monitoring and evaluation plan. The plan will outline key activities and the expected results to be accomplished for the year and each subsequent year.

The Recipient shall submit an Annual Work Plan within 45 days from the date of the award. USAID/WA will review and provide comments (if necessary) on the work plan and request a revised version for approval. The Work Plan will include major activities that will be undertaken, rationale behind these activities, anticipated results of the efforts and how they will be measured, any outside technical assistance that may be required to complete the activity, and a timeframe for when activities will begin and end. A draft of subsequent work plans will be submitted no later than August 31 each year and will cover the U.S. government fiscal year (October 1 to September 30).

- **Monitoring and Evaluation Plan:** The Recipient shall submit an M&E Plan with the Annual Work Plan. The M&E Plan will be approved at the same time and with a similar approval process as the Annual Work Plan. The M&E Plan shall track progress towards indicators proposed by the successful applicant. The M&E Plan shall be updated and revised as needed in collaboration with USAID. It should be noted that USAID will contract with a separate, external entity to conduct the baseline and related, subsequent qualitative evaluations for the PEDERS program. This is intended to complement the monitoring and evaluation system that the program should develop for its own program of support for the achievement of stated objectives.
- **Quarterly Reports:** The Recipient shall deliver quarterly progress reports to USAID within 30 days from the end of the quarter. These reports shall include a descriptive and/or qualitative description of actual achievements versus planned activities for the life of the project, in both narrative and in data performance table formats; and targets for the next reporting period. The fourth quarter report should be drafted as an annual report and should cover activities of the quarter as well as overall assessment of performance and progress for prior 12 months of the program.
- **Final Report:** The Recipient shall submit a final report of the program within 60 calendar days after the expiration or termination of the award. The final report contents shall meet requirements as set in 22CFR226.51. The final report will consolidate activities and analyses of all partners into one document and their activities and progress towards results.

OPERATIONAL AND MANAGEMENT GUIDELINES

The successful applicant will be responsible for and sensitive to, inter alia, the following:

- Minimizing overhead-related costs to the greatest extent feasible – without jeopardizing program performance and achievements – while maximizing program-related expenditures. For example, capitalize on and expand, through training and hands-on experience, the respective country's local human

resources capabilities – in lieu of an over reliance on costly technical specialists from afar – which thereby serves the long-term development goals of USAID and the respective nations.

- Having a lean and nimble in-country presence capable of responding to an array of unanticipated events (coup d'états, major natural disasters, significant country-specific program adjustments) which necessitate a diversity of quick-reaction skills and experiences among senior program staff. These are unstable environments and the Recipient must have the proper security plans and procedures in place.
- As defined and coordinated by USAID/WA, maintaining relations with the two other TSCTP Program's participating parties – State Department (as embodied in the respective country's U.S. Embassy) and the DOD – in conjunction with the designated USAID representative in each participating country.

ILLUSTRATIVE BUDGET

The following represents the envisioned allocation of funds over the 5-year life of the Program, although there are always substantial uncertainties as to out-year funding.

PDERS BUDGET					
Year/$million	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
Chad	30.00%	30.00%	30.00%	30.00%	30.00%
Niger	32.00%	32.00%	32.00%	32.00%	32.00%
Burkina Faso	18.00%	18.00%	18.00%	18.00%	18.00%
Mauritania	20.00%	20.00%	20.00%	20.00%	20.00%
Totals	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%

Approximate percentage of total budget per country

It should be noted that the current uncertainties over the commencement and nature of the Mauritania program is reflected in the modest allocations for each year. However, should the situation change in Mauritania with the signing of an LSGA (as mentioned above,) and there are possibilities for expansion of program activities, then adjustments will be made accordingly in the overall budget. Similarly, there have been substantive USAID TSCTP activities in Chad and Niger and high expectations for the first-time commencement of activities in Burkina Faso. The program will explore possibilities of developing linkages with other USAID activities.

Along with its other desired budget presentations, the Applicant should submit a detailed, activity-specific budget for each country in accordance with the approximate allocations above.

Illustrative Team Composition (See "Instructions to Prepare Technical Application and Information…" below)

USAID's overarching principle is to focus on the utilizing and further developing host country human resources and host country systems, tailored to the specific needs and demands of each country, and the West Africa region more broadly. To the greatest extent possible, applicants should first look for qualified talent available within the host country. U.S. - or third country-based technical specialists deemed not available in the host country could be engaged on a short- or long-term basis to assist with meeting the objectives of the PEDERS program.

While it is incumbent on Applicants to present the most appropriate and cost-effective, country-specific implementation and backstopping teams, USAID/WA suggests the following illustrative team composition:

Long-term Staff:

- A Chief of Party or overall Senior Program Manager position is envisioned, who would be resident either in one of the participating countries of USAID/WA's TSCTP program or in Accra.

- A Deputy Team Leader/Program Development Officer position resident in the field.
- A Country Lead or Country Director position resident in each participating country.
- Senior financial manager, responsible for all aspects of financial and budget management of the program.
- Administrative support staff with relevant, region-specific technical specialties [e.g., radio broadcasting, media, youth, civil society development, local government expertise in West Africa, etc.]

As appropriate, **Short-Term staff** should be proposed by Applicants with a clear explanation of their roles and functions in achieving the goals and objectives of PEDERS, as well as an estimated level of effort for the expert(s) proposed.

ANNEX 1

SUMMARY OF FACTORS AFFECTING VIOLENT EXTREMISM

Enabling Environment Factors

1. **Weak states with ineffective security services:** The lack of rule of law allows corrupt practices, which can enable Violent Extremism (VE) groups to operate with ease – moving money and arms, bribing officials to look the other way, etc.
2. **Poorly governed or ungoverned areas:** These areas into which the writ of government hardly extends. They may be isolated, low population density regions in difficult terrain or crowded, peri-urban slums. They constitute safe havens where VE organizations can establish themselves with little hindrance, and garner support from communities ignored by the government. VE groups may gravitate by preference toward states of limited strength - as opposed to failed or even failing states - in order to access the infrastructure necessary to develop their network and carry out operations.
3. **State support of VE groups**: When governments permit or support extremist groups as a counter-weight to domestic opposition or to pursue covert foreign policies, VE groups are likely to flourish. Foreign governments – or groups/individuals within – have often supported VE movements, only to later lose control over them.
4. **Pro-active religious agendas:** The extent to which radical (non-violent) religious agendas have penetrated society they may establish an atmosphere conducive to support for violent groups espousing many of the same goals. "Pro-active," refers to groups that are pressing cultural demands on others. They seek to restructure the cultural territory of others so as to make it conform to their vision of how society ought to be organized and run its affairs.

Pull Factors

1. **Existence of VE groups with a compelling narrative and attractive objectives:** An enabling environment and popular grievances will not lead to anything more than random, disorganized violence in the absence of mobilizing groups.
2. **Existence of radical institutions or venues (mosques, madrasas):** These institutions help facilitate radicalization and the entry to extremist groups; they serve as recruiting grounds.
3. **Social networks and group dynamics:** These factors play a critical role in radicalization and recruitment. Individuals may drift into VE groups with friends or as a result of the influence of relatives, neighbors or a charismatic local preacher.
4. **Provision of services (responding to unmet expectations and needs):** Deprivation of socioeconomic needs – especially when combined with other factors such as widespread corruption, lack of security and justice and social exclusion by the government – may be exploited by VE groups, who may attract community support and recruits as well as obtain political cover by providing services.
5. **Greed or the proliferation of illegal economic activities:** VE organizations' illegal activities offer lucrative economic opportunities for those who seek a ready income. Networks operating VE and illegal economic activities have a mutually beneficial relationship and provide each other with revenue, experience in concealment, and an ideology to legitimize illegal behavior. Prisons are also a popular venue for VE recruitment.

Push Factors

Socioeconomic Drivers:

1. **Social exclusion and marginality:** Particularly true of peri-urban/slum youth; when family structures erode; and normal social controls no longer check behavior; deviancy, anomie, and isolation may result. VE groups exploit this isolation by offering an escape, a sense of purpose, and inclusion in a collective movement.
2. **Societal discrimination:** Real or perceived discrimination towards an individual or community (or both) in a broad sense can be a driver for VE. In places where Muslims are a small minority, socio-economic and/or political discrimination may be perceived as linked to disrespect for Islam and Muslims, provoking radicalization.
3. **Frustrated expectations and relative deprivation**: Relative depravation and frustrated expectations are powerful drivers towards VE activity given increased schooling and in some

countries significant improvements in social mobility in the 70s and 80s. This is especially true with a massive expansion of secondary and higher education.

Political Drivers:

1. **Denial of political rights and civil liberties:** The lack of political rights and civil liberties, as well as closed, unresponsive political systems, can instill a belief that violence is the only means for political change. Civil liberties and political rights also may represent a critical - but not representative - link between economic development and vulnerability to VE.
2. **Harsh government repression and gross violations of human rights:** Justice is a critical value in Islam. Cruel, degrading treatment (including torture) to an individual at the hands of the police or security forces can lead to a desire for revenge. The harsher and more widespread the brutality, the greater the spur to VE activities, and the more support VE may garner from the local communities.
3. **Foreign occupation**: Countries subject to foreign military occupation are at risk of insurgency and rights abuses. Individuals seeking to obtain redress for humiliation caused to their person or community may support VE groups/activities
4. **Political and/or military encroachment:** Large-scale political or military intrusion into internal affairs can act as a unifying element, with the community resorting to violence to redeem individual and collective honor. In communities with a historically high degree of autonomy and self-regulation, strong resistance is likely.
5. **Endemic corruption and impunity for well-connected elites**: At the least, this driver prompts civic disengagement and political apathy. In addition it can foster a profound sense of moral outrage as is the case in Afghanistan. The more corrupt the environment, the easier it is for VE groups to establish themselves as a righteous alternative and to lash out at immoral governing elites.
6. **Local conflicts:** Local conflicts of sufficient scale can create chaos, incapacitate government institutions, and result in a power vacuum to be exploited by VE organizations. VE groups will try to co-opt one side in a conflict and will try to impose their transnational agenda on purely local dynamics. One example: the Afghan Taliban now call for an Islamic Caliphate.
7. **Discredited governments and missing or co-opted legal oppositions:** When a regime is entirely discredited and there is no viable opposition, those who wish to oppose the government and bring about reform, will be pushed outside normal political channels and may support VE groups.
8. **Intimidation or coercion by VE groups:** Where governments cannot provide security and protection for its citizens, VE groups use intimidation and coercion to force support for or limit opposition to their movement.
9. **Perception that the international system is fundamentally unfair and hostile to Muslim societies and peoples:** Populations may accept VE propaganda that the global political and economic system discriminates against the Muslim world, which can mesh with personal or communal feelings of discrimination.

Cultural Drivers:

1. **Islam under siege:** A strong correlation exists between VE success and the perception that the West is attacking Islam and Muslims. Religious solidarity may be more powerful than (though not independent of) political and socioeconomic variables. This overlaps political driver #9 (above); they are mutually reinforcing.
2. **Broader cultural threats:** Population may perceive a broader cultural threat – to traditions, customs, values and sense of collective/individual honor & dignity.

ANNEX 2 - PDEV Program Assessment FINAL.pdf (87 pages)

ANNEX 3 - Mid-Term Evaluation of USAID Counter Extremism Programming FINAL.pdf (110 pages)

[**See Attached**]

Annex 2

Peace through Development (PDEV)

Program Assessment

Report

March 2011

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USAID/West Africa Peace through Development Program (PDEV)

USAID/WA Program Office

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ACRONYMS

AED	Academy for Educational Development
AEN	Association des Éleveurs et des Nomades
AI	Appreciative Inquiry
AIN	Association Islamique du Niger
AQIM	Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
CAG	Content Advisory Group
CP	Conflict Prevention
CVE	Countering Violent Extremism
CYM	Community Youth Mapping
DoD	Department of Defense
FOG	Fixed-Obligation Grants
GSPC	Groupe Salifiste pour la Prédication et le Combat
HA	Humanitarian Assistance
ONEE	Organisation Nigérienne pour l'Education Environmentale
OTI	Office of Transition Initiatives
PDEV	Peace through Development
PSI	Pan Sahel Initiative
RC	Community Radio Reporter
RJD	Rassemblement des Jeunes pour le Développement
State	Department of State
TSCTP	Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership
UECN	Union des Ecoles Coraniques du Niger
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development
YRTEP	Youth Reintegration Training and Education for Peace Program

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) contracted EnCompass LLC to assist them in assessing the Peace through Development (PDEV) program within the broader context of the Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP).The assessment was conducted to better design the next phase of the program. Specifically, the goals of the assessment were to:

- Summarize the PDEV's program operational strategy and performance to date;
- Identify factors of success, lessons learned, and innovations pioneered through PDEV, TSCTP, and other counter-extremism program implementation; and
- Provide recommendations to be used in planning follow-on activities for PDEV.

BACKGROUND

Established as the Pan Sahel Initiative (PSI) in November 2002, the Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP) has evolved into a multicounty interagency effort that aims to combat violent extremism in the Sahel region of Africa. In this partnership with the Department of State (State) and the Department of Defense (DOD), the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) implements the development-based portions of the TSCTP. USAID's current TSCTP activities include community-development activities in Mali, a research agenda examining the drivers of extremism in the Sahel, and the Peace through Development (PDEV) program in Niger and Chad.

PDEV aims to mitigate the potential for terrorism and extremism in the Sahel, and to deter marginalized populations from contemplating destructive and hostile ideologies that advocate conflict resolution by violence means. The current phase of the program began in 2008 program, and runs through 2011. It is managed out of USAID/West Africa and is implemented by the Academy for Educational Development (AED). Originally operating in Niger, Chad and Mauritania, PDEV programs in each country focused on three strategic areas: good governance; youth empowerment and integration; and media and outreach support. While PDEV in Chad has continued to develop its programs in all three areas, political changes in Mauritania and Niger necessitated subsequent changes in operations; the programs in Niger were reduced to focusing on media and religious outreach, and the Mauritania program was shut down completely. Plans are now underway to restart the program in Mauritania before the completion of this phase of the PDEV program.

ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY

A tailored assessment, grounded in the use of whole-systems thinking, appreciative methodologies, and qualitative data collection methods allowed for an understanding of the multidimensional nature of PDEV and its role in communities. Data collection activities included a desk review and interviews of key project staff in Washington, D.C.; a preliminary briefing with USAID/WA; fieldwork in Chad and Niger that included stakeholder interviews and site visits; and a final briefing of USAID in Accra.

The data collected and the analysis directly connected to the ten questions provided by USAID/West Africa and focused on program design, program evolution and learning, impact, and implications and recommendations. The assessment team used ATLAS.ti, a qualitative data analysis software package, to code and analyze both relevant documents provided by USAID, as well as the notes of the field team.

Many of the conditions that affect the PDEV program itself were also experienced in carrying out the assessment. Unpredictable security, travel, and health issues, as well as very tight timeframes posed constraints to data collection, analysis, and use.

FINDINGS

In order to be useful at different levels of future program planning, this report presents findings from three different perspectives: Findings by program or result area, findings regarding operational strategy and success factors, and findings around larger strategic issues.

FINDINGS BY EXPECTED RESULTS

PDEV's Results Framework has evolved to better reflect the intended results produced by PDEV at the activity level. By examining PDEV from the perspective of the program's Results Framework, the assessment team described program accomplishments and country differences by result area, noting the following activities:

- **Result 1: Improving Local Governance in Target Communities:** The development of civil society, radio programs about governance issues, and training of community leaders.
- **Result 2: Empowering Youth to Become Participants in Communities and the Economy: Community** youth mapping activities, vocational and life -skills training, in-kind grants for youth cultural activities
- **Result 3: Discrediting Extremist Ideologies:** Capacity-building of radio stations and promotion of moderate messaging. Finding by each activity are noted below.

Though not intended results of the program, other results were noted by the assessment team:

Sustainable And Locally Owned Impact: The participative approach, in combination with capacity building, has encouraged individuals and communities to design and implement activities without assistance from the program.

Improved community cohesion in target communities: While the emphasis has been mainly on addressing community needs and developing and/or strengthening community-based organizations, improved community cohesion has also resulted from PDEV's grant making process

Positive behavioral changes through Civic Education Messaging: The radio programs have stimulated some changes of behavior, particularly among the young listeners.

FINDINGS RELATED TO THE OPERATIONAL STRATEGY AND PDEV SUCCESS FACTORS

In addition to examining PDEV programming by intended result areas, the assessment team analyzed available documents and field interviews about PDEV's experience and accomplishments, in order to identify the effective elements of PDEV's operational strategy. Through this analysis, the assessment team identified four essential steps in programming aimed at countering violent extremism, along with factors of success in programming for each step:

Essential Steps	PDEV Success Factors
1. Assess and Understand the Context	– Using Assessments for Programming – Adaptation of and Flexibility in Programming
2. Establish Relationships and Build Trust	– Identifying stakeholders – Selecting and developing local partnerships – Building trust – Using a participatory approach – Visible and effective packaging of benefits – Understanding Relationships in the context of violent extremism
3. Strengthen Resiliency through Capacity and Infrastructure Building	– Capacity building o Individuals o Communities o Youth associations o National/local civil society organizations o Partner radio stations – Infrastructure building
4. Sustain Impact through Local Ownership	– Empowering primary beneficiaries as local actors to become part of the solution – Collaborating locally to strengthen local ownership – Facilitating sustainability through building awareness, capacity. and resources

FINDINGS BY STRATEGIC ISSUES FOR USAID

The assessment team also identified findings related to the broader strategic issues for USAID that will be important factors to consider in the design of the follow-on TSCTP programming in the region.

The sensitive nature of the violent extremism label: The evaluation team found that the **sensitive** nature of the notion of extremism in Chad and Niger made U.S. implementing partners hesitant to share the ultimate goals of PDEV with their local partners. The reworking of the Results Frameworks helped reframe PDEV's objectives in ways that were less sensitive; however, the higher level strategic context often remained unarticulated.

- **The relationship of countering violent extremism programs and conflict prevention programs:** Where conflict prevention focuses on structural causes of violent conflict, countering violent extremism (CVE) activities look at the conditions that stress existing structures. It is important to understand the key differences, when each type of activity is most appropriate (vis-à-vis conflict); what is addressed; and the population targeted.

The PDEV program in the context of other USAID programs: The team identified design and implementation issues related to four areas:

- Program mix—governance, media, and youth
- Similarities Between PDEV and the Office of Transition Initiatives
- Prevention strategy
- Non-presence countries and the impact on technical and management success

The theory of change of the PDEV program model: The great need for a clearly articulated, testable theory of change was evidenced in the confusion and varying perceptions of program goals expressed by different stakeholders involved.

CONCLUSION

Recommendations within each perspective are presented throughout the report for the overall program; Appendix 5 breaks down many of these recommendations to offer specific suggestions for Chad and for Niger. Throughout these findings and recommendations, five themes have stood out.

1. The **clear need for a well-defined and articulated theory of change** that recognizes the fluidity of the context and incorporates the means to test and adapt hypotheses, linkages to program objectives, and programming.

2. Reframing the focus of follow-on activities from the prevention of violent extremism to the **strengthening of community resilience** aligns with a development focus by better describing what PDEV activities have sought to develop.

3. **Building relationships and partnerships play a central role both** as a goal in itself, and as a successful strategy, for countering violent extremism.

4. The need to incorporate into follow-on programming **flexible planning systems that acknowledge and plan for the "constant" of change**.

5. The **use of monitoring and evaluation with a focus on learning** can inform both the theory of change as well as systems for planning around contextual changes. Further development of appropriate M&E systems as well as increased attention to and budget for these systems will be needed.

I. INTRODUCTION

PURPOSE OF ASSESSMENT

The Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP) is a multicounty interagency effort that aims to combat violent extremism in the Sahel region of Africa. In this partnership with the Department of State (State) and the Department of Defense (DOD), the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) implements the development-based portions of the TSCTP. USAID's current TSCTP activities include community-development activities in Mali, a research agenda examining the drivers of extremism in the Sahel, and the Peace through Development (PDEV) program in Niger and Chad.

PDEV aims to mitigate the potential for terrorism and extremism in the Sahel, and to deter marginalized populations from contemplating destructive and hostile ideologies that advocate conflict resolution by violence means. The current phase of the program began in 2008 program, and runs through 2011. It is managed out of USAID/West Africa and is implemented by the Academy for Educational Development (AED).

In December 2010, USAID/West Africa contracted with EnCompass LLC to assess the PDEV program in order to gain a deeper understanding of what has been effective in the program and in other counter-extremism initiatives, and to incorporate that learning into PDEV for the next phase of work. The specific goals of this assessment were to do the following:

1. Assess the PDEV program
   - Clarify operational strategy and performance of the PDEV program model
   - Describe implementation of the PDEV program
   - Measure impact (intended and unintended) to date
2. Review the field of CVE development programming, exploring similar or related programs and their relevance to PDEV
3. Provide recommendations for future programming for PDEV

EnCompass conducted the assessment of the PDEV program shortly after the completion of a separate impact evaluation of TSCTP, commissioned by the USAID Africa Bureau's Office of Sustainable Development in Washington, D.C., that focused on the measurement of the impact of the partnership in Mali, Niger, and Chad. EnCompass' assessment was designed to complement the findings of the impact evaluation by clarifying the PDEV program's operational strategy and performance; reviewing similar or related programs in the field of counter-extremism; and exploring implications for future programming.

ORGANIZATION OF THE REPORT

The report is organized as follows:

- **Section I: Introduction** provides short introduction to the report.
- **Section II: Background** provides background on the TSCTP initiative and the PDEV program as well as the methodology used to assess the PDEV program.

In order to be useful at different levels of future program planning, this report presents findings from three different perspectives: Findings by program or result area, findings regarding operational strategy and success factors, and findings around larger strategic issues. Specifically, these sections include the following:

- **Section III: Findings by Expected Results** presents findings according to the program's Results Framework and program activities, to assist in planning in specific program areas. Additional results of the program are also featured.
- **Section IV: Findings Related to the Operational Strategy and PDEV Success Factors** identifies the core elements of a successful program process for countering violent extremism, and presents findings related to the program's operations and factors that enabled successes in the program.
- **Section V: Strategic Issues for USAID** highlights findings around the larger strategic issues, and presents overall recommendations for USAID to strengthen its countering violent extremism programming in the future.

Finally:

- **Section VI: Conclusion** reiterates the most important recommendations and presents concluding remarks

II. BACKGROUND

BACKGROUND ON TSCTP

One year after 9/11, the United States identified the Sahel as a new front in the war on terror and responded by establishing the Pan Sahel Initiative (PSI) in November 2002. Targeted countries included Chad, Mauritania, Mali, and Niger, which have vast ungoverned regions and large Muslim populations who suffer from extreme poverty and corruption. These countries were signaled out as likely targets for terrorist activities by violent extremist organizations, which include the Algerian-based *Groupe Salifiste pour la Prédication et le Combat* (GSPC). The GSPC declared its allegiance to Al Qaeda and rebranded itself the Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in 2003. The AQIM has used the Sahel as a safe haven, engaging in both extensive smuggling as well as occasional skirmishes with government forces in Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger, and recruiting a small number of nationals from Sahelian countries.

Until 2005, the bulk of U.S. Government spending dedicated to countering terrorism in the Sahel focused on military assistance to develop the capacity of the targeted Sahelian governments to detect and prevent terrorist groups from establishing safe havens or launching pads for extremist movements. In 2005, Senegal, Nigeria, Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia were added to the initiative. In 2007, PSI changed its name to Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP), shifting greater strategic emphasis to development assistance as a key to preventing the spread of extremism in the Sahel.

The strategic objective of the TSCTP is to forge partnerships between the U.S. and African governments to combat extremism and empower beneficiaries to resist the drivers of extremism at the individual and community levels. At the highest strategic level, TSCTP's multiyear strategy is focused on defeating terrorist organizations and their ability to gain recruits by:

a) Developing public diplomacy strategies to discredit terrorist ideology,

b) Strengthening regional counterterrorism capabilities,

c) Enhancing and institutionalizing cooperation among the region's security forces,

d) Denying public support and sanctuary for terrorists through strategically targeted development assistance,

e) Promoting good governance, and

f) Normalizing bilateral military ties in the Sahel.

At the country level, one of the principles of the TSCTP is the recognition of the importance of creating partnerships between the United States and moderate governments in the Sahel, and facilitating increased cooperation among moderate governments to defeat extremist threats in the region.

The role of USAID within TSCTP is to work with communities and individuals to prevent the conditions that create an enabling environment for violent extremism and to build their resilience to combat the rise of violent extremism in Sahelian countries. The role of USAID in TSCTP is in line with its role under the *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (2006)*: to diminish the underlying conditions that terrorists seek to exploit, such as a lack of democracy and governance, poor economic performance, widespread unemployment, and failing educational systems. In much the same way that the Department of State and the Department of Defense build partnerships at the national level, USAID's role is to build partnerships and relationships at the community level with at-risk groups and in at-risk geographic areas to address chronic problems leading to instability.

BACKGROUND ON PDEV PROGRAM

The current phase of the Peace through Development (PDEV) program began in 2008 and runs through 2011. Lacking an official USAID Mission in each country, the PDEV program is managed out of USAID/West Africa; the Academy for Educational Development (AED) is the primary in-country contractor for the program, with Equal Access, Mercy Corps, and AfriCare as its international subcontractors. In addition, in each country, the program has selected primary local implementers.[1]

Originally operating in Niger, Chad and Mauritania, PDEV programs in each country focused on three strategic areas: good governance; youth empowerment and integration; and media and outreach support. Specifically, within the governance sector, PDEV focuses primarily on strengthening civil society organizations that can then build and strengthen their constituencies, many of whom live in remote areas. Youth integration provides vocational and life skills training so that unemployed youth are equipped with livelihoods, thus reducing their dependence on external forces for income and making them valued members of their society. Media outreach works with radio and journalists to shape peace and tolerance messaging, and to provide civic education-type information as well as community based listening groups to discuss the messages.

[1]In this report the term "PDEV implementers" refers to Academy for Educational Development (AED) (the lead implementer) and Equal Access. The evaluation team was informed by the management team that major program decisions (choice of local partners, program strategies) in Niger and Chad were taken in a collegial way; that is as "one team". The evaluation team did not find instances or evidence that show separate decision making processes between AED and Equal Access. However, local beneficiaries in both countries, particularly those of the media component, referred more often to Equal Access than AED or PDEV. Youth referred more often to PDEV or the local partners directly running the activity. In the rest of the report, the name of the PDEV local partners is mentioned when necessary and appropriate. Overall both the beneficiaries and local partners in both countries knew that the activities were funded by USAID or "Americans".

While PDEV in Chad has continued to develop its programs in all three areas, political changes in Mauritania and Niger necessitated subsequent changes in operations; the programs in Niger were reduced to focusing on media and religious outreach, and the Mauritania program was shut down completely. Plans are now underway to restart the program in Mauritania before the completion of this phase of the PDEV program.

The Results Framework also changed over the first two years of the program, to better reflect the results produced by PDEV at the activity level. (See Table 1.) These changes were a result of greater learning and better articulation of the expected results within each country.

Table 1. Changes in the PDEV Results Framework

Original Intended Results	Intended Results and Activities as of July 2010
Result 1. Terrorists denied support and sanctuary by improving governance and reducing ungoverned and poorly governed spaces.	→ **Result 1: Improving local governance in target communities.** A key underlying assumption of PDEV is that poorly and ungoverned spaces create opportunities for violent extremism to take root. Improving local governance in targeted communities not only denies extremists opportunities they can exploit, but creates stronger community resiliency in remote areas. Activities related to this result focus on strengthening civil society's capacity to impart civic knowledge and democratic values and include the development of community development plans, grants for development activities, radio programs about governance issues, and training of community leaders.
Result 2.Terrorists denied support and sanctuary by reducing the pool of potential recruits (i.e. unemployed and/or uneducated youth).	→ **Result 2: Empowering at-risk youth to become active participants in their communities and the economy.** Youth integration provides vocational and life skills training so that unemployed youth are equipped with livelihoods, thus reducing their dependence on external forces for income and making them valued members of their society. Activities for this result include community youth mapping activities, vocational and life -skills training, in-kind grants for youth cultural activities, and youth-driven radio chat shows.
Results 3. Extremist ideologies supporting terrorist tactics are discredited.	→ **Result 3: Rendering superfluous ideologies promoting violence.** Ideologies are targeted through media outreach to shape peace and tolerance messaging, and to provide civic education-type information as well as community-based listening groups to discuss the messages. The activities under Result 3 include strengthening the capacity of local radio station by providing equipment and supporting moderate messaging through promotion of dialog among religious leaders.

ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY

APPROACH

The assessment team used an approach grounded in the use of **whole-systems thinking** and **appreciative methodologies**.

A **whole-systems approach** helped to incorporate into the assessment design the complexity of client systems and helped to clarify roles and responsibilities, the nature and dynamics of partnerships, and the reality of country differences, organizational needs, and USAID standards and priorities. This approach allowed for better understanding of the context of each situation and the way in which stakeholders, processes, and systems interconnect. The interview and focus group questions were structured using a systems-thinking perspective, to ensure that multiple perspectives of stakeholders are respected and their roles in the whole system acknowledged.

Given the fragile and unstable environments involved in PDEV, EnCompass used an **Appreciative Inquiry (AI) approach** in assessment design and methodologies, and particularly in designing interview and focus group protocols. Briefly defined, Appreciative Inquiry is a process that inquires into, identifies, and further develops the best of "what is" in organizations and programs in order to build toward results that are more effective in the future. Instead of beginning by gap analysis and reviewing possible causes of problems and solutions, the assessment inquired into times when PDEV programs and other related initiatives have led to positive results; it then used the study of those times to explore strengths, challenges, lessons, and hypotheses.

This approach shifted the lens of analysis from a focus on fragile and unstable environments to an understanding of what works best in such environments. This focus on assets and strengths is especially useful in prevention programs such as PDEV that seek to assess the absence of a factor (e.g., destructive influences on communities and youth). The Appreciative Inquiry approach also engenders greater responsiveness from stakeholders in communities where economic and social challenges are abundant and sensitive. Stakeholders are more inclined to openly participate if the assessment allows them to frame their environment in positive ways. (A further benefit of an AI approach is its contribution to actively moving stakeholders forward in overall program processes, while reflecting the tone of positive alternatives to violent extremism inherent in the PDEV.)

DATA COLLECTION

In assessing PDEV, EnCompass tailored an approach that used qualitative data collected through a variety of methods, each of which added value to understanding the multidimensional nature of PDEV and its role in communities in Chad and Niger. The data collected directly connected to the 10 questions provided in the SOW for this assessment of PDEV. Table 2 lists these assessment questions, reordered

into four parts: program design, program evolution and learning, impact, and implications and recommendation.

The following table summarizes key assessment areas and questions:

Table 2. Key assessment areas and questions from the SOW[2]

Program Design	1. How, if at all, do the analytic resources on violent extremism (Drivers and Programming Guides) and country risk assessments inform programming decisions? (f) 2. What is the model being used; what are the assumptions made (added)? 3. How do the programs resemble more traditional or standard youth, media, and governance programs? How do they differ? (h) 4. How do development programs in USAID non-presence countries differ from presence countries? (What are advantages and disadvantages?) (i)
Program Learning and Evolution	1. How were the lessons learned both in terms of the what (types of activities) and the how (ways in which the activities are implemented) applied within country program? (b) 2. How did program activities evolve or change over time? (c) 3. What are the documented programmatic impacts to-date? (a) 4. How did the program develop local individual and institutional partnerships? (e)
Lessons Learned and Recommendations	1. What impact/role did the visible benefits aspect of the program, i.e., community grants, youth job training, micro-credit have on the implementation (success) of the program? (d) 2. What are the advantages and disadvantages of the multisector approach of the program? (g) 3. What recommendations do key stakeholders have for the next phase of the program? (j)

Several types of data collection activities were used.

Desk review: EnCompass conducted a desk review and analysis of existing project documents to examine the operational strategies for achieving program objectives. USAID provided approximately 237 documents for the desk review. The assessment team catalogued all documents, eliminating duplicates and identifying key sources in the process. (Those documents found to be most useful are listed in **Appendix 2**.) Findings from the desk review were used to develop the protocols for field interviews, which are included in **Appendix 3**.

Preliminary briefing: Immediately following the desk review, as part of the presentation of preliminary findings of that review, EnCompass sought input from USAID/West Africa on the accuracy of desk review

[2] Note: The letter following each assessment question is the order in which the question was originally listed in the SOW.

findings; the context and evolution of the program; and other TSCTP activities in these countries and in the region as a whole.

Fieldwork in Chad and Niger: The EnCompass field team of two consultants travelled to Chad and Niger to conduct key informant interviews, focus groups, and other fieldwork in order to provide a more in-depth examination of the assessment questions. The stakeholders interviewed included those directly involved with implementing the program; beneficiary groups and local representatives; and other donors, organizations and expert individuals. A list of all stakeholders interviewed is included in **Appendix 4**.

The assessment field team spent about 1 week each in Niger and Chad and used protocols developed from the desk review to conduct interviews and site visits. In Niger, the team conducted approximately 20 one-on-one interviews with resource people, facilitated 13 focus groups discussions and group meetings, and conducted 10 field visits in Niamey, Zinder and surrounding villages (Mirryah and Maigaria). In Chad, the team conducted 14 one-on-one interviews, facilitated 27 focus groups and group meetings, and conducted 12 field visits in Ndjamena, Mao, Moussoro, and Chaddra. In Niger the team met with the main implementing partners in Niamey and Zinder. In Chad, they met with partners /beneficiaries in N'djamena, Mao and Moussoro. In both countries, the evaluation team used a local translator when needed.

Field team briefing in Accra: At the completion of the fieldwork in Niger and Chad, the field team briefed USAID/WA and received feedback on their preliminary findings in Niger and Chad.

DATA ANALYSIS

Desk review documents and field notes were compiled and coded for data analysis using ATLAS.ti, a qualitative data analysis software package. In the desk review, the assessment team used ATLAS.ti to code relevant documents based on the assessment goals and USAID's key questions included in the original SOW. The coded text from documents allowed the assessment team to organize data by theme. Analysis of coded text helped to identify key issues and questions that then informed the development of the field protocols. This analysis process was also used to examine implications and recommendations around various aspects of the PDEV program and approach.

CONSTRAINTS TO THE ASSESSMENT SCOPE AND FINDINGS

As noted earlier, this assessment was not intended to serve as an impact assessment (particularly in light of the simultaneous separate impact evaluation of the ongoing programs in Mali, Niger and Chad commissioned by the USAID office of Sustainable Development); nor was there an expectation that the field team would be in a position to audit on-the-ground projects to verify accuracy of reported outputs.

Many of the conditions that affect the PDEV program itself were also experienced in carrying out the data collection and analysis activities (as discussed in the report), further constraining the assessment process as well as the use of the final report. Unpredictable security issues in country restricted access to PDEV sites in both countries. A very tight timeframe limited options for addressing inevitable disruptions caused by travel and health issues experienced by the field team. This timeframe also limited the extent of data analysis in preparation of the final report. Both the travel and health issues, as well as the immediate scheduling of follow-on planning and design, limited the use of the report in that planning.

In addition, this report suggests further areas of research that are beyond the scope, budget, and timeframe for this assessment. These areas include the articulation of a theory of change model and corresponding new results framework, where program goals and objectives are reframed from a resiliency perspective. Further research could also develop a clearer picture of CVE and where it falls on the continuum of the conflict prevention spectrum.

III. FINDINGS BY EXPECTED RESULTS

The following section presents findings according to the program's three expected results and activities. The assessment team found some additional results of the program, which are shared in **Other Results** at the end of this section.

RESULT 1: IMPROVING LOCAL GOVERNANCE IN TARGET COMMUNITIES

As noted, activities for Result 1 include the development of civil society, radio programs about governance issues, and training of community leaders. Finding related to each are featured below.

CIVIL SOCIETY DEVELOPMENT

In Chad, the governance program focuses on civil society development. The emphasis is mainly on assessing and addressing community needs and developing and/or strengthening community-based organizations. The underlying assumption is that community resiliency can be built through income-generating activities, encouraging participative governance by citizens, including women and youth; and developing conflict and disputes management skills of community leaders.

The governance component in Chad has been fully implemented. The PDEV program has selected eight local NGOs, based on its unique expertise on a topic or connection to a particular segment of the population. Examples include:

- The Association of Herders and Nomads, which works with extension agents in animal husbandry in Moussoro;
- The Chadian Human Rights League, which works with communities to resolve intercommunal conflicts;
- LEAD Tchad, which trains and educates communities in Bar el Ghazal to develop income-generating activities in agriculture.

The local partners has been selected to implement community development projects related to training, civic education, and income-generating activities. A prerequisite to project implementation is the establishment of a representative governance structure from the community.

RADIO PROGRAMS ABOUT GOVERNANCE ISSUES

One of the major differences affecting media programming in Niger and Chad is the extent of radio listening culture in the two countries In Niger, there are many community radios stations with youth-led chat groups or "Fadas" that PDEV has utilized as a platform for expanding the listening group concept. . The same cannot be said in Chad, where there are a limited number of community radio stations. This difference shows on the result of the program. In Niger, the field team saw more engaged and organized

listener clubs, not far from becoming an organized network of more than 120 listeners. The evolution of these groups from listeners clubs to community development groups was only seen in Niger.

In Chad, community radio reporters were paid to organize listeners club (not the case in Niger) and listeners clubs were not cohesive groups. They met at the direction of the community radio reporters and disbanded after listening to the radio program.

In Niger, the PDEV program began the development of civic education messages with a participative assessment so that messages resonated with the target audience. The PDEV team organized a series of workshops with a variety of stakeholders including youth, religious leaders, and local authorities, to identify key themes for the radio programming. Triangulated with the results of the community youth mapping (see Result 2 below), the media team identified a series of main themes. This participatory approach helped guarantee that these themes reflected the needs of the people, as well as respected their norms and culture. The assessment also informed the choice of the format and languages for the radio programming.

In Niger, the PDEV program developed three radio programs:

1. Gwadaben Matasa—Covers youth-related issues and broadcast in French.
2. Hantsi Leka Gidan Kowa—Addresses governance using the format of radio drama or soap opera. This program is the most popular because of the important, relevant issues discussed.
3. Samu Zamunci—This program provides religious leaders, both Muslim and Christian, the opportunity to discuss societal issues from their religious perspective, thus sharing competing ideas in a constructive way.

TRAINING OF COMMUNITY LEADERS

When the scope of work for PDEV was developed in 2007, Niger was fully implementing its decentralization framework. Though limited progress had been made, each commune was developing its own development plan and there was potential for PDEV to capitalize on this mechanism for bringing decision making closer to citizens. PDEV was able to conduct training in 20 communes on budgeting and priority setting before the project was obliged to suspend its activities due to political turmoil in Niger, and by December 17, 2009, the governance component was officially cancelled.

RESULT 2: EMPOWERING YOUTH TO BECOME PARTICIPANTS IN COMMUNITIES AND THE ECONOMY

Overall, the assessment team found that through the PDEV program, youth are empowered participants in their community. Most youth involved in the program went through vocational training, life skills training, and entrepreneurship training. While many of them did not enter the world of work, they agree that their exposure to PDEV has transformed them in a positive way. For example, the youth community mappers in Ndjamena have designed and run multiple activities in their communities. Some youth have

been recruited by PDEV as young producers. In Niger, even though the youth component was cancelled, some youth who went through the vocational training have succeeded in getting a job or an apprenticeship, as is the case of the young community health agents.

As noted, activities for this result include community youth mapping activities, vocational and life -skills training, in-kind grants for youth cultural activities. Finding by each activity are noted below.

COMMUNITY YOUTH MAPPING

Because of the community youth mapping exercise, activities and issues concerning youth and relevant to PDEV were identified in both Chad and Niger. Community youth mappers have developed valuable insights into the PDEV target community. In addition to understanding these communities, the youth mappers have developed data collection and analysis skills that have increased an understanding of community concerns among local and U.S.-based implementers of the PDEV program.

The PDEV program capitalizes on the importance of youth and includes them through the community youth mapping (CYM) exercise, which is a youth-led data collection strategy to link youth mappers involved with a variety of community building processes, including identifying at-risk youth populations, and viable institutions. The tools learned by the youth via CYM have broad applications.

In preparation for CYM strategy, young people were recruited through a local organization, and trained in skills including data collection, data analysis, data management, data dissemination and presentation, public speaking, interviewing, small group problem solving, effective survey techniques, situational professionalism, communication, facilitation, and data integrity.

In both Chad and Niger, a local association working with youth was selected to implement the CYM.

In Niger, the NGO Karkara was recruited to implement the activity. Karkara staff and youth mappers were trained simultaneously. The first round of mapping was done in Niamey, under the supervision of AED. The second round was implemented in Maradi, Zinder, Agadez, and Tahoua. Karkara trained about 360 youth during this second round of CYM.

In Niger, community youth mapping was a new approach to both Karkara and the youth involved. Karkara has been able to use this capacity and expertise it gained in work they have done with other partners, i.e. OXFAM. However, according to some, the CYM did not work as expected– the delays in the delivery of the final CYM report limited the application of the results of the mapping exercise to PDEV activities in Niger.

In Chad, the local NGO *Rassemblement des jeunes pour le Developpement* (RJD) supervised the CYM activity. RJD is a youth-led network of youth organizations. RJD recruited youth from each neighborhood (*quartier*) of Ndjamena and in the regions targeted by PDEV. Unlike in Niger where the data analysis was done by AED in the United States, RJD took responsibility for the data analysis during

the second round. RJD was appreciative of their increased capacity and knowledge gained through this partnership with AED.

VOCATIONAL TRAINING

Vocational skill development provided training on different trade skills including mechanics, sewing, computer science (Word and Excel), carpentry, gardening, electricity, and others.

The use by PDEV team of a multi-dimension approach that combines vocational and life skills training provided greater opportunities for youth development. In fact, despite the difficulties of economic integration, most youth recognize the value and the impact of this combination of trainings, particularly the life skills training. From a CVE perspective, it provided them with self-confidence, the "esprit de critique" or critical thinking skills to be engaged citizens. They still hope to become productive citizens by using their newly acquired skills.

Political instability in Niger led to suspension of the youth component in December 15, 2009. However, by that time, the program had already generated a lot of momentum and raised hopes among youth. About 1,000 youth were in their first trimester of vocational training when the decision of suspension was announced, resulting in disappointment and some frustration amongst these disenfranchised youth.

In Chad, about 320 youth were trained in Moussoro (55), Ati (168) and Mao (100). In addition to vocational training, youth received life skills training (self-confidence, health, and HIV/AIDS, professional behaviors in the work place).

In kind grants also figured into the vocational training strategy however after the inconclusive experience of individual micro-credit loans during the pilot phase, PDEV shifted from individual to group loans. Youth organized into groups through a voluntary group formation process in which youth decide among themselves who they want to include in their loan group. These groups are targeted to receive start-up kits to launch income-generating activities.

Though the skills training has yielded some success, the assessment team found that the training of youth is marred by many challenges, including:

- Insufficient market analysis of the local economy. The program did not take the weak local economy into account in helping youth select viable trades for vocational training.
- Substantial gaps between training completion and application of those new skills due to delays in providing tool kit package or insertion into apprenticeship or world of work.
- Delays in approving funding for tool kits and equipment to complete the vocation training cycle.
- Changes in implementing partner relations, which have slowed the effectiveness of the vocational training program.

IN-KIND GRANTS FOR YOUTH CULTURAL ACTIVITIES

The level of realization of cultural activities was different in Chad and Niger. In Niger, there was a well-functioning, government-supported network of youth centers, with highly motivated managers directly paid by the government and accessible youth centers to a diversified cohort of youth. Each commune in Niamey had one of such youth centers. In Chad, the youth centers were mainly buildings, and the field team did not observe the same level of organization and dynamism. Particularly the youth centers in Moussoro and Mao were mostly attended by students. The presence of the more supportive youth centers in Niamey offered PDEV with a better chance to reach out to a diversified group of both in- and out-o-school youth. In Chad, extra efforts were required to reach out to a more diversified group of youth.

RESULT 3: DISCREDITING EXTREMIST IDEOLOGIES

As noted, activities for this result include capacity-building of radio stations and promotion of moderate messaging. Finding by each activity are noted below.

BUILDING CAPACITY OF COMMUNITY RADIO STATIONS

In both Niger and Chad, PDEV has provided the following capacity-building assistance:

- Provision of equipment—computers, software, microphones, transmitters, etc.;
- Training of producers and technicians of community radio stations on topics such as technical maintenance, interactive radio programming, and the use of Adobe software; and
- Financial support—each community radio receives financial support for broadcasting PDEV radio programs.

In Niger, PDEV works with 58 community radios and the national radio station *La Voix du Sahel*. In Chad, PDEV works with 12 community radios and the national radio station.

Capacity development has been a critical piece to the viability and sustainability of the PDEV messaging goals. The skills and equipment assets will have long lasting impact on these local radio stations, and their use will continue long after the PDEV program is completed.

SUPPORTING MODERATE MESSAGING

The assessment team found that through PDEV's efforts, individuals and communities have been empowered to start the conversation on underlying issues driving violent extremism. The PDEV program has created a space conducive to exchange, through which moderates can engage in a religious dialogue with those sympathetic to religious extremism.

One of the impressive achievements of PDEV is its production of **intra-religious radio programming**. In Niger, the radio program *Samu Zamunci* provides religious leaders from different Islamic sects and Christianity the opportunity to discuss societal issues from religious perspectives, thus informing the

population in a constructive way. In Chad, the PDEV program sponsored co-production of a radio program by Radio Al Bayan and Radio Al Quoran, two religious (Islamic) radio stations that have generally found themselves on opposite sides of important societal issues. This initiative is a breakthrough for intrareligious dialogue, given each radio station differing perspectives of Islam that are often in disagreement on the Islamic interpretation of societal issues in Chad.

The PDEV program has also invested in **Koranic schools**, and worked with the *Association Islamique du Niger* (AIN) to develop a peace and tolerance guide, which has reached more than 6,000 students in more than 600 Koranic schools. A partnership between PDEV and the Salam Institute in the United States is also supporting the *Union des Ecoles Coraniques du Niger* to develop a curriculum centered on civic education, peace, and tolerance for the Koranic schools. The Director of the Koranic School in Zinder noted, *The community was surprised and happy to see that Americans were helping a Koranic school. We never thought it will ever be possible.* AIN/ONEE also produced a Bulletin in Ajami and distributed 6,000 bulletins to 100 targeted Koranic schools in Zinder.

In Niger, AIN and ONEE were recipients of a grant to organize a **conference on peace and tolerance** bringing together the four dominant Islamic sects (Tidjania, Malaki, Izallah, Kadria). The participants were Marabous (religious leaders) of five departments of Zinder. The proceedings of the conference were televised and aired on different radio stations. The conference was followed by departmental workshops targeting teachers of Koranic schools. Each workshop brought together 40 teachers of Koranic schools and involved magistrates to share the legal perspectives on issues related to peace and tolerance.

MEDIA ACCESS FOR MODERATE VOICES AND DIALOGUE

In addition to strengthening the capacity of moderates within the Muslim community in Niger, the program has also carried its messages of peace and tolerance on the airwaves, expanding their outreach and sharing moderate perspectives with more of the population. For example, after the kidnapping of the 07 French, Togolese and Madagascar employees from AREVA at Arlit, the community radio station of Arlit launched a series of debates over the impact of kidnapping and its consequences on their community. They brought together community and religious leaders, as well as local authorities to discuss the impact and what could be done to prevent these kinds of acts in the future. The Arlit community radio station received support from PDEV in 2009.

OTHER RESULTS

Though not intended results of the program, other results were noted by the assessment team and featured below.

SUSTAINABLE AND LOCALLY OWNED IMPACT

The participative approach, in combination with capacity building, has encouraged individuals and communities to design and implement activities without assistance from the program. In both Chad and Niger, community radio stations are now willing to produce local radio programs around issues of governance, peace, and tolerance. In Niger, community radios targeted by PDEV have recognized the added capacity and the impact of the partnership on their development and particularly for their sustainability. Many of them expressed their willingness and capacity to carry on some of the radio programming, particularly Hantsi (on good governance) even after PDEV is finished. In Chad, some community radio stations have even expressed the need to work in partnership with PDEV to develop local radio programming on issues of good governance. Radios El Bayan and El Quran are working together to launched a co-production of radio programming on religious outreach. This is will be the first local partnerships between these two religious radios and more interestingly a major local co-production, which will be about youth and religion: *Shebab Ouaddin*.

Community groups or *groupements* have been created to manage relatively important income-generating activities and other community development projects, and some of these community projects have been scaled up to new levels by community members themselves. In Moussoro, for example, with the support from LEAD Chad, Moussoro 1, Moussoro 2, and Moussoro3,(these are community based groups facilitated by LEAD Chad with funding from PDEV)have developed sustainable income-generating activities around cereals and gardening (*culture maraicheres*). These income-generating activities are managed by governance structures led by community members themselves. Business decisions, including new investments are now made by these community-based organizations. In addition to initial funding, PDEV through LEAD Chad has provided microenterprise management training and training on conflict resolution.

IMPROVED COMMUNITY COHESION IN TARGET COMMUNITIES

While the emphasis has been mainly on addressing community needs and developing and/or strengthening community-based organizations, improved community cohesion has also resulted from PDEV's grant making process. Working with local partners in Chad, PDEV has supported community livelihoods and development projects. These projects were carefully chosen through a participative needs assessment. Most of the community development projects were income-generating activities. In addition to being income-generating activities, these projects provided community members the opportunity to develop new skills (i.e., micro project management, conflict resolution, and governance). They also provided opportunity for intergenerational and gender collaboration.

POSITIVE BEHAVIORAL CHANGES THROUGH CIVIC EDUCATION MESSAGING

The radio programs have stimulated some changes of behavior, particularly among the young listeners. Some of them who were engaged in negative risk taking (drugs, risky sexual behaviors) told the

assessment team how much they have changed since listening to these messages. Some listeners have started community initiatives and awareness campaigns on issues discussed through the radio program.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the findings noted above, the assessment team has drafted the following recommendations to improve the PDEV program, which are grouped by expected result.

RESULT 1: IMPROVING LOCAL GOVERNANCE IN TARGET COMMUNITIES

- Ensure that all programming, including specific local projects, have long-term goals and objectives that clearly fit into PDEV's overall program strategy, and that these goals and objectives are clearly understood by those selecting and implementing projects.
- To date, the governance program in Chad has focused on civil society development. The focus has been on citizen participation in increasing access to services and resources through community-development projects but not through, or in partnership with, the local government. This is seen as a missed opportunity, as linking communities to their government officials could be a stabilizing factor for remote villages. Good governance programming should seek to build relationships with local officials. In most cases, government-citizen relations contribute to stability.

RESULT 2: EMPOWERING AT-RISK YOUTH TO BECOME ACTIVE PARTICIPANTS IN THEIR COMMUNITIES AND THE ECONOMY

- Consider incorporating community youth mappers to enhance monitoring and evaluation data collection of PDEV activities.
- Better inform youth on the options available to them for vocational training and the potential for gainful employment for each of the trades. In PDEV, some young people were trained in traditional vocations, with limited or no prospects. Certain communities can only support a limited number of carpenters. It is therefore important to look for new value-chains that can be supported by local economies.
- When beneficiaries, particularly youth, are given the choice of grants or training, their choice should be analyzed in the context of the community situation. Greater integration of existing supportive structures (youth centers, vocational centers), and leaders in the community (religious leaders, parents, workshop owners, etc), could contribute to a greater success rate in the selection of viable vocational careers. An excellent example can be drawn from the initiative of training young people in photography in Moussoro, thanks to a partnership with the National Geographic channel, which carried the promise of innovative income-generating activities. The

training, however, focused on teaching the craft of photography, not the trade. A clear understanding of the market and all the players of the photography value-chain in the region of Bar el Ghazal and Ndjamena would have been very helpful in transforming the training into a sustainable livelihood for the youth involved.

RESULT 3: RENDERING SUPERFLUOUS IDEOLOGIES PROMOTING VIOLENCE

- The confluence of partners around different messages within the same community adds to the strength of the overall PDEV goal. Link various initiatives (AIN/ONEE and UECN) working to educate, shift, and modify curricula in Koranic schools.
- Continue to develop relationships with moderate voices within the Muslim community.

IV. FINDINGS RELATED TO THE OPERATIONAL STRATEGY AND PDEV SUCCESS FACTORS

In addition to examining PDEV programming by intended result areas, the assessment team analyzed available documents and field interviews about PDEV's experience and accomplishments, in order to identify the effective elements of PDEV's operational strategy. Through this analysis, the assessment team identified four essential steps in programming aimed at countering violent extremism:

1. Assess and understand the context
2. Establish relationships and build trust
3. Build capacity and infrastructure
4. Sustain impact through local ownership

This section reviews each of these four steps; why each step is important in countering violent extremism; what factors in PDEV were found to have contributed to success for each step; and what else is needed. Table 3 lists these four steps, as well as corresponding factors of success in PDEV's programming.

Table 3. Essential steps and success factors in programming aimed at countering violent extremism

Essential Steps	PDEV Success Factors
1. Assess and Understand the Context	– Using Assessments for Programming – Adaptation of and Flexibility in Programming
2. Establish Relationships and Build Trust	– Identifying stakeholders – Selecting and developing local partnerships – Building trust – Using a participatory approach – Visible and effective packaging of benefits – Understanding Relationships in the context of violent extremism
3. Strengthen Resiliency through Capacity and Infrastructure Building	– Capacity building o Individuals o Communities o Youth associations o National/local civil society organizations o Partner radio stations – Infrastructure building
4. Sustain Impact through Local Ownership	– Empowering primary beneficiaries as local actors to become part of the solution – Collaborating locally to strengthen local ownership – Facilitating sustainability through building awareness, capacity. and resources

STEP1. ASSESS AND UNDERSTAND THE CONTEXT

Understanding the context in which the PDEV program takes place is essential, both to be able to identify and assess the particular drivers of violent extremism that the program seeks to address, as well as to design a program that fit the needs and conditions of the area within which it is implemented.

The different contexts involved in preventing violent extremism are complex and are discussed in terms of contextual *differences* and contextual *change*. Contextual differences refer to how the context differs where PDEV is implemented; these include geographical, political, physical, socio-economic, cultural, and religious differences—all of which can have an impact on drivers of violent extremism and the differences in levels of violent extremism. Contextual change refers to the speed, frequency, and unpredictability of changes in the conditions and circumstances in which PDEV operates; contextual change can be expected given the instability of the areas where PDEV is working, as well as the many interacting systems and stakeholders affecting PDEV's ability to implement activities.

PDEV implementers have recognized that each country has unique conditions requiring specific adaptation. The previous section of this report has described these opportunities and challenges and the way they have affected the implementation of PDEV, highlighting differences between Chad and

Niger. The conclusion of the report also highlights in a table, key programmatic suggestions based on the contextual differences, opportunities and challenges unique to each country (Chad and Niger).

The assessment team did not notice major differences in the program design between Niger and Chad due to contextual differences. The absence of substantial differences in the program design and implementation could be explained by the fact that contextual and societal differences between Chad and Niger that could have affected PDEV in a meaningful way were related to components that were suspended in Niger. These differences are more pronounced in political governance arrangement (national and local) including the role of civil society and youth participation, as noted in the baseline reports and country assessments (AED 2009a and 2009b).

USING ASSESSMENTS TO UNDERSTAND CONTEXT

Contextual differences were identified using assessments that informed the overall planning of PDEV, particularly in targeting and different types of PDEV programming such as in-kind grants, and media programming. Several assessments were conducted in Chad and Niger to gather information related to the following factors that may affect countering violent extremism (CVE) programming:

- Violent extremism environment
- Community issues, needs and interests (local communal conflicts, land issues, economic and social vulnerabilities or risks factors)
- Media landscape
- Baseline indicators to be addressed through programming
- Political and administrative institutions
- Society's perception of youth and their political and economic participation

In interviews, PDEV implementers stated that they used the country risk assessments, but found them somewhat confusing, and often went with the reality on the ground. They did not mention using the analytic resources on violent extremism (Drivers and Programming Guides) for planning programs.

An important strength of the assessment processes used is that implementers of PDEV have taken a participatory approach that relies heavily on local stakeholders to understand context and needs. At the same time, in addition to providing information for programming, operations, and evaluation, these types of participatory assessments also have contributed to building trust and gaining buy-in of local stakeholders.

Less evident was planning for the impact of contextual differences on operations and the ability to manage or monitor program activities. PDEV did do safety and security assessments to assess security issues and operational needs for safety. Other conditions affecting programming did not receive as much attention. Such conditions included the slow bureaucracy. In Chad, for example, it took more than 6 months for AED to obtain the legal status of PDEV, therefore delaying the start of operation. Insufficient analysis of current socio-economic conditions in targeted areas in both countries resulted in

deficiencies in the effectiveness of the youth livelihoods component. The lack of a solid understanding of the economic vulnerabilities and opportunities affected the deployment and the success of the youth livelihoods component in Chad, (less effect in Niger since the component was suspended).

ADAPTATION OF AND FLEXIBILITY IN PROGRAMMING

The impact of contextual changes also appeared to be less considered in planning, but was addressed in some instances by implementers as needed, through the adaptation of programming. Through these adaptations, there is a better understanding now of further flexibility needed to meet contextual changes.

As noted in the impact evaluation and other program documents, major contextual changes had a serious impact on PDEV programming. These included two coups (Mauritania and Niger); suspension of the Mauritania program; USG sanctions eliminating the youth and governance components of the Niger program; increased occurrences of violent extremism related activity in both Niger and Chad; and security-related travel restrictions and evacuations in Chad; and the order to move the PDEV Chad field office with 1 week's notice.

Given some flexibility in its design, PDEV has made some significant adaptations to its programming and operations based on such contextual changes, though much of the adaptation has been administrative. Examples of these adaptations include the following:

- With the *suspension of the Mauritania program*, AED suggested options for expanding activities in the other two countries, and at USAID's request, expanded upon selected concepts for Chad.
- Given new *security issues* in Niger. PDEV Niger finalized its Safety and Security Contingency Plan, reviewed its contents with staff, and adjusted travel plans.
- After *suspension of the youth and governance components in Niger* due to USG sanctions against the Government of Niger, to maintain relationships and minimize the disappointment of the youth and of the training institutes, PDEV sent teams to each school to meet with the students and explain the situation to them, answer their questions, and pay the students' last month of transportation fees that were due. AED worked with USAID to reprogram Niger activities, and to expand PDEV's Chad activities.
- PDEV also prepared a new 17-month PDEV program in Mauritania, and an extension of the task order through September 2011.
- With the *potential rise in extremism in Faya*, AED responded to a request from the Prefect in Faya for assistance in carrying out events that would counter a rise in extremism there. PDEV shifted programming to carry out the Faya Cultural festival, identified as "one of the most visible and positive tangible activities throughout the life of the project [AED Lessons Learned]".

Minor adaptations appeared to be a matter of course, and included adjustments to CYM activities in Chad due to security issues, changes in travel schedules due to transport issues, changes in assessment

schedules due to management turnover, and delays in programming due to registration problems. An ironic example of the need for such adaptations was given in the second quarterly report, which explained that "The security assessment, originally planned for mid-June but cancelled due to insecurity, was finally completed during the period September 14-28."

The varied and unstable contexts, combined with the innovative nature of the program, require more flexible programming that is able to adapt and respond to those contexts and to new learning about CVE.

STEP2. ESTABLISH RELATIONSHIPS AND BUILD TRUST

One of the central findings of this assessment relates to the role of relationship building. This section on relationship building, participation, and the role of local partnerships offers findings related to identifying stakeholders, selecting partners and beneficiaries, and building trust through initial activities.

In the context of the results framework formulated for the PDEV program, the development of partnerships and relationships, as well as the building of networks, is of utmost importance. Influencing people to become agents of change is at the heart of the program and important at every level of activity. Therefore, choosing the right partner on the ground, developing and strengthening networks and building trust among the partners and towards the USAID program is an integral part of the overall goal of the program.

IDENTIFYING STAKEHOLDERS

Stakeholders for PDEV were identified through the assessments as described earlier, both more broadly at a strategic level, and on the ground through local assessment processes. There are many stakeholder groups relevant to PDEV programming, who hold different and sometimes multiple roles.

In addition to the primary international implementers (AED, Equal Access, Mercy Corp, Africare), in each country the program selected primary local implementers through a proposal process, based on their understanding of the program area and regions targeted. While PDEV did some capacity strengthening with these national civil society organizations, their role was focused more in the implementation of PDEV activities. These national implementing CSOs helped to identify and select the local CSOs, groups and associations to receive grants and other services. While the selection of local beneficiary CSOs followed a proposal process, PDEV did offer assistance to them in this process, further strengthening their capacity in participating in this kind of funding. For some grants and events, PDEV also funded consortia of organizations and associations.

Some of the individual beneficiaries of PDEV activities include youth receiving vocational and life skills training; those involved in community youth mapping; individuals receiving media training (e.g., community reporters or producers); and study tour participants.

Other important groups participating in PDEV activities include the listening clubs, which in some cases, through involvement with PDEV, evolved from listening clubs to community development groups, and sometimes to PDEV's content advisory groups, which provided feedback on media programming. In addition, different levels of governmental stakeholders have an effect on PDEV programs and operations in different ways. For example, U.S. Government agencies and policies can affect the success of the program. Host country national government policies, and the various ministries involved, can also play a role in the operations of PDEV. Likewise, host country regional and local authorities can be both actors in, and beneficiaries of, PDEV activities. **Appendix 1** summarizes these groups, their level of organization, their role in the project, and how they were selected.

SELECTING AND DEVELOPING LOCAL PARTNERSHIPS

The assessment team observed that local implementing partners were selected based on varying criteria, creating a group of partners diverse in capacity and experience but grounded in the community. From the outset it was made clear that the local implementing partners would have the freedom of choosing their activities. Where managerial skills were weak, PDEV provided a training and accompaniment to strengthen the local partner. The same strategy was applied to more direct grant giving and in-kind grant giving. Through this process, a trust partnership was developed between AED/Equal Access, the local partners, and the beneficiaries.

One of the core strengths of PDEV has been its approach to local partnership development. Partners were chosen based on the relevance of the ideas proposed, and their experience with the target group or community. While capacity was important, it was not the most important criteria. This approach allows organizations whose core work fits the purpose of PDEV to join the project, therefore increasing the chances of sustainability and local ownership. In other words, with or without PDEV, the local partners selected would have developed the type of activities supported, albeit not on the same scale or level of performance. PDEV brought additional resources and capacity, while local partners brought in the knowledge of the target group or community, local outreach, and local legitimacy.

In Niger for example, partnerships with *Union des Ecoles Coraniques du Niger* (UECN) or with Radio Bonferey helped reach out to both moderate Muslims and those segments of the Muslim population exposed to extremist messages. In Chad, the partnership with *Rassemblement des Jeunes pour le Développement* (RJD) facilitated outreach to all segments of the youth population (RJD is a youth serving network led by youth). In both Niger and Chad, each local partner brought to PDEV a unique value.

The text box on the next page describes the process used to select local partners in Niger; the same template was followed in Chad. While it appears that the criteria led to better results, it is difficult to create a strict causal link or correlation between one criterion and particular results. Also, the overall strategy of PDEV grant making mechanism is risk-averse, requiring NGOs to have years of experience, an ability to "pre-finance", experience in collaboration with multiple NGOs, the ability to support surprise

visits, and documented results. While these criteria included a certain level of managerial capacity and experience, in cases where the NGO was only slightly short of the level of capacity required, PDEV did provide some training. However, this overall approach still may exclude the possibility of working with certain community organizations that may have the local connections, organizational will, and community legitimacy to best meet PDEV counter-extremism objectives.

The PDEV Grant Making Process in Niger and Chad

A call for proposals—The call is publicized in media, networks of USAID implementers and beneficiaries. The documents providing detailed information on the terms of references are collected by applicants at PDEV headquarters in Niamey or Ndjamena; or sent via email to the potential applicants upon request.

Selection committee—The selection committee is internal, composed of AED and Equal Access staff members.

Selection criteria—The selection criteria depend on the project, but the main criteria are management capacity of the applicants, official status (registered with the authorities--no informal organization is qualified), implementing strategy, number of years of existence, and familiarity with the stakeholders affected or involved with the proposed activity.

Publication of results—The winners and the losers received a letter explaining the reasons. In most cases they are given a choice between three projects.

Due diligence and management form—The process is to understand the level or the capacity needs of the recipient and identify any potential conflict of interest. The recipient then receives help from PDEV to develop a formal and acceptable proposal. This process is an important capacity-building process, as the recipient is exposed to USAID criteria and proposal development. It is important to mention that the capacity developed is to help the recipient develop a standard proposal. PDEV will also check the references of the recipient (due diligence).

Launch meeting —PDEV organizes a launch meeting will all the recipients and previous beneficiaries, to explain methodologies and procedures; as well as letting previous beneficiaries share their experiences. During the meeting, the letter of commitment is signed, as well as the PMP plan, which comprises a series of deliverables and results to be met by the recipient. Disbursement of funds follows the principle of “pre-financing”, where reimbursement are made after each deliverable.

The principle of “pre-financing” has been denounced by beneficiaries as an obstacle to local organizations that do not necessarily have the cash flow to engage some of the expenses necessary to

meet a deliverable. The flexibility and transparency of the grant making process were well appreciated by the grant team.

Less evident to the field team were partnerships with local authorities. Much was included in the RFTOP on the involvement of local authorities, the importance of fostering collaboration between local government authorities and civil society organizations, and working with the level of government that is closest to citizens. This lack of collaboration with local authorities was more pronounced in Niger; a situation aggravated by the suspension of the governance component of the program.

There is some indication that the pilot program in Chad had as its goal the promotion of "conflict mitigation and stability in Chad by fostering the development of effective partnerships between the local governments and NGOs"—and providing training for local leaders focused "on practical issues relating to better management of limited local resources and community level advocacy." The RFTOP also included as a key activity for PDEV the integration of "educated out-of-work youth into supportive roles for local government and/or communal councils."

PDEV involved local authorities in community dialogues and needs assessments, yet there appeared to be less involvement with them during project activities. The recent impact assessment emphasized how critical it is to continue to work to build the capacity of local organizations and local governments.

The elections scheduled in both countries over the next few months could provide PDEV the opportunity to work with newly elected national and local authorities for the first time in a while. This could be the opportunity to provide capacity strengthening for newly elected authorities and regions.

BUILDING TRUST

From the selection of partners and beneficiaries and onward, PDEV began to build trust between its implementers and its partners. The assessment team identified three key elements to this trust building process: an appropriate timeframe, participatory approach, and visible and effective packaging of benefits.

An appropriate timeframe includes both attention to short-term impact, as well as a long-term perspective on relationship building.

Attention to short-term impact. The need for quick impact activities was well recognized in the overall programming strategy from the beginning. Through interviews in the field, the assessment team found that in-kind grants given in a timely fashion and elicited by the beneficiaries go a long way. (See below for further discussion of visible benefits.) This ability to provide quick results, when it worked, has been a strength of the program. By building in activities that brought about immediate benefits to beneficiaries, PDEV established a foundation for further involvement and benefits.

A long-term perspective on relationship building: The activities and steps in providing short-term impacts can both move the relationships forward while providing results that contribute to PDEV goals; however, the achievement of these relationships is of high priority and needs to be allowed the time to develop. The process of building relationships takes time.

PDEV was designed to provide results in an abbreviated timeframe (three years), as it needed to reinforce interventions by DOD and DOS components of the TSCTP. Contrary to those expectations, while some short term "visible benefits" could be realized, the realities in Chad and Niger require a longer timeframe in which to build solid relationships and yield sustainable results (briefing). The impact assessment noted as well the long-term nature of PDEV's goals.

PDEV has clearly built these relationships in different ways, with evident impact particularly with its religious outreach efforts in both countries.

When the PDEV program was starting in Niger, Imams in Maradi had been reluctant to speak with representatives of U.S. organizations. Yet, when interviewed for the impact evaluation in 2010, the Imams expressed an eagerness to work with PDEV trainers to improve their communication abilities, spoke favorably about PDEV sponsored religious conferences, and expressed interest in visiting the U.S. This is indicative of the relationships built by the program and increased trust of formally estranged entities. This important shift in perception lays the foundation for future activities.

Radio Bonferey was a radio station catering to an audience prone to extremism. At the beginning, they did not like the idea of inter-faith messaging and were skeptical that their audience, who listened for religious messages and readings of the Koran, were not receptive to the peace and civic education messages proposed by PDEV. However, through discussions and negotiations and by involving Radio Bonferey in the stakeholder meeting, PDEV was able to build this relationship to the point where the station managers saw the benefit of broadcasting PDEV programs. Now, Radio Bonferey regularly receives an outpouring of listener call-in feedback after each episode of Hantsi and Gwadaben Matasa requesting a replay of the episode. This feedback convinced the radio managers of the suitability of the material for their listening audience.

A point of sensitivity particularly related to the length of time needed for building trust was noted in the second Quarterly Report:

> "The topics of terrorism and extremism remain very sensitive and are not discussed openly in the Chadian context. The PDEV team and CSO partners agreed that when framing and implementing program activities that touch upon extremism and issues related to Islam, the (interlocutor) with the community must be a trusted source and slowly ease into discussions; rushing and/or being too insistent will not help PDEV reach its objectives."

CHALLENGES FACED IN BUILDING AND MAINTAINING TRUST

Once trust is established, it must be maintained, both through a long-term commitment to the relationships established, and through setting and maintaining appropriate expectations—particularly given that one of the drivers of violent extremism has been identified as "frustrated expectations and relative deprivation (not so much from the system's failure to deliver, but from its inability to keep up with expectations)." As learned with the suspension of youth and governance activities in Niger, when that commitment is perceived as broken, serious damage can be done to the relationships built and to the overall goals of preventing violent extremism. Some felt strongly that the beneficiaries of the program have been extremely frustrated by the cut-off of the youth and governance components and that this negatively affected PDEV. Future programming needs to consider how it will manage expectations in volatile operating environments.

The recent impact evaluation also emphasized this commitment (TSCTP Impact Evaluation, December 2010):

> "USG programming needs to be accompanied by political commitments to sustain funding of key interventions if they are to have the desired impact. TSCTP partners, especially community leaders and traditional authorities, must have faith in USG program commitments if they are to assume the risk of working with sensitive counter-extremism programming. It requires only one failed commitment to seriously, and sometimes permanently, set back relations in a community, a region, or even a country."

USING A PARTICIPATORY APPROACH

Participation at all levels appears to be important in trust building. By meeting together with ministry officials, academicians, and other stakeholders, PDEV sought and received input and ideas on themes, needs and activities, and thus engendered trust.

In Niger, in addition to the international implementers (Equal Access, AED) operating as "one team", this principle of participation has been applied in programming as well, through initiating the media component with a series of focus groups throughout all regions of the project. These focus groups included all segments of the populations and across all ages and religions, and received input on themes and issues, preferred media of communication, format of media programming, and languages. After the focus groups, workshops were organized in Niamey to further inform decisions around these issues.

In Chad, community youth mapping (CYM) provides another example of a participatory approach to assessment and program development. In interviews with AED and some of the community youth mappers, the assessment team found that most of the relative success achieved with the quick start and in-kind grants activities appears to have derived from the information gathered by youth, through the CYM process, especially in those instances where local groups were engaged in analyzing results.

VISIBLE AND EFFECTIVE PACKAGING OF BENEFITS

The visible and effective packaging of benefits was another key element of building trust. As noted by a representative of USAID in Niger, the success of a youth program is achieved if it provides tangible tools to the youth to do something with their lives. The director of a Koranic school in Zinder that received benefits commented, "It was the first time, whites provided support to a Koranic school…It was impressive and the community was surprised and really pleased."

PDEV provided in-kind grants (TVs, chairs, books, refrigerators, kitchen appliances, sewing machines, etc.) to seven youth centers in Niamey, based on the centers' own statements of its needs and on their explanation of how the donation would strengthen its activities and contribute financially. Even after the suspension of activities in Niger, AED management reported that the youth centers have been a big success. One factor in this success was seen to be the use of these in-kind donations to create income-generating activities

Packaging of benefits is important. For example with vocational training, packaging training with the tools and access to employment makes the difference as to whether youth actually benefit from the training. The eighth quarterly explained that "A number of community members in Ati were reticent to participate in the CYM data collection as they were not convinced that positive outcomes would be seen in their community as a result of the CYM process. They informed PDEV that previous surveys carried out in the community did not produce tangible results, so they felt like their time was being wasted." The inclusion of youth development activities to follow up CYM surveys are integral to both responding to community needs and avoiding frustrated expectations (and loss of trust) on the part of those that responded to the surveys.

UNDERSTANDING RELATIONSHIPS IN THE CONTEXT OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM

Relationships are not a by-product of activities, but rather a core component of activities' effectiveness. It is important to understand how each relationship figures into addressing the drivers of violent extremism. Despite the challenges of determining the right program mix, target population, and most at-risk geographic regions, PDEV has made significant in-roads where none existed before. Without USAID Mission presence, PDEV has developed relationships with individuals, community, and youth groups who are at the heart of the violent extremism issue. Through these relationships, PDEV and USAID have a window into the most isolated and remote areas and relationships with people who are faced, on a daily basis, with choices for survival. Often without any government services, education or employment opportunities, PDEV works on the frontline with those who are most vulnerable and targeted for recruitment into terrorist networks.

Indeed, each relationship fostered with a youth, a school, a government official, journalist, radio station manager, or community group provides insights into how that society copes with the underlying conditions that contribute to violent extremism. Many of those that benefit from the youth integration program, or listen to civic education messages aired on PDEV sponsored radios, or who benefited from a

new community project, may not be on the threshold of signing up as a terrorist recruit. However, the infusion of positive inputs, including new ideas, builds trust. With trust, there is room to grow the relationship, and thus to grapple with more challenging issues.

Building relationships is one area of strength for USAID within the TSCTP. Beneficiaries trust and hope that USAID-funded programs will provide opportunities to surmount the challenges of their environment. By the same token, when USAID withdraws from these relationships for political reasons (such as in Niger), there are consequences to the relationship, dashed expectations and frustrations, all of which, if not managed correctly, can contribute to the push factors already present in violent extremism environments.

STEP3. BUILD RESILIENCY THROUGH CAPACITY AND INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT

After gaining an understanding of contextual factors, and building relationships, PDEV provides the opportunity to address the prevention of violent extremism through a development focus on **resiliency**—building resilient communities, strengthening existing groups, institutions and philosophies that are stabilizing influences. PDEV does this in two ways: through **capacity building** at different stakeholder levels (individual, group, community, etc.), and through **infrastructure development**, particularly in media programming.

CAPACITY BUILDING

Many of PDEV's activities are focused on capacity building at different levels.

Individuals—Benefits provided to individuals were primarily aimed at increasing their capacity to support themselves, and building skills while connecting them to their communities or organizations. Youth trained as *Community Youth Mappers* gained skills in surveying and needs assessment, and then through the mapping process became further connected to identifying and meeting the needs of their communities. Youth receiving vocational training in a particular livelihood often received concomitant life skills training, including civic education. Those working in the media (e.g. youth producers, radio management council members, community reporters) received training to increase their skills in that area.

Communities—Both the benefits to communities, and the processes modeled through which those benefits were provided, were aimed at building community capacity to meet local needs and address local issues.

Youth associations—Through PDEV support, youth associations built their capacity to better meet the needs of youth while generating income for its programs. In Niger, PDEV brought the youth organizations up to another level that provided alternative structures that can be used for community development. In the goal of reaching out to as many youth as possible, the program has also worked

with youth-serving and youth-led organizations. Youth centers in Niamey were particularly targeted. There is one youth center per commune, and PDEV has strengthened the capacity of these youth centers with in-kind donations and training. In Chad, RJD played a critical role in the community youth mapping process by training and empowering young people to get engaged in their community.

National/local CSOs—While it differed somewhat in each country, PDEV's work with local CSOs increased their capacity to do more projects on their own, while also increasing their ability to work outside the capital. PDEV provided intensive technical assistance to the CSOs to ensure that their budgets, budget narratives, timelines, and technical proposals were realistic, accurate, and well organized. While this could be frustrating at first, slow and process oriented, it paid off in the long run by increasing their capacity to seek and manage projects.

Partner radio stations—In addition to supporting the management of partner radio stations, PDEV also provides training to staff at these stations, as well as programming inputs.

Use of the grants process to address community needs and build capacity—PDEV has provided grants to community organizations to address some of their needs. The two main criteria for awarding grants required that they be for income-generating activities and that they be given to associations or community organizations. Fixed-obligation grants (FOG) were disbursed based on several deliverables and milestones agreed upon by PDEV and the recipients. For these types of grants, associations were encouraged to be in partnership with another association. PDEV then analyzed the capacity of the recipients; for those who did not have all the capacity needed, there was a capacity development process, through milestones and deliverables.

Capacity strengthening should be an important component of partnership with local organizations—PDEV is implemented in poor areas and local organizations may have the will, the experience, the local knowledge, and legitimacy, but may lack the capacity to carry out activities. Capacity strengthening of local organizations takes enormous time and resources, but when invested in organizations whose mission and core work speak to the results and overall goal of the program, the chances of sustainability of results increase. Even more than in traditional development programs, countering violent extremism require capable local partners who can sustain the results long after U.S. implementers are gone.

As with the packaging of visible benefits to add value to PDEV activities, instead of adopting stand alone capacity-building activities, PDEV integrates capacity building into the partnership package. This strategy enables PDEV to focus more on organizations that share, or could significantly contribute to, the goals of the project, and then to work with them to develop their capacities. This strategy is exhibited in the partnerships with community radio in Niger ad Chad, as well as with the LEAD in Chad or *Association des Éleveurs et des Nomades* (AEN). Both organizations are local partners, and at the same time, beneficiaries of capacity building activities organized by PDEV.

INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT

In addition to building the capacity of individuals and groups, PDEV also develops infrastructure that contributes to community resiliency and to promoting messages of peace, tolerance, and civil debate. In-kind grants have provided materials that have allowed local organizations to increase their ability to serve their community. Youth associations have reported increased youth involvement after receiving these grants. The focus on organizations using materials to generate their income contributes to the sustainability of these community organizations. For example, some organizations have received photocopiers (e.g., *Collectif Des Associations Et Groupement Du Bar El Ghazal*); youth associations have received TV sets; some community and grassroots organizations have received funding to purchase grains and cereals that they are now selling.

The value of the new infrastructure was seen by the field team in a visit to a flour mill supported by CAP and PDEV. The women's group had received a flour mill which helped them with their income redistribution. The money they could save was reinvested in adult literacy. The women had created a small fund for other activities (alphabetization and training of midwives). The women were asking to receive more in-kind support, for a machine to remove the shell of the kernels as a way avoid the traditional hand crushing of the grain, an unhealthy women's task.

Perhaps even more significantly, PDEV has strengthened the community radio infrastructure in a way that has the potential for reaching far more with messages of peace, tolerance and civil debate. Key contributions of PDEV in this regard include the following:

- FM transition mapping
- Building radio stations
- Supplying equipment & training in its use
- Establishing content advisory boards
- Establishing audience response systems
- Supporting listening clubs that boost the signal at a human level

STEP 4. SUSTAIN IMPACT THROUGH LOCAL OWNERSHIP

The impact of strengthening the capacity, infrastructure, and overall resiliency of its beneficiaries is that PDEV is then able to move towards sustaining this work through local ownership. Important elements of this local ownership include empowering beneficiaries to become part of the solution; collaboration among stakeholder groups; and further efforts to facilitate local ownership and sustainability.

EMPOWERING PRIMARY BENEFICIARIES TO BECOME PART OF THE SOLUTION

Through PDEV, primary beneficiaries are empowered to be part of the solution. All primary stakeholders are not only targeted as beneficiaries of the project, but are also empowered to play an important part in the process, and become change agents themselves. In Chad, the youth community mappers started to collect data about their communities and have ended up running community

projects. In Mirryah, Niger, the women listeners from the "Tundu Sale" listeners club have become engaged in their community. In training community reporters, PDEV has insisted in pointing out their difference from journalists, they are, primarily, community development agents working on raising awareness, facilitating the expression of the community, and informing on issues affecting the community.

Local stakeholders become critical in implementing activities, as can be seen in the example of the increasing role played by listeners clubs in influencing behavior changes in communities. Some of the clubs are morphing into solidarity groups and community action groups. Some youth associations have involved youth who are lost in the slums by having those who are trained through PDEV go out and find other youth who are jobless and delinquent, and try to pull them in.

LOCAL COLLABORATION

While PDEV has engaged local stakeholders separately, there is limited collaboration between different local stakeholders (local authorities, civil society, and private sector). Lack of collaboration between local stakeholders may lead to duplication of efforts and missed opportunities.

In addition to collaboration across components (governance, media, youth), collaboration between stakeholders within the same component is required. For instance, absence of dialogue between vocational training centers, youth serving organizations, workshop owners (carpentry, tailoring, etc.), and private sector businesses slowed and in some cases jeopardized the economic integration of the youth trained. In the sense that youth were provided skills, but were not adequately informed or introduced to the world of work; businesses in the other hand were not fully aware of the existence of this newly trained workforce. Some of the youth met in Moussoro and Mao admitted that most of the skills they have acquired through PDEV were forgotten, as they could not find opportunities to put them in practice/use.

When PDEV does bring together a variety of local organizations and institutions working on the same issues or the same communities, it provides the program with the opportunity to build alliances and linkages across sectors, to facilitate experience and information sharing, and to leverage additional resources from other donors. In other programs, linkages between actors of the same sectors have been effective in improving practices and increasing opportunities. Community radio stations, for instance, will gain from being in network with technicians, spare parts dealers, and national and international broadcasters operating in their region. In Niger, about 100 listeners club have been created; these are new resource people and institutions that have been created that could benefit from networking together. Many community reporters have expressed the needs to be connected to other community reporters to exchange experience and information.

FACILITATING SUSTAINABILITY

The combination of relationship building, a participatory approach, and capacity building has been instrumental in creating the basis for sustained impact. Some of the following quotes illustrate how PDEV has facilitated sustainability:

"Even after the suspension of the youth component, the youth organized themselves to protest and put pressure on the government to support the vocational training that started under PDEV."—AED Niger

"In this case, we are not journalists but also community development agents." - Producers with Equal Access/ PDEV Niamey

Support provided to partner community radio stations can help them continue their programming, though it may not be on the same scale. In Chad and Niger, PDEV has trained and employed about 100 community radio reporters; the skills acquired by these reporters and journalists remain in the community.

A community feedback process has been established through listeners' clubs and content advisory groups. Even though they are formed around PDEV programming, the relationship between listeners and their community radio has been established. In Niger, listeners have become more active and proactive, suggesting themes and making comments. This listening habit can be maintained by community radio without extra cost.

To ensure that the content is appropriate, culturally sensitive, and resonates with the audience, PDEV has put in place, or facilitated the emergence of, the following mechanisms: The content advisory group (CAG); Community radio reporter (RC); Listeners clubs.

Each program (Youth, Governance and Religion affairs) has a CAG, and the composition of the CAG depends on the theme around which the radio program will be developed. More than an editorial board, the CAG allows Nigeriens and Chadians to influence the content of radio programming, and the way in which the message is aired. For instance, the CAG of the religious program includes different Muslim sects, some sympathetic to violent extremism. The CAG also helps frame the message in a way that allows constructive debates between different segments of the society.

Through listening clubs, young people have become community development agents—and part of the solution. In addition to being a relay and feedback mechanism for media messages, listeners clubs are morphing into community development groups, as is the case of "Tundu Lele" in Zinder, Niger, which is a predominantly female listeners club. Created in November of 2009, this group of 23 women and 03 men enjoyed listening to PDEV radio programming, but mostly Hantsi Leka Gidan Kowa (governance). The group is now running a solidarity fund for its members; it also works with the Red Cross to contribute to a blood bank.

The same can be said of the youth listeners club the "Jaz" in Mirryah. The Jaz is a listeners club of 16 young people, both out-of-school and in-schools, between 14 and 25 years old. The Jaz members, after

listening to the programming, organize community discussions and interviews with key people (e.g., medical doctors for HIV and AIDS related issues) to further their understanding of issues and provide the community with accurate information. The program has affected the lives of the members by exposing them to new ideas and encouraging new behaviors.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the findings noted above, the assessment team has drafted the following recommendations to improve the PDEV program, which are grouped by core step of the operational strategy.

STEP 1 ASSESS AND UNDERSTAND THE CONTEXT

- Ensure adequate opportunities to bring stakeholders together to garner input and increase understanding across countries. Engage local stakeholders in the assessment process, as it develops capacity, and builds engagement and trust.
- Incorporate into follow-on programming systems for adapting to context changes and to new understandings of CVE. In planning for these systems, it is essential to involve those with experience in the realities of on-the-ground implementation. Such systems could include flexible tools such as waivers, which would ease restrictions (e.g. working with religious organizations, USAID branding, environmental issues, construction, etc.) as well as provide possibilities to fund innovative activities relevant to new conditions created by changes in the country or targeted communities (e.g., conflict resolution of communal disputes, multi-stakeholder dialogue to address grievances after riots, etc.)

STEP 2: ESTABLISH RELATIONSHIPS AND BUILD TRUST

- Continue to select local partner organizations based on the relevance of the ideas proposed and their experience with the target group or community—their capacity can be strengthened after selection.
- Strengthen engagement of civil society with local authorities. Take advantage of the opportunities provided by the local elections in Niger and Chad scheduled between January and April 2011 to both involve and build the capacity of newly elected local authorities.
- In follow-on programming, budget for the time needed for developing relationships and trust, while continuing to implement quick impact activities that link to the overall goals and community needs and to foster trust.
- Continue to use a participatory approach to identifying themes to ensure that these themes reflect the needs of the people, as well as respect their norms and culture.

- Make the selection of partners strategic, with a clear rationale as to why they were selected for participation in the program and how they might figure in the broader countering violent extremism objectives.
- Carefully map out next steps for the relationships USAID has built through the TSCTP work in Niger and Chad. It is important to reframe these relationships in to the context of violent extremism.
- Conceptualize the timeframe for building long-term relationships and incorporate this into program design.

STEP 3: BUILD RESILIENCY THROUGH CAPACITY AND INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT

- Continue to focus on building the capacity of organizations that share or could significantly contribute to the goals of the project, as part of an integrated partnership package, and budget time for capacity building.
- Monitor the use of income-generation materials.

STEP 4: SUSTAIN IMPACT THROUGH LOCAL OWNERSHIP

- Recognize and design programming to support the important role of beneficiaries empowered as local actors in building community resilience.
- Encourage and use every opportunity to bring local stakeholders together to facilitate communication and experience sharing, and reduce reliance on U.S. implementers, thus facilitating local ownership and sustainability. Encourage and facilitate the development of a network of listener clubs and provide more training on their potential role in the community. Foster
- Further dialogue among the youth, local authorities, training centers, and private sector actors on youth livelihood and job opportunities.
- Build sustainability into program designs that build awareness through media work; strengthen individual, community, and organizational capacity; and incorporate locally-owned resources.

V. STRATEGIC ISSUES FOR USAID

The experiences of the PDEV program to date have shown some promising results on the ground, despite difficult circumstances, and related findings will be important factors to consider in the design of the follow-on TSCTP programming in the region. This section discusses issues affecting USAID programming in TSCTP in the future and how these may be addressed. Specifically, this section briefly discusses:

1. The sensitive nature of the violent extremism label
2. The relationship of countering violent extremism programs and conflict prevention programs
3. The drivers of extremism
4. The PDEV program in the context of other USAID programs
5. The theory of change of the PDEV program model

SENSITIVE NATURE OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM LABEL

One of the overarching issues heard repeatedly during the field work with regard to the program was the sensitivity around discussing extremism. Specifically, the evaluation team found that the **sensitive** nature of the notion of extremism in Chad and Niger made U.S. implementing partners hesitant to share the ultimate goals of PDEV with their local partners. The reworking of the Results Frameworks helped reframe PDEV's objectives in ways that were less sensitive; however, the higher level strategic context often remained unarticulated.

In Chad and Niger, and repeated during data collection in Mali for a similar assessment , there is concern among the local population that the United States has exaggerated the security risk of violent extremism and the violent extremism label is an unfair negative portrayal of the country. The recent controversy around the anti-corruption statement made by the U.S. Ambassador in Senegal followed by a sharp and angry rebuke by President Wade is illustrative of the difficulties of expressing directly the goals of programs aimed at fighting or combating issues such as extremism or corruption. The underlying assumption of these programs is the presence of these issues, therefore increasing the risk profile of the host country. This is true for violent extremism in Chad and Niger, where this notion is perceived as casting a negative image of these countries, whose history is marred by instability. The Government of Chad, in particular, is fighting to break the cycle of its violent past and more importantly to emphasize the image of a capable and stable state.

RELATIONSHIP OF COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM PROGRAMS AND CONFLICT PREVENTION PROGRAMS

This section explores the similarities and differences of programs for countering violent extremism (CVE) and conflict prevention (CP). While both are aimed at prevention, there exist important distinctions in the focus and objectives of CVE and CP programming that are discussed below.

Conflict prevention (CP) programs most often address the structural causes of violent conflict through programs that promote participation and dispute resolution by focusing on strengthening host government institution's capacity to resolve conflict and by promoting activities that generate dialogue and consensus. Much of USAID's conflict prevention work has been conducted by the Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) situated within USAID's Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance Office. The office assists countries emerging from conflict or civil strife to transition to longer term development models. Programs of OTI often address conflict prevention in conjunction with local and national institutions to address systemic issues around which conflict has flared in the past. Youth, media and good governance are key elements of OTI's programming strategy.

Where conflict prevention focuses on structural causes of violent conflict, countering violent extremism (CVE) activities look at the conditions that stress existing structures. Countering violent extremism activities operate in environments where the conditions for conflict are present but the country is not engulfed in widespread civil strife, though like Chad and Niger, may have long, complicated histories of rebellion, insurgency, and coup d'états. Countering violent extremism programming, as seen through the PDEV program, attempt to work with at-risk populations in at-risk communities through activities that address underlying social, political, or economic drivers that contribute to an enabling environment for extremism.

Key differences between CVE and CP programming include the following:

- When employed (vis-à-vis conflict): CVE programming, thought closely related to CP, is employed at an earlier phase on the conflict continuum than CP. CVE programs recognize the existence of conditions to render violent extremism prior to an emerging confluence of conditions, or, otherwise said, before they give birth to a movement in a specific country.

- What is addressed: CVE programming addresses "drivers"—social, economic, political or cultural trends—that foster an atmosphere conducive to recruitment for violent extremism. These trends are difficult to narrow down to a discrete set of factors and instead are broadly defined and come together in ways that are unique to each country and to each community within that country

- Population targeted: CVE programming is broad in its scope but relatively narrow in its target population. CVE seeks to dissuade a much smaller fraction of the population vulnerable to recruitment in violent extremist networks. CP programming, in comparison, seeks to achieve broader consensus through participatory dialogue and the strengthening of public institutions. Targeting at-risk populations is one of the more complex features of CVE programming

particularly in the Sahel where little scholarly work has been conducted in this domain. While some research in the Driver's Guide suggests that adoption of CVE ideology is a personal choice or done with a close group of friends CVE programming would benefit from additional research in the psychological attraction of jihad or violent extremism and the accompanying resiliency factors that impact these decisions.

THE PDEV PROGRAM IN THE CONTEXT OF OTHER USAID PROGRAMS

The assessment team sought to explore the current PDEV program in the context of other USAID programming. PDEV's unique set of circumstances—notably a prevention-based approach in non-presence countries with a profile that most closely mirrors stabilization programming in a post-conflict environments—places it in a category of its own. Given this unique design of the program, the desk review focused on design and implementation issues from four perspectives:

1. Program mix—governance, media, and youth
2. Similarities Between PDEV and the Office of Transition Initiatives
3. Prevention strategy
4. Non-presence countries and the impact on technical and management success

PROGRAM MIX--GOVERNANCE, MEDIA, AND YOUTH

The PDEV program's activities are key components of traditional USAID programming options in Governance and Civil Society Strengthening, Media and Youth Programming. Each of the program's components is identified as a strategic contributor to "establishing and ensuring" enhanced governance, freedom of information, and youth support.

Governance. The focus of PDEV on governance lies primarily in strengthening civil society's capacity to impart civic knowledge and democratic values by working with civil society associations who represent constituencies in remote or at-risk regions. PDEV also works with youth groups and various media outlets. Specifically:

Media. The program's media efforts focus on strengthening the mediums through which citizens can freely organize and communicate with their government and with each other via:

- Support for independent media,
- Creating an enabling environment for civil society organizations, and
- Strengthening a democratic political culture through support for civic engagement and civic education.

Youth. The PDEV program engages youth in the development of a plan for themselves, and provides support necessary for youth to implement their plan. Support may include basic education, life skills,

skills development, and community service. The goal of positive youth development is to prepare youth to earn a livelihood, provide for their family, and contribute to their community.

The program does not strive to modify the policy environment but instead focuses at the community level; as such, its programming targets improvements and modifications at the individual and association levels. While PDEV is linked to broader policy objectives within the TSCTP program, PDEV's activities in all sectors aim to strengthen the capacity of civil society organizations to self-govern, engage in civic-minded discussions, and open peaceful dialogue on issues that affect the lives of citizens at the community level.

The strength of the PDEV model is that governance, media, and youth activities work together and regularly cross-fertilize. Each sector has cross-cutting impact. While a traditional USAID program may be more robust in each individual sector, sector activities are rarely as integrated across the portfolio as PDEV's activities. Unlike many traditional USAID activities, PDEV's governance, media, and youth efforts operate in the same geographic area with similar, sometimes overlapping beneficiaries.

SIMILARITIES BETWEEN THE OFFICE OF TRANISITION INITIATIVES AND PDEV

Since 1994, Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI), part of USAID's Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance, has worked in 31 conflict-prone countries undergoing a transition from authoritarianism to democracy, violent conflict to peace, or pivotal political events. The officer's programs often are initiated in fragile states that have not reached the stability needed to initiate longer-term development programs. Programs promote reconciliation, jumpstart local economies, support nascent independent media, and foster peace and democracy through innovative programming. While closely coordinating with Missions, Regional Offices and Bureaus, OTI's activities are often set apart from traditional USAID Mission activities.

The assessment team noted four areas of similarities between the efforts of PDEV and OTI:

- Operating environments
- Program composition
- Hand-off of activities and sustainability

The following observations on these similarities include some lessons learned from OTI programs that can be applied to future PDEV design.

OPERATING ENVIRONMENTS

Both OTI and PDEV work in complex, fragile, or conflict-prone environments. Both efforts address similar destabilizing factors such as weak or debilitated government structures, conflict or civil strife, fragile political and social environments, and limited information flow. Program management is a

significant challenge for OTI and PDEV. Both programs face similar implementation challenges that stem from operating in environments that are highly fluid, necessitating change, political acumen, and flexible implementation mechanisms. Issues of security, travel restrictions and an undercurrent of uncertainty all pose significant challenges in program implementation.

PROGRAM COMPOSITION

The focus of PDEV on three sectors—good governance, youth empowerment and integration, and media and outreach support—is consistent with other USAID conflict mitigation and peace building programs provided by OTI. As discussed above, PDEV and OTI share programming strategies to stabilize populations, ideologies and radical elements. These programming elements seek to build new relationships to solidify stability, reduce marginalization, and promote messages of tolerance. Both efforts share similarities in programming in each of these sectors.

YOUTH

OTI's youth programs focus on livelihood skill development and vocational training for youth to open up alternatives to violence. OTI youth programs also focus on behavior change, promoting peace, community development, empowerment of women, and community ownership. In Sierra Leone, the concept of OTI's Youth Reintegration Training and Education for Peace Program (YRTEP) had the goal of bringing closure to a debilitating civil war and supporting the process of reconciliation and reintegration. . Youth were the most important potential source of destabilization in the post-conflict period. If nothing was done, there was a definite risk that the youth would become more susceptible to negative and violent influences (Final Evaluation of the OTI Program in Sierra Leone, CARE, Inc, August 2002). There were three key components targeting youth: 1) reintegration into their communities of origin, 2) training in functional literacy, life skills and vocational training, and 3) civic education.

The PDEV program follows a similar approach by applying these three components to a pre-conflict setting where youth are vulnerable due to dwindling traditional livelihoods, high unemployment, low literacy, and external drivers that seek to lure them into illicit networks with promises of compensation and meaningful activity.

GOVERNANCE

OTI's governance programming focuses on providing the basic democratic requirements of minimum state capacity, order, and disincentives to violence. OTI often works at the national and local levels reconnecting and implicating isolated communities in national political processes, such as voter registration and constitutional referenda. (USAID/OTI Community-

Focused Reintegration Programs in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Burundi, Final Evaluation, 2006)

PDEV's focus tends to be narrower than OTI's in the governance arena, focusing exclusively on civil society strengthening. Specifically, PDEV works with those civil society organizations that can provide linkages to strengthen social networks and bonds. In this way, activities are structured to build associations that can serve as lasting connectors between community and at-risk populations. PDEV's governance focus rests primarily with civil society and reinforcing their capacity to organize around community issues. In Niger, a country that, at the time of the program design, was moving forward with a decentralization agenda, resources were targeted to work with local government officials. In Chad, an entirely civil society based governance approach was adopted, also a reflection of the decentralization agenda in that country.

MEDIA

Peace and tolerance messaging is used pervasively in OTI programs. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, OTI stabilized and invigorated war-torn communities through a combination of vocational education training and radio listening groups. Radio provides wide rural community involvement.[3]

The most robust component of the PDEV programming is media. In Niger and Chad, radio is a salvo for populations in the most remote part of the Sahel. Technological development has provided even youth in the remotest Sahelian village with cell phones. These youth may not be able to read or write, but they are busy communicating with each other from their urban and rural environments. They are the ones creating the information flow; they are the agents of change. Since the young form the majority in these societies, they are hungry for information and to change attitudes in these authoritarian societies. Radio broadcasts can fill this void of information. If this space is filled responsibly, these youth become the positive agents for change.

Lessons from the OTI program that are relevant to PDEV include the following:

- Spread of learning is most likely to occur when leaders and persons of influence are involved in the dialogue. Listening groups should seek to integrate leaders and persons of influence into their discussions whenever possible.
- Nearly all OTI evaluations stressed the need for greater synergy of programs—youth, media and governance—to be most effective.

[3] Ibid, p.6

- Institutional strengthening must figure in as part of a successful governance program. Building civil society in the absence of local government leads to inequitable information shared among strategic partners.
- Whenever possible, leverage other USAID programming and/or other donors.
- Capacity Building and Community Grants
- Provide greater clarity on project selection and the long-term impact of local activities.
    - Strive for greater integration of training and grant-making.
    - Build on existing capacity building and grant models such as the OTI program in Burundi that struck a productive balance between training, project management, and civic messaging.

HAND-OFF OF ACTIVITIES AND SUSTAINABILITY

The independent, stand-alone OTI model enjoys significant independence and freedom during implementation. Hand-off of activities, however, is often problematic. Often a clear linkage into the country or regional Strategic Framework has not been established. With a strategy that focuses on resolving problems in a quick and immediate fashion, OTI programs do not fit neatly inside traditional USAID programming approaches. Nearly every OTI evaluation cites unmet expectations as a characteristic of the hand-off to USAID Missions.

PDEV's programs in Chad and Niger, both countries without USAID presence, face similar challenges. With no foreseeable implementation of a USAID Mission in either location, there is concern as to how these programs will be sustained in the absence of USAID presence. PDEV's experience in Niger in 2009 illustrates this point. A sudden shift in the government of Niger's position on term limitations for the president led to a shutdown of all USG assistance, including PDEV's youth vocational training program. Nearly 1,000 young people had been trained and were anticipating the arrival of their toolkits that, due to the program's closure, never arrived. There are many who are sensitive about the expectations that are being raised and the program's capacity to not only fulfill but also sustain this momentum in the absence of the program.

PREVENTION STRATEGY

The PDEV program is conceived as a program to prevent the factors that generate and sustain violent extremism in countries with predominantly Muslim populations. In this way, PDEV is different from both OTI programming and traditional USAID programs. PDEV focuses on approaches to prevent or mitigate known drivers associated with violent extremism. PDEV's success is measured in its ability to reduce the impact of destabilizing social trends and prevent drivers of extremism present, in varying degrees, in the Sahel.

The desk review was not able to identify USAID prevention programs comparable to PDEV in objective, content, or theory of change.

USAID prevention programming is typically found in two areas: conflict prevention in response to existing or potential conflict; and prevention in the form of early warning systems to monitor food shortages and prevent famine. In both cases, the programming is designed to respond to a situation or a defined set of circumstances. Conflict or violent outbreaks usually related to political, ethnic, or tribal tensions or in the case of famine, early warning, food production, prices, and market availability serve as the baseline for measuring the impact and success of the activity. With a concrete goal of preventing the return to a previous state, the success of the program is measured against something quantifiable.

PDEV is organized around violent extremism drivers—socioeconomic, political, and cultural—that are identified as factors that generate and sustain violent extremism. For example, one of the socioeconomic drivers addressed in Niger and Chad is "social networks and group dynamics." Field research suggests that high levels of social fragmentation and marginality are push factors for violent extremism. PDEV is designed to prevent and contain destabilizing trends such as social marginalization of young people. The inherent challenge in monitoring social, political, and cultural trends is that they are highly mutable and require constant reassessment. Similarly, the absence of baseline indicators renders progress in reducing the effect of these factors anecdotal.

As discussed in the previous section of this report, reframing PDEV objectives to focus on strengthening resilience will allow for easier measurement of results.

NON-PRESENCE COUNTRIES AND THE IMPACT ON TECHNICAL AND MANAGEMENT SUCCESS

A third factor distinguishing PDEV from traditional programming is that the program operates in non-presence countries. USAID's traditional management model is an in-country mission, with resident U.S. and foreign national employees filling a variety of program and administrative positions. However, USAID funds activities in places where it does not maintain resident U.S. direct hire employees, thus defined as non-presence countries (Memorandum: Audit of USAID-Funded Activities in Nonpresence Countries, 2009). Activities in these countries are managed by resident contractor staff, USAID personnel in nearby missions and/or one or more of USAID's Washington bureaus. PDEV, like many other activities in non-presence countries, supports a variety of developmental, humanitarian and/or foreign policy objectives and responds to many different managers both in Washington and in the Regional Mission, as well as to the Ambassador in the host country.

Difficulties in implementation arise with the mix of multiple managers and a new, evolving program design as part of an interagency program. Unlike other USAID programs operating in non-presence countries, PDEV, as part of the interagency initiative TSCTP, is scrutinized by the Ambassador. In short, PDEV has many advisers and managers, from the Ambassador, to the USPSC in country, to the Regional Mission's COTR to USAID/WA special advisors. The multi-tiered TSCTP Strategic Framework is open to

multiple interpretations about the types of activities that best achieve objectives, as well as which geographic areas are most at risk. As a new and evolving program, the program is typified by negotiations on which initiatives are most pertinent to the program.

Monitoring and reporting on activities in non-presence countries is complicated due to the kind of information that is useful to each of the managing entities. Goals and measures of success differ between the Regional Mission and the Washington Bureaus and undergo further scrutiny by the Department of State, also a key partner in the TSCTP. Conversations in Washington, Accra, Chad, and Niger with various USAID representatives indicated differences, sometime significant, in the purpose, utility, and effectiveness of this violent extremism program. Each USAID manager conveyed the need for greater understanding of the goals and strategies of violent extremism programming to maximize program effectiveness. Some USAID managers expressed a lack of conviction concerning the development hypothesis of the program and believe that other, more pressing issues would be worthier targets of USAID programming. Others use the program as a vehicle to respond to issues raised by the Ambassador despite a tenuous relation to violent extremism goals. Absent a clearer set of defining principles (development hypothesis, theory of change, linkages of DA activities to violent extremism goals), violent extremism programming will continue to be beset with management and directional challenges.

In addition, as noted earlier, because violent extremism drivers change quickly, and require programmatic responses to be able to change accordingly, violent extremism prevention programs are subject to constant revision. Complicating matters further is the difficult operating environment. Security concerns, remote locations and difficult travel conditions slow implementation. PDEV operates in regions that go through periods of instability. Those operating in these environments need to develop plans to adjust management strategies accordingly (i.e. remote management; curtailing certain projects; and budgeting for security escorts). The combination of multiple managers, challenging operating environment, security concerns, and evolving theory of change necessitate programming and operations to develop more realistic timeframes to shift to new directives. [4]

THEORY OF CHANGE

Fundamental to the program's success is a common understanding on how selected activities, organizations, and geographic locations contribute to the violent extremism goals set out in the project design. Governance, youth integration, and media outreach were identified as the key sectors by which

[4] Those operating in these environments need to develop plans to adjust management strategies accordingly (i.e. remote management; curtailing certain projects; and budgeting for security escorts). RFTOP – Lessons learned from TSCTP programs

these results would be obtained. As the program evolved, and understanding of violent extremism drivers developed, PDEV's goals also shifted. These shifts were anticipated given the nature of the program[5], and the original scope of work was explicit about the experiential nature of the PDEV program. However, as discovered in interviews both in Washington and in the field, what began as common understanding in PDEV seemed to morph into the confusion over goals (described earlier in this report), as the program tried to incorporate the new lessons generated by assessments and other available documentation.

This lead, as noted throughout the above two sections, to a lack of clarity on the program's fundamental hypotheses, assumptions, and overall theory of change. After reviewing how this need for a clearly articulated, testable theory of change was evidenced in the confusion and varying perceptions of program goals expressed by different stakeholders involved, several aspects to clarifying a theory of change are discussed below, including the following:

- Reframing the drivers and goals to resiliency
- Understanding CVE in a low-threat environment
- Testing the theory of change and developing hypotheses
- Budget and personnel implications of measuring and documenting impact

REFRAMING THE DRIVERS AND GOALS FOR RESILIENCY

While the two published guides on violent extremism contribute toward the understanding of violent extremism, the acknowledgement of a dominant cluster of drivers only partly informs the development hypothesis (what positive conditions, if developed, will prevent those drivers) to be addressed by development programs to prevent violent extremism. Each driver requires additional detail and specificity, to serve as the backdrop or hypothesis for violent extremism prevention activities. Specifically, it would be beneficial to re-state the driver within the country context. For example, in the case of Chad, if social exclusion is a key socioeconomic driver, it could be restated as: "youth in Moussoro have access to employment or leadership opportunities" depending upon the specifics of "social exclusion" in Chad. A corresponding positive corollary would then specify the objective of the program. In this way a deliberate linkage between "driver", program objective and result could be drawn.

A focus on resiliency offers a new prism for looking at PDEV. A recent assessment done in Burkina Faso (Burkina Faso Risks and resiliency assessment, 2010) provides a new prism for looking at and improving

PDEV. Most CVE assessments done so far recognize the threat of extremism in Chad , Niger, and Burkina Faso to be either remote, low, or moderate (depending of the region); therefore, as argued by the Burkina assessment team "*…in the context of Burkina Faso, resiliency to instability is a more relevant prism than risk of violent extremism*."

A focus on resiliency to deter and prevent violent extremism more accurately reflects what PDEV has accomplished so far in Chad and Niger. By strengthening community assets and individuals skills, PDEV is building the ability of communities to better address the underlying drivers of extremism, while at the same time building people's abilities to earn a livelihood, exercise informed judgment about issues, and refrain from using violence as a means to resolve conflict. Monitoring and evaluating progress in community and individual resiliency promises to yield more insights than assessing the prevention of a phenomenon which is yet to happen.

In order to build communities resilient to violent extremism where the violent extremism threat is low and development challenges high, consider reframing the development hypothesis from one of prevention to one of resiliency. Shift the prevention paradigm to strengthening existing groups, institutions, and philosophies that are stabilizing influences.

UNDERSTANDING VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN A LOW-THREAT ENVIRONMENT

The PDEV program's original project goals were framed in risk-mitigating terms: "Deter marginalized populations (youth in particular) from contemplating destructive ideologies that advocate violence, by: improving local governance, empowering at risk-youth and, rendering superfluous ideologies promoting violence."

Building on that framework, USAID has commissioned assessments in Chad and Niger that have looked at risk factors for violent extremism and violent Islamic extremism (Chad: Counter Extremism and Development, 2009; Niger Counter Extremism Assessment, 2009). However, one of the issues with the "risk-factors/ drivers approach" in the context of low or moderate levels of violent extremism is that these drivers are similar to those targeted in development assistance in conflict-affected countries/fragile states.. In other words, interventions in such contexts are close to traditional development approaches in unstable or fragile states.

In a context of low violent extremism, the line between traditional development and counter-extremism is blurred. There are competing expectations. On one hand, there are those who expect PDEV to address development needs of communities and individuals; and on the other, there are those who see community development needs as one part but not the most important element of PDEV. The evaluation team found these competing expectations at all levels of the program.

TESTING THE THEORY OF CHANGE AND DEVELOPMENT HYPOTHESIS

The articulation of a theory of change is essential as USAID strengthens this relatively new area of countering violent extremism through development. A particularly important part of that process is to test the hypotheses and assumptions of this theory through ongoing monitoring and evaluation. As USAID moves forward in CVE programming, M&E systems built into the program that test elements of the theory of change can contribute the further evidence needed on what most successfully achieves the goals of USAID's efforts in this area.

Unlike other geographic areas that have abundant scholarly work on the qualities of those individual most likely to be attracted to extremist ideology, little research has been done on the characteristics of Sahelian populations. As a result, continued adjustment to country- specific drivers is necessary for program effectiveness. From 2007-2010, USAID's AFR/SD conducted at least one country level assessment in each of the PDEV target countries. These assessments provide greater specificity on program mix, at-risk geographic areas, and at-risk populations. The frequency of these assessment missions demonstrates the importance given to regularly monitoring and updating the current country conditions.

Similarly, at the activity level, monitoring progress is an essential part of learning. Monitoring and evaluation within the PDEV and TSCTP program could be used to test development hypotheses and identify which elements within a governance, youth integration, and media programs most impact the violent extremism environment. In order to do so, the development hypothesis must be clear, testable, and specific. Absent a violent extremism framework that articulates development linkages, the program monitors simple development results rather than aggregating results to broader violent extremism goals.

BUDGET AND PERSONNEL IMPLICATIONS OF MEASURING AND DOCUMENTING IMPACT

Prevention programming faces the difficult challenge of measurement. As stated during an interview with a USAID/WA Manager: *"It is difficult to measure the absence of trend. I want to know the absence of something through the presence of something else, something measurable*." PDEV is challenged to measure how its activities contributed to preventing underlying conditions.

PDEV has encountered difficulties in measurement by the lack of resources, both budget and personnel, to cover the large territory targeted by the program in both Chad and Niger. Complicating matters further is the poor capacity of local partners to collect, analyze and report results, and given their role in implementation of activities, they are critical actors in any monitoring and documenting strategy.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Understand where violent extremism programs sits on the conflict prevention spectrum. Articulate clearly how violent extremism programs differ from CP activities.

- As the drivers of and context around violent extremism are ever changing, programming must be flexible both in terms of activities and funding mechanisms. The implementer must have the capability to be responsive in this highly fluid environment both in terms of contractual mechanism and in terms of internal processes.
- As violent extremism prevention programs are replicated, reframing the program objectives to a focus on strengthening resilience will allow for easier measurement of results. If the prevention framework is maintained, additional research on proxies of performance are necessary.
- The program's fundamental hypotheses, assumptions, and overall theory of change need to be clarified and explicitly stated in the PDEV follow-on design document — and understood by all stakeholders during program implementation. Particularly important is a clear understanding of the program's objectives, target beneficiaries, interventions, and expected changes—and how they link to the wider goals and strategy.
- Reframe the goals to focus on strengthening resiliency to decrease vulnerability to violent extremism rather than preventing violent extremism.
- In order to build communities resilient to violent extremism where the violent extremism threat is low and development challenges high, consider reframing the development hypothesis from one of prevention to one of resiliency. Shift the prevention paradigm to strengthening existing groups, institutions, and philosophies that are stabilizing influences.
- Re-state the driver within the country context. For example, if social exclusion is a key socioeconomic driver in Chad, it could be restated as: "youth in Moussoro have access to employment or leadership opportunities" depending upon the specifics of "social exclusion" in that community. A corresponding positive corollary would then specify the objective of the program. In this way a deliberate linkage between "driver", program objective and result could be drawn.
- Further study is necessary to understand the relationship of development objectives to violent extremism goals and their linkages. Clarity on the hierarchy of goals would greatly streamline management decisions at the country and regional levels and in Washington, D.C.
- To effectively measure the linkages between development inputs and violent extremism, make the hypothesis of change explicit and measurable. At the program level, monitoring and evaluation should focus on establishing and testing the linkages between development objectives and violent extremism to better articulate how community-level achievements respond to violent extremism goals.

- Develop the capacity of the local partners to collect and report data related to results by focusing on the use of various tools and methodologies for assessing impact, monitoring, and reporting performance.
- Both the programming context and operating environment are constantly changing; both programming and operations need to incorporate the expectation of change into all planning, in part by including contingency plans and have more realistic timeframes. Again, involve in this planning those with experience in the realities of on-the-ground implementation.

VI. CONCLUSION

This report has presented findings from different perspectives: by results, by overall operational strategy, and in terms of the larger strategic issues. Recommendations within each perspective have been presented for the overall program; Appendix 5 breaks down many of these recommendations to offer specific suggestions for Chad and for Niger.

Throughout these findings and recommendations, five themes have stood out.

1. In the design of follow on programming, there is **a clear need for a well-defined and articulated theory of change** that recognizes the fluidity of the context and incorporates the means to test and adapt hypotheses, linkages to program objectives, and programming. A starting point for this theory of change is an explicit understanding of countering violent extremism programming in context of related types of conflict prevention and development programming. Overall strategy, as well as program and project objectives should directly relate to this theory of change.

2. Reframing the focus of follow-on activities from the prevention of violent extremism to the **strengthening of community resilience** aligns with a development focus by better describing what PDEV activities have sought to develop. Not only is resiliency easier to measure, it is easier and less sensitive to articulate to our partners and beneficiaries. USAID values transparency and honest relationships with its partners. Framing program goals in terms of strengthening existing institutions, partnerships, cultural factors, etc. that are part of the context in which the program operates demonstrates respect and will generate many appreciative results.

3. **Building relationships and partnerships play a central role both** as a goal in itself, and as a successful strategy, for countering violent extremism. By effectively incorporating building relationships and partnerships into its theory of change, follow-on programming can strengthen local capacity and lead to local ownership and sustainability of efforts to build community resilience. As part of this, partnerships with local authorities and with moderate religious voices are important. Partnerships need to be built deliberately and selectively within the overall strategy and theory of change; existing partnerships are a resource to be incorporated as well. In addition, by fostering local participation as well as local collaboration between beneficiaries and partners, local ownership is strengthened.

4. Incorporate into follow-on programming **flexible planning systems that acknowledge and plan for the "constant" of change**. As the drivers of and context around violent extremism are ever changing, programming must be flexible both in terms of activities and funding mechanisms. The implementer must have the capability to be responsive in this highly fluid environment both in terms of contractual mechanism and in terms of internal processes. In addition these systems should include regular contingency planning as well as more realistic time frames given the in country challenges of security, travel, bureaucracy, and other issues that consistently impact program operations and staff.

5. Finally, **the use of monitoring and evaluation with a focus on learning** can inform both the theory of change as well as systems for planning around contextual changes. Further development of appropriate M&E systems as well as increased attention to and budget for these systems will be needed. The strengthening and use of local M&E capacity of beneficiaries (both individual youth and partner organizations) can contribute to improving overall M&E of follow-on activities.

APPENDIX 1: PDEV PARTNERS AND BENEFICIARIES

Type of Stakeholder	Includes	Role		Selected by
		As actor	As beneficiary	
Implementers				
Primary int'l implementers	AED; Equal Access, Mercy Corp, Africare Salam Institute, Visions Workshop			USAID & AED
Primary Nat'l/local implementing CSOs	Distinct CSOs for different programming areas	Primary role	Limited cap. strengthening	Proposal process, interviews
Other partner organizations and groups				
Other local CSOs & groups (some overlap)	Local CSOs Training institutions (incl. vocational training centers) Schools School associations Partner radio stations Community Radio Service Organizations Various types of associations (incl. Youth, Religious, Women's, Community) Community action groups		Grantees	RFAs, proposal process, local implementers help select
	Listening clubs			?
	PDEV Content Advisory Groups			?Equal Access
Consortia & networks	CSO consortia Radio For Development network of broadcasters (if created)			RFAs, proposals, local implementers select
Individual beneficiaries				
Youth	Community Youth Mappers Youth receiving vocation/Lifeskills training Youth producers Study trip participants			
Other media-related	Radio management council members Community Reporters			Local implementers
Governmental partners and potential partners				
USG	USAID, DoD, State Dept, US Embassy			
National	Host government, represented through various ministries	Nat'l laws/regs		

Local	Regional government, represented through reg'l authorities & laws Community authorities			
Other int'l	Other int;l multilaterals, bilaterals and NGOs operating in country			

APPENDIX 2: DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

1. Primary & General Documents
   - USAID/West Africa: Trans-Sahel Counter Terrorism Partnership Program Design and Scope of Work, Social Impact, June 2007
   - Guide to the Drivers of Violent Extremism (Drivers Guide), USAID, 2009
   - Development Assistance and Counter-Extremism: A Programming Guide (Programming Guide), USAID 2009
   - Timeline of Counter Extremism Analysis, USAID AFR, July 2010
   - Violent Extremism Factors Tree (PPT graphics), USAID AFR
   - TSCTP Fact Sheet, USAID AFR
   - PDEV Chad Program, Fact Sheet
   - PDEV Niger Program, Fact Sheet
   - PDEV Lessons Learned as of August 2010, AED

2. TSCTP Pilot Program Report:
   - Final Report for Mercy Corps SKYE (Skill and Knowledge for Youth Empowerment) Program
   - Final Report for CARE Maradi Youth Development Project in Niger
   - Y2 Q3 report for Mercy Corps BRIDGE (Decentralization) Program
   - Chad Capacity Development & Peace Support Project: Final Report: July 11, 2006 – September 11, 2008, AED

3. Assessments
   - Strengthening Stability through Development in Burkina Faso, USAID, Sep 2010
   - Counter Extremism and Development in Chad (Assessment), USAID and MSI, October 2009
   - Mauritania Pilot – CT and Development (Assessment), USAID and MSI, 2008
   - Mauritania assessment – trip report February 2010
   - Niger Counter Extremism Assessment, USAID and MSI, April 2009
   - USAID/West Africa Regional Mission: Phase I: Program Assessment Report
   - Mid-Term Evaluation of USAID'S Counter-Extremism Programming in Africa, Impact Assessment Draft version, December 13, 2010, (QED/AMEX)
4. Work Plans
   - PDEV Annual Work Plan 2008-2009
   - PDEV Annual Work Plan 2009-2010
   - PDEV Annual Work Plan 2010-2011

5. Baseline Report
   - PDEV Chad Baseline Survey - Key Findings Report
   - PDEV Niger Baseline Survey - Key Findings Report

6. PMP & PIR
   - PDEV Performance Management Plan, 2008, AED
   - PDEV Revised Performance Management Plan, July 2010, AED
   - 2008 Portfolio Review Narrative and Indicator Data, October 2009
   - Performance Indicator Review (PIR) Sheet, FY08
   - PIR Sheet, FY09
   - PIR Sheet, FY10

7. PDEV Reporting
   - PDEV Quarterly Program Report Nos. 1-10 (March 2008 – June 2010), AED
   - 1207 Quarterly Reports:
     - FY2010 Quarter 1, 2 & 3
     - FY 2009 Quarter 3
     - FY 2008 Quarter 4

8. OTI Final Report Documents
   a. Final Evaluation of the Office of Transition Initiative's Program in Sierra Leone, August 2002
   b. Final Report of the USAID/Office of Transition Initiative's Community-Focused Reintegration Programs in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Burundi, February 2006
   c. Mercy Corps Tajikistan Final Report for the Tajikistan Conflict Prevention Program, April 2007

9. Success Stories:
   - Community Reporter Success Story (April 2010)
   - Song Festival Success Story (April 2010)
   - Equal Access Success Stories (May 2010)
   - PDEV Radio Success Story (Nov. 2009)
   - PDEV Niger Success Story - ANASI (July 2010)
   - PDEV Success Story - Youth Training in Niamey (Nov. 2009)
   - PDEV Programs in Chad
   - Faya Festival III

Interviews Planned

Interview with	Explanation
Primary implementers:	
AED program mgmt	*Overall program implementation*
Equal Access program mgmt	*Overall/media program implementation*
AED staff	*Factors of success*
Equal Access staff	*Factors of success*
Implementing CSOs:	
KARKARA, Niamey	*CSO selected to support the management of the CYM process in Niger /CYM implementation*
AIN/ONEE, Zinder	*Consortium of the Organisation Nigérienne pour le Education Environmentale (ONEE) and the Zinder branch of AIN (Association Islamique du Niger, the oldest, largest and most influential Islamic association in the country) /Religious outreach*
UECN, Zinder	*Union des Ecoles Coraniques du Niger: The biggest network of Koranic schools in Niger /Support to religious schools*
NIGETECH, Zinder	*Vocational training center featured in an episode of a youth radio show that highlighted the work of PDEV and its youth training program /Vocational training*
RIESCA, Niamey	*Réseau International d'Etudes Stratégiques sur les conflits en Afrique: to implement peace messaging and conflict-prevention activities /Peace messaging & conflict prevention*
Other beneficiary CSOs & groups	
Vocational Training Center, Niamey	*Centre de formation professionnelle des jeunes de Tallajé /Vocational training*
Radio station, Magaria	*Media capacity & programming*
Listening club, Magaria	*Participation in media*
Listening club, Mirriah	*Participation in media*
Religious association, Zinder	*Recipient of in-kind grant /Religious outreach*
Listening club TUDUN SALE, Zinder	*Participation in media*
Radio Anfani	*Radio privée /Media capacity & programming*
?School, Niamey	*Comité de gestion de l'école Plateau 1 /?Governance work?*
Individual beneficiaries	
CYM Youth, Niamey	*CYM experience*
Community reporters, Zinder	*Journalist training*
Community reporters, Niamey	*Journalist training*
USG	
USAID Country Program Manager	*USAID work in Niger*
RSO - US Embassy	*Security*
First Secretary, US Embassy (DCM?)	*Country/CE strategy & vision*
?Ambassador	*Country/CE strategy & vision*
Possible others	
Women's NGO	
International NGO	

CSO	
Donor organizaiton	

Protocols to use

Primary implementers: Program Management

Print out the reporting format document for taking notes.

In introducing the interview:

- *Thank those present for their cooperation and hospitality in welcoming us.*
- *Acknowledge that they have probably spent a lot of time with assessments, most recently with the impact assessment team.*
- *Explain that the purposes of this assessment – as different from the impact assessment – are to:*
    1. **Clarify PDEV's operational strategy, as well as how the program has evolved and what has worked well in implementation.**
    2. **Explore similar or related CE and development programs, and their relevance to PDEV.**
    3. **Use input from the field and the lessons learned to provide recommendations for future programming for PDEV.**
- *Emphasize that we are particularly interested in looking at strengths, and how those strengths are used to overcome expected and unexpected challenges.*

1) Roles & involvement of partners

a) Please introduce yourself and your organization. In doing so, tell us briefly about your organization and particularly your name, title, and your role in PDEV activities.

b) Why is your organization involved in PDEV? How does the PDEV program fit with your organization's work and goals in this country/field?

c) From your perspective, what is the most important goal of PDEV?

d) What role does your organization have in PDEV activities? What specifically is it involved in?

e) How has the involvement of your organization evolved over time?

f) How do you learn from what happens in the project? Are there structures and processes are in place in your work that help you learn from what is going on, and share what is being learned by those involved?

2) How program planning is done

Before talking about the strengths and successes of your work, we'd like to have a better understanding of the programs and activities planned, and how the implementation of the program has evolved. First, we'd like to better understand how program planning and decision-making is done.

When the program is working at its best, for programming decisions…

1) Regarding <u>what types of projects</u> are done:

i. Who makes those decisions, and how?

ii. **What informs those decisions?** *(e.g. People's opinions/experience, assessments, guides, other?)*

(Probe: To what extent has the "Drivers of Extremism" and "Programming Guide" been used, if at all?)

iii. Any examples of effective decision-making regarding *types of projects planned*?

iv. What do you think are the greatest challenges in decision-making about the *types of projects* planned?

2) Regarding decisions on where/ whom to target:

i. Who makes those decisions, and how?

ii. What informs those decisions? *(e.g. People's opinions/experience, assessments, guides, other?)*

(Probe: To what extent has the "Drivers of Extremism" and "Programming Guide" been used, if at all?)

iii. Any examples of effective decision-making regarding *where/whom to target*?

iv. What do you think are the greatest challenges in decision-making about the *where/whom to target*?

3) **Regarding whom to work with as <u>implementing partners:</u>**

   i. **Who makes those decisions, and how?**

   ii. **What informs those decisions?** *(e.g. People's opinions/experience, assessments, guides, other?)*

   (Probe: To what extent has the "Drivers of Extremism" and "Programming Guide" been used, if at all?)

   iii. **Any examples of effective decision-making regarding *implementing partners*?**

   iv. **What do you think are the greatest challenges in decision-making about the *implementing partners*?**

4) **Regarding choosing the specific individuals/ groups to receive inputs/ benefits <u>(beneficiaries)</u>**

   i. **Who makes those decisions, and how?**

   ii. **What informs those decisions?** *(e.g. People's opinions/experience, assessments, guides, other?)*

   (Probe: To what extent has the "Drivers of Extremism" and "Programming Guide" been used, if at all?)

   iii. **Any examples of effective decision-making regarding *specific beneficiaries*?**

   iv. **What do you think are the greatest challenges in decision-making about the *specific beneficiaries*?**

5) **Regarding adding activities to meet newly identified needs, making needed program changes**

   i. **Who makes those decisions, and how?**

   ii. **What informs those decisions?** *(e.g. People's opinions/experience, assessments, guides, other?)*

   (Probe: To what extent has the "Drivers of Extremism" and "Programming Guide" been used, if at all?)

   iii. **Any examples of effective decision-making regarding *specific beneficiaries*?**

   iv. **What do you think are the greatest challenges in decision-making about the *specific beneficiaries*?**

3) Activities Planned

We would like to get a better understanding of the overall program model, and how all of the activities work together to accomplish what expected results.

a) **What have been the <u>core or primary activities</u> planned for this program/project?** *(Get them to list primary activities, not just "Youth, Governance, and Media", but rather "CYM, Radio programming, etc.")*
1.
2.
3.
4….

For each core activities, <u>briefly</u>, what activities are important to this? *(Just list the most important ones)*

(NOTE: If time is particularly short and questions <u>must</u> be cut, skip b-f here)

First, let's talk about <u>what was planned</u> for each of these core activities. For each:

(Note responses as b-1, b-2, etc.)

b) Why this core activity? What is the history or rationale behind it?

c) What were the expected outcomes? What impact did you hope to have?

d) What is the timeframe that was planned, both overall and for each project?

e) What is expected to happen when the program is over?

f) What regions did this activity intend to cover? What partners were expected to be involved?

(Repeat for each core activity)

g) How do these core activities work together? To what end specifically?

4) Activity implementation

Now let's talk about what has actually happened and how these activities have evolved.

For <u>each</u> core activity: *(Note responses as a-1, a-2, etc.)*

a) What regions have actually involved in this activity?

b) Who have been the implementing partners? Were there other roles taken on by other stakeholders?

c) Who have been the actual participants/beneficiaries?

d) How have the project activities evolved or changed over time? What adaptations have you made to the original plans?

e) What (other) challenges have you had to overcome? How did you do that/How are you doing that?

f) For you personally, what has been the most exciting/ encouraging aspect of this activity? What has made that possible?

g) What significant (other) results have been seen/documented so far?

5) Lessons Learned

In our next session with all of the staff, we will be asking more about program successes and factors of success. To conclude this session, we want to ask just a couple of questions about lessons learned:

a) What do you think is the most important thing you or your organization has learned through your involvement in PDEV so far?

b) What do you think has been learned about preventing violent extremism?

c) Any final thoughts? Is there anything we should have asked about, but didn't?

Organizational Staff Focus Groups

This protocol is to be used for all organizational participants interviewed:
1) Primary Implementers staff
2) Local Implementers/CSO staff
3) Other associations/groups

BACKGROUND INFORMATION TO RECORD FOR EACH:

1. Participants' names, ages, roles
2. About the participants' organizations/associations

INTERVIEW FORMAT

A. Welcome & Introductions:

-- Purpose of focus group

We have asked you here because we are looking to better understand how PDEV works with you to build on the strengths that your organizations and communities already have. To address this, we seek to answer several questions:

1) What makes communities strong and resilient?
2) How do your organizations play an effective role in strengthening their communities and groups?
3) How can/does PDEV support this?

We believe that each of you has a unique perspective and experience in this, and today we hope to gather those perspectives to begin to answer these questions.

-- How information will be used

The information we gather here will be compiled and presented to the program designers and used to make future programming decisions both here and in other countries.

-- Brief introductions (10 minutes)

Please introduce yourself; tell us a little bit about yourself, your community or association, and one or two sentences about how you see your role/place in that community.

-- Review agenda

We are going to do things a little differently from a typical focus group interview. After this introduction, I will ask you to break up into pairs to interview each other – I'll give you more instructions on that in a moment.

After each one has had a turn to be interviewed, we will come back together and discuss what we've heard. To lead that discussion I'll be asking you to comment on several different things, and your comments will be listed up here on this newsprint.

-- Review ground rules (2 minutes)

I would like to offer a few basic rules that will guide us throughout this discussion:

1) Everyone's ideas count – everyone deserves to be listened to.
2) At the same time, all should have the opportunity to speak. If we find that some are dominating the conversation and others are quiet, we may stop those who have spoken a lot in order to hear those who are quiet.
3) Regarding confidentiality – we request that you respect each other's willingness to speak freely, by keeping what is said here confidential. Individual quotes may be used in our final report as representative examples, but no identifying information will be associated with quotes without your permission.

B. Pair interviews (13 minutes -- 3 minute intro, 5 minutes each for 1 hour mtgs, longer if meeting is longer)

1) *Introduction of pair interviews*

The first thing we are going to do is to take advantage of the fact that you all are expert interviewers, and ask you to interview each other, using 4 specific questions, which we are providing in this HANDOUT.

[*READ QUESTIONS ON HANDOUT]*

You will break up into pairs, preferably with someone you don't know or don't know well. Each person will have a 10 minute turn to be an interviewer, and a 10 minute turn as the one interviewed. You will see some basic instructions on the handout; these include:

- Ask the questions below in order.
- Take brief notes – enough to remind you when you are reporting
- Show interest, but refrain from "putting words in the person's mouth."
-

In these interviews, we are looking for real stories of best moments, best experiences.
We will keep the time, and suggest when you might want to move on to the next question; we'll also tell you when it is time to switch roles from interviewer to the one being interviewed.

After the 10 minutes, we'll come back together to share these stories.

2) *Break into pairs.*

Suggest moving on to the following question at these points:

2 minutes – "You might want to move to question 2 if you haven't already"
3 minutes – "Consider moving on to question 3 if you're not there yet"
4 minutes – "Two minutes left – try to make sure you get to question 4"

5 minutes – "It's time to switch roles, whether you've had a chance to get to all of the questions or not."
7 minutes – "You might want to move to question 2 if you haven't already"
8 minutes – "Consider moving on to question 3 if you're not there yet"
9 minutes – "Two minutes left – try to make sure you get to question 4"
10 minutes – "Time's up, let come back together.

C. Share stories (10 minutes for 1 hour interviews, longer if more time)

[Ask each person to briefly tell the group the stories they heard from the person they interview. For each, after the initial "report," ask the person whose story it was if they want to add anything. Note taker should try to get the general idea of the stories – particularly any quotable statements.]

D. Opportunities

-- Identify themes related to #1 (5 minutes)

"Think about each of the stories you heard. What were the strengths that individuals brought to these experiences? What were the strengths of the organizations and communities themselves that made this possible?

[Get people to comment on this. At this point, the note taker should try to capture answers to this in short phrases on newsprint. If appropriate, ask, "Are there any reoccurring themes going on here?"]

-- And identify themes related to #3 (5 minutes)

"What was unique to the PDEV program and its approach that contributed to this success?

[*Get people to comment on what happens in the organization when people are connected. Again, the note taker should try to capture answers to this in short phrases on newsprint. If appropriate, ask, "*Are there any reoccurring themes going on here?"]

E. Overcoming obstacles (10 minutes, longer if needed)

"The last question in the interview was 'If you had 3 wishes to help make more such situations possible, what would they be?' What are the wishes for the future that you heard expressed – or that you want to express now? We're going to list those wishes here [on newsprint] right now."

[Keep the focus on "overcoming" & wishes for the future, rather than on bad experiences of the past. If such experiences are described in illustration, that's o.k., just try to keep those illustrations short.]

F. If there's time:

Discussion of a vision for their organizations/groups & resources needed to realize that vision. (This depends on time available)

"Given all of what we've heard here today, what do you think should be the vision for strengthening your communities and groups? And what resources are needed to make that vision a reality?"

H. Closure

1) Go around the group and have participants tell "One thing that you heard here today that was really important."
2) Express thanks to participants, restate how info will be used, and provide information for those interested in follow-up.

IMMEDIATELY AFTER PARTICIPANTS LEAVE:

Team should discuss and record the following:

1) Description of purpose, site and participants in interview
2) Question by question summaries/characterizations of answers that the group gave to each question; transcription of newsprint
3) Any comments that might have been expressed by just one person but that seem relevant to the topics at hand
4) An overall summary of what was learned from the group

HANDOUT: INTERVIEW QUESTIONS ON COMMUNITY CONNECTIONS AND STRENGTHS

Instructions to the interviewer:

- Ask the questions below in order.
- Take brief notes – enough to remind you when you are reporting
- Show interest, but refrain from "putting words in the person's mouth."

---

1) Think for a moment about your organization and your involvement with PDEV, and about a time when you really felt that this involvement was really effective, successful, at a high point; this could be either with an activity being implemented, or the results of an activity being seen – or even when you just experienced really good management of the program, in a way that contributed something important through this work. Describe that time.

2) What strengths did you bring to that experience that helped make it possible? What did other individuals bring?

3) What were the strengths and values of the existing communities and/or local organizations involved that contributed to this?

4) If you had 3 wishes to help make more such moments possible (where you are connected to your community), what would they be?

Individual Beneficiaries Focus Group Protocol

This protocol is to be used for all individual beneficiaries: 1) Community youth mappers 2) Community reporters

BACKGROUND INFORMATION TO RECORD FOR EACH:

3. Participants' names, ages, roles
4. About the participants' associations

INTERVIEW FORMAT

A. Welcome & Introductions:

-- Purpose of focus group

We have asked you here because we are looking to better understand how PDEV works with you (CYMers, community reporters) to build on the strengths that you and your communities already have. To address this, we seek to answer several questions:

4) What makes communities strong and resilient?
5) How do individuals play an effective role in strengthening their communities and groups?
6) How can/does PDEV support this?

We believe that each of you has a unique perspective and experience in this, and today we hope to gather those perspectives to begin to answer these questions.

-- How information will be used

The information we gather here will be compiled and presented to the program designers and used to make future programming decisions both here and in other countries.

-- Brief introductions (10 minutes)

Please introduce yourself; tell us a little bit about yourself, your community or association, and one or two sentences about how you see your role/place in that community.

-- Review agenda

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After each one has had a turn to be interviewed, we will come back together and discuss what we've heard. To lead that discussion I'll be asking you to comment on several different things, and your comments will be listed up here on this newsprint.

-- Review ground rules (2 minutes)

I would like to offer a few basic rules that will guide us throughout this discussion:

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10 minutes – "Time's up, let come back together.

C. Share stories (10 minutes)

[Ask each person to briefly tell the group the stories they heard from the person they interview. For each, after the initial "report," ask the person whose story it was if they want to add anything. Note taker should try to get the general idea of the stories – particularly any quotable statements.]

D. Opportunities

-- Identify themes related to #1 (5 minutes)

"Think about each of the stories you heard. What were the strengths of the communities that were mentioned? What were people proud of?"

[Get people to comment on this. At this point, the note taker should try to capture answers to this in short phrases on newsprint. If appropriate, ask, "Are there any reoccurring themes going on here?"]

-- And identify themes related to #3 (5 minutes)

"What strengths do different individuals bring to the community? (Could probe regarding strengths of youth, what is the role of women in contributing to strong communities?) What made it possible for people to play a role in that community? What happened when they did?"

[*Get people to comment on what happens in the organization when people are connected. Again, the note taker should try to capture answers to this in short phrases on newsprint. If appropriate, ask, "*Are there any reoccurring themes going on here?"]

E. Overcoming obstacles (10 minutes, longer if needed)

"The last question in the interview was 'If you had 3 wishes to help make more such situations possible, what would they be?' What are the wishes for the future that you heard expressed – or that you want to express now? We're going to list those wishes here [on newsprint] right now."

[Keep the focus on "overcoming" & wishes for the future, rather than on bad experiences of the past. If such experiences are described in illustration, that's o.k., just try to keep those illustrations short.]

F. If there's time:

Discussion of a vision for their communities/groups & resources needed to realize that vision. (This depends on time available)

"Given all of what we've heard here today, what do you think should be the vision for strengthening your communities and groups? And what resources are needed to make that vision a reality?"

H. Closure

1) Go around the group and have participants tell "One thing that you heard here today that was really important."
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Instructions to the interviewer:

- Ask the questions below in order.
- Take brief notes – enough to remind you when you are reporting
- Show interest, but refrain from "putting words in the person's mouth."

---

1) Think for a moment about your community, its strengths, and what makes you proud to be part of it. Is there a story you can tell about a time when you felt <u>most connected to and proud of your community</u>?

2) What strengths did you bring to that experience that helped make it possible? What did others bring?

3) How did your involvement with PDEV contribute to this experience? Has your involvement affected the way you look at your role in the community?

4) If you had 3 wishes to help make more such moments possible (where you are connected to your community), what would they be?

APPENDIX 4: LIST OF KEY INFORMANTS MEETINGS, INTERVIEWS, FOCUS GROUPS AND SITE VISITS

December 14-17, 2010 (USA) and Jan 4-13, 2011 (Niger)

Institutions/organizations	Key informants	Type	Date	Format	Place
USAID Washington, D.C	Angela Martin, Senior Counterterrorism Advisor Kellie Burk, Research Analyst Amanda Day, Senegal Desk Officer	Donor	12/15/10	Meeting	USA, Washington, D.C
Academy for Educational Development (AED)	Anne O'Toole Salinas, Program Director Kaitlyn Crook, Program officer Allison Poyac, Senior Program off.	Implementer	12/15/10	Meeting	USA, Washington. DC
PDEV, NIGER	Rougui, CoP and Country Rep.	Implementer	01/05/11	Interview	Niamey, Niger
USAID, Niamey/Niger	William Nobles, Country Program manager Abdourahamane Hassane, Cy. Program asst.	Donor	01/05/11	Interviews	Niger, Niamey
PDEV, Niamey/Niger	Senior staff: Rougui, CoP and Country representative Abdoul Kader, Resp. Media – Equal Access (2008) Rene Djamen (March 2010) Denise Ferron – Finance Manager	Implementer	01/6/2011	Group interviews	Niamey, Niger
Centre des Jeunes de Tallaje	Mariame Oumar, Director	Local beneficiary	01/05/11	Interview/ field visit	
Karkara	Ibrahim Sofo, Suivi et évaluation	Local partner	01/06/11	Interview/ Field visit	Niamey, Niger
Centre de jeunes de Larcourrousse	Zakaria Insa	Local beneficiary	01/06/11	Interview/ Field visit	Niamey, Niger
Producers of PDEV, Niamey/Niger	Katiella, Responsible of content Idi, governance Bintou Hassan, youth Ramoud Gyo, religion outreach Moussa Nekanja, governance,	Implementer	01/06/11	Focus group	Niamey, Niger

Institutions/organizations	Key informants	Type	Date	Format	Place
	Attaou, religious outreach				
Radio Kitari	Lamine Harouna, Directeur Abdoul Martina, Responsable Technique and Community Reporter Mamane Goto, Animateur et producteur d'emission interactive	Beneficiary/Community radio	01/07/11	Focus group / field visit	Maigaria, Niger
Listeners Club CHAHO	Idrissa, Vice president Fati Idrissa, Treasurer Hassan Oumoussa, Vice-treasure Moussa Tchiroma, Secretary Rabia Souleymane, Vice Secretary Ramatou Ousmane, President	Beneficiaries	01/07/11	Focus group	Maigaria, Niger
PDEV, Niamey/ Niger	Aminou, Charge programme Aff. religieuses	Implementer	01/08/11	Interview	Zinder, Niger
Listeners club – Jaz (jeunes amateurs du Zouk)	11 members of the group (age : 12-25) : Seidou, student (4ème) Bisadi, animateur radio Ousmane, mecanicien Ibrahim, out-of-school Ibrahim Manasa, mecanicien Ibrahim, restaurateur Maarou Mutare, apprenti chauffeur Ibrahim Mallam, vendeur d'essence Yacoubou Salissou, eleve 3ème Souleymane Ousmane, Chaï man Moutaria,élève 4ème	Beneficiaries	01/09/11	Group discussions	Mirryah, Niger
Union des Ecoles coraniques du Niger (UECN)	Mamoud Ibrahim, President and the Senior staff	Local partners	01/09/11	Group discussions	Zinder, Niger
Radio Anfani	Aissah, Reporter governance Mariama, Reporter Governance Jean Gerard Loti, reporter Jeunesse Mariam Ousmane, Reporter	Beneficiary/ community radio	01/09/11	Focus group/ field visit	Zinder, Niger

Institutions/organizations	Key informants	Type	Date	Format	Place
	Jeunesse Boukary, Focal Point				
Ecole Coranique	Director	Beneficiary (In-kind donation)	01/09/11	Interview/field visit	Zinder, Niger
Young beneficiaries trained by AFRICARE	Koumba, apprenti couture Aminou,, broderie Mamanou, cpouture	Beneficiaries – youth training	01/09/11	Focus group / field visit	Zinder, Niger
Listeners club- Tundu Sale	20 women and 03 men	Beneficiaries	01/09/11	Group discussions	Zinder, Niger
Association Islamique du Niger (AIN) and Organisation Nigérienne pour l'Education Environnementale (ONEE)	The President of ONEE and the senior staff of both organizations	Local partner	01/10/11	Group discussions	Niamey
PDEV, Niamey	Boucar Nanatao, Grant manager Mamane Rabiou, Asst. Grant Manager	Implementer	01/12/11	Interview	Niamey, Niger
03 Vocational training Centers	Mahamane Bachir Souley Lep, Lycée professionnel, Frère Jean-Baptiste Coulibaly, Lycée professionnel Mme Hassane Wangari, Complexe technique Wangari Harouna Alouissa, Ecole de santé publique	Local partners	01/12/11	Group interview	Niamey, Niger
OXFAM Quebec	Ibrahima Fatima, Country Rep. Anifa Soumana, Technical Adviser	International NGO	01/12/11	Interview	Niamey, Niger
Former Mayor – Tahoua 1er	El Hadj Abala (Tel: 96 88 52 43)	Beneficiary	01/12/11	Interview	Niamey, Niger
Former PDEV Governance, Program	Aissah Riba (96 96 52 26)	Former Staff	01/12/11	Interview	Niamey, Niger
USAID/ Niger	William Nobles, Country Program manager Abdourahamane Hassane, Cy. Program asst.	Donor	01/13/11	Meeting/Debrief	Niamey, Niger
U.S Embassy, Niger	H.E. Amb. Bisa Williams	US Government	01/13/11	Meeting/Debrief	Niamey, Niger

APPENDIX 5: COUNTRY-SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS

Key finding area	Chad	Niger
Nimble processes	*Tailor programming and funding mechanisms to specific needs and concerns of each regions.*(see country assessment for region specific concerns). Revisit the $250,000 fixed obligation grant funding limit for local partners implementing projects in regions outside N'Djamena. Flexible funding would enable PDEV to provide more timely interventions when opportunities present themselves. (e.g., activities around religious festivals) Where specific institutions and activities merit support, there should be an option for "special case" grants. (e.g., support for pastoral wells; for Islamic councils (with non-evangelizing stipulations); University Student Association.)	Resume governance work in Niger when possible, but provide for appropriate contracting mechanisms to engage consulting firms to support PD.C.s or ensure adequate resources for implementers to provide their own TA directly to commune leaders.
Role of Trust Building	Continue to strengthen the relationships and work with traditional and religious leaders, as well as formal authorities, in Chad to decrease skepticism amongst the Chadian population, and to allow messages of peace and tolerance to pass to a larger audience.	Work to regain trust among youth and communities whose involvement was terminated.
Link Stakeholders	Program to increase recognition of the role and value of youth in society, including focusing on fostering greater linkages between youth and the Islamic establishment, and between youth and local authorities	<u>After</u> gaining a better understanding of the dynamics of associational life within the university system and the ties of student and faculty with different political and religious movements, explore the possibility of working with university students and faculty in the University of Niamey. Look for opportunities to link youth with local authorities. Explore the possibilities of integrating components and resources from other

Key finding area	Chad	Niger
		USG activities in Niger, where appropriate
Packaging of Benefits	Increase focus on the PDEV youth component (suspended in Niger), to build and reinforce social, cultural, and economic capital. This would include income generation activities, including timely provision of "start-up kits" trained youth, and peer mentoring. Link vocational training with the GOC's new trade skills programs well as local business opportunities. Consider further replication of the AED/USAID-sponsored tailoring mentorship. Couple economic opportunities with support of social and cultural opportunities of youth groups. Most importantly, increase cross-sectoral linkages: The interweaving of the Governance, Youth, and Media activity areas would provide benefits beyond that obtained from single-tracked interventions.	Continue support for training in vocational and life skills to youth in Maradi and Zinder to enhance their employment potential. Extend training programs to work with poor youth in slum neighborhoods of Niamey and in Diffa region and to look at the possibility of working with groups of younger adolescents like the palais. Ensure benefits are packaged to provide full support and opportunities after completion. address the needs of specific youth sub-sets in Maradi, Zinder, Niamey, Agades, and Tahoua regions
Resiliency-focused	Given that associational life is still relatively weak, further support the community development project groups as important community infrastructures that will enrich the associational life of the target communities.	
Local Ownership for Sustainability	Given that associational life is still relatively weak, further support the community development project groups as important community infrastructures that will enrich the associational life of the target communities. Encourage and provide training to youth groups (such as in Mao) interested in taking on conflict mediation as among their major activities. Continue to support schools that seek to better integrate the religious and public systems Strengthen the resiliency and ability of youth to take local ownership through: 1. enabling economic activity within their ranks;	Consider a broader engagement with the target audience via listening clubs as a cost-effective and impactful means of engaging Nigeriens, particularly youth, and building on an existing tradition.

Key finding area	Chad	Niger
	2. formally extending recognition to them in local institutions and developmental activities; 3. providing them a greater voice in media outlets; 4. integrating them within decentralization reform.	
Importance of Information & Messaging	The PDEV media component has been a successful way to spread PDEV messages and reduce extremist influences. This component could be expanded in Chad. Reassure and reaffirm religious Leaders (especially the Conseil Islamique) of their integral role in maintaining peace for development through 1. Convening seminars (in which they have a prominent position) on peace-building and development; 2. Supporting their outreach opportunities, logistically as well as programmatically; 3. Initiating mentoring programs for youth, for the purposes of leadership building (not religious education). Continue to work in supporting curriculum development for Koranic schools.	*The PDEV follow-on can build on the success of its gradual outreach approach in Niger by more directly tackling the issues of violence, causes and consequences of religious extremism, and methods for mitigation and control of extremism.* *Clarify USG legal boundaries of support, and find ways to work more directly with religious leaders, in so far as the US constitution permits* *Continue to support programs to equip and r modernize the curriculum of Koranic school and post-Koranic school education, through new content on literacy and numeracy; as well as programs to promote religious tolerance in Niamey, Maradi, and Agadez regions.*
Expansion to Remote Regions	Expand upon religious activities conducted in northern Chad. Consider establishment, in Faya, of a small office for proper oversight.	N/A
Targeting & Role of Women	Provide support for girls-only classes in the public school sector.	N/A

Annex 3

MID-TERM EVALUATION OF USAID'S COUNTER-EXTREMISM PROGRAMMING IN AFRICA

FEBRUARY 1, 2011

This publication was produced by AMEX International and its Subcontractor, the QED Group, LLC for the United States Agency for International Development. It was prepared by Jeffrey Swedberg (QED), Evaluation Team Lead; and Steven Smith (AMEX Consultant), under Contract No. RAN-I-00-09-0008

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MID-TERM EVALUATION OF USAID'S COUNTER-EXTREMISM PROGRAMMING IN AFRICA

DISCLAIMER

The authors' views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Agency for International Development or the United States Government.

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ANNEXES

ACRONYMS

AED	Academy for Educational Development
AFR	Africa Bureau
AFR/SD	Africa Bureau's Office of Sustainable Development
AFRICOM	United States Africa Command
AMEX	AMEX International, Inc.
AMSS	Association Malienne pour la Survie au Sahel
AQIM	Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
CAP	Chad Capacity Development & Peace Support Project
CARE	Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CMM	Conflict Management and Mitigation
CRS	Congressional Research Service
CSO	Civil Society Organization
DCHA	Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance
DCM	Deputy Chief of Mission
DFA	Director of Foreign Assistance
DOD	Department of Defense
DOS	Department of State
E&E	Europe and Eurasia
EDC	Education Development Center
EERN	Evangelical Church of Niger
GAO	General Accountability Office
IESC	International Executive Service Corps
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MSI	Management Systems International
NCTC	National Counterterrorism Center
ORB	Opinion Research Business
PDEV	Peace for Development
PGP2	Programme de Gouvernance Partagée 2
PHARE	Programme Harmonisé d'Appui au Renforcement de l'Education
PMP	Performance Management Plan
PPR	Performance Plan and Report
QED	The QED Group LLC
RPNP	Radio for Peace Building in Northern Mali Program
TSCTP	Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USG	United States Government
VE	Violent Extremism
WITS	Worldwide Incidents Tracking System

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Based on a review of quantitative and qualitative information and data from the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP), it can be concluded that USAID's Niger, Chad and Mali programs have had some positive impact – most strikingly on lower-level programmatic goals such as civic engagement and listenership for USAID-sponsored radio. Results on higher-level goals, measured through surveys on attitudes towards extremism, were also positive in the aggregate but less dramatic. Despite this empirical evidence of program impact, implementation of the TSTCP has coincided with a worsening of the terrorist threat in parts of the Sahel, indicating a continued need for counter-extremism programming.

Background - In 2010, USAID's Bureau for Africa commissioned AMEX International and its subcontractor, the QED Group LLC, to conduct a mid-term evaluation of USAID's counter-extremism-programming in Africa, focusing on the TSCTP. The evaluation team was composed of Team Leader Jeffrey Swedberg (QED Group LLC) and Peace and Security Specialist Steven A. Smith (AMEX consultant).

The Sahel has been a concern to USG policy makers for several years as a possible staging area for violent extremists. These fears are becoming more pronounced as Mauritania, Niger and Mali have all experienced a worrisome uptick in kidnappings and killings of foreigners, while Chad continues to be plagued by chronic instability. To counter extremist forces in the Sahel, USAID has worked for the past five years in concert with the Departments of Defense and State on the TSCTP. The USG's interagency strategy is aimed at defeating terrorist organizations and their ability to gain recruits by (a) strengthening regional counter-terrorism capabilities; (b) enhancing and institutionalizing cooperation among the region's security forces; (c) promoting good governance; (d) discrediting terrorist ideology; and (e) reinforcing bilateral military ties. USAID implements the non-military portions of this partnership in cooperation with State and Defense.

USAID's current TSCTP activities include: a regional multi-sector Peace for Development (PDEV) program in Niger and Chad (and in Mauritania until activities were suspended), implemented by the Academy for Educational Development (AED); and community development activities in Mali, implemented by multiple partners. For USAID, the program seeks to provide tangible benefits to populations, particularly youth, at risk for recruitment by violent extremist (VE) organizations and communities in at-risk regions through youth employment and outreach programs, vocational skills training, and community development and media activities. The program also gathers beneficiaries from different communities, ethnic groups, and countries together through outreach events on topics related to religion and tolerance.

Methodology - The evaluators developed qualitative information (focus groups and key informant interviews) and quantitative data (surveys), and conducted an in-depth review of literature and past reports. Utilizing a quasi-experimental design, this impact evaluation analyzed survey data to determine if treatment populations in Niger, Chad and Mali, where TSCTP programming was present, had more favorable responses to the survey questionnaire than comparison populations in areas where less TSCTP programming had been present. In all,

the evaluators analyzed the results of 1,064 surveys administered in five treatment and four comparison clusters across three countries.[1]

The evaluators used the same survey mechanism in both Niger and Chad, and a slightly different version in Mali. The questions for the surveys were chosen from previous questionnaires that had been administered in these countries before, allowing for comparison with baseline data. These "source surveys" included the 2009 PDEV Baseline Survey for Niger and Chad; the Afrobarometer for Mali; and the Public Attitudes in the Sahel 2007-2008 survey commissioned by AFRICOM for all three countries.

The survey questions were designed so that the most favorable answer to each question would be coded as a "5" with the least favorable answer coded as a "1". This system allows comparability of analysis of questions or groupings of questions, which are averaged to produce a score on the 1-5 Likert Scale[2]. In order to measure these results, the evaluation team surveyed households identified as "treatment" clusters, and "comparison clusters." The survey was administered by trained enumerators in the local language of the community.

Survey Results - While results from this quasi-experimental survey design cannot be considered definitive proof of impact, the findings are consistent with existing literature on the TSTCP. According to the surveys, the program appears to be having modest yet significant impact across all three countries.

The graphic on the following page (Figure 1) highlights the differences on the survey questions shared in all three countries covered by this evaluation[3]. The differences between treatment and comparison areas, when shown on a one to five scale, are modest – an average of 5.67% in aggregate in favor of the treatment clusters. However, the impact appears mostly consistent across countries. The biggest impact for all three countries came on the survey question regarding whether respondents listen to TSCTP-sponsored peace and tolerance radio. Since residents of all treatment and comparison clusters were in broadcast range of these radio signals, data indicates that complementary TSCTP programming, such as governance, youth, micro-enterprise, religious outreach and education, significantly boosts listenership. Scores on whether respondents "participate in decision-making", a governance indicator, indicate significant results for Mali, where there has been a long-standing governance program, as well as for Chad where governance and civil society has been a focus of PDEV and its predecessor program. The level of "satisfaction with services," a key socio-economic indicator, shows marginal but positive results across the countries.

The aggregated AFRICOM cultural questions – measuring respondents' views on the degree to which they were against Al Qaeda; against violence in the name of Islam; their opinion of the United States; whether they approved of working with West to combat terrorism; and felt that the

[1] Two treatment and comparison clusters each in Niger, one of each in Mali, and two treatment and one comparison cluster in Chad.
[2] The Likert Scale is an attitudes scale that measures the level to which the respondent "agrees" or "disagrees" with a given statement. The scale will give an odd number of choices with an equal amount of agreement/disagreement choices on either side of a neutral option.
[3] Largest possible theoretical difference is "5", in which all treatment areas scored "5" on a question or group of questions and all comparison areas scored "1". On most questions, treatment areas outscored comparison areas by 0.5 or less. If there was no difference between the treatment and comparison areas, such as in Niger on the "participation in decision making" question, the graphic shows no visible bar.

U.S. was fighting terrorism not Islam – measure progress on the hardest goals to achieve, and are arguably the most important indicators for demonstrating TSCTP's long-term impact. Predictably, the differences between treatment and comparison areas are the smallest on the cultural/attitudinal questions. However, the relatively better results for Chad and Niger over Mali may indicate the value of having a holistic TSTCP program, in which programs directed at the various drivers of VE are more intensively coordinated but less integrated with other USAID programming

Figure 1.



Lessons Learned from Focus Groups and Interviews—The evaluators also conducted focus groups and key informant interviews and determined that residents of the Sahel are deeply religious and support Sharia law, but are against violence and do not share extremists' views. On the other hand, focus groups indicated a growing unease with perceived anti-Muslim sentiment in the United States.

According to an analysis of the focus groups, the most successful and popular parts of the TSCTP have been the radio programs. These programs are widely listened to and discussed. They include advice on reducing domestic violence, building understanding and tolerance between Muslim and Christian communities, and providing news in the local language. Radio programming demonstrated real impact on public attitudes and understanding about tolerance and peace. It may be one of the most cost-effective means of helping people find peaceful resolutions to conflicts and supporting dialogue between communities. It became clear from numerous conversations that radio programming is most effective when it is complemented with other TSTCP interventions.

The evaluators concluded that several factors exist that are outside of USAID's manageable interest, primarily the increasing lawlessness of northern Niger and Mali. Despite PDEV's demonstrable impact, terrorism – especially in the northern regions of Mali and Niger – has gone up and is trending toward the kidnapping of Western hostages. Focus groups and key informants stressed that the extremist problem in Mali, Niger, and Chad is not indigenous, but is coming from the porous borders with neighboring countries to the north.

The need to address local conflicts was also a point emphasized by focus groups and interviews. These include conflicts between Tuaregs and other ethnic groups in Niger and Mali and resource-driven clashes between herders and farmers in Chad. Some of these problems, however, are outside the current scope of TSCTP and would imply a long term commitment to issues that have existed for years.

Conversations with implementers pointed to the need to establish satellite offices in remote parts of all three countries – most likely staffed by host-country nationals for security reasons. While TSCTP has been successful in building a "firewall" against extremism in the southern parts of its programming area, the stronger need is probably in the north where terrorists are operating with increasing impunity. Extremists in the northern reaches of the Sahel are taking advantage of reduced governance in the region and may be benefiting from an increasingly complicit population that enables violence even if not explicitly supporting it.

A Proposed Results Framework for TSCTP - Based on its conversations and document reviews, the evaluation team sees the primary focus of the USAID TSCTP programs to be on "reducing the enabling environment" for extremism in the Sahel, which is the highest level goal for which programs have a manageable interest. The aim of this focus on reducing the enabling environment for VE is to support program countries in the Sahel to maintain a low level of risk for violent extremist recruitment.

With this goal in mind, the evaluators propose a Results Framework for measurement of the TSTCP. It addresses criticism that current TSCTP measures are too focused on sector development results and not directly enough on counter-extremism. The framework also is designed to be used across countries, providing some level of TSCTP universality. To address the fact that individual country programs will require different measures, some indicators are provided in a menu format so that different indicators can be chosen depending on the program and country context.

In all, the proposed framework provides for five "orders" of results. The orders follow the principle of causal logic – meaning that the top order of results is reliant on achievement of the second order, which is reliant on the third, and so on.

Based on this Results Framework, the evaluation team recommends that USAID conduct a survey, similar to the version outlined in this document, on an annual basis or biennially, to track the impacts of the TSCTP in future years. To the extent possible, the survey should be applicable across multiple countries, but should be flexible enough to incorporate indicators specific to individual countries.

INTRODUCTION

IMPACT EVALUATION DESIGN

An impact evaluation assesses the changes that can be attributed to a particular intervention. It is structured to answer the question: how would program outcomes have changed if the intervention had not been undertaken? This involves counterfactual analysis—a comparison between what actually happened and what would have happened in the absence of the intervention.

In a quasi-experimental design, the counterfactual analysis involves comparison of treatment clusters – communities that received the intervention – and comparison clusters that did not. Unlike an experimental design, (often used in clinical trials) a quasi-experimental design does not randomly select treatment and comparison groups for analysis. Logistical constraints require instead that the evaluators choose a small number of treatment and comparison clusters based on known characteristics.

In 2010, USAID's Bureau for Africa, Office of Sustainable Development commissioned a mid-term impact evaluation of USAID's counter-extremism programming in Africa, focusing on the Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP) Program (see Annex K, Scope of Work). The evaluation contract was awarded to AMEX International and its subcontractor, the QED Group LLC. The evaluation team was composed of Team Leader Jeffrey Swedberg (QED Group LLC) and Peace and Security Specialist Steven A. Smith (AMEX consultant). The evaluation was carried out from October 4, 2010 – January 4, 2011.

The evaluation team spent one month conducting field work in Niger, Chad and Mali from October 24 through November 24, 2010. Prior to the field work, the team reviewed literature and previous field reports, much of which is synthesized here. In the field, the team collected data from hundreds of questionnaires and conducted focus groups and key informant interviews. This data is the primary source material for the evaluation. The evaluators have compared their findings to past reporting and evaluations, as well as to critical background documents like USAID's "Guide to the Drivers of Violent Extremism"; and "Development Assistance and Counter-Extremism: A Programming Guide". The results are presented in narrative and graphical format.

This evaluation uses a quasi-experimental methodology designed to measure program impact. The data collected from the survey questionnaires are intended to provide a comparison between areas that have had TSCTP programming and those that have not. It was not possible to isolate a comparison group with no exposure to TSCTP programming. For example, the widespread geographic areas covered by radio stations in the Sahel made it hard to isolate communities that had not received any programming messages. Still, it was possible to see differences in public attitudes and perceptions in areas where there was substantial TSCTP programming and where there was far less.

When pilot programming under TSCTP began in 2006, counter-terrorism was a new area of focus for USAID. In the years that have followed, a number of high profile terrorist acts in the Sahel have highlighted the continued need to undertake creative programming that directly counters the drivers of violent extremism. This evaluation is designed to help USAID build upon TSCTP, based on conclusions reached through analysis of empirical impact data and other

sources, and to inform ongoing and future implementation. It also contains a suggested framework to monitor and measure the results and impacts of these activities.

This evaluation is divided into two primary sections:

Section One provides background information on the TSCTP. It also contains information on the methodology and results for each of the three countries studied here: Niger, Chad and Mali. Section One also looks at lessons-learned through counter-extremism program implementation[4].

Section Two provides a summary of what has been measured and how for the TSTCP. It answers a number of questions USAID requested be addressed in the Scope of Work for this evaluation. Section Two also contains a proposed framework to better monitor and measure the impact of these programs in the future.

[4] This mid-term report is intended to address program impact, not program efficiency or management. An impact evaluation is characterized by the use of counterfactual analysis, that is, a comparison between what actually happened and what would have happened in the absence of the intervention. The evaluators recognize that proving impact after a relatively short period of implementation is problematic. However, the evaluation design does include the three elements of sound and credible impact evaluation designs cited by the National Research Council of the National Academies: 1) reliable and valid measures of the outcome that the project is designed to affect; 2) collection of outcome measures both before and after the project is implemented; and 3) comparison of outcomes in both the units that are treated and an appropriately selected set of units that are not.

SECTION ONE

BACKGROUND

The Sahel, the semiarid region of north-central Africa south of the Sahara, includes Niger, Chad and Mali as well as Mauritania. It has been a concern to USG policy makers for several years as a possible staging area for violent extremists. These fears are becoming more pronounced as Mauritania, Niger and Mali have all experienced a worrisome uptick in kidnappings and killings of foreigners. In Mauritania, many of these attacks are from indigenous elements, while coming mostly from outside in the case of Niger and Mali. Chad has been chronically unstable, with an ongoing problem in the East near the border with Darfur that has occasionally threatened other parts of the country.

To counter extremist forces in the Sahel, USAID has worked for the past five years in concert with the Departments of Defense and State in the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSTCP). The TSCTP's inter-agency strategy is aimed at defeating terrorist organizations and their ability to gain recruits by (a) strengthening regional counter-terrorism capabilities; (b) enhancing and institutionalizing cooperation among the region's security forces; (c) promoting good governance; (d) discrediting terrorist ideology; and (e) reinforcing bilateral military ties. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) implements the non-military portions of this partnership in cooperation with State and Defense.

The TSCTP program has forged partnerships with African governments to combat extremism, and USAID seeks to empower its program beneficiaries to combat extremism at the individual and community levels. USAID's role in TSCTP is managed by the West Africa Regional Mission and the Africa Bureau in Washington along with the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance. USAID's current TSCTP activities include: a regional Peace for Development (PDEV) Program in Niger and Chad; and community development activities in Mali.[5] For USAID, the program seeks to provide tangible benefits to youth at risk for recruitment by violent extremist (VE) organizations and communities in at-risk regions through youth employment and outreach programs, vocational skills training, and community development and media activities. The program also gathers beneficiaries from different communities, ethnic groups, and countries together through outreach events on topics related to religion and tolerance.

USAID's strategy has evolved, based in part on a series of assessments and analytical studies. As of 2007, programming has fallen into three major activity areas: good governance; youth empowerment; and media and outreach support.

[5] A youth program in Morocco affiliated with TSCTP is funded separately.

SURVEY METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS

This mixed-method impact evaluation employed both quantitative and qualitative information. On the quantitative side, it relied on surveys, using a quasi-experimental design to contrast treatment and comparison communities.[6] The evaluators chose accessible and relatively secure communities to survey based on discussions with USAID and implementers. Treatment clusters were chosen because of the high concentration of program activity. Comparison clusters were chosen where there had been a minimum of TSTCP activity.[7] Both treatment and comparison clusters had similar ethnic, religious and linguistic features. The qualitative side of this evaluation was informed by focus groups and key informant interviews in the capital cities and the other surveyed communities of the three countries.

NOTES ON BASELINE DATA

Baseline data was collected at the national level for AFRICOM and Afrobarometer questions, and for all PDEV implementation areas nationwide in the case of the PDEV Baseline Survey. Therefore, there is an imperfect comparison between baseline data and data collected in geographically-specific treatment areas sampled in this evaluation.

On the whole, comparisons between treatment cluster data and comparison cluster data, which used consistent and comparable methodology, are more meaningful than comparisons between treatment area data and baseline data, where the data gathering and analysis methodology was not always the same.

At the core of the field methodology was a 15-question survey, administered in Niger and Chad between October 24 and November 15, 2010, measuring host country attitudes on several issues. In Mali, another 14-question survey was administered between December 17 and 20, 2010. All questions were adopted from existing "source surveys," ensuring existence of baseline data against which current results could be compared. Pre-existing questions also have the benefit of being previously vetted and field tested, saving considerable time in the survey design process.

Sources of the Survey – In Niger and Chad, there were two sources for the survey questions. First was the 2009 PDEV Baseline Survey for each of the two PDEV countries. The 25-question PDEV surveys were administered to people between the ages of 15 and 45 in regions of project focus and provided several of the indicators for the project performance management plans (PMPs). The other source of questions for Niger and Chad was the Public Attitudes in the Sahel 2007-2008 survey, commissioned by AFRICOM and administered by ORB, a British survey firm. The 60-question AFRICOM surveys were conducted throughout the Sahel with a national sample.

For Mali, the surveys differed somewhat. They included the AFRICOM questions for which there was baseline data for Mali and several relevant questions from the PDEV survey for which there

[6] Quasi-experimental is defined as using treatment and comparison groups that were not selected at random

[7] Treatment and comparison groups to be surveyed were selected based on discussions with local USAID and project implementer staff. Given the widespread geographical coverage of radio programs under the TCSTP programming, however, it was not possible to isolate comparison groups "uncontaminated" by potential listenership to peace and tolerance radio.

was not. On the other hand, Mali is one of several African countries in which the Afrobarometer survey is administered (although Chad and Niger are not). Therefore, the Mali survey uses several questions from Afrobarometer to ensure more available baseline data.[8]

Role of USAID Analytic Resources in Choice of Survey Questions – The number of questions were limited to 15 or less to expand the number of responses. Survey questions were chosen from the sources mentioned above based on their relevance to the impact of TSCTP programming and whether the questions addressed issues raised by USAID's analytical work. The evaluators reviewed the assessment documents for Chad, Niger and Mali, as well as the Drivers and Programming Guides produced by USAID, to ensure that the survey questions addressed the previously identified drivers of VE and were relevant for the drivers present in each country. For instance, the February 2009 Drivers Guide indicated that economic development is an indirect, as opposed to a primary, driver of VE although the lack of economic development does correlate with the failure to sustain civil liberties and political rights, a more direct VE driver. The Drivers Guide emphasizes the problem of "social marginality," which results in idle young people who are vulnerable to involvement in petty crime, often a characteristic of the newer generation of jihadists. The Drivers Guide also cites as a VE driver the perception of injustice and the view that the international system serves as a mechanism through which Muslims are oppressed and their culture de-valued.

More precise information on the drivers of violent extremism comes from USAID's "Development Assistance and Counter-Extremism: Programming Guide". It specifies the following Socioeconomic Drivers:

- Perceptions of social exclusion and marginality.
- Real or perceived societal discrimination.
- Frustrated expectations and relative deprivation.
- Unmet social and economic needs.

In addition, the evaluation team reviewed the country assessments to confirm that the drivers were relevant in the individual countries. In the case of Niger, drivers identified included:

- Youth perceptions of exclusion and marginality in the political/decision-making process.
- Radical religious influence from Nigeria in Maradi and Zinder.
- Presence of safe havens and poorly governed or ungoverned regions.

In the case of Chad, the drivers included:

[8] Surveys were translated from English to French and then into local languages with careful reviews by several layers of readers, including local USAID representatives, TSTCP implementer staff, and field enumerators. See Annexes C, D, E, F, G and H. Once the translations were finalized, enumerators were trained in the meaning of the questions so as to produce a harmonized understanding. Enumerators were trained to read the survey questions precisely as written. If the respondent did not understand the question, the enumerators were trained to leave the answer blank rather that explain the question further. Since the questions had all been used in previous surveys and had received some degree of pretesting during baseline collection - and because of time constraints - the questions were not formally pre-tested for this evaluation. Instead, debriefing sessions were held with enumerators following the first day of data collection to confirm the validity of the questions and their translation. Evaluators analyzed the data at the end of each data collection day to ensure that answers to the questions appeared realistic. Any possible discrepancies were discussed afterwards with enumerators.

- Economic weaknesses that could be exploited by outside actors.
- At-risk youth who are frustrated, disaffected and idle. Violence seen in gangs, military forces, and anti-government rebel movements.
- Unemployment
- Social marginalization

According to the 2009 USAID assessment of VE in Mali, the primary drivers of extremism are:

- State weakness, at the national and local level, that worsens the climate of lawlessness in which violence can thrive.
- Perceptions of economic under-development and uneven development between north and south, often perceived as deficiencies of public infrastructure.
- Tuareg rebellion and the longstanding legacy of associated resentment and violence.

After reviewing the analytic material, the evaluation team chose the questions that most closely matched the relevant VE drivers in the targeted countries. In the case of Niger and Chad, the identified VE drivers and available baseline data allowed use of the same survey to be administered in both countries. Of the 15 total questions, two were tied to socio-economic drivers and five were tied to political drivers. An additional eight questions were linked to cultural drivers. In Mali, 14 questions were chosen after reviewing the background assessments and specific VE drivers. One question was economic; five questions were political and eight were cultural.

Survey Methodology – The survey questions were designed so that the most favorable answer to each question would be coded as a “5” with the least favorable answer coded as a “1”. This system allows comparability of analysis of questions or groupings of questions, which are averaged to produce a score on the 1-5 Likert Scale[9]. For the purpose of the survey analysis, the seven questions linked to the socio-economic and political drivers are viewed together. In order to measure these results, the evaluation team surveyed households identified as “treatment” clusters, and “comparison clusters.” The survey was administered by trained enumerators in the local language of the community[10.] Surveyors were trained in the verbatim reading of the survey questions and were instructed not to elaborate on the written questions. To provide some level of randomization, the enumerators visited every second household on a street within a given cluster.

[9] The Likert Scale is an attitudes scale that measures the level to which the respondent "agrees" or "disagrees" with a given statement. The scale will give an odd number of choices with an equal amount of agreement/disagreement choices on either side of a neutral option

[10] In Niger and Chad, enumerators were recruited from the ranks of the Community Youth Mapping Project, a cadre of surveyors affiliated with PDEV. This allowed the collection of far more surveys than would have been available otherwise. To prevent any conflict of interest, the enumerators were not given any information about which sampling areas were treatment clusters and which were comparison clusters.

NIGER AND CHAD – METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS

The survey mechanism for both Niger and Chad is found in Figure 2.

Questions 1-7 all originate with the 2009 PDEV baseline survey. Questions 1 and 2, linked to the socio-economic drivers, measure the overall sense of economic well-being in the community and satisfaction with the level of services. These are relatively high-level contextual questions and the results cannot be attributed to TSCTP program interventions.[11] Questions 3 through 7 address the degree to which individuals feel marginalized or alienated from their community decision-making processes. Positive answers to these questions indicate a sense of connection to one's community and its institutions. These questions are intended to measure impact of interventions, specifically the governance, youth and civil society programs of the TSCTP. Question 4 on perceptions of the value of youth associations is a direct measure of an actual TSCTP intervention.

JEFFREY SWEDBERG/EVALUATION SURVEY ENUMERATORS – NIAMEY, NIGER

Questions 8 through 15 are linked to cultural drivers. Questions 8 and 9 originate with the 2009 PDEV baseline survey and are closely linked to TSCTP interventions. Question 8 addresses the frequency one hears messages of peace and tolerance, without specifying the source of the message. Question 9 refers specifically to whether survey respondents are listening to USAID-sponsored radio programs on peace and tolerance. Questions 10 through 15 come from the AFRICOM/ORB survey and are more contextual and difficult to attribute to TSCTP interventions. However, they do measure whether the drivers of VE related to pro-active religious agendas or perceptions of "Islam under siege" by the U.S. and the West are present in surveyed communities. TSCTP programs are attempting to influence these perceptions, although they are not entirely within USAID's manageable interest.

[11] Questions such as "how would you describe your economic situation?" are broad and measure perception rather than defined status. For the purpose of this evaluation, perception is more important. There are fewer questions linked to socioeconomic drivers in the survey compared to the other category drivers partly because the existing PDEV baseline survey, from which the socio-economic questions were taken, had a very limited number of such questions since the objective of the program is not economic development.

Figure 2.

TSTCP SURVEY – CHAD AND NIGER

Survey Questions Based on Socioeconomic Drivers	Circle one				
1. How would you describe your economic situation?	Very Good -5	Good -4	Fair -3	Bad -2	Very Bad -1
2. What is your level of satisfaction with your access to services and resources in your community?	Very Good -5	Good -4	Fair -3	Bad -2	Very Bad -1
Questions Based on Political Drivers					
3. Do you participate in decision-making in your community?	All the time -5	Often -4	Occasion-ally -3	Seldom - 2	Never - 1
4. Do youth associations make a positive contribution to society?	All the time -5	Often -4	Occasion-ally -3	Seldom - 2	Never - 1
5. What is your level of satisfaction with how decisions are made in your community?	Very Good -5	Good -4	Fair -3	Bad -2	Very Bad -1
6. Do you think your opinions are respected by community leaders?	All the time -5	Often -4	Occasion-ally -3	Seldom - 2	Never - 1
7. Is violence sometimes, most of the time, or always an effective method to solve problems?	Never -5	Seldom - 4	Occasion-ally -3	Often -2	Always - 1

Questions Based on Cultural Drivers

8. Do you hear messages or conversations about peace and tolerance?	All the time -5	Often -4	Occasionally -3	Seldom -2	Never - 1
9. Do you listen to radio programs about peace and tolerance?	All the time -5	Often -4	Occasionally -3	Seldom -2	Never - 1
10. What is your opinion of the United States?	Very good -5	Good -4	Fair -3	Bad -2	Very bad - 1
11. Do you agree that our government needs to work with Western countries to combat terrorism?	Completely agree - 5	Somewhat agree - 4	Not sure - 3	Somewhat disagree - 2	Completely disagree - 1
12. Is using violence in the name of Islam justified?	Never justified 5	Rarely Justified - 4	Not sure- 3	Sometimes justified - 2	Always justified -1
13. Do you agree or disagree that Al Qaeda's violent activities are permitted under Islamic law?	Completely disagree - 5	Somewhat disagree - 4	Not sure - 3	Somewhat agree - 2	Completely agree - 1
14. Do you support the implementation of Sharia law?[12]	No - 5		Sometimes - 3		Yes - 1
15. Some say the U.S. is engaged in countries around the world to fight terrorism. Others say that the U.S. is engaged in countries around the world to fight Islam. Which is closer to your view?	Fight terrorism 5		Not sure - 3		Fight Islam -1

[12] Question 14 is included for context only. While there is much support for Sharia law throughout all communities surveyed, there appears to be no correlation with extremism. Moreover, there are different views of what defines "Sharia." A low score on this question does not imply a negative outcome. Question 14 is not included in the aggregate analysis of the cultural questions.

NIGER FINDINGS

Fieldwork in Niger - The evaluation team conducted field work in Niger between October 24 and November 3, 2010. Although TSCTP activities have been implemented throughout the country, security concerns prevented the evaluation team from visiting any region in the north. The U.S. Embassy had restricted travel to 85% of the land area of the country, given a number of successful and attempted kidnappings of westerners in cities as far south as Tahoua.[13] Therefore, field work was conducted in the capital of Niamey and the region around the southern city of Maradi. (See Figure 3) In all, 344 surveys were administered in Niger, 120 in Niamey and 224 in the Maradi area. In each region, a four person, mixed gender team of enumerators collected the surveys.[14]

In Niger, the survey was administered in Hausa, a primary language of southern Niger and northern Nigeria. Clusters in communities known to be primarily Hausa were chosen for sampling.

Figure 3.

ATLAS OF THE WORLD. MAP OF NIGERIA. RETRIEVED JANUARY 15, 2011, FROM: HTTP://WWW.WELT-ATLAS.DE

[13] Concerns raised by security incidents, such as the kidnapping in Niamey on January 7, 2011and subsequent murder of two westerners, have prompted the U.S. Embassy to limit, and at times severely restrict, field travel outside of Niamey.
[14] Given the security restrictions on field work, conclusions on the impact of PDEV activities in the north are more difficult to draw.

The map below (Figure 4) shows the clusters in Niamey, Niger, which had a population of 774,235 according to the 2006 census. Enumerators collected 60 surveys in the treatment cluster neighborhood of Yantala, and 60 in the comparison cluster of Lazaret between October 27 and 29, 2010. Both neighborhoods are primarily Hausa and are in range of USAID-sponsored peace and tolerance radio programs.[15] However, Yantala has had several years of TSTCP implementation (governance, youth programs, etc.), while Lazeret has not.

Figure 4.

GOOGLE MAPS. NIAMEY. RETRIEVED JANUARY 15, 2011, FROM MAPS.GOOGLE.COM/NIAMEY

Given the proximity of the two Niamey neighborhoods and their similar ethnic makeup, these two clusters offer the clearest contrast between treatment and comparison populations in Niger.

[15] Language was an important criterion in community sampling selection to ensure maximum comparability between treatment and comparison clusters. Hausa-speaking populations were chosen in Niger because they represent a target demographic of the PDEV program in that country.

The following map (Figure 5) shows the areas surveyed in and around Maradi, a mostly Hausa city in the south of Niger, close to the Nigerian border. With a population of around 170,000, it is considered vulnerable to the sometimes extremist messages emanating from Muslim clerics in Nigeria. Maradi is considered to be the spiritual center of Islam in Niger and has been the focus of significant PDEV activity in recent years. Currently, this work includes work with religious leaders and peace and tolerance radio.

The village of Gabi (est. population 4,000) is about an hour's drive south of Maradi. No TSCTP activities have been implemented there, although other USAID projects have been and peace and tolerance radio can be received. Like Maradi, Gabi is a traditional Muslim Hausa community, but it is much smaller, traditional, and focused almost entirely on agriculture. In other words, its characteristics were often quite different than the more urban treatment cluster surveyed in Maradi.

Figure 5.



GOOGLE MAPS. MARADI MAP – SATELLITE IMAGES OF MARADI. RETRIEVED JANUARY 15, 2011, FROM: WWW.MAPLANDIA.COM/NIGER/MARADI/

The following pages show the survey results on radar graphs that allow viewing of more complex disaggregated results. In all, four radar graphs (Figures 6-9) are illustrated for Niger. They focus separately on the socio-economic and political questions and the cultural questions, comparing results from the program implementation (treatment) areas against similar results in non-program implementation (comparison) areas, and against the 2008-2009 baseline. Bar graphs (Figures 10-11) show the results from different perspectives.

NIGER SURVEY RESULTS

Treatment vs. Comparison - The first graph (Figure 6) shows the results on the socio-economic and political questions. Each point on the radar graph corresponds to the average score on a question from the survey on a one to five scale. The solid blue shape represents the average score for the aggregated treatment clusters. The red line shows the comparable scores for the aggregated comparison clusters. The scores of the treatment and comparison areas are similar in the aggregate, with the exception of whether respondents felt youth associations made a positive contribution to society. The treatment clusters averaged 3.1 out of 5 on this question, as opposed to a 2.3 for the comparison group.

Treatment vs. Baseline - The second graph (Figure 7) shows the results on the socio-economic and political questions against the PDEV Baseline Survey Report from early 2009. Again, the solid blue shape represents the average score for the aggregated treatment clusters, while the brown line shows the comparable scores for the aggregated baseline results of all targeted PDEV regions. The scores of the treatment and baseline areas are similar in the aggregate, with the exception of the level of participation in decision-making in the community. The treatment clusters averaged 2.9 out of 5 on this question, as opposed to a 2.16 for the baseline. This question indicates that more people are participating in decision making in treatment areas since the baseline. However, this has yet to translate to substantially greater satisfaction with the decision making process. Impacts diminish as results become less

Figure 6.



Figure 7.



Results Summary – The TSCTP implementation areas have a more positive view of the value of youth associations than in comparison areas. There has been improvement over the last year against the baseline in treatment (implementation) areas regarding participation in decision making. However, there has been no improvement on the other indicators, indicating challenging problems that TSCTP has not impacted yet.

Figure8.



Figure9.



Results Summary[16] **-** Improvements over the baseline in Niger on the cultural questions (Figure 9) are more striking than current advantages over comparison areas (Figure 8).

NIGER SURVEY RESULTS

Treatment vs. Comparison - The first graph (Figure 8) shows the results on cultural questions. Each point on the radar graph corresponds to the average score on a question from the survey on a one to five scale. The solid blue shape represents the average score for the aggregated treatment clusters. The red line shows the comparable scores for the aggregated comparison clusters. The scores of the treatment and comparison areas are similar in the aggregate, with a few exceptions. The biggest advantage is on the question of whether the US is fighting terror rather than Islam. The treatment clusters averaged 4.4 out of 5 on this question, as opposed to a 3.3 for the comparison group. There were smaller advantages for the treatment clusters on three other questions.

Treatment vs. Baseline - The second graph (Figure 9) shows the results on the cultural questions against the PDEV Baseline Survey Report from early 2009 and the AFRICOM survey. Again, the solid blue shape represents treatment clusters. The brown line shows the comparable scores for all of Niger, in the case of the AFRICOM questions; and the aggregated baseline results of all targeted PDEV regions in Niger in the case of the PDEV questions. The scores for the treatment areas exceed the baseline areas in aggregate on all questions, especially regarding a rejection of Al Qaeda and Islamist violence and the opinion of the United States. There are also lesser advantages regarding the number who listen to peace and tolerance radio and who have heard messages of peace and tolerance.

[16] Baseline data was not available for two questions (US fighting terror or Islam and support for Sharia).

This could signify that the messages from peace and tolerance radio (heard nationally) have been internalized throughout the country over time, increasing the scores over the baseline (measured nationally). Possibly, the suspension of other TSCTP programming in Niger in 2009 may have slowed the improvement of the treatment areas over the comparison areas. Alternatively, Niger's relatively poorer showing on the treatment vs. comparison area graph (Figure 8) could partly be explained by the fact that one comparison area (Gabi) surveyed in Niger, may have skewed the results somewhat in favor of the aggregated comparison areas (i.e., the presence of other USAID projects and Gabi's traditional rural character). For context, the following graph (Figure 10) isolates the Niamey treatment and comparison clusters, groupings with a more similar profile (although smaller sample size). When looked at this way, there is an advantage for the treatment cluster on 12 of the 15 questions, indicating a more favorable TSCTP impact.

The biggest advantage of the Niamey treatment cluster over the comparison cluster was on the question regarding the value of youth associations (3.9 vs. 1.5). Another big difference between the two Niamey neighborhoods was on the question of whether respondents believed the U.S. was fighting terror or Islam. The treatment cluster score was 4.3 out of 5.0; while the comparison clusters score was only 2.7 on this scale.

Figure 10.



The chart below (Figure 11) shows the range of differences between the aggregate treatment and comparison clusters in Niger. The most significant result is a substantial advantage for treatment over comparison areas (1.1 points out of 5.0) on views regarding youth associations. This offers evidence that youth programming in Niger has shown significant impact. To a lesser degree, treatment areas show a higher level of listenership to peace radio (0.36 points out of 5.0) and hearing messages of peace (0.36 points out of 5.0), indicating some impact regarding the media programming. However, this analysis does show some contradictory findings, e.g. the belief that the U.S. is fighting terror not Islam coupled with a negative opinion of the United States.

Figure 11.



(*Note the scale is in tenths of a point on a five point scale, exaggerating the length of each bar.)

CHAD FINDINGS

Fieldwork in Chad - The evaluation team conducted its fieldwork in Chad from November 4-14, 2010. In N'Djamena, 199 surveys were completed in the neighborhood of Diguel – a treatment cluster. This community has been a focus of TSTCP activity, but is known by the PDEV staff as "tough" area, characterized by a disproportionately large number of radical mosques.

The city of Moussoro (169 surveys) is the other treatment cluster. It has a population of around 16,000 and is a day's drive from the capital. Midway between the two cities is Massakory (152 surveys) which provides for the comparison group. Massakory (also about 16,000) is the last city on the paved portion of the road between Moussoro and N'Djamena. (See Figure 12)

Figure 12.



MAPPERY. CHAD MAPS. RETRIEVED JANUARY 15, 2011, FROM: WWW.MAPPERY.COM/MAP-OF

CHAD SURVEY RESULTS

Treatment vs. Comparison - The first graph (Figure 13) shows the results on the socio-economic and political questions. Each point on the radar graph corresponds to the average score on a question from the survey on a one to five scale. The solid blue shape represents the average score for the aggregated treatment clusters. The red line shows the comparable scores for the comparison cluster. The scores of the treatment areas exceed the comparison area on most of the political questions. The biggest difference is in regard to youth associations' contribution to society, where the treatment clusters averaged over a full point higher on the 1 to 5 scale.

Treatment vs. Baseline - The second graph (Figure 14) shows the results on the socio-economic and political questions against the PDEV Baseline Survey Report from early 2009. Again, the solid blue shape represents the average score for the aggregated treatment clusters, while the brown line shows the comparable scores for the aggregated baseline results of all targeted PDEV regions. The treatment areas outscored the baseline on the level of participation in community decision-making and on the perceived value of youth associations. As in Niger, this increased level of participation in decision making has yet to translate into greater support for the decision making process since the baseline data was collected.

Figure 13.



Figure 14.



Results Summary – The aggregated treatment clusters in Chad showed little difference on the economic questions but demonstrable difference over both comparison areas and the baseline on some key political questions. The results point to program impact regarding work with youth associations and participation in community decision making.

Figure 15.



Figure 16.



CHAD SURVEY RESULTS

Treatment vs. Comparison - The first graph (Figure 15) shows the results on cultural questions. Each point on the radar graph corresponds to the average score on a question from the survey on a one to five scale. The solid blue shape represents the average score for the aggregated treatment clusters. The red line shows the comparable scores for the comparison cluster. The scores of the treatment and comparison areas are similar in the aggregate, with a few exceptions. The biggest advantage for the treatment area is on the questions of listening to peace and tolerance radio and support for working with the West to combat terrorism.

Treatment vs. Baseline - The second (Figure 16) graph shows the results on the socio-cultural questions against the PDEV Baseline Survey Report from early 2009 and the 2008 AFRICOM survey. Again, the solid blue shape represents the average score for the aggregated treatment clusters, while the brown line shows the comparable scores for all of Chad, in the case of the AFRICOM questions; and the aggregated baseline results of all targeted PDEV regions in the case of the PDEV questions. The scores for the treatment areas exceed the baseline areas in aggregate on all questions *except* regarding support for working with the West to combat terrorism.

Results Summary – Perhaps most importantly there is significantly more listening to peace and tolerance radio in the treatment areas than comparison areas.

Figure 17.



When the results for the treatment area in N'Djamena (the 'tough' neighborhood of Diguel) are excluded, the results for Chad are more striking. (Figure 17) Moussoro and Massakory are similarly sized cities of around 16,000. Excluding the urban area, and making a direct comparison between the two rural towns, provides a more telling result. Under this comparison, the treatment cluster outscores the comparison cluster on 14 of the 15 questions. The most consistent differences are on the economic and political questions.[17]

[17] These findings do not imply ineffectiveness of urban programming; however, they do indicate that results will likely vary in urban versus rural areas. For example, results in urban areas may be slower to come due to the larger number of youth with frustrated economic expectations who are less moored to traditional tribal and family networks.

Figure 18.



(*Note the scale is in tenths of a point on a five point scale.)

The chart above (Figure 18) shows the range of differences between the aggregate treatment and comparison clusters in Chad. The most significant result is a substantial advantage for treatment over comparison areas (almost 1.2 points out of 5.0) on views regarding youth associations. This offers evidence that youth programming in Chad, as in Niger, has shown significant impact. To a lesser degree, treatment areas show a higher level listenership to peace radio (0.6 points out of 5.0) However, this analysis does show some contradictory findings, e.g. the belief that the U.S. is fighting Islam not terror, coupled with support for standing with the West on combating terrorism. The lower score on the question regarding “U.S. fighting terror not Islam”, comes from N’Djamena results. Scores on this question were far more supportive of the U.S. position in the more rural areas of Moussoro (treatment) and Massakory (comparison).

MALI METHODOLOGY AND FINDINGS

The survey instrument for Mali differed somewhat from that used for Chad and Niger given the difference in the TSCTP programs and the availability of baseline data. Whereas Niger and Chad counter-extremism programs all fall under PDEV, the TSCTP components in Mali are implemented by different partners – Management Systems International (MSI) (PGP2): (governance and decentralization activity); IESC and GeekCorps: (radio for peace-building); Education Development Center, PHARE: (Education in Medersas); Trickle Up: (economic opportunities), Abt Associates, and Mali Pro Nord: (economic opportunities). Coordination among the various TSCTP partners in Mali was not evident and the evaluators found no source of common indicators as was the case for Niger and Chad with the PDEV baseline survey.

The survey instrument used for Mali is included on the following two pages (Figure 19). It was designed so as to balance compatibility with the Niger and Chad survey and comparability with existing baseline data. As such, the Mali survey used here contains some indicators from the PDEV baseline survey for which there is no Mali baseline data, and some questions from the Afrobarometer survey for which there is baseline data, but no comparable data for Chad and Niger. The cultural questions from the AFRICOM/ORB survey provide comparable current and baseline data for all three countries. All questions attempt to link to drivers of extremism highlighted in USAID analytical documents.

Question 1 (How free are you to join political organizations?) is from the Afrobarometer survey. Question 2, on the level of satisfaction with services, is from PDEV and addresses perceptions of economic under-development, an economic VE driver. Question 3 on participation in decision making is a political driver question from the PDEV baseline survey. Questions 4 through 6 are political driver questions from Afrobarometer measuring Malian local governance and the population's involvement with it. Question 7 is from Afrobarometer and tests support for the Northern (Tuareg) Rebellion. Question 8 on listening to Peace and Tolerance Radio comes from the PDEV baseline. Finally, Questions 9-14 reflect cultural VE drivers and come from the AFRICOM survey.

Figure 19.

MALI TSCTP SURVEY

Socioeconomic and Political Drivers	**Circle one**				
1. In Mali, how free are you to join any political organization you want?	Very free - 5	Somewhat free -4	Neutral -3	Somewhat un free -2	Not free -1
2. What is your level of satisfaction with your access to services and resources in your community?	Very good -5	Good -4	Fair -3	Bad -2	Very bad -1
3. Do you participate in decision-making in your community?	All the time -5	Often -4	Occasionally -3	Seldom -2	Never 1
4. During the past year, have you contacted a Local Government Councilor about some important problem or to give them your views?	Often -5		Occasionally -3		Never 1
5. In your opinion, how likely is it that you could get together with others and make your local government councilor listen to your concerns about a matter of importance to the community?	Very likely -5	Somewhat likely -4	Neutral-3	Somewhat unlikely -2	Very unlikely – 1
6. When there are problems with how local government is run in your community, how much can an ordinary person do to improve the situation?	A lot -5	Some - 4	Not sure -3	Little – 2	None - 1
Cultural Drivers					
7. Do you believe the northern rebellion is a justified war for the autonomy and development of regions of the country or an unjustified war against the national unity of the country?	Unjustified -5		Not sure -3		Justified - 1
8. Do you listen to radio	All the time	Often -4	Occasionally	Seldom -2	Never - 1

programs about peace and tolerance?	-5		-3		
9. What is your opinion of the United States?	Very good -5	Good -4	Fair -3	Bad -2	Very bad -1
10. Do you agree or disagree that our government needs to work with Western countries to combat terrorism?	Completely agree - 5	Somewhat agree - 4	Not Sure - 3	Somewhat disagree - 2	Completely disagree - 1
11. Do you feel that using violence in the name of Islam is always justified, sometimes justified, rarely justified or never justified?	Never justified - 5	Rarely Justified - 4	Not sure - 3	Sometimes justified - 2	Always justified - 1
12. Do you agree or disagree that Al Qaeda's violent activities are permitted under Islamic law?	Completely disagree - 5	Somewhat disagree - 4	Not sure - 3	Somewhat agree - 2	Completely agree- 1
13. Do you support or oppose the implementation of Sharia law?	No -5		Sometimes - 3		Yes - 1
14. Some say the U.S. is engaged in countries around the world to fight terrorism. Others say that the U.S. is engaged in countries around the world to fight Islam. Which is closer to your view?	Fight terrorism - 5		Not sure - 3		Fight Islam - 1

Fieldwork in Mali - The field-work in Mali was conducted in the treatment area of Timbuktu, while Diré provided the comparison cluster. The security situation in Mali prevented the evaluation team from traveling to the survey areas. Therefore, the team supervised the process remotely and used a local contractor, Association Malienne pour la Survie au Sahel (AMSS), to conduct the survey work. The contractor administered 200 surveys in Mali – 100 in Timbuktu and 100 in Diré over three days in mid-December. (Figure 20) As in Chad and Niger, the comparison area of Diré has received radio signals from TSCTP programming, somewhat diluting its value as a control. However, unlike Timbuktu, Diré has not had the benefit of the TSCTP education, microfinance and governance projects.

Figure 20.



MALI MAPS. RETRIEVED JANUARY 15, 2011; FROM WWW.TOMBOUCTOU.NET/BLOG

MALI SURVEY RESULTS

Treatment vs. Comparison - The first graph (Figure 21) shows the results on the socio-economic and political questions. Each point on the radar graph corresponds to the average score on a question from the survey on a one to five scale. The solid blue shape represents the average score for Timbuktu, the treatment cluster. The red line shows the comparable scores for Diré, the comparison cluster. The scores of the treatment area exceeds the comparison area primarily on questions regarding whether people participate in decision making and whether they have contacted local government.

Treatment vs. Baseline - The second graph (Figure 22) shows the results on the socio-economic and political questions against the Afrobarometer Survey Report from early 2009. Again, the solid blue shape represents the average score for Timbuktu the treatment cluster; while the brown line shows the comparable scores for all of Mali on the Afrobarometer Survey. The treatment area outscored the baseline by wide margins on whether respondents had contacted local government, and whether an ordinary person could have an impact.

Figure 21.



Figure 22.



Figure 23.



Figure 24.



MALI SURVEY RESULTS

Treatment vs. Comparison - The first graph (Figure 23) shows the results on cultural questions. Each point on the radar graph corresponds to the average score on a question from the survey on a one to five scale. The solid blue shape represents the average score for Timbuktu, the treatment cluster. The red line shows the comparable scores for Diré, the comparison cluster. The scores of the treatment and comparison areas are similar, with two exceptions. Timbuktu respondents reported greater listener ship to peace and tolerance radio, and were less likely to be in favor of Sharia law than respondents from Dire.

Treatment vs. Baseline - The second graph (Figure 24) shows the results on the cultural questions. Each point on the radar graph corresponds to the average score on a question from the survey on a one to five scale. The solid blue shape represents the average score for Timbuktu on this evaluation survey. The brown line shows the comparable scores all of Mali. For four out of the five questions, the baseline data comes from the AFRICOM survey. One question, on the Northern Rebellion, comes from Afrobarometer. The treatment areas score better on all the questions from the AFRICOM survey than the baseline by wide margins. On the Northern Rebellion question, performance is slightly below baseline, but opposition to the rebellion continues to be strong.

Mali Results Summary—On the whole, the treatment cluster of Timbuktu scored no worse than the comparison area of Diré. On certain key questions related to programming, the treatment area scored better. This included satisfaction with services, frequency of contacting local government councilors and participation in decision making – all indicators signifying some impact on the part of local governance programming in Timbuktu. There was also greater listenership to peace and tolerance radio in the treatment over the comparison cluster. On the higher-level attitudinal questions, however, there is little difference between the treatment and comparison areas.

The greater differences seem to be between results of the December 2010 survey of Timbuktu and whole-of-Mali baseline data from 2008-2009. The results were particularly striking regarding the questions of whether people had contacted local governance councilors and whether they believed an ordinary person could make a difference. The 2010 Timbuktu results were significantly better than the baseline results from 2008-2009 – interesting for a region that is currently off limits for expat travel.

Figure 25.



The graph below (Figure 26) disaggregates responses between the Sonrai and Tuareg populations surveyed in Mali, given the history of Tuareg conflicts with the Malian Government in the north. For the purposes of this graph, both treatment and comparison areas (Timbuktu and Diré) are included. The Tuareg sample is comparatively small, only a quarter of the total population sampled. With this caveat, it is interesting to note that the Tuareg population has higher scores on all but three of the fourteen survey questions. Despite the possible linkages between the Tuareg rebellion and AQIM presence in the north of Mali, Tuaregs in this survey

show no indication of being more extremist, or even more alienated, than their Sonrai counterparts. This is a subject that should be researched further.

Figure 26.



The graph below (Figure 27) shows the difference between treatment and comparison areas in Mali. The scaling of the graph is the same as for the similar illustrations in Niger and Chad and exaggerates small differences on a 1.0 to 5.0 scale. The biggest differences between the treatment and comparison areas (around a half point on a five point scale) is on a pair of governance indicators – respondents level of participation in decision making, and the number of respondents who have contacted their local governments. This may be due to the presence of strong USAID governance programming over the years in Mali, much of it outside the context of TSCTP.

Figure 27.

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN TREATMENT AND COMPARISON AREAS ON SURVEY QUESTION - MALI



THREE-COUNTRY COMPARISON

The graph below (Figure 28)[18] compares the differences on the common questions asked of survey respondents in Chad, Niger and Mali.[19]. They are ordered according to which results TSCTP would be expected to have the most direct impact on, to the result where USAID attribution would be the most difficult. The question with the most direct impact is "Listening to peace and tolerance radio." The treatment clusters in all three countries have relatively large advantages over comparison clusters on this question. On the two common governance indicators, "Satisfaction with services" and "Participation in decision-making", Chad and Mali also have larger advantages than does Niger. While this chart exaggerates the differences between the three country studies, Niger has the lowest difference between treatment and comparison areas on the governance questions. This may reflect the fact that significant elements of programming were suspended in Niger, but were not suspended in Chad and Mali.

Finally is the result on which TSCTP impact is least direct – the cultural/attitudinal questions. To lessen the potentially distorting effect seen in the varied results of the individual questions from the AFRICOM survey, especially in Chad and Niger, five AFRICOM cultural questions are aggregated here: Against Al Qaeda; Against violence in the name of Islam; Opinion of the United States; Working with West to combat terrorism; and U.S fighting terrorism not Islam[20]. On this aggregated question, treatment clusters in Niger show the biggest differences over comparison clusters of the three countries. In Mali, the comparison cluster actually scores slightly higher than the treatment cluster.

[18] Largest possible theoretical difference is "5", in which all treatment areas scored "5" on a question or group of questions and all comparison areas scored "1". On most questions, treatment areas outscored comparison areas by 0.5 or less. If there was no difference between the treatment and comparison areas, such as in Niger on the "participation in decision making" question, the graphic shows no visible bar.

[19] For the purpose of presentation, this graph exaggerates the lengths of the bars, all of which show differences of less than a point on a five point scale. Also, as mentioned earlier, inclusion of the rural village of Gabi as a comparison area for Niger may have slightly biased the data in that country against the treatment clusters.

[20] "Against Sharia law" is not included here, since this is a context indicator only and not a programming goal.

Figure 28.



The figure below (Figure 29) is of the same data, but shows the full 1 to 5 range of possible scores – making impact look less dramatic. The differences between treatment and comparison areas on the questions shared by all three countries are modest – an average of 5.67% in aggregate in favor of the treatment clusters.

Figure 29.



Given that this quasi-experimental survey design was not randomized, and considering the methodological differences in cluster sampling of the treatment and comparison areas among the three countries, this data cannot be considered definitive proof of impact. However, the results do seem to be consistent across programming areas. The program appears to be having modest yet significant impact across all three countries.

The biggest impact for all three countries came on the question of listening to peace and tolerance radio. Since residents of all treatment and comparison clusters were in broadcast range of these radio signals, these data indicate that complementary TSCTP programming significantly boosts listenership. Scores on “participation in decision-making”, a governance indicator, indicate significant results for Mali, where there has been a long-standing governance program, as well as for Chad where governance and civil society has been a focus of PDEV and, before that, CAP Chad. Satisfaction with services, the primary economic indicator for this survey that was used in all three countries, shows marginal but positive results across the board. Given that this indicator is only partially in TSCTP’s manageable interest, this is an encouraging finding.

The aggregated cultural questions on these surveys are the highest level indicators regarding TSCTP’s impact. Predictably, the differences between treatment and comparison areas are the smallest here. However, the relatively better results for Chad and Niger over Mali may indicate the value of having a holistic program, in which programs directed at the various drivers of VE are more intensively coordinated. USAID is fully present in Mali (not in Chad and Niger) and has had longstanding governance, media and other projects with which the TSCTP activities have been integrated. This approach is more problematic for implementers who may be less aware of how their individual projects affect and are affected by other counter-extremism interventions. The fact that the treatment cluster in Mali actually had a lower score than the comparison cluster on the aggregated AFRICOM questions (although by only a very small amount), indicates that progress on the more program-specific results in Mali have yet to translate into gains on the more difficult questions of attitudes toward VE.[21]

[21] See Figure 25 for a disaggregated breakdown of the cultural questions for Mali.

FINDINGS FROM FOCUS GROUPS AND INTERVIEWS

In addition to the quantitative research, the evaluation team also held focus groups in every community targeted for surveying, supplemented by numerous key informant interviews. Unlike the surveys described earlier, the focus groups were not intended to contrast treatment and comparison areas, but to get more detailed information on issues highlighted in the surveys. Questions generally followed the outline of the Niger/Chad survey (Figure 2). Key informant interviews (see Annex J) were conducted with TSCTP partners and beneficiaries to gain a greater understanding of programming. Focus groups and key informant interviews began with structured interview guides, based on the survey, that were flexible enough to allow exploration of issues that arose independently of the script.

JEFFREY SWEDBERG/WOMEN'S FOCUS GROUP – GABI, NIGER

The team endeavored to bring together focus groups that provided for a range of diverse voices, but ensuring that young males in particular were included. Focus groups included:

Niger:

- Niamey (Yantila): urban youth (mostly male);
- Niamey (Lazarie): Neighborhood elders (mostly male)
- Maradi – Listening Club Members – (mixed gender)
- Gabi – Separate groups of village elders, women and youth

Chad:

- N'Djamena: Youth soccer club (all male)
- Moussoro: Separate groups of Moussoro mixed gender youth; and small businesswomen
- Massakory: Civil society representatives (mixed gender, all ages).

These qualitative data can provide insight into the conclusions reached by the survey research.[22]

Importance of Radio – As documented in the quantitative research, listenership to peace and tolerance radio was higher in treatment clusters than in comparison clusters in all three countries surveyed. However, analysis of focus groups showed that these radio shows were

[22] It was not possible to conduct focus groups in program areas of Mali due to security related travel restrictions.

popular whether a listener resided in a treatment area or not. This was especially clear in rural areas (treatment and comparison group alike) such as Gabi in Niger and Moussoro in Chad.

JEFFREY SWEDBERG/YOUTH FOCUS GROUP – GABI, NIGER

In Gabi, a focus group of six women expressed particular interest in radio shows on health, education and child rearing. Participants pointed out that women are typically home to listen to the radio far more than men. Youth also had a strong interest in the radio shows, particularly shows on health and "preaching."

The focus groups in Gabi were particularly enthusiastic about the radio shows - including separate groups of adult women and teenage boys and girls. Focus group participants in other rural areas had similar opinions.[23]

In Gabi, where a focus group was held specifically for youth, the participants made it clear that they valued youth clubs as an outlet for expression, since "youth are not allowed to participate in community meetings." The "Fada" tradition of listening clubs in Niger offers a good opportunity for encouraging listenership of peace and tolerance radio – even in communities such as Gabi, which do not have an active PDEV program outside of radio.

"If you want to hide something in Niger, put it in a book. People don't read, but they do listen to the radio." – MARADI RADIO MANAGER [MAKING A JOKE]

The evaluators heard several times from people in focus groups and interviews how much they valued the opportunity to speak on the radio. This was especially true of religious leaders in Maradi, Niger where PDEV-sponsored interfaith dialogues are tied in with the radio programming. For instance, Sani Nomaou, a Christian Pastor, has a 15 minute daily show on Gackwar Radio in Maradi. He is also an enthusiastic participant in the interfaith dialogue conferences sponsored by PDEV. Regarding the radio show, Pastor Nomaou says he is "getting many calls of support."

As noted in the analysis of the survey results for all three countries, listenership was higher in treatment areas within Niger, Chad and Mali where there was multi-sector TSCTP programming than it was in comparison areas that also had access to peace and tolerance radio.[24] Listenership appears to go up when it is supported by other programs in the non-media TSCTP sectors, especially those with connections to the radio programs such as the religious dialogue programming in Maradi, Niger.

[23] The highest scores for the question – "Do you listen to peace and tolerance radio?" came from Moussoro, Chad (pop. 16,000) (4.2 out of 5.0); and Gabi, Niger (pop. 4,000) (3.8 out of 5.0). Other scores on this question ranged between 3.0 (Lazerai neighborhood of Niamey), and 3.5 (Yantala neighborhood of Niamey).
[24] Gabi, Niger was an exception to this finding.

Some underlying anger—Focus group participants in Niger and Chad exhibited little in the way of support for violent extremism, but there was a level of underlying anger, especially among young men in Niger. One of the less encouraging results on the quantitative survey research in Niger was the lack of any significant difference between TSCTP treatment clusters, measured against either comparison clusters or against the national level baseline data, on certain socio-economic and political questions. These questions included respondents' satisfaction with their economic situation, satisfaction with community services, views on decision making, or faith that their opinions were respected by community leaders. In Niamey, one focus group was particularly disillusioned with the local authorities and expressive of youth solidarity. When asked if they could participate in decision making in their community, one participant said, "No. Decisions come from the central government. We are only citizens when it comes to paying taxes." Members of the Niamey focus group were careful to avoid any statement that advocated violence, but the feelings of dissatisfaction with the status quo were palpable.



JEFFREY SWEDBERG/GACKWAR RADIO STATION– MARADI, NIGER

Wariness with the West - Focus groups also provided insight on the attitudes towards the U.S. and the West in the Sahel. Some of the more complicated results from the quantitative survey research were the seemingly inconsistent answers on the cultural questions. For instance, while there was general progress in the aggregate on the cultural questions, in Chad more people in treatment clusters than in comparison clusters reported they believed the U.S. was fighting Islam rather than terrorism. Also, there was a reduction from the baseline in the number who believed they should work with the West to combat terrorism. These were questions the evaluators attempted to clarify. Vocal focus group members in both Niger and Chad appeared to reject violence but were often hostile when the subject of western countries was broached. Attitudes toward France, the former colonial power in the region, were universally negative. Expressed views of the United States were more mixed. Most focus group members in Niger and Chad stated that they had grown up admiring the United States for its stands on human rights and democracy, but had grown wary of the American people's seemingly negative view of Islam.

"When you have numbers, you can confront the devil, and the devil is the authorities." – YOUNG PARTICIPANT IN NIAMEY FOCUS GROUP

JEFFREY SWEDBERG/YOUTH FOCUS GROUP – NIAMEY, NIGER

Participants raised issues such as opposition to the "Ground Zero Mosque" in New York and a U.S. pastor's plans to burn Korans. Television pictures of civilian casualties of U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan were also cited. While the evaluators heard no expressions of sympathy for anti-Western terrorists, the focus group and interview subjects clearly identified with the Islamic community world-wide and took umbrage at perceived injustices to Muslims by the West well outside of their home communities.

Disillusionment in Niger over youth program - An interview with members of a youth center in Niamey resulted in a series of angry statements from multiple participants regarding the cancelation of the PDEV youth program in Niger. Some participants couched their language on the youth program cancellation as though it were a betrayal by the U.S. Government. This was echoed in a focus group held later in Niamey. Views on youth associations were one area in which survey evidence is most supportive of PDEV/TSCTP impact, especially in Chad. In Niger, however, there was no increase on this question since the baseline, a period that coincided with the suspension of the youth program.

"[The PDEV youth training program] was teaching us to swim. Then they took away the water." – YOUTH FROM LACOUROUSSOI CENTER IN NIAMEY

Positive stories regarding religious outreach in Niger - In the absence of its original governance and youth programs, PDEV Niger has focused increasingly on religious outreach – an area that seems to be paying dividends. Some of the most memorable interviews outside of the focus group format were with Imams in Maradi, a population that had reportedly been reluctant to speak with representatives of U.S. organizations when the PDEV program was starting. The Imams were eager to work with PDEV trainers to improve their communication abilities, spoke favorably about PDEV sponsored religious conferences, and expressed interest in visiting the U.S. While attribution to the religious outreach activities would be difficult, it is worth noting that the survey in Niger showed significant increases over baseline on most of the cultural questions.

Land Use Issues Driving Conflict in Chad—Focus Group participants in Chad focused extensively on land use issues and their potential for conflict, especially in the communities of Moussoro and Massakory. This was echoed in key informant interviews with Chadian groups such as the Association of Herders and Nomads. While the quantitative survey research did not ask specifically about land use issues, satisfaction with the economic situation was one of the few areas where respondents in treatment areas in Chad scored below baseline. Focus groups in Chad were asked to elaborate. The focus group participants spoke about unemployment and the need for education, but no issues resonated like land use, water and climate change. Older residents spoke nostalgically about Chad in the 1980s when there was more water in the Sahel. Shallow wadis, as pictured here, dry up earlier after the rainy season than in the past. Now, as one focus group farmer put it, "people are beginning to say that cultivation is not worth it."

"We have more problems than before; between farmers and herders; between cities and towns; and conflict over size of plots. The population is increasing and there is less generosity regarding territorial rights." – ELDER PARTICIPANT IN FOCUS GROUP, MOUSSORO CHAD

There was an appreciable fear of what desertification was doing to the Sahel region of Chad. The Mayor of Massakory spoke of how his city was being drained of inhabitants leaving for areas with more water. Talk in the focus groups and interviews in Chad was not of fights over interpretation of Islam, but of the tense relationship between livestock herders and the farmers on whose increasingly barren land they crossed.

JEFFREY SWEDBERG/FOCUS GROUP – MOUSSORO, CHAD

Supporting Local Cultures—According to interviews with PDEV Chad implementers, one of the most significant success stories was a cultural festival sponsored in the northern city of Faya. With this support, PDEV reinvigorated the musical and dance traditions of northern Chad, which had been in decline due to fundamentalist Muslim influence. The counter-extremism message was thereby associated with local customs much missed by many local inhabitants of this remote region. Faya was not part of the sampled population for the survey in Chad, but a comparison between the rural treatment and comparison communities in northern Chad (Moussoro and Massakory) showed significant advantages for the treatment area on all but one of the cultural questions (Figure 17). While there is no empirical evidence that this positive contrast had anything to do with TSCTP *cultural* programming, it was clear anecdotally that northern Chadians were grateful for the opportunity to reengage with their cultural heritage.

LESSONS LEARNED

This evaluation is based upon hundreds of surveys in areas that have received USAID TSCTP programming and those that have not. It is supplemented by extensive discussions with focus groups and interviews with traditional leaders, religious authorities, political leaders, women and youth groups, associations, academics, as well as senior U.S. Embassy staff, including the US ambassador to Niger and the Deputy Chief of Mission for Chad. This section presents some key lessons-learned for consideration based on these conversations and the survey data.

The evaluation team found much reason for hope and clear signs of progress during the field visits in Niger and Chad, despite the ongoing security issues. While the team was unable to physically travel outside of Bamako in Mali – something that many now find impossible – it was still able to meet with the country representatives for project implementers MSI and EDC as well as USAID staff. These in-depth discussions, plus the literature review, provided important information and insights into what is working in the Sahel, and why.

Countering extremism is necessarily a long term goal and as such must be addressed with programs that help societies build the capacity to manage the drivers of extremism. Survey data shows higher impact on the lower level programmatic indicators and a more modest impact on the higher-level cultural questions. Assuming a relationship between these levels of results, significant impacts at the higher level will follow in time. The thirty and under age group are frequently targeted by extremist elements due to their vulnerability to manipulation. Focus groups and interviews with youth indicate that programs currently targeting youth are especially important to develop leadership within that community and provide alternative paths towards resolving tensions and long standing grievances. It is important to note that these programs are seen by the youth primarily as paths to employment and a better life. There is a risk of raising and then dashing expectations unless the reasons and objectives of the programs are transparently and carefully explained to participants.

USG programming needs to be accompanied by political commitments to sustain funding of key interventions if they are to have the desired impact. TSCTP partners, especially community leaders and traditional authorities, must have faith in USG program commitments if they are to assume the risk of working with sensitive counter-extremism programming. It requires only one failed commitment to seriously, and sometimes permanently, set back relations in a community, a region, or even a country. For instance, the suspension of the PDEV youth program in Niger has resulted in adverse effects visible in qualitative and quantitative data. Treatment areas in Niger had less of an advantage on governance survey questions over comparison areas than in Chad and Mali where no program suspension had taken place. Interviews with youth association members also bore this out. The suspension of the youth program in Niger, while mandated by U.S. law, had the effect of seriously undermining the trust of participants, many of whom came directly off the streets. It is not possible to foresee all eventualities in program design – certainly not a coup d'etat. However, there will be risks in unstable countries and future suspension of additional programming cannot be ruled out. Designers of programs will have to take into account whether such suspensions could undermine USG objectives.

The Sahel is beset by endemic and long running local and regional conflicts. The remote parts of Mali, Niger, and Chad will never be truly safe and accessible as long as these conflicts continue. These conflicts often go back to pre-colonial times. Conversations with key informants and focus groups make clear that people in the Sahel understand the legacy of conflict in their region and the risks inherent in other major trends. The concept of blood debt is deeply ingrained in Sahelian cultures, and there has been much blood spilled recently. Moreover, change is coming to the Sahel that will dramatically affect the dynamics of these local conflicts – namely access to natural resources like water, grazing areas, and farmland. The herders and nomads of Chad interviewed made clear that climate change is altering the habitability of many parts of the Sahel. The countries of the Sahel have recognized this and are moving to protect their natural resources, realizing that they cannot sustain their populations without productive farmland and sustainable grazing. But much of this effort is hindered by the very conflicts the changing nature of the landscape provokes.[25]

It should be remembered, that, while conflict can be a driver of violent extremism, it is a different phenomenon from VE itself. Chad, with its violent recent history, has strong potential for future conflict, but exhibited little evidence of VE or sympathy for extremism. However, while localized conflicts are rarely exploited by violent extremists, they can reinforce negative perceptions of government authority. USAID should continue to think through the relationships between conflicts and other areas of program intervention, such as land use.

Cultures under threat can create opportunities extremists exploit. But the changes in the Sahel can also be used to advantage if the energy and enthusiasm of youth are captured through creative programming. The PDEV programs to support youth centers and training programs in Niger showed excellent promise and it is hoped that they can be restarted when conditions permit. Survey data shows strong evidence that TSCTP programming positively impacts community views on youth associations. Hopefully this will translate in the future to a greater sense of youth empowerment in their communities. Focus groups with youth suggest that TSCTP youth programs should focus even more upon linking training and employment, so that young people have job prospects after training. It is not possible to dramatically impact youth unemployment with these programs. Rather, the intent is to create a cadre of leadership among young people through training and support to youth organizations that will impact the broader community.[26]

Interviews with program implementers made it clear that programming needs to be expanded in insecure areas. Local partners will need to be the prime avenue for programming in many areas as long as the security threat remains. Satellite offices can be used to expand geographic reach while minimizing security risks.

Interviews with PDEV implementers also highlighted the importance of building the capacity of local organizations and local governments. Small grants to both organizations and communities

[25] An unpublished study by evaluator Steven Smith found that two of the three primary factors of change in the Sahel relate to the changing landscape: urbanization and climate change. The third is an increasingly young population.

should be considered along with training in managing such grants as part of capacity building and conflict resolution. Such programs have been successful in Afghanistan for example and should be considered as a way to build self-reliance and help people resist outsiders offering money in exchange for assistance in kidnappings or other illegal activities.

The radio programming stands out as a significant success story, well accepted –even beloved in many communities – and it has the broadest reach. This was confirmed through both quantitative (survey) and qualitative (focus group and interview) findings. Radio programming is less susceptible to uneven funding and is cost-effective. Associated with the radio programs are several important activities, including the listening clubs where people come together to discuss what they've heard. Listening clubs consist most often of members of youth or women's groups. But a particularly interesting example consisted of small business people in Maradi Niger – men and women – who benefited from the opportunities to meet and discuss politics and business. The two women members, speaking during a Maradi focus group, brought out the point that they were both divorced and that there were limited opportunities for them to socialize given the stigma of divorce. They were especially appreciative of the radio listening group and the men in the group were very comfortable with their participation.



JEFFREY SWEDBERG/RADIO LISTENING CLUB- MARADI, NIGER

Focus group participants regularly complained about unemployment. One area of common interest was business and livelihoods, and consideration could be given to expanding this kind of programming in the future. Although TSCTP cannot hope to significantly reduce unemployment in the Sahel, business development programs could reduce feelings of frustrated economic expectations.

The impact of youth programming was more problematic to evaluate because some program funding was suspended. However, both quantitative and qualitative findings highlighted the importance of the youth component. The USG alone cannot provide training and employment programs that will significantly impact millions of young people who need work across the Sahel. This must be a coordinated effort with the national government, private enterprises, and donors such as the World Bank and UNDP. The objective of the youth program is to build leadership capacity and technical skills among participants in targeted geographic areas so that these young people can then help their compatriots. It is also hoped that successful participants in the youth programs can be an example to others by showing a concrete alternative to the extremist path. A major challenge, however, will be how to monitor and quantify work with youth. If the focus of the program is training youth to be leaders, and ultimately transferring capabilities in counter-extremism to this new cadre, more thought will need to be given to measurement of this work beyond the mere counting of jobs created.

The evaluation findings point to impacts on the lower level indicators, for example radio listenership and support for youth participation, being achieved by the program. The evidence is less clear regarding program impact on perceptions and attitudes. Preliminary evidence indicates that shifts in attitudes are possible, but that the lag is considerable. Thus, a long term commitment and strategy will be necessary. Survey data seems to support the approach of administering TSCTP programming in a holistic program, as in the PDEV programs in Niger and Chad.

SECTION TWO

Section Two of this evaluation begins with a summary of what has been measured and how. It looks at measurement of the TSCTP and how monitoring and evaluation of the program has evolved to date. This section will answer the questions of what indicators are being used and what types of process evaluation questions are employed. It will explore links with the drivers of VE that USAID has researched and how these drivers inform program decisions. Section Two will also explore the similarities and differences in which program activities are being evaluated, how objectives and program measurements have evolved over time, and how reliable and effective these evaluation processes and indicators are in measuring performance. The underlined questions below are answered according to the requirements of this evaluation's scope of work. [27]

Section Two concludes with a proposed framework to better monitor and measure the impact of TSTCP programs in the future – also in response to the evaluation scope of work.

What type of results are being examined (inputs versus outputs versus outcomes)?

TSTCP implementers, both for current and previous projects, collected data on their activities and reported them through Performance Management Plans (PMPs). Most of the indicators reported are on program inputs and outputs with a few measuring outcomes. With the exception of the revised PMP for PDEV in Chad and Niger, TSCTP programs have not been measured through impact indicators. This is understandable, since TSCTP programming falls into sectors – counter-terrorism, democracy and governance, with some education and economic growth activities - that are notoriously difficult to measure for impact without the use of survey data.

TSCTP and the PPR—TSCTP results are being reported, as in the case of other USAID programs, through the annual Performance Plan and Report (PPR). The annual PPR is prepared with guidance issued by the State Department Office of the Director of Foreign Assistance, focusing on performance against expected targets. Under TSCTP, the majority of results are reported under the Counter-Terrorism Program Area. The number of official indicators is small and USAID has developed custom (mostly input and output) indicators to help monitor more incremental progress in the TSCTP program.

The standard indicators, including "Number of public information campaigns completed by USG programs" and "Number of community development projects," under which USAID reports its TSCTP activities, are useful but inadequate as a measurements for the full program, as they do not cover numerous TSTCP activities and do not measure impact[28.]

USAID's TSCTP reporting also captures the number of individuals from at-risk groups that have been reached though a wide variety of activities. In Chad and Niger under PDEV, this includes income-generation projects, governance training and activities, media workshops, proposal

[27] The question subtitles in this section correspond to questions C through question H asked in USAID's solicitation for this evaluation.
[28] Public information campaigns cover such things as a radio drama about good governance in Niger and a governance campaign in Chad.

development workshops, youth mapping activities, vocational training, public debates on tolerance issues, radio competitions, youth center grant activities, listening clubs, and exchange visits. Rolling up individuals reached into a single number is a useful metric to understand the total outputs of the broad array of different TSCTP projects. However, it is critical that this number can be disaggregated and remains transparent enough to allow a distinction between, for instance, a radio listener and a participant in an exchange program.

TSCTP also reports on the number of individuals who have received training. The diverse nature of activities makes rolling up results problematic, since the skills imparted in training are often very different. Training covers a broad spectrum of activities, including management skills and fiscal management to local government, life skills, vocational skills, "youth mapping" methodology, radio management, microcredit management, as well as small business and governance training.

One good outcome indicator is the number of youth who have obtained employment with project support (in Chad and Niger, this includes work as community reporters, radio technicians, and actors in radio productions). However, given that TSCTP is not a youth jobs program with the scope or resources to significantly boost employment levels, this indicator alone cannot be used to measure impact on youth. Additional indicators on youth civic engagement will be necessary; for example, developing indicators to show whether or not program participants have become leaders in their communities and if so, the impact that has had.

Custom Indicators—USAID does report on a number of custom indicators, which are not on the Standard Indicator list, given the unique nature of the TSCTP intervention. Examples include: the Number of youth who have increased their participation in social, cultural or economic opportunities due to project support; the number of intra-faith dialogues facilitated; the Number of youth social groups; Number of community radio stations that have been built; and the Number of teachers who have been trained through radio-based programming. Again, these custom indicators are useful, even critical, for tracking program activities, but do not establish whether the project is successfully contributing to the prevention or mitigation of extremism in the Sahel.

Impact Indicators— The best example of impact indicators currently available for TSCTP comes from the PDEV PMP. These are in the form of broad-based, independently gathered survey data that gauge general attitudes and support for violent extremist organizations. Several of these existing indicators (marked with *[29]) make up the core of the survey highlighted in Section One of this report and the proposed Results Framework which concludes Section Two. Other questions were based on surveys of community leaders, employers and radio listeners. Survey research, however, can be methodologically complex, costly, and is usually carried out infrequently. Further review of potential impact indicators is warranted.

From Baseline Survey (Collected in late 2009 with plans to be repeated for end line in 2011):

Increased % citizens in target areas satisfied with local decision-making processes.*

[29] The TSCTP evaluators asked these questions on a 1-5 scale, of all age cohorts over 15, and in both treatment and control communities. AED's Baseline Survey was focused on youth in target areas and on different scales for different questions.

Increased % of community members satisfied with access to services and resources *
Increased % of citizens participating in local decision-making processes *
Increased % of youth stating that their opinions are respected by community leaders*
Increased % of youth expressing an improvement in their economic situation*
Increased % of citizens stating youth groups make positive contributions to society*
Increased % of youth participating in civic activities
Increased % of youth stating positive changes in their communities as a result of their participation in civic activities
Decreased % of citizens stating that violence is an effective method to solve problems*
Increased % of citizens perceiving increased flow of information on peace and tolerance*
Increased % of citizens listening to radio programs about peace and tolerance*

From Survey of Community Leaders:

Increased % of community leaders stating that youth participate constructively in community decision-making processes
% of community leaders (government, traditional, business, and civil society) reporting satisfaction with social, cultural, or economic opportunities for youth

From Survey of Employers:

% of employers satisfied with skills of graduates from target training programs

From Radio Audience Surveys:

% of PDEV activity participants / audience declaring the messages of moderate voices as attractive

What types of process evaluation questions are being used?

The evaluation team did not find documents identified specifically as "process evaluations." A process evaluation focuses on the internal dynamics of implementing organizations, their policy instruments, their service delivery mechanisms, their management practices and the linkage among them. It is not used to assess success or outcome of a program. Rather it is concerned with process of a program and whether it has been implemented as planned.

AED Lessons Learned— While not billed as a process evaluation, one of the more illuminating documents to address issues of process was the August 2010 lessons-learned document AED submitted to USAID. The following questions addressed in the document tell us about key process issues:

What is Program's Intended Impact? The AED Lesson's Learned Paper asked a fundamental question regarding the TSCTP project design. Focusing on issues that would need to be addressed in the future design of a follow-on program, the authors of the lessons learned document wrote of the need…

> "…to have clarity on specifically what the program's interventions are, and where they are to be aimed – i.e., is the program trying to impact the "battle of ideas"? Is it trying to directly reduce the number of recruits (or potential recruits) to extremist groups? Or is it

seeking to target disparate dimensions of the "enabling environment" for violent extremism (and, therefore, have a more indirect impact on combating extremism)?"

Providing the answer to this question is fundamental to future project design and measurement.

Based on its conversations and document reviews, the evaluation team sees the primary focus of the USAID TSCTP programs to be on the *enabling environment* for extremism in the Sahel, which is the highest level goal for which programs have a manageable interest. Other goals, such as prevailing in the "battle of ideas," a primary objective of the public information programming, can be seen as a lower level result. Indeed, the two DFA counter-terrorism program elements to which the TSCTP is intended to contribute – "Deny Terrorist Sponsorship, Support and Sanctuary", and "De-Legitimize Terrorist Ideology" – could both be considered subsets of the enabling environment for extremism. By contrast, reducing the number of extremist organization recruits would be an indirect benefit of the TSCTP program, but one in which attribution to USG intervention would be difficult to demonstrate. Moreover, country assessments of Niger, Chad and Mali have regularly concluded that recruits into terrorist organizations like Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) come from outside these countries rather than from within them. It is the enabling environment in the Sahel, in which AQIM has been able to act with a degree of impunity in some countries through the quiet complicity of the population, that poses the biggest risk.

How can flexibility be enhanced? Another key question addressed by the AED Lessons Learned Paper addressed the issue of program flexibility. Program managers emphasize that TSCTP operates in difficult and unpredictable countries. For PDEV, this has meant two coups (Mauritania and Niger), USG sanctions impacting the Niger program, in Chad, security-related travel restrictions and evacuations, and the notice of demolition of the PDEV Chad field office with one week's notice. Accordingly, the AED implementers of PDEV have asked what changes could provide for a more flexible program design and funding mechanism. One suggestion was use of a Cooperative Agreement instead of a Time and Materials Contract.

How, if at all, do the analytic resources on violent extremism (Drivers and Programming Guides) inform programming decisions?

TSTCP has an impressive analytical underpinning. USAID, particularly the Africa Bureau's Office of Sustainable Development (AFR/SD), has attempted to incorporate its research and analysis into the program design for the TSCTP and its efforts to counter extremism. Analytical tasks undertaken include:

- Country assessments in Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Chad, and Burkina Faso;
- Development of a "Drivers Guide" identifying the political, social and cultural drivers of violent extremism in the region;
- Development of a "Programming Guide" summarizing the implications of this research.

The initial step was an interagency assessment, conducted in 2005 in Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger, to identify the level of risk based upon the existing literature and data and the perspectives of the partner nation and communities. Later country-level assessments more

precisely identified the risk factors in each county and identified those communities most at risk to violent extremist organizations or ideology. On the whole, the country assessments found low levels of violent extremist threat in Chad, Niger, Mali, and Mauritania, resulting in a TSCTP program focused mostly on prevention.

The Drivers and Programming Guides, which underpin many of the assumptions of this evaluation, form part of the theory behind the TSCTP intervention in its current form. For instance, the studies showed that poverty was only tangentially related to terrorism, primarily when considered as part of a larger context of alienation and threatening social change. Socioeconomic drivers such as social exclusion and unmet economic needs are greater contributors to the threat of violent extremism. The analysis also posited that extremism is driven by the denial of political rights and civil liberties, or endemic corruption and impunity for well-connected elites. Cultural threats—to traditions, values or cultural space—are also identified as drivers. Findings from the Drivers and Programming Guides have been used by USAID to devise a holistic strategy of reducing the identified drivers through activities that strengthen resiliencies and communicate messages among at-risk groups. As programming has evolved, TSCTP targeting has been refined based on these conclusions from the Africa Bureau's research.

Accordingly, USAID's TSCTP approach has concentrated on youth empowerment, education, media, and good governance—the four areas it identified as the greatest opportunity for local partnerships and progress. Each activity was tailored to meet the specific threat levels, political environments, and material needs of each country. For instance, the threat assessment in Chad identified access to clean water and education as among the highest counter extremism priorities. In many ways, TSCTP provides fairly traditional development interventions, but differs in more narrowly targeting populations and regions unlikely to be reached by other programs. For instance, a major targeting focus is young men in urban and peri-urban areas—the group most likely to be recruited by extremist groups.

Aside from broad conclusions of impact, this evaluation was limited in its ability to determine the efficacy of individual TSCTP projects. A separate field assessment will help test which TSTCP interventions are actually reducing the drivers of extremism as opposed to simply advancing more general development goals.

What are the similarities and differences in the way program activities are being evaluated?

The primary difference between TSCTP activities in the three current focus countries lies in the implementation vehicles. Activities in Chad and Niger are under the umbrella of the PDEV program, while in Mali the numerous implementers operate mostly independently from each other and as part of broader development programs. PDEV's Performance Management Plan (PMP) currently offers the most comprehensive existing measurement framework for TSCTP. The various Mali TSCTP programs have their own PMPs.

The PDEV PMP is tied to TSCTP's overall strategy and is organized through a results framework. It contains a PMP matrix that covers indicators; data collection methods,

responsibility, and frequency; data sources; and baselines/targets. PDEV has identified its broad results as: 1) improving local governance in target communities (with emphasis on urban and peri-urban areas), 2) empowering at-risk youth to become active participants in their communities and the economy, and 3) rendering superfluous ideologies promoting violence. The PDEV PMP specifies the range of activities that contribute toward each the result. Under 'Result 1: Improving local governance', are the development of community development plans, grants for development activities, radio programs about governance issues, and training to community leaders. Under 'Result 2: Empowering at-risk youth to become active participants in their communities and the economy' are Community Youth Mapping activities, vocational and life skills training, micro-credit and grants to youth, support for vocational and religious schools, in-kind grants for youth cultural activities, youth-driven radio chat shows, and scholarships. Under 'Result 3: Discrediting extremist ideologies promoting violence', are activities supporting Koranic schools, inter- and intra-faith dialogues, and peace messaging.

PDEV Results Framework—The PDEV Results Framework (Figure 30) provides the basis for AED's Performance Management Plan and offers a starting point for a results framework for the entire TSTCP, since it was designed for a multi-country, multi-sector program. The framework does incorporate causal logic, identifying three primary results, each with four contributing sub-results.

For two of the results, (1 and 2) the focus is on individual sectors – governance and youth. Result 3 – "Ideologies promoting violence are rendered superfluous" – may be a higher level result than the other two. What is missing is an overarching primary result for the TSCTP, a subject that will be addressed later in this evaluation.

Figure 30.


Result 1 Improved local governance in target communities-emphasis on urban and peri-urban areas)
Increased access to quality services and resources– especially those in demand by at-risk groups
Increased collaboration of public, private, and civil society sectors
Increased and more effective citizen participation (emphasis on youth) in the governance process
Increased capacity of local CSOs to respond to community needs
Result 2 At-risk youth are empowered participants in the community and economy
Increased quality opportunities in the social, cultural, and economic sectors for youth
Expansion of informal and formal social groups for youth
Increased youth civic participation
At-risk youth increasingly possess knowledge and skills relevant to the needs of economy
Result 3 Ideologies promoting violence are rendered superfluous
Improved information flow among citizens on peace and tolerance
Moderate voices strengthened
Traditional educational institutions strengthened
Intra-faith dialogue enhanced

Mali TSCTP Projects—In Mali, it is harder to identify an existing comprehensive framework for measuring counter-extremism. USAID Mali's PGP2 governance program, implemented by MSI, has a strong PMP, incorporating baselines, targets and identifying program overlap with other sectors. Good outcome indicators incorporated in the PGP2 PMP include: "Percentage of target communes that meet a majority of established targets on a local government capacity index"; and indicators shared with other development sector programs such as "Number of target communes producing an annual 'Education for All' plan." However, most of the PGP2 PMP indicators seem more suited to a traditional local governance program than a counter-extremism program.

Few of the PMPs for the various TSCTP component projects in Mali seem tailored to a counter-extremism program. The indicators used by ProMali Nord focus on outputs for medium, small and microenterprise development. The Trickle Up program PMP has a results framework identifying reduced poverty in the north of Mali (certainly an appropriate lower level counter-extremism goal) as its highest level result, and outcome indicators focusing on microenterprise and development of savings groups. The PHARE education program has produced some useful baseline data on the quality of Medersa education and student test scores. The indicators perhaps most specifically targeted on counter-extremism in Mali came from the now-terminated Radio for Peace Building in Northern Mali Program (RPNP). The RPNP PMP had a number of outcome indicators such as "Number of radio programs produced on local government, peace & development, conflict mitigation, & civil society." On the whole, however, the Mali PMPs seemed more focused on sector-specific outcomes than on counter-extremism impact.

How have the objectives and program measurements evolved over time?

Before the introduction of the PDEV program, TSCTP objectives and measurement were less cohesive. There was also little in the way of documented impacts. In the early years, TSCTP projects had limited scopes, a short period of time of time to implement their objectives and obtain the desired results, and lacked in-depth studies of the targeted groups and regions. These limitations made it difficult for these programs to be more than pilot projects exploring possible approaches to combating extremism. For instance, the diverse projects originally connected to the TSCTP in Niger, and implemented by Africare, CARE, and Mercy Corps, had results frameworks focused on sector-specific results. For instance, a high level Mercy Corp indicator was "Number of youth exhibiting knowledge, skills and attitudes relevant to chosen training" – a good outcome indicator for a youth program, but not one that directly addresses counter-extremism.

Maradi Youth Development Project— Some of the early programs in TSCTP projects probably contributed to the impacts documented in this evaluation. For example, two phases of the Maradi Youth Development Project were implemented by CARE (May 2003 to April 2005 and May 2006-April 2009). When these earlier projects are coupled with the PDEV program, TSCTP can point to a record of almost seven consecutive years operating in Maradi. While the CARE program did not develop impact indicators, it did provide some important output measures for youth jobs, training, and access to credit program.

Chad Capacity Development & Peace Support Project—CAP Chad was the TSCTP predecessor to PDEV in Chad and ran from July 2006 to September 2008. It was essentially a pilot program for a more comprehensive, multi-sector approach for addressing extremism in the Sahel.

The CAP Chad M&E system used both quantitative and qualitative data. Most of its results were geared towards documenting outputs, but the indicators used allowed for the collection of data on participation at the community level that is foundational for TSCTP programming. Its key measurements included:

- Number of community leaders trained in community problem-solving processes
- Number of times community members met to solve problems (through grant activities)
- Increase in participation of community members in community problem solving processes
- Number of CSOs/ individuals trained in participatory project management approaches
- Percentage of organizations showing progress in meeting institutional strengthening benchmarks
- Number of meetings held with grant recipients
- Number of technical assistance episodes

CAP Chad did include some indicators based on survey results. For instance, the CAP Chad final report specified that "99% of community members reported strengthened 'connectors' in inter- and intra-community relations as a result of grant activities." However, surveys of direct program beneficiaries often result in reported satisfaction levels that are too high to be fully useful for determining program impact.

Program Design and Scope of Work— The document that guided the most recent direction of the TSCTP program is the 2007 TSCTP Program Design and Scope of Work. It provided a number of suggested performance indicators, but encouraged implementers "to make modifications that improve the measurement of success and the efficiency with which progress is measured." In some cases, "USAID recognizes that there may not be a valid and cost-effective means of measuring the full impact of the desired result."

The 2007 document did suggest a number of impact indicators, although it was less specific on actual indicator methodology. However, a number of these ideas were eventually incorporated into the PDEV and Mali M&E systems, including:

- Increase in community members' knowledge, attitudes and participation in local governance activities as indicated through baseline and annual surveys.
- The unrealized expectations of youth related to their socio-economic situation will be reduced. This decrease in unrealized expectations is due both to more realistic assessment of self and situation and an increase in life and employment skills.
- Participating youth associations offer guidance, training and education to at-risk youth members that facilitate their social and economic integration in communities and their understanding of social change.

- Changes evident in types and quality of youth outreach programs of participating youth associations; changes toward more democratic governance processes of participating youth associations; growth in associations' membership.
- Targeted messages delivered by respected and credible community leaders influence community values and attitudes and behaviors.
- Changes in knowledge, attitudes and beliefs reflected in periodic listeners' surveys conducted by partners and radio station staff.
- Number (and %) of sampled radio messages that promote moderate and democratic values, attitudes and behaviors.
- Number (and %) of youth leaving faith-based community schools who possess basic literacy.
- The implementing partner(s) will conduct baseline surveys prior to commencing work in specific communities.

Increased Pressure for M&E—The 2009 Drivers and Programming Guides did not expressly address indicator development, but have influenced the most recent developments in TSCTP M&E. The PDEV baseline survey is an example of how USAID and AED sought to improve M&E from a focus on sector-specific outcomes to a more holistic approach for measuring counter-extremism impact. The 2009 survey also included statistical tables that disaggregated survey results by gender and age, (although the disaggregated findings did not show substantially different findings for different groups).[30]

For PDEV, expectations for monitoring and evaluating the program's impact grew as the program evolved, requiring AED to budget more for M&E – both in financial and human capital— than originally budgeted/planned. This increased level of M&E has required more home office support. Since M&E is not a noted strength of local partners in PDEV countries (especially in data analysis and reporting), AED now has to take on much more of the survey and evaluation data analysis and reporting work than originally expected.

How reliable and effective are these evaluation processes and indicators in measuring performance?

The primary criticism regarding TSCTP performance measures has been the absence of impact indicators. This problem has been exacerbated by the interagency nature of the TSCTP. The biggest challenge has been demonstrating that the general development results of the TSCTP activities are actually contributing to the higher counter-extremism goal.

GAO Criticism regarding Interagency M&E—A 2008 General Accountability Office Report on TSCTP was critical of the entire USG, saying "without common indicators of their activities' outcomes, the agencies will continue to have limited ability to measure overall progress in combating terrorism."

> "The agencies [State, DOD, and USAID] have few common mechanisms for measuring their TSCTP activities' outcomes—that is, the results of the products and services delivered. The agencies have some indicators to measure their activities' outputs—that is, direct products and services—such as the number of foreign military personnel trained.

[30] The authors of this evaluation disaggregated their findings in Niger and Chad by gender and age and similarly found only minor differences among the disaggregated groups.

> However, they generally do not measure their activities' outcomes, such as any decrease in extremism in the targeted regions. Our previous work has shown that developing common mechanisms to evaluate outcomes is important to improving the effectiveness of large interagency efforts to combat terrorism."

The GAO report did credit USAID for its plans for analytical research into the root causes of terrorism and extremism in Africa. State and DOD officials told the GAO that that the results of these studies could be useful in their efforts to develop common indicators of TSCTP activities' outcomes. The evaluators have seen no evidence yet that this has happened, although a TSCTP interagency strategy with common measures is reported to be in the works. As the GAO pointed out, USAID officials "noted the difficulty of measuring how certain activities, such as building wells or providing radios, may contribute to the achievement of TSCTP goals."

At a November 2009 TSCTP hearing before Congress, however, USAID was better able to describe the way program activities were interrelated and contributed to counter-extremism, although there was little in the way of proven impact.

Other Interagency Criticism—A 2007 report by the Congressional Research Service acknowledged the difficulty of measuring progress in combating terrorism. The CRS report notes that a common difficulty in demonstrating success in combating terrorism is an over reliance on quantitative data—particularly those that may correlate with progress but not accurately measure it, such as the amount of money spent on counter-terrorism efforts—without considering its qualitative significance. According to the report, an alternative for measuring progress in combating terrorism might involve analyzing data on the numbers, magnitude, impact and significance of terrorist incidents; public attitudes in targeted countries or regions; and trends in incidents, attitudes, and other factors over time. The report also notes that agencies' lack of common criteria, as well as uncertainty with respect to strategies and measurements, makes it difficult to describe and demonstrate progress.

Towards an Acceptable End State — A challenge for future program design will be to define what the preferred end state of counter-extremism programming in the Sahel would look like. USAID's 2007 program design for TSCTP defined its objectives as: (1) Good governance improved to reduce ungoverned and poorly governed spaces; (2) Support and sanctuary denied through aid to youth and education; and, (3) Extremist ideologies that support terrorism are discredited.

Three years later, Niger and Mali are less secure than before, with majorities of their land areas largely off-limits to Western visitors. A relatively small, but growing, terrorist group (AQIM) kidnaps tourists, mine workers and diplomats. It demands, and often receives, ransom payments, the proceeds of which are funneled into increased terrorist activities. Terrorism and other illegal activities in the area, such as drug trafficking, are mutually reinforcing. While AQIM has little indigenous support in the Sahel, it does benefit from an often complicit population in an increasingly ungoverned space. USAID does not have a manageable interest in all aspects of this complex problem. At the highest level, however, TSCTP cannot be considered to have met its stated goals if this trend continues.

Still, this evaluation has shown that at least some TSCTP projects are having a demonstrable impact in people's attitudes – a key component of a more favorable enabling environment. At least in the areas in which it is safe to survey, extremist ideologies appear to be discredited. However, there are wide swathes of the Sahel where these ideologies have not been discredited to the degree required to stem terrorism.

The following section of this evaluation looks at ways in which these simultaneously negative and positive trends interplay and how they can be monitored.

FRAMEWORK TO BETTER MONITOR AND MEASURE THE IMPACT OF TSTCP PROGRAMS

The Results Framework on the following pages is proposed for measurement of the TSTCP. It addresses criticism that current TSCTP measures are focused too much on sector development results and not enough on counter-extremism. It attempts to map the linkages between the lower level programmatic results and the higher level, less direct results that are critical to TSCTP success. The framework also is designed to be used across countries, providing some level of TSCTP universality. To address the fact that individual country programs will require different measures, some indicators are provided in a menu format so that different indicators can be chosen depending on the program and country context.

Five Orders of Results— In all, the proposed framework provides for five "orders" of results. The orders follow the principle of causal logic – meaning that the top order of results is reliant on achievement of the second order, which is reliant on the third, and so on. The framework is laid out on two pages. The first page contains the first four orders of results. The following page focuses on the fifth and lowest level of results and presents a menu of indicators.

The first order result is "Enabling Environment for Extremism in the Sahel Reduced;" the formulation recommended by the evaluators for the top level goal of TSCTP. Under this proposed framework, the first order result would be measured by the F indicators currently used to report to Congress. While the F indicators are sometimes criticized as being overly reliant on inputs and outputs, they are designed to be aggregated for reporting to Congress. Moreover, these indicators are sufficiently general, applying to all country TSTCP programs. The evaluators recommend keeping the current F indicators – Number of people from at-risk groups reached through TSCTP program; Number of public information campaigns completed by USG programs; and Number of community development projects; – with the first order result to allow consistency with past reporting.

The second order of results highlights the Foreign Assistance Framework goals to which TSCTP contributes: "Deny Terrorist Sponsorship, Support and Sanctuary" and to "De-Legitimize Terrorist Ideology." It lays out high-level, third party counter-terrorism indicators for each. The third party indicators outlined here are primarily contextual, as they are the least attributable to USAID interventions. This lack of attribution and the difficulty in identifying indicators that measure multiple counties has prevented the development of good measures in the past. These indicators were chosen from the Counter-terrorism Index developed by USAID's Bureau on Europe and Eurasia in collaboration with the State Department, and are described in greater detail in the final section of this evaluation. These indicators may also be of benefit for the interagency process.

The third order of results goes to the core of measuring the counter-extremism impact of TSCTP. The result categories are based on USAID's analytical research on extremism, drawing from the Drivers and Programming Guide, as well as the Radicalization and Public Support for Extremism Factor Trees. Indicators for the third order of results incorporate many of the indicators used to measure program impact for this evaluation. Terrorist Sponsorship, Support and Sanctuary Denied, a second order result, is supported by two third order results:

“Resiliencies to recruitment strengthened,” measured by indicators of perceived social alienation and discrimination; and “Frustrated expectations and relative deprivation reduced,” measured by indicators on economic condition and satisfaction with services. Terrorist Ideology De-Legitimized, the other second order result, is supported by two third order results: “Community support for extremist movements reduced,” measured by indicators on community attitudes towards violence and counter-terrorism; and “Support for pro-active religious agendas reduced,” measured by indicators on the acceptability of Islamist violence. A final third order result, “Religious or ideological pull” will be measured by an indicator on support for Sharia, but will be tracked for context purposes only as this result is not in the scope of TSCTP programming.

The fourth order of results is also based on the drivers and factors identified by USAID analytical research, but at a lower level than the third tier. In other words, achievement of the fourth order results will allow achievement of the third order results.

The original sources of the third and fourth order indicators include the PDEV Baseline Survey, the Afrobarometer Survey and the AFRICOM Survey – all used for the survey highlighted in Section One of this evaluation. These represent the primary outcome and impact indicators proposed to measure changes in the results impacting the enabling environment for extremism.[31] However, they do require the use of a survey instrument and, with the exception of the AFRICOM questions, there is not yet a complete set of survey questions that cover all countries in the TSCTP. Not all PDEV questions are relevant to programming in Mali, for instance. The Afrobarometer survey used in Mali is not available for Chad and Niger. Therefore, a menu of indicators drawn from both surveys is included for the third and fourth order results.

The last page of the Results Framework shows the fifth and final order of results. The results here are listed as sector categories and many are crosscutting. These lower order results may not necessarily be dedicated to the TSCTP holistic program. However, the linkages outlined in the higher level TSCTP results may provide insight into design of sustainable follow-on programming when and if holistic counter-extremism programming is discontinued. Arrows from the fifth tier to the fourth highlight the causal linkages. Some program areas contribute to more than one fourth order result. Each box on the fifth order contains a menu of indicators (followed by its original source) that an individual country program could choose based on its own regional and programming context. Indicators are chosen so as to illustrate the multiple dimensions of a sector activity. For example, there are indicators under the youth category measuring job creation, as well as civic engagement and perception of youth associations. Also, there are a number of indicators that could be used in more than one fifth order category. For instance, job creation indicators under the youth programs category could also be used in the economic programs category.

[31] Questions should be field tested again before future use. The PDEV Niger baseline survey pre-tested the questions in just one of five regions surveyed and there was no field testing for the PDEV Chad baseline survey. The time elapsing between baseline and mid-term has potential to change perceptions and attitudes and warrants pre-testing even if it was done at baseline.

First Order Result – Enabling Environment for Extremism in the Sahel Reduced

Number of people from at-risk groups reached through TSCTP program (F)

Number of public information campaigns completed by USG programs (F)

Number of community development projects (F)

Second Order Result - Terrorist Sponsorship, Support and Sanctuary Denied

Country Report on Terrorism Rating – (US State Department)

Progressive Deterioration of Public Services (Failed States Index)

Second Order Result - Terrorist Ideology De-Legitimized

Country Report on Terrorism Rating – (US State Department)

Political Stability and Absence of Violence (World Bank Institute)

Severity of Terrorism (National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC))

3rd Order - Resiliencies to recruitment strengthened

Survey Questions: What is your level of satisfaction with how decisions are made in your community? *(PDEV)*

How likely is it you could work with others to advocate for your community concerns? *(Afrobarometer)*

3rd Order - Frustrated expectations and relative deprivation reduced

Survey Question: How would you describe your economic situation? (PDEV)

3rd Order - Religious or ideological pull

Survey Question: Do you support or oppose the implementation of Sharia law? *(AFRICOM) Context Only*

3rd Order - Community support for extremist movements reduced

Survey Question: Should our government work with Western countries to combat terrorism? *(AFRICOM)*

3rd Order - Support for pro-active religious agendas reduced

Survey Question: Is using violence in the name of Islam justified? *(AFRICOM)*

4th Order - Social Alienation Reduced

Survey Questions: Do you participate in decision making in your community? *(PDEV)*

How free are you to join any political organization you want? *(Afrobarometer)*

Have you contacted local government? *(Afrobarometer)*

4th Order - Real or perceived societal discrimination reduced

Survey Questions: Do you think your opinions are respected by community? *(PDEV)*

How much can an ordinary person do to improve community problems? *(Afrobarometer)*

4th Order - Social and economic needs better met

Survey Question: What is your level of satisfaction with your access to services and resources in your community? (PDEV)

4th Order - Cultural pressures against extremism strengthened

Survey Question: Do you hear messages or conversations about peace and tolerance? *(PDEV)*

4th Order - Support for local conflicts reduced

Survey Question: Do you believe the [northern rebellion] is a justified war? *(Afrobarometer)*

(Asked of selected ethnic groups)

4th Order - Normative acceptance of violence reduced

Survey Question: Is violence an effective method to solve problems *(PDEV)*

4th Order - Perception of "Islam under siege" reduced

Survey Question: Are Al Qaeda's violent activities permitted under Islamic law? *(AFRICOM)*

TSTCP Results Framework (Continued…)

4th Order - Social Alienation Reduced

4th Order - Real or perceived societal discrimination reduced

4th Order - Social and economic needs better met

4th Order - Cultural pressures against extremism strengthened

4th Order - Support for local conflicts reduced

4th Order - Normative acceptance of violence reduced

4th Order - Perception of "Islam under siege" reduced

5th Order - Local Governance Programs

Illustrative Indicators

Number of individuals who received USG-assisted training, including management skills and fiscal management, to strengthen local government and/or decentralization (F)

Number of local mechanisms supported with USG assistance for citizens to engage their sub-national government (F)

Number of sub-national government entities receiving USG assistance to improve their performance (F)

% of communes meeting targets in Local Government Capacity Index (PGP2, Mali)

% of communes where budget reflects priorities in the development plan (PGP2)

5th Order - Civil Society Programs

Illustrative Indicators

Number of local non-governmental and public sector associations supported with USG assistance (F)

Number of Civil Society Organizations using USG assistance to improve internal organizational capacity (F)

Number of people who have completed USG assisted civic education programs (F)

Number of people trained in conflict resolution /prevention skills (PGP2)

5th Order - Youth Programs

Illustrative Indicators

Survey Question: Do youth associations make a positive contribution to society? (PDEV)

Number of youths receiving training in economic enterprises (Maradi Youth Development Program)

Number of youth that obtained employment with project support (PDEV)

Increased % of youth participating in civic activities (PDEV)

% of youth stating positive changes in their communities as a result of their participation in civic activities (PDEV)

5th Order - Economic Programs

Illustrative Indicators

Number of borrowers from USG-assisted microfinance institutions (F)

Number of Depositors at USG-Assisted Microfinance institutions (F)

Percent of USG-assisted microfinance institutions that have reached financial sustainability (F)

Number of people with increased economic benefits derived from sustainable natural resource management and conservation as a result of USG assistance (F)

Number of USG-supported initiatives or mechanisms designed to reduce the potential for violent conflict over the control, exploitation, trade or protection of natural resources (F)

5th Order - Education Programs

Illustrative Indicators

Number of learners enrolled in USG-supported primary schools or equivalent non-school-based settings (F)

Number of learners enrolled in USG-supported secondary schools or equivalent non-school-based settings (F)

Number of teachers/educators trained with USG support (F)

Number of textbooks and other teaching and learning materials provided with USG assistance (F)

5th Order - Media Programs

Illustrative Indicators

Survey Question: Do you listen to radio programs about peace and tolerance? (PDEV)

Number of journalists trained with USG assistance (F)

Number of non-state news outlets assisted by USG (F)

Number of radio stations producing and broadcasting own programs incorporating program messaging (PDEV)

Number of conflict/CR related radio programs produced per year (RPNP Mali)

Number of radio programs produced on local government, peace & development, conflict mitigation, & civil society participation (RPNP Mali)

5th Order - Religious Outreach Programs

Illustrative Indicators

Number of participants in USG-funded programs supporting participation and inclusion of traditionally marginalized ethnic minority and/or religious minority groups (F)

Number of moderate leaders participating in program activities to deliver their messages more effectively and/or to reach wider audiences (PDEV)

Number of intra-faith and inter-faith dialogues facilitated (PDEV)

Number of TV, Radio, or press articles that provide appropriate opportunity for moderate leaders to challenge those who advocate violence (Mauritania Pilot)

Proposed Second Order Indicators—The Second Order indicators outlined here are proposed as measures for the higher level results in the TSCTP Results Framework: Terrorist Sponsorship, Support and Sanctuary Denied; and Terrorist Ideology De-Legitimized. The evaluation team identified additional third party global indicators that can track country progress in counter-terrorism at the second order level. They measure conditions that are not usually in USAID's manageable interest and attribution to development interventions is difficult. However, they should prove useful to track progress, at least contextually, in combating VE at the higher levels and can be useful for interagency coordination. These third party indicators have been adopted from the Counterterrorism Index – an element of the Peace Security Index developed for USAID's Europe and Eurasia Bureau in 2009. It grew out of an exercise requested by the US State Department to devise an index measuring country progress in the Peace and Security area of the DFA Framework. All indicators have been reviewed for relevancy during an extensive interagency review, including USAID, State and CIA. In keeping with the E&E Bureau methodology, where possible, all scores are rated on a 1 to 5 scale to better allow comparisons.

Second Order Result – Terrorist Sponsorship, Support and Sanctuary Denied

Country Report on Terrorism Rating – (US State Department)

Progressive Deterioration of Public Services – (Failed States Index)

Second Order Result – Terrorist Ideology De-Legitimized

Country Report on Terrorism Rating – (US State Department)

Political Stability and Absence of Violence— (World Bank Institute)

Severity of Terrorism – (NCTC)

State Department's Country Reports on Terrorism - Data for both of the second order results—Terrorist Sponsorship, Support and Sanctuary Denied; and Terrorist Ideology De-Legitimized—comes directly from the country-level narratives contained in the State Department's annual Country Reports on Terrorism. The reports' narrative summaries of terrorism in most of the world's countries are a publicly available, comprehensive global analysis that directly address a country's capacity and will to fight terrorism. The evaluators reviewed the reports below and coded these indicators according to a coding guide. (See Annex B)

Country	Country Reports on Terrorism - Terrorist Sponsorship, Support and Sanctuary Denied (1-5)	Country Reports on Terrorism - Terrorist Ideology De-Legitimized (1-5)
Chad	NA	NA
Mali	2	2
Niger	2	2

Progressive Deterioration of Public Services – measures the second order result: Terrorist Sponsorship, Support and Sanctuary Denied. It is a component of the Failed States Index, as compiled by Foreign Policy Magazine and the Fund for Peace. This 2010 indicator attempts to measure the status of basic state functions that serve the people, including the capacity to protect citizens from terrorism and violence and to provide essential services, such as health, education, sanitation, public transportation. When a country scores poorly under the Progressive Deterioration of Public Services indicator, the state apparatus narrows to those agencies that serve the ruling elites, such as the security forces, presidential staff, central bank, diplomatic service, customs and collection agencies, fueling VE drivers such as marginalization, perceived discrimination, and unmet social and economic needs. Results are coded on the following 1 to 5 rating scale.

Country	Progressive Deterioration of Public Services (0-10)	1 to 5 Conversion
Chad	9.6	1.0
Mali	8.5	1.5
Niger	9.7	1.0

(Fund for Peace, *Failed States Index*): **"1.0":** 8.6 to 10; **"1.5":** 7.1 to 8.5; **"2.0":** 6.7 to 7.0; **"2.5":** 6.2 to 6.6; **"3.0":** 5.7 to 6.1; **"3.5":** 4.9 to 5.6; **"4.0":** 4 to 4.8; **"4.5":** 3.1 to 3.9; **"5.0":** 0 to 3.0[32].

Political Stability and Absence of Violence—One of six aggregate indicators from Kauffman and Kraay of the World Bank Institute, Political Stability and Absence of Violence combines the results of several surveys, mostly from political risk companies. This 2009 indicator measures perceptions of the likelihood that the government in power will be destabilized or overthrown by possibly unconstitutional and/or violent means, including domestic violence and terrorism. A country scoring poorly on this indicator is likely to have active insurgencies or terrorist movements with some degree of public support and perceived legitimacy.

Country	Political Stability and Absence of Violence (Global Percentile Ranking 0-100)	1 to 5 Conversion
Chad	5.7	1.0
Mali	34.9	2.0
Niger	14.2	2.0

(World Bank Institute, *Governance Matters Indicators)*
"1.0" 19 percentile or less; **"2.0"** 20-39; **"3.0"** 40-59; **"4.0"** 60-79; **"5.0"** 80-99 percentile

[32] Ratings based on global ranking.

Severity of Terrorism—is compiled from country terrorism statistics gathered by the National Counter-terrorism Center (NCTC). Since 2004, the NCTC has been a part of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. The unclassified Worldwide Incidents Tracking System (WITS) is a publicly available resource that supplies data for the annual report on terrorist incidents mandated by Congress.

As the table below indicates, the highest rate of terrorism among the three core TSCTP countries is Chad, followed by Niger and Mali.

Country	Annual Terrorism Victims, 3 year average (per 100,000 population)
Chad	6.65
Mali	0.24
Niger	0.59

For the purposes of the TSCTP evaluation, Severity of Terrorism is listed only as a context indicator. While important to know, tallies of terrorist acts and victims can be misleading, both in country-to-country comparisons and over time in a single country. Therefore, no 1 to 5 scaling is provided. The graph below highlights the difficulties in relying on this metric for more than context. It is important to look at the actual incidents behind the data.

Chad's number of terrorism victims is actually lower than both Niger and Mali in 2009, after having been much higher in previous years, although this fluctuation can be controlled for to a degree by taking a three year average. Chad's high rate of terrorism casualties in 2008 was due to a rebel attack on the capital of that year – an event unrelated to extremist ideology. Since 2009, Chad has enjoyed a period of relative calm, although it would be premature to say how its terrorism risk currently compares to other TSCTP countries.

The graph below (Figure 31) also shows a reduction in terrorism victims in Mali and Niger, a finding at odds with the increased risks for terrorism over the past two years in those counties highlighted by U.S. Embassy security policies and assessments of TSCTP implementers. What the graph may show is that the attacks due to the Toareg rebellion have fallen off due to the cease fires with the Malian and Nigerien governments. What the graph does not reflect are reports that the Malian and Nigerien military and police forces have increasingly disengaged from the north, leaving these areas more susceptible to AQIM hostage takers. Hostage taking results in far fewer victims but is arguably a much greater concern for USG policy makers.

Figure 31.



NEXT STEPS

If a common framework for all TSCTP countries is to be adopted, it will require surveys administered on a regular basis across several countries. Whether or not the model suggested above is used, the methodology should be standardized as much as possible to ensure that the results will be comparable and allow accumulation of knowledge. Studies such as the PDEV end-line survey—scheduled to be conducted by AED in Niger and Chad in 2011- should continue. In addition, USAID should conduct regular independent surveys of all TSCTP countries, standardized to the extent possible.

According to the World Bank toolkit, *Making Monitoring and Evaluation Systems Work*, periodic surveys should be included as part of a comprehensive M&E system for several reasons.

> 1) Surveys generate impact and outcome-level data (something that exists only partially for TSCTP at present) and are usually more credible than data collected by the project itself. 2) Surveys provide data that can be generalized to the entire population from which the sample was selected. Every program or organization does not necessarily need to do its own survey as they can all use the results of a representative (and statistically valid) survey. 3) Surveys enable trend analysis over time, provided that the survey is conducted with the same methodology and collects the same kind of data.

Ideally, data collected can be used for future impact evaluations. According to the 2008 study on impact evaluation of democracy programs by the National Research Council commissioned by USAID, credible impact evaluation designs share three characteristics: 1) they collect reliable

and valid measures of the outcome that the project is designed to affect, 2) they collect outcome measures both before and after the project is implemented, and 3) they compare outcomes in both the units that are treated and appropriately selected units that are not. Regular administration of a standard survey instrument will add tremendously to TSTCP's future "evaluability."

USAID should conduct a survey, similar to the version outlined in this document, on an annual basis or biennially, to track the impacts of the TSCTP in future years. To the extent possible, the survey should be applicable across multiple countries, but should be flexible enough to incorporate indicators specific to individual countries. The menu of indicators on the accompanying results framework offers a starting point.

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ANNEX A: Country Reports on Terrorism 2009

Country Reports on Terrorism 2009
Compiled August 2010[33]
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/141114.pdf

Mali – Score 1 (Worst) to 5 (Best)

Denial of Terrorist Sponsorship, Support and Sanctuary – 2; De-Legitimize Terrorist Ideology – 2

In contrast to 2008, 2009 saw increased terrorist activity on Malian soil, although at the end of the year it was unclear if this increased activity was indicative of a long-term change in the terrorist environment in Mali.

• On May 31, al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) executed a British citizen, Edwin Dyer, who had been kidnapped in Niger on January 22 and held in northern Mali along with several other Western hostages.

• On June 10, AQIM elements assassinated Malian State Security officer Colonel Lamana Ould Bou at his residence in Timbuktu.

• On November 29, three Spanish aid workers were kidnapped by AQIM in Mauritania, but were brought to northern Mali, where they were still being held at year's end.

• On December 18, AQIM kidnapped two Italians in Mauritania, but brought them to northern Mali, where they were still being held at year's end.

Although the Malian government was aware that northern Mali was being used by AQIM as a safe haven, Mali's long, porous borders and a general lack of resources have hindered the country's ability to combat AQIM effectively.

Although the kidnapping of westerners is a continuation of AQIM's tactics of prior years, the execution of Edwin Dyer, the kidnapping of Pierre Camatte on Malian soil, and the attacks against Colonel Ould Bou and the Malian army represented a significant departure from AQIM's prior tactics in northern Mali.

Following the assassination of Colonel Ould Bou, the Malians launched a military operation in northern Mali targeting AQIM. The Malian military effort included extended patrols through areas where AQIM was thought to be present, and resulted in engagements on June 15 and in July. The beginning of the rainy season led to a lull in military action.

[33] No available report for Chad

Mali continued to address terrorist financing issues. Mali's National Section for the Processing of Financial Information, which began operations in May 2008, received eight reports of suspicious financial activities during the year, although ongoing investigations have not yet revealed any links to terrorist financing or terrorist activity.

Mali has expressed a willingness to increase regional cooperation against AQIM and terrorism generally. Mali is a Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership country. Mali also works with other regional partners and organizations to support its counterterrorism efforts, notably the Algerian-led counterterrorism coalition comprised of Algeria, Niger, Mali, and Mauritania. Malian President Amadou Toumani Toure has long called for a regional Heads of State Summit to be held in Bamako to discuss coordination of counterterrorism efforts, including improved border monitoring and security. On August 12 in Algeria, Mali participated in a meeting with military chiefs of staff from Algeria, Mauritania, and Niger to draft a counterterrorism strategy for the Sahara.

Mali is an engaged and active member of the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership. It is also an active participant in U.S. programs including bilateral, joint combined exchange and regional military training, and the Anti-terrorism Assistance Training program.

Niger – Score 1 (Worst) to 5 (Best)

Denial of Terrorist Sponsorship, Support and Sanctuary – 2; De-Legitimize Terrorist Ideology – 2

The Nigerien government's counterterrorism program has improved to include the use of updated terrorist watch lists, more consistent border patrols, and regular monitoring of mosques believed to espouse extremist views. Border crossings were not automated and relied on handwritten ledgers to record entry and exit. The government has been receptive to Western and regional counterterrorism training and is a Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership country. Niger also works with other regional partners and organizations to support its counterterrorism efforts, notably the Algerian-led counterterrorism coalition comprised of Algeria, Niger, Mali, and Mauritania.

Al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) demonstrated a greater interest in Niger in 2009, with attempts to extend its influence into Nigerien territory from the largely ungoverned region bordering Mali and Algeria. The porous borders and ungoverned spaces provide terrorist groups such as AQIM a potential environment for recruiting, people and contraband smuggling, undetected transit, and logistical facilitation. Niger's severe resource constraints stemming from its status as one of the poorest countries in the world, and the ongoing political crisis, hampered the Nigerien government's ability to prevent AQIM intrusion.

On December 14, 2008, AQIM-affiliated persons kidnapped and held hostage UN Special Envoy, Robert Fowler, his colleague, Louis Guay, and a local Nigerien driver. They were seized by AQIM within 40 kilometers of Niamey, taken across the Mali border and held hostage in the Sahara desert for 130 days before being released. On January 22, 2009, along the Mali/Niger

border, AQIM-affiliated persons kidnapped four European tourists near the Niger/Mali border and held them hostage in the Sahara desert. Three of the European hostages were released months later, but one British hostage was killed. In October, an AQIM-linked Mauritanian was captured in Niamey following his involvement in terrorist related activities outside Niger. On November 14, AQIM associates armed with AK-47 assault rifles attempted to kidnap five U.S. Embassy personnel from a hotel in Tahoua. The failed operation was believed to have been sanctioned by AQIM leaders. The perpetrators of this attempted kidnapping have yet to be captured. Although the rise of violent extremist organizations in northern Nigeria has yet to directly impact southern Niger, a very real threat exists. Northern Nigeria and southern Niger share a common Hausa ethnicity, numerous economic and cultural links, and a long, porous border. Immediately following the July 2009 Nigerien break-up of the Boko Haram group, Nigerien ties to the group were revealed when dozens of Boko Haram members were deported from Nigeria to their home cities in southern Niger.

ANNEX B : Indicator Coding Guide – Government Capacity to Fight Terrorism

INTRODUCTION

The following is a guide for coding Indicators. It is based on the country-level narratives contained in the State Department's Annual Country Reports on Terrorism. The report's narrative summary of terrorism in most of the world's countries is a publicly available, comprehensive global analysis that directly addresses a country's capacity and will to fight terrorism. It provides scores for two indicators: the extent to which a country denies terrorist sponsorship support and sanctuary; and de-legitimizes terrorist ideology.

These reports can be found online. The most recent available reports are for 2009. http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/141114.pdf

1. Denial of Terrorist Sponsorship, Support and Sanctuary

Definition:

This variable indicates the extent to which terrorists are denied the tools they need for long-term survival; sustainable leadership; safe havens that provide secure environments for training and operational planning; a steady influx of recruits; equipment; communications, documentation and logistics networks; and effective propaganda capabilities.

Does government effectively deny terrorist safe havens (physical and virtual)? Do terrorists operate in ungoverned territories? Are there problems with corruption and fraud in government identification and travel document issuance systems? Does government take effective measures to identify, disrupt, and deny access to sources, means, and mechanisms of terrorist finance?

Coding Scheme:

(1) Government, or elements of government, sponsor and/or provide sanctuary for terrorists or terrorist organizations.

(2) Country, despite declared government policy, provides de-facto sponsorship of and/or sanctuary for terrorists or terrorist organizations to a significant degree.

(3) Terrorists enjoy some degree of sponsorship and/or sanctuary despite active government efforts to deny it.

(4) Terrorists enjoy only minimal degree of sponsorship and/or sanctuary.

(5) Terrorists or terrorist organizations have no notable degree of sponsorship and/or sanctuary. Government works closely and effectively with other countries to combat terrorism.

2. De-Legitimize Terrorist Ideology

Definition:

This indicator measures the extent to which the use of terror to advance an ideology, religious outlook or philosophy is accepted by society. Are terrorist leaders effectively isolated and discredited as well as their facilitators and organizations? The focus is primarily on whether terrorist ideology is prevalent within a country and, to a lesser degree, whether the government is taking effective action to counter such ideology.

Coding Scheme:

(1) Terrorist ideology has strong and dangerous presence in country. Elements of the government may take actions that seem to condone such ideology.

(2) Terrorist ideology is present to a significant degree, despite official government efforts to counter it.

(3) Terrorist ideology is present, but to a less significant degree.

(4) Minimal presence of terrorist ideology. Government takes strong efforts to combat it.

(5) No notable presence of terrorist ideology.

ANNEX C: English Version – Translated into French, Hausa, and Arabic

Niger TSCTP Survey

Inform Survey Recipient:

"This survey asks question of citizens of Niger regarding their feelings and attitudes on important issues. It is required by the US Government regulations to ensure the effectiveness of its programs in Niger. All questions have been asked in prior surveys approved by the US Government. Survey recipients will be anonymous".

"Would you agree to take part in this survey?"

If yes, ask questions and circle answers:

Date:
Place (City & Neighborhood):
Name of interviewer(s):
Questionnaire Number:

A. Demographic Questions	**Circle one**				
1.) Gender :	¨ **Male**	¨ **Female**			
2.) How old are you? ¨	¨ **15-24**	¨ **25-30**	¨ **31-35**	¨ **36-45**	¨ **Over 45**
3.) Where do you live for most of the year? Town/City: _____					

Socioeconomic Drivers	**Circle one**				
How would you describe your economic Situation?	Very Good -5	Good -4	Fair -3	Bad -2	Very Bad - 1
What is your level of satisfaction with your access to services and resources in your community?	Very Good -5	Good -4	Fair -3	Bad -2	Very Bad - 1

Political Drivers					
Do you participate in decision-making in your community?	All the time -5	Often -4	Occasionally -3	Seldom -2	Never 1
Do youth associations make a positive contribution to society?	All the time -5	Often -4	Occasionally -3	Seldom -2	Never 1
What is your level of satisfaction with how decisions are made in your community?	Very Good -5	Good -4	Fair -3	Bad -2	Very Bad - 1
Do you think your opinions are respected by community leaders?	All the time -5	Often -4	Occasionally -3	Seldom -2	Never 1

Is violence sometimes, most of the time, or always an effective method to solve problems?	Never -5	Seldom -4	Occasionally -3	Often -2	All the time 1

Cultural Drivers

Do you hear messages or conversations about peace and tolerance?	All the time -5	Often -4	Occasionally -3	Seldom -2	Never 1
Do you listen to radio programs about peace and tolerance?	All the time -5	Often -4	Occasionally -3	Seldom -2	Never 1
Do you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable, or very unfavorable opinion of the United States?	Very Good -5	Good -4	Fair -3	Bad -2	Very Bad - 1
Do you agree or disagree that our government needs to work with Western countries to combat terrorism?	Completely agree - 5	Somewhat Agree - 4	Not Sure - 3	Somewhat Disagree - 2	Completely disagree - 1
Do you feel that using violence in the name of Islam is always justified, sometimes justified, rarely justified or never justified?	Never justified 5	Rarely Justified - 4	Not Sure 3	Sometimes Justified - 2	Always Justified 1
Do you agree or disagree that Al Qaeda's violent activities are permitted under Islamic law?	Completely disagree 5	Somewhat Disagree 4	Not Sure - 3	Somewhat Agree - - 2	Completely agree - - 1
Do you support or oppose the implementation of Sharia law?	No 5		Sometimes 3		Yes 1
Some say the U.S. is engaged in countries around the world to fight terrorism. Others say that the U.S. is engaged in countries around the world to fight Islam. Which is closer to your view?	Fight Terrorism 5		Not Sure 3		Fight Islam 1

ANNEX D: French Translation of Survey (Used for translations to local languages – and as primary survey document in Mousorro, Chad)

Enquête TSCTP au Niger

Informez le destinataire de cette enquête :

"Cette enquête pose la question des citoyens du Niger concernant leurs sentiments et attitudes sur les questions importantes. Il est exigé par les réglementations gouvernementales des Etats Unies d'Amérique d'assurer l'efficacité de ses programmes au Niger. Toutes ses questions ont été posées dans des enquêtes antérieures approuvées par le gouvernement des Etats unies d'Amérique. Les destinataires de cette enquête seront anonymes".

" Accepteriez-vous de participer à cette enquête?"

Si oui, posez les questions et encercler les réponses :

Date :

Lieu (Ville et quartier) :

Nom de l'enquêteur :

Numéro du questionnaire :

A. Questions démographiques	**Encercercler un**				
1.) Sexe :	**Homme**	**Femme**			
2.) Quel âge avez-vous?	**15-24**	**25-30**	**31-35**	**36-45**	**plus de 45**

3.) Où habitez-vous pour la majeure partie de l'année ?

Pays/Ville :

_____

Orientations socio-économiques	**Encercler un**				
Comment est-ce que vous décririez votre Situation économique?	Très bien 5	Bien 4	Juste 3	Mauvais 2	Très mauvais 1
Quel est votre niveau de satisfaction avec votre accès aux services et ressources dans votre communauté ?	Très bien 5	Bien 4	Juste 3	Mauvais 2	Très mauvais 1

Orientations politiques

Participez-vous à la prise de décision dans votre communauté ?	Tout le temps 5	Souvent 4	De temps en temps 3	Rarement 2	Jamais 1
Les associations jeunes apportent-elles une contribution positive à la société ?	Tout le temps 5	Souvent 4	De temps en temps 3	Rarement 2	Jamais 1
Quel est votre niveau de satisfaction avec la façon dont des décisions sont prises dans votre communauté ?	Très bien 5	Bien 4	Juste 3	Mauvais 2	Très mauvais 1
Pensez-vous que vos avis sont respectés par les chefs de la communauté ?	Tout le temps 5	Souvent 4	De temps en temps 3	Rarement 2	Jamais 1

Est-ce La violence parfois, le plus souvent, ou toujours une méthode efficace pour résoudre des problèmes ?	Jamais 5	Rarement 4	De temps en temps 3	Souvent 2	Tout le temps 1

Orientations culturels

Avez-vous entendu des messages ou des conversations au sujet de paix et de tolérance ?	Tout le temps 5	Souvent 4	De temps en temps 3	Rarement 2	Jamais 1
Écoutez-vous des émissions radio au sujet de paix et de tolérance ?	Toutle temps 5	Souvent 4	De temps en temps 3	Rarement 2	Jamais 1
Avez-vous une opinion très favorable, peu favorable, quelque peu défavorable et ou très défavorable des Etats-Unis ?	Très bien 5	Bien 4	Juste 3	Mauvais 2	Très mauvais 1
Etes-vous d'accord ou en désaccord que notre gouvernement à besoin de travailler avec les pays occidentaux pour combattre le terrorisme ?	Complètement d'accord 5	Un peu d'accord 4	Pas sure 3	Un peu en désaccord 2	Complètement en désaccord 1
Pensez-vous que l'utilisation de la violence au nom de l'Islam est toujours justifiée, parfois justifiée, rarement justifiée ou jamais justifiée?	Jamais justifié 5	Rarement justifié 4	Pas sure 3	Parfois justifié 2	Toujours justifié 1
Êtes-vous- d'accord ou en désaccord que les activités violentes d'Al Qaeda sont autorisées sous la loi islamique ?	Complètement en désaccord 5	Un peu en désaccord 4	Pas sure 3	Un peu d'accord 2	Complètement d'accord 1
Soutenez-vous ou opposez-vous à l'application de la loi de la Sharia ?	Non 5		Parfois 3		Oui 1
Certains disent que les Etats-Unis sont engagés dans les pays autour du monde pour combattre le terrorisme. D'autres disent que les Etats-Unis sont engagés dans les pays autour du monde pour combattre l'Islam. Laquelle est plus proche de votre vue ?	Combattre Terrorisme 5		Pas sure 3		Combattre l'Islam 1

ANNEX E: Hausa Survey (Administered in Niger)

Niger TSCTP Survey

Wa anga tambayoyi da mu ke yi ma ain kasar nijar domin samun ra ayin su da amsoshin su, bu sa kan zantutuka ma su mahimanci.

Wanan tambayoyin Gomnati amrica ta sa a yi su dan ta karfafa sarin aikin ta a kasan nijar. Dukan tambayoyin da za mu muku an taba yin su a can kwanan baya.kuma gomnatin amrica ta yarda da su.

Domin kiayaye kucece kuce,zamu yi muku tambayoyin nan a cikin sihiri wato ba za mu fadi sunan ku ba.

Kun yarda a yi mu ku tambayoyin nan

Localité : (Quartier, Ville):

Nom de l'enquêteur :

Numéro du questionnaire :

A. Questions démographiques. encercler la réponse appropriée

1.) Sexe : Masculin Féminin

2.) Quel âge avez-vous ? 15-24 ans ; 25-30 ans; 31-35 ans ; 36-45 ans ; Plus 45 ans

3. Quelle est la principale langue parlée dans votre maison ? Haussa ; Djerma ; Autre

Ce questionnaire est préparé pour être administré en Haussa. (Y a-t-il quelqu'un dans votre maison qui peut répondre en Haussa ? Si oui, posez les questions, sinon, allez à la prochaine maison.)

Orientations socio-économiques

1-Yaya ku ke fayace matsayi ku a fani tatali arziki ?

Circler un

sossai, kwarai -5	ku san sossai -4	yanda ya kamata, daidai wa daida -3	bai cikka kau ba -2	bakau ko gudda, ba na kwarai ba sam -1

2-Wane matsayin gamsuwa ku ka samu dangace da ayuka da anfani da ku ke cin moriya su a cikin al'umma ku ?

sossai, kwarai -5	ku san sossai -4	yanda ya kamata, daidai wa daida -3	bai cikka kau ba -2	bakau ko gudda, ba na kwarai ba sam -1

Orientations politiques

3-Ku na bada ra'ayi ku waje yanke shawarwarri a cikin al'umma ku ?

ko Wane lokaci -5	mafi yanci lokaci -4	lokaci zuwa lokaci -3	can abunda ba arasa ba -2	sam bakidayya 1

4-Kunguiyoyin matasa su na kawo ma jama'a mahimiya gudumuwa ?

ko Wane lokaci -5	mafi yanci lokaci -4	lokaci zuwa lokaci -3	can abunda ba arasa ba -2	sam bakidayya 1

5-Wane matsayi gamsuwa ne ku ka samu game da yanda a ke yanke shawarwarri a cikin al'umma ku ?

sossai, kwarai -5	ku san sossai -4	yanda ya kamata, daidai wa daida -3	bai cikka kau ba -2	bakau ko gudda, ba na kwarai ba sam -1

6-Ku na tsamani shuwagabani al'umma su na aiki da ra'ayoyi ku ?

ko Wane lokaci -5	mafi yanci lokaci -4	lokaci zuwa lokaci -3	can abunda ba arasa ba -2	sam bakidayya 1

7-Muzgunawa ta na iya zama wani lokaci, ko mafi yawanci lokaci ko kuma kullum kaikawa hanya warwarre matsaloli ?

-5 sam bakidayya	-4 can abunda ba arasa ba	lokaci zuwa lokaci -3	mafi yanci lokaci -2	ko Wane lokaci 1

Orientations culturelles

8-Kun ta ba jin wasu labaru ko wasu hiraraki bisa zance kontiya hankalli da sasawtama juna ?

ko Wane lokaci -5	mafi yanci lokaci -4	lokaci zuwa lokaci -3	can abunda ba arasa ba -2	sam bakidayya 1

9- Ku na saurare shireye shireye radio bisa kan zance kontiya hankalli da sasawtama juna ?

ko Wane lokaci -5	mafi yanci lokaci -4	lokaci zuwa lokaci -3	can abunda ba arasa ba -2	sam bakidayya 1

10-Ku na da wani ra'ayi na alheri ko mai alheri kalilan, ko kuma marass alheri a game da kasra America ?

sossai, kwarai -5	ku san sossai -4	yanda ya kamata, daidai wa daida -3	bai cikka kau ba -2	bakau ko gudda, ba na kwarai ba sam -1

11-Ku amince koba ku amince ba da cewa gobnaci America na bukata yin aiki tare da kasashen turaî dan yaki dan in ta'adaî ?

na yi imani hakane – 5	ina zato hakane - 4	ban da cikake sani a game da abun, ban sani ba – 3	to bancikka amincewa ba - 2	ban amince ba sam - 1

12-Ku na tsamani muzgunawa juna da sunnan adini muslimci ta na da huja kullum koko wani lokaci ta keda huja ko kuma koko baida hujja ko daya ?

babu cikake huja 5	Dal Kel - 4	ban da cikake sani a game da abun, ban sani ba 3	Wani zubbi - 2	a kwai cikaka huja 1

13- Kun yarda ko baku yarda da ayyukan ta addanci da alka ida ke yi sun halalta a addini musulmci ?

ban amince ba sam – 5	to bancikka amincew- 4	ban da cikake sani a game da abun, ban sani ba – 3	ina zato hakane a ba - 2	na yi imani hakane - 1

14- Ku na goyon baya ko ba ku goyon ba magana yin anfani da dokkoki shari'a muslimci ?

a ah 5		wani zubbi 3		eh 1

15-Wasu su kan cewa kasar America ta dau niya yakki da ta'adanci cikin kasashe duniya bakkidaya.

Wasu su kan cewa kasar America ta dau niya yakki da adini musulimci cikin kasashe duniya gabadai.

Wace da ga cikin magangani biyu kuke sa da ra'ayi ku ?

yakki da ta adanci 5		ban da cikake sani a game da abun, ban sani ba 3		yakki da musulimci 1

ANNEX F: Survey Administered in Mali

Mali TSCTP Survey

Inform Survey Recipient:

"This survey asks question of citizens of Mali regarding their feelings and attitudes on important issues. It is required by the US Government regulations to ensure the effectiveness of its programs in Mali. All questions have been asked in prior surveys approved by the US Government. Survey recipients will be anonymous".

"Would you agree to take part in this survey?"

If yes, ask questions and circle answers:

Date:
Place (City & Neighborhood):
Name of interviewer(s):
Questionnaire Number:

A. Demographic Questions	**Circle one**				
1.) Gender :	¨ **Male**	¨ **Female**			
2.) How old are you? ¨	¨ **15-24**	¨ **25-30**	¨ **31-35**	¨ **36-45**	¨ **Over 45**
3.) What is your primary language?					

Town/City:
_____

Socioeconomic Drivers	**Circle one**				
1. In Mali, how free are you to join any political organization you want?	Very Free -5	Somewhat Free -4	Neutral -3	Somewhat Un free -2	Not free -1
2. What is your level of satisfaction with your access to services and resources in your community?	Very Good -5	Good -4	Fair -3	Bad -2	Very Bad -1
Political Drivers					
3. Do you participate in decision-making in your community?	All the time -5	Often -4	Occasionally -3	Seldom -2	Never 1
4. During the past year, have you contacted a Local Government Councilor about some important problem or to give them your views?	Often -5		Occasionally -3		Never 1
5. In your opinion, how likely is it that you could get together with others and make your local government councilor listen to your concerns about a matter of importance to the community?	Very Likely -5	Somewhat Likely -4	Neutral-3	Somewhat Unlikely -2	Very Unlikely – 1

6. When there are problems with how local government is run in your community, how much can an ordinary person do to improve the situation?	A lot -5	Some - 4	Not Sure -3	Little – 2	None - 1

Cultural Drivers

7. Do you believe the northern rebellion is a justified war for the autonomy and development of regions of the country or an unjustified war against the national unity of the country.	Unjustified -5		Not Sure -3		Justified - 1
8. Do you listen to radio programs about peace and tolerance?	All the time -5	Often -4	Occasionally -3	Seldom -2	Never 1
9. Do you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable, or very unfavorable opinion of the United States?	Very Good -5	Good -4	Fair -3	Bad -2	Very Bad -1
10. Do you agree or disagree that our government needs to work with Western countries to combat terrorism?	Completely agree - 5	Somewhat Agree - 4	Not Sure - 3	Somewhat Disagree - 2	Completely disagree - 1
11. Do you feel that using violence in the name of Islam is always justified, sometimes justified, rarely justified or never justified?	Never justified -5	Rarely Justified - 4	Not Sure- 3	Sometimes Justified - 2	Always Justified -1
12. Do you agree or disagree that Al Qaeda's violent activities are permitted under Islamic law?	Completely disagree - 5	Somewhat disagree - 4	Not Sure - 3	Somewhat agree - 2	Completely agree- 1
13. Do you support or oppose the implementation of Sharia law?	No 5		Sometimes 3		Yes 1
14. Some say the U.S. is engaged in countries around the world to fight terrorism. Others say that the U.S. is engaged in countries around the world to fight Islam. Which is closer to your view?	Fight Terrorism 5		Not Sure 3		Fight Islam 1

ANNEX G: Survey Administered in Mali (French)

Enquête TSCTP au Mali

Informez le destinataire de cette enquête :

"Cette enquête pose la question des citoyens du Mali concernant leurs sentiments et attitudes sur les questions importantes. Il est exigé par les réglementations gouvernementales des Etats Unies d'Amérique d'asSurr l'efficacité de ses programmes au Mali. Toutes ses questions ont été posées dans des enquêtes antérieures approuvées par le gouvernement des Etats unies d'Amérique. Les destinataires de cette enquête seront anonymes".

" Accepteriez-vous de participer à cette enquête?"

Si oui, posez les questions et encercler les réponses :

Date :
Lieu (Ville et quartier) :
Nom de l'enquêteur :
Numéro du questionnaire :

A. Questions démographiques	**Encercer cler un**				
1.) Sexe :	**Homme**	**Femme**			
2.) Quel âge avez-vous?	**15-24**	**25-30**	**31-35**	**36-45**	**plus de 45**

3.) Où habitez-vous pour la majeure partie de l'année ?

Pays/Ville :_____

Socioeconomic Drivers	**Circle one**				
1. Au Mali, est-ce que vous etes libre a participer dans n'import quelle organisme politique que vous voulez?	Tres Libre -5	Un peu Libre - 4	Neutral -3	Peu Libre -2	Pas Libre -1
2. Quel est votre niveau de satisfaction avec votre accès aux services et ressources dans votre communauté ?	Tres Bien -5	Bien -4	Juste -3	Mauvais -2	Tres Mauvais -1
Political Drivers					
3. Est-ce que vous participez dans les decisions fait dans votre communaute?	Tout le temps -5	Souvent -4	De temps en temps -3	Rarement -2	Jamais 1

4. Pedant l'annee derniere, avez-vous contacte un representative du gouvernment y compris d'un problem inportant ou de les partager votre point de vue?	Souvent -5		De temps en temps - 3		Jamais -1
5. Selon vous, il est quel provable que vous pouriez vous organizer avec des autres membre de votre communaute et avoir votre representative gouvermental vous ecouter des concerns importantes au communaute?	Tres Provable -5	Un peu Provable -4	Neutral- 3	Un peu UnProvable -2	Tres UnProvable – 1
6. Quand il y ades problems avec la gestion de votre gouvernement local, qu'est-ce qu'un person typique peut Justee pour ameliorer la situation?	Beaucoup -5	Un peu - 4	Pas Sur -3	Peu – 2	Jamais - 1

Cultural Drivers

7. Est-ce que vous considerez la rebellion au au nord est une guerre justifiee pour l'autonomie et development des regions du pays ou bien une guerre pas justifiee et contre l'unite nationale?	UnJustifie -5		Pas Sur -3		Justifie -1
8. Écoutez-vous des émissions radio au sujet de paix et de tolérance ?	Tout le temps -5	Souvent -4	De temps en temps -3	Rarement -2	Jamais -1
9. Avez-vous une opinion très favorable, peu favorable, quelque peu défavorable et ou très défavorable des etats-unis ?	Tres Bien -5	Bien -4	Juste -3	Mauvais -2	Tres Mauvais -1
10. Etes-vous d'accord ou en désaccord que Pasre gouvernement à besoin de travailler avec les pays occidentaux pour combattre le terrorisme ?	Completement d'accord - 5	Un peu Agree - 4	Pas Sur - 3	Un peu Disagree - 2	Completement desaccord - 1
11. Pensez-vous que l'utilisation de la violence au nom de l'Islam est toujours justifiée, parfois justifiée, rarement justifiée ou jamais justifiée?	Jamais Justifie -5	Rarely Justifie - 4	Pas Sur - 3	Un peutimes Justifie - 2	Toujours Justifie -1

12. Êtes-vous- d'accord ou en désaccord que les activités violentes d'Al Qaeda sont autorisées sous la loi islamique?	Completement des'accord - 5	Un peu deagree - 4	Pas Sur - 3	Un peu agree - 2	Completement d'accord - 1
13. Soutenez-vous ou opposez-vous à l'application de la loi de la Sharia ?	Non - 5		Un peu -3		Oui -1
14. Certains disent que les Etats-Unis sont engagés dans les pays autour du monde pour combattre le terrorisme. D'autres disent que les Etats-Unis sont engagés dans les pays autour du monde pour combattre l'Islam. Laquelle est plus proche de votre vue ?	Combattre terrorisme -5		Pas Sur - 3		Combattre Islam - 1

TSCTP lawrayanoo/ankeetoo Maali ra ①

Ka boraa kay ga lawrandi alhabaaray nda lawrayanoo woo.

" lawrayanoo woo si tee kala Maali gandaa izey alhawawey nda ngi misey hãayay Cerecerantey ga. Ameriki ganda margantey gofornemayoo ašariyawey g'a waazibandi nga porogaramey ma tee ka boori Maali gandaa ra.
Hãayaney wey kul teendi lawra bisanteyay ra kay Ameriki ganda margantey Gofornemayoo yadda nd'ey. borey kay ga lawrayanoo woo ga teendi maayey si harandi".

" War ga yadda nda lawrayanoo wala?
Ndo war yadda, wa hãayaney tee, war ma zaabey kali:

Hanoo:

Nongoo (koyraa nda fargandoo)
lawrakaa maa:
hãayan kaddasoo lanbaa:

A. Ganda alžamaa hãayaney: W'affoo kali

1° Aru wala Woy:
2° Jiiri marje bara ma ne:
3° Man ra ni ga bisa ka goro Jiiroo ra?
ganda / koyra: _____

Aru	Woy			
15-24	25-30	31-35	36-45	kay bisa 45

B. Adama Izetaray duura hãayaney W'affoo kali

4° Maali gandoo ra war ga war boŋ may ka huru politiki kondey kaŋ war bag'a ra wala?	hanse ka ay boŋ may - 5	Ay boŋ may kayna - 4	Si affoo kul se - 3	boŋ may kaceu - 2	(2) Si ay boŋ may kul - 1
5° Maein ti war binekaanaa alkadaroo, war sawtisey nda war jamaa muraadey, huruyanoo ra?	A hanse ka boori - 5	A boori - 4	Labas - 3	A laala - 2	A hanse ka laala - 1

C/ Politiki hâayaney

6° War jamaa ra, war ga garandi anniyawey zaa dogey wala?	Waati kul - 5	Waatiyaŋ - 4	Waati ka kaa waati - 3	Cee fro-fooyaŋ - 2	Abada - 1
7° Jiiroo kaŋ bisa ra, war ciini kasinay nda war kominoo konziyya, koyra boŋkoyni, addin jine boro foo sugulla cerecerante ga, kar war anniyaa har i se, a ga wala?	Waatiyaŋ - 5	Waati ka kaa waati - 3	Abada - 1		
8° War do, tenekaanay alkadar foo no war ga hin ka duu a war alwakiiley do hala war mo hin ka hanatee war se, ka selen war jamaa hâayaŋ cerecerahtey ga?	Ga hanse ka kaŋ - 5	Ga kaŋ - 4	Si affoo kul se - 3	Agoo nda kaydoo - 2	Ga hanse ka kaŋ nda kaydoo - 1

9° Nda war kominoo goo nda Šugullayan, koyra ra, fargandi ra areezon ra, mdein no boro hana foo ga hin k'atee ka šugullaa misaa serrandi ?

i boobo	i kayna	kay mana tabati	kaccu	b'affoo
- 5	- 4	- 3	- 2	- 1

D/ Alaada hayey hãayaney

10° War ga tammahã kay Maali hawsa kanboo mintiyanoo/rebeeliyonoo ti wangu kay go nda dalil gandaa hawsa areezoey bay mayraa nda nji koyjineyanoo se wala wangu no kay oii nda dalil gandaa laama hawsoo se ?

Sii nda dalil	Kay mana tabati	goo nda dalil
- 5	- 3	- 1

11° War ga hana jer arajoo fadjikaara wey se alaafiya nda yaafayan fondaa ra wala ?

Waati kul	Waatiyay	Waati ka kaa waati	Cee foo-fooyay	Abada
- 5	- 4	- 3	- 2	- 1

12° War goo nda amniya kay go hanse ka waafaku, wala kay ga waafaku kaccu, wala kay si yadda, wala kay si yadda kul nda Ameriki ganda mangantey wala?

Hanse ka boori	A boori	A sawa	A laala	A hanse ka laala
- 5	- 4	- 3	- 2	- 1

13° War ga yadda wala war si yadda nda War goforneMayoo kay ga baa ka goy nda unnaslara gandaley ka terorismoo kangam wala?	hanse ka yadda -5	yadda kayna -4	Mana tabati -3	Mana yadda nd'a kayna -2	Mana yadda nd'a kul -1
14° War ga tammahâ kay futay alsilaamataray fondaa ra, goo nda dalil waati kul, wala dalilloo ti waatiyay, wala dalilloo ti cee-foo-fooyay, wala kay sii nda dalil abada?	Mana bay ka bara nda dalil -5	Goo nda dalil Cee foo-fooyay -4	Mana tabati -3	Cee fooyay -2	Goo nda dalil waati kul -1
15° War ga yadda wala war si yadda nda Al qaeda teegoy futey ga yaddandi alsilaamataray ašariyaa fondaa ra wala?	hanse ka yadda nd'a -5	Mana yadda nd'a kayna -4	Mana tabati -3	Yadda nd'a kayna -2	Mana yadda nd'a šoy 1
16° War ga yadda wala war si yadda nda alsilaamataray ašariya dirandoo ga?	Kala-kala -5	Kayna -3	Ayyo -1		

(5)

17° boro fooyan nee Ameriki nda margantey kul na anniya noo adunyaa gandawey ra hala i ma hin ka teerorismoo tangam.
borey jerey nee Ameriki ganda margantey kul na anniya noo koyne, adunyaa gandawey kul ra, hala i ma hin ka alsilaamataray tangam. Jenni hinkaa woo ra, affoo no ka bisa ka man war honnaa?

Ka teerorismoo tangam	Mana tabati	Ka alsilaana taraa tangam
-5	-3	-1

(Note – reversed scores for Question 15 were corrected)

ANNEX I

Mid-Term Evaluation of the Counter-Extremism Programming in Africa

List of Materials for Document Review Phase

USAID Africa Bureau, Office of Sustainable Development

Regional/General

Countering Extremism and Terrorism in the Sahel, (Assessment), USAID/West Africa, USAID/DCHA/CMM, DOD, July 2005

USAID/West Africa: Trans-Sahel Counter Terrorism Partnership Program Design and Scope of Work, Social Impact, June 2007

Peace Through Development, Quarterly Program Report Nos. 1-10 (March 2008 – June 2010), AED

Peace Through Development, Performance Management Plan, 2008, AED

Peace Through Development, Revised Performance Management Plan, July 2010, AED

Peace Through Development, Lessons Learned as of August 2010, AED

Public Attitudes in the Sahel -- 2007-2008, February 2009, ORB

Polling Brief – Kenya, ORB

Polling Brief – Level of Extremism (Sahel), ORB

Strengthening Stability through Development in Burkina Faso, USAID, September 2010

Guide to the Drivers of Violent Extremism (Drivers Guide), USAID, 2009

Development Assistance and Counter-Extremism: A Programming Guide (Programming Guide), USAID 2009

Violent Extremism Factors Tree (PPT graphics), USAID AFR

Timeline of Counter Extremism Analysis, USAID AFR, July 2010

TSCTP Fact Sheet, USAID AFR

TSCTP Results (summary prepared for testimony in 2009), USAID AFR

Measuring Success (summary by country prepared for testimony in 2009), USAID AFR

Written Testimony by U.S. Agency for International Development Senior Deputy Assistant Administrator for Africa Earl Gast, U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on African Affairs, "Examining U.S. Counterterrorism Priorities and Strategy across Africa's Sahel Region," November 17, 2009

Combating Terrorism: Actions Needed to Enhance Implementation of Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership, GAO, July 2008

Key Issue: Counterterrorism, Africa, FY 2009 Performance Plan Reports, USAID

Key Issue: Counterterrorism, Africa, FY 2010 Operational Plans, USAID

Mauritania

Mauritania Pilot – CT and Development (Assessment), USAID and MSI, 2008

Chad

Interagency Support on Conflict Assessment and Mission Performance Planning for Chad -- Overview: Interagency Team Findings, *Draft*, March 19, 2006, DOS and USAID

Chad Capacity Development & Peace Support Project: Final Report: July 11, 2006 – September 11, 2008, AED

Appendix 2: Key Findings from Kanem Needs Assessment

Appendix 3: Key Findings from Batha Needs Assessment

Appendix 10: Baseline Community Profiles

Counter Extremism and Development in Chad (Assessment), USAID and MSI, October 2009

Peace Through Development—Chad, Overall Findings Report Baseline, AED

Peace Through Development—Chad, Overall Baseline Findings, (quarterly report appendix), AED

PDEV Chad Program, Fact Sheet

Niger

Skills and Knowledge for Youth Empowerment (SKYE) Program in Niger: Final Report: September 20, 2006 – September 19, 2008, Mercy Corps

Annex A: Indicator Monitoring Table

Bridging Collective Responsibility and Development Goals through Effective and Inclusive Decentralization (*Bridge*): Quarterly Report – April-June 2008, Mercy Corps, 2008

Maradi Youth Development Program, Phase II: Final Report, CARE, May 2008

Maradi Youth Development Program -- Evaluation Matrix 2, CARE

Niger Counter Extremism Assessment, USAID and MSI, April 2009

PDEV Youth and Governance Themed Radio Programs, Success Story (PDEV)

Youth Training in Niamey, Success Story (PDEV)

Peace Through Development—Niger, Overall Findings Report Baseline, AED

PDEV Niger Program, Fact Sheet

Mali

Counter Extremism and Development in Mali (Assessment), USAID and MSI, October 2009

Mali Radio for Peace Building in the North Program, Fact Sheet, IESC

Mali 1207 Reports: FY09 Q4, FY10 Q1

ANNEX J – People Interviewed (Partial List)

People interviewed in Niger

Ibrahim Adama, Monitoring and Evaluation Associate, AED Niamey

Kadri Nana Aichatou – Program Assistant, AED Niamey

ANASI Association of Islamic Leaders – Maradi

- Abdou Adamou, Secretary General
- Eheik Moumirou Salifou
- Nalam Attikou Aboubacar
- Malam Toukour Uman Aboubacar
- Nabam Souleyman Abdou

Rouguiatou Diallo-Allou, AED Country Representative, Niger

Saley Habou, Radio Garkwar

Ismael Mallam Hafizu; President ANDEP, Anfani Radio Board;

Addouraamame Hassane, USAID Niamey

Elh. Samaila Hatimou, President Membre Cunsulaire; Syndicat National des Commercants du Niger (SNCN), Niamey

Paula Gray Hunker, Chief of Executive Affairs, Office of the Executive Director, World Food Programme

Sahissou Issa, Director of Radio Garkwar

Dr. Abdoulaye Mohamadou, Director General, National Agronomy Institute of Niger, Niamey

Hamado Moumouni, Director of Radio Anfani, Maradi

Moustapha Moussa, Research Scientist, National Agronomy Institute of Niger, Niamey

Pastor Sani Namaou ; Director of Studio Yusufu Garba, EERN Worlds of Hope, Niamey

William Noble, USAID Niger Country Program Manager

Gordon Shettle, Program Manager, Equal Access, US Office

Robert Tate, Public Affairs Officer, American Cultural Center Director

Bisa Williams, Ambassador, United States to Niger

Alexander Yu, Security Attache

People Interviewed in Chad

Bouba Abba - Gouvenorat de Hadjer Lamis

Daoud Hamat Bechir, Prefect, Barh El Gazel

Sue L. Bremner, Deputy Chief of Mission,

Les McBride, USAID Representative, Chad

Jill Morris – PDEV Chief of Party

Adoumngar Ngoisi, Charge de Programme, RJD, N'Djemena

People Interviewed in Mali

Moussa Bambara, USAID Mali

Mamadou Kante, Director, PGP2 (Programme Gouvernance Partagee, MSI Bamako

Thelma Khelghati, Director, Programme Harmonise dAppui au Reinforcment d l'Education

M. Youssouf Kone - PGP2 (Programme Gouvernance Partagee, MSI Bamako)

Rebecca Rhodes, Deputy Director, Programme Harmonise dAppui au Reinforcment d l'Education

Aminata Simbara, PGP2 (Programme Gouvernance Partagee, MSI Bamako)

Jason Smith, Team Leader for Democracy and Governance, USAID Mali

Tim Stein, Acting Program Officer, USAID Mali

People Interviewed in Ghana

Jennifer Crow Yang, Regional Contracting/Agreement Officer, USAID/West Africa

Lisa Franchett, Deputy Mission Director, USAID/West Africa

Madeline C. Williams, Program Office Chief, USAID/West Africa

People Interviewed in Washington

Kellie Burk, Research Analyst, USAID AFR/SD/CPG

Lisa M. Chandonnet-Bedoya, Development Advisor, USAID/DCHA/CMM

Susannah Hopkins Leisher, Director of Programs and Strategic Planning .Trickle Up

Angela C. Martin, Senior Counter Terrorism Advisor, USAID/AFR/SD/CPG

Mona Mehta Steffen, Academy for Educational Development

Tarek Nabhan, Radio for Peacebuilding (GeekCorps)

Anne O'Toole Salinas, Program Director, Peace Building and Conflict Mitigation, Center for Civil Society and Governance, Academy for Educational Development,

Brooke Stearns Lawson, Conflict Advisor, USAID/AFR/SD/CPG

Amy Willsey, Director New Business Development, International Development Division, Educational Development Center Inc. Washington DC

ANNEX K – Evaluation Scope of Work (From USAID Solicitation)

Section C – DESCRIPTION/SPECIFICATION/STATEMENT OF WORK

C.1. Title

Mid-Term Evaluation of the Counter-Extremism Programming in Africa

C.2. Overview and Purpose

USAID's Bureau for Africa, Office of Sustainable Development (AFR/SD) is soliciting the services of a contractor to conduct a mid-term evaluative study of USAID's counter-terrorism programming in Africa, including the programming of the Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP) Program. Counter-terrorism programming was a new area of programming for USAID when pilot programming under TSCTP began in 2006. The risk of terrorism continues to be a major area of concern in Africa, and the U.S. is committed to continuing its important work to combat violent extremism (VE) through development assistance programming that complements other USG activities in this area. As the implementation of counter-extremism programming through development assistance evolves, it is important to build upon TSCTP and other experience to-date and use lessons learned to inform ongoing and future implementation, as well as to continue to develop innovative programming approaches. In particular, it is anticipated that USAID's counter-extremism programming to-date will inform the development of a more meaningful framework to monitor and measure the results and impacts of these activities. To this end, AFR/SD would like for the evaluation to be an effective learning tool that can be used by USAID to further the TSCTP and other counter-extremism efforts in Africa.

The Mid-Term Evaluation of Counter-Extremism Programming in Africa is a three-stage evaluation assessing the impact of USAID counter-extremism programming in Africa.

Stage 1: Document Review

Stage 2: Fieldwork

Stage 3: Framework Development and Report Preparation

This Statement of Work covers all three stages which will be conducted between August and November 2010. Stage 1 will entail a review and analysis of program/project documents and sectoral assessments covering the period FY 2006-2009. Stage 2 will involve fieldwork in Chad, Mali, and Niger. Based on the first two Stages, the contractor will develop a monitoring and evaluation framework for counter-extremism programming and prepare a report of their findings from all three stages.

The overall deliverable under this Statement of Work (SOW) will be a comprehensive Evaluation Report that addresses the issues and questions provided below in Section C.4. Offerors will be

given the latitude to define the manner in which they present their evaluation findings (results tables, lessons learned, program approaches, etc.). The evaluation findings should include: (1) a summary of the program impacts to-date, (2) a set of lessons learned and innovations pioneered through TSCTP and other counter-extremism program implementation, (3) a summary of what has been measured and how, and (4) a framework to better monitor and measure the impact of these programs. These findings and recommendations will be used to assist USAID and its missions in Africa to more effectively implement and integrate counter-extremism programming both through further refinement of development approaches to countering violent extremism and through the establishment of standardized monitoring and reporting systems to allow cross-country and cross-regional comparisons of results and experiences.

C.3. Background

USAID counter-extremism programming in Africa to-date includes activities under the Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership and activities contributing to the East Africa Regional Strategic Initiative (EARSI).

The Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership is a multi-country interagency effort that aims to combat violent extremism (VE) in the Sahel region of Africa. TSCTP forges partnerships between the U.S. and African governments to combat extremism and empowers beneficiaries to resist the drivers of extremism at the individual and community levels. USAID's role in TSCTP is managed by the West Africa Regional Mission and the Africa Bureau in Washington. Funded at $20 million in FY 2009, USAID's current TSCTP activities include: a regional Peace for Development (P-Dev) Program in Niger and Chad; community development activities in Mali; and youth related programming in Morocco.

Managed out of USAID/West Africa, the P-DEV Program is currently in its second phase, which runs from 2006 to 2011. The program provides tangible benefits to youth at risk for recruitment by VE organizations and communities in at-risk regions through youth employment and outreach programs and community development and media activities. In addition to delivering tangible benefits, such as vocational skills training, the program gathers beneficiaries from different communities, ethnic groups, and countries together through outreach events on topics related to religion and tolerance. In Niger, we have been building the capacity of local leaders to launch and sustain community development projects. In Chad, we are developing conflict mitigation and community stabilization projects that reach into the country's remote north.

The USAID/Mali TSCTP programming includes linked development activities, including rural radio activities in the north and east; a basic education program to train teachers and support School Management Committees in primary schools including madrasas; a shared Governance Program to address conflict prevention and peace building; and a microcredit program that targets youth in urban areas. In Mali, media activities are expanding access in information-scarce areas in the North.

Also under TSCTP USAID/Morocco engages in youth programming focusing on reintegration of youth that have been marginalized after detention and/ or imprisonment.

In East Africa, the East Africa Regional Strategic Initiative (EARSI) includes the following countries: Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mauritius, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, and Yemen. (Legislative and policy restrictions inhibit the provision of EARSI assistance to Eritrea and Sudan. However, our embassies in Asmara and Khartoum contribute their analysis and recommendations to the EARSI process.) Modeled after the TSCTP, the EARSI is an interagency and inter-country program to: enhance regional capabilities to prevent, detect, counter and mitigate terrorist activity, undermine, marginalize, and isolate terrorists; discredit their violent ideology; and empower groups opposed to extremism through threat identification and joint collaboration strategies, policy recommendations and actionable initiatives. This will be achieved through the use of targeted development, military, counterterrorism and strategic communications assistance. USAID activities that contribute to EARSI include youth programming in Garissa, Kenya, and livelihood activities in Somaliland.

To track performance, USAID submits an annual Performance Plan and Report on performance against expected targets including both success and areas identified for improvement. In the case of USAID programs under TSCTP, the majority are reported under the Counter-Terrorism Program Area. Because the number of official indicators is small, USAID has developed custom indicators to help monitor more incremental progress in our programs. For these indicators, our implementing partners have gathered solid baseline data against which progress is being monitored quarterly. Through the interagency, USAID also accesses more broad-based, independently gathered polling data to gauge general attitudes and support for violent extremist organizations.

In addition to the programming described above, USAID has undertaken an ongoing multiyear effort to develop analysis and programming tools to better understand the risks that can create the condition for terrorism to flourish and design appropriate development responses to mitigate those risks. The initial step was an interagency assessment conducted in early 2005 in the four core countries – Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger – to identify the level of risk, based upon the existing literature and data and the perspectives of the partner nation and communities. Subsequent country-level assessments more precisely identified the risk factors in each county and target those communities most at risk to violent extremist organizations or ideology. These risk assessments have been updated to reflect the changing conditions on the ground as well as our increased knowledge of the actual risk factors. The recent assessments provide supplemental detail to the broader analysis of the *Guide to the Drivers of Violent Extremism* (Drivers Guide) and the companion *Development Assistance and Counter-Extremism: A Programming Guide* (Programming Guide) developed during 2009. This research effort suggests that socioeconomic, political, and cultural drivers need to be considered holistically when designing development programs to counter-extremism.

This evaluation will build upon these existing mechanisms to more explicitly identify the ways through which USAID counter-extremism activities have affected the drivers of violent extremism identified in the Drivers and Programming Guides.

C.4 Tasks

The contractor shall undertake the following specific tasks during the assignment period, working with USAID/AFR and the relevant missions, as appropriate:

1. Under Stage 1, review and analyze project documents, such as completed evaluations, assessments, sectoral studies (including by other donors and multi-lateral institutions), contractors' reports, project-related documents, Mission performance reports and relevant background materials of USAID counter-extremism programs and projects in African countries, including TSCTP programming. The Missions will seek to gather all available project documents and make them available to the Contractor. The Contractor should also work with the USAID/Washington Library and CDIE to secure relevant documentation, particularly the evaluation and assessment report and studies of earlier projects. The results of Stage 1(Document Review) will inform the fieldwork design and implementation. The review should examine both the identified impacts and the monitoring and evaluation processes and measures used and should consider the following questions:

a. What are the documented programmatic impacts to-date? For example, how has
b. What are the lessons learned both in terms of the *what* (types of activities) and the *how* (ways in which the activities are implemented)?
c. What type of results are being examined (inputs versus outputs versus outcomes)?
d. What types of process evaluation questions are being used?
e. How, if at all, do the analytic resources on violent extremism (Drivers and Programming Guides) inform programming decisions?
f. What are the similarities and differences among the way in which program activities are being evaluated?
g. How have the objectives and program measurements evolved over time?
h. How reliable and effective are these evaluation processes and indicators in measuring performance?

2. Under Stage 2, based on the results of the documents reviewed in Stage 1 and taking into account the program/project results as reported in the relevant performance monitoring/indicators system, the contractor shall:

2.1. Develop an in-depth process and impact evaluation methodology to further examine the program impacts to-date and the monitoring and evaluation processes and measures being utilized. In this phase of evaluating counter-extremism programs in Africa, the evaluation will examine counter-extremism activities in the three countries with the most robust counter-extremism programming: Chad, Mali and Niger. Potential follow-on phases may include fieldwork in other countries where USAID implements counter-extremism programming (e.g., Kenya, Morocco, and Yemen).

2.2. Conduct fieldwork including key informant interviews and focus groups. The fieldwork should provide a more in-depth examination of the questions outlined in Stage 1. The contractor shall identify, collect and analyze additional data on the program impacts that are

not captured in the existing documentation as well as validate the documented findings. Using questions cleared by USAID, the contractor shall interview representative groups of stakeholders (project contractors, grantees, implementing partners in government, civil society, private business sector, beneficiary groups, women's organizations, local leaders, USAID officers and staff, U.S. Embassy Country Team officers, other donors and organizations working in the selected countries) and conduct focus group discussions at the local and national levels, as appropriate.

3. Under Stage 3, based on the results of the above tasks, the contractor shall:

3.1. Analyze and synthesize review findings and fieldwork data in order to describe, quantify and assess the impacts of USAID's programs on target beneficiaries and assess how USAID counter-extremism activities affect the drivers of violent extremism.

3.2. Analyze and synthesize review findings and fieldwork data to identify lessons learned in program implementation, including further examination of the key factors that influence program success, challenges faced and strategies for addressing them, and the role played by violent extremism analytic work.

3.3. Based on the above review of the monitoring and evaluation processes used in counter-extremism programming, recommend a logical results framework for TSCTP and other counter-extremism country and regional programs and provide a menu of indicators for measuring performance. The review should consider how the revised framework will achieve the following:

a. Serve to measure USAID's attributable impact on the Foreign Asssistance Framework goals to "Deny Terrorist Sponsorship, Support and Sanctuary" and to "De-Legitimize Terrorist Ideology?"
b. Measure programming that strengthens resiliencies to recruitment as well as mitigates the risks of recruitment.
c. Measure programming that strengthens resiliencies to community support for violent extremism.
d. Measure how programming affects the drivers of VE identified through the existing analytical tools (Drivers and Programming Guides).
e. Address the regional-level, as well as country-level, aspects of programming and its results/impacts.

3.4. Produce an evaluation report that summarizes the results from the above tasks. The goal of the report is to assist USAID to identify how counter-extremism activities have affected violent extremism in these countries and to recommend an effective logical framework for monitoring and evaluating activities and measuring the impact of program performance. The final report should include: (1) a summary of the program impacts to-date, (2) a set of lessons learned and innovations pioneered through TSCTP and other counter-extremism program implementation, (3) a summary of what has been measured and how, and (4) a framework to better monitor and measure the impact of these programs.

C.5. Methodology and Deliverables

The conduct of the evaluation is estimated to take a total of twelve weeks. The contractor will determine the overall work plan, which will include reviewing documents and meeting with USAID officials in Washington before conducting fieldwork. The contractor will travel to several target countries (Chad, Mali, and Niger) and the West Africa regional mission to interview mission and interagency personnel, implementing partners, non-governmental representatives, local government officials, traditional leaders, and youth to obtain input and perspectives on TSCTP and other USAID counter-terrorism programs and to review additional data and related information about these programs.

A **Work Plan** for the overall evaluation shall be completed by the contractor within two days of the award of the contract. The Work Plan, to the extent possible, should include a tentative draft outline of the Evaluation Report for consideration by the COTR. The Work Plan will ensure coverage of all elements of the Statement of Work.

A **draft Evaluation Report** and presentation to AFR/SD will be expected at the end of the tenth week, with a **final Evaluation Report** due at the end of the twelfth week.

C. 6. Key Personnel

Senior Evaluation Specialist: This individual will be responsible for managing and coordinating the overall evaluation process and for the overall compilation of the final Evaluation Report. The individual will work closely with USAID Africa Bureau. The individual should have a graduate degree in a discipline related to international development and possess at least 15 years of experience implementing and monitoring/evaluating development programs, preferably in Africa, including some experience with USAID-related activities. The individual should have significant experience with frameworks for monitoring and measuring development activities and developing indicators for tracking progress and impact. The individual should have at least a familiarity with peace and security, and counter-terrorism specifically, in Africa.

Peace & Security Specialist: This individual should have a graduate degree in a discipline related to international peace, security, conflict mitigation and/or governance with at least 10 years of experience with development programming in Africa. This individual should have a broad range of experience including conflict mitigation, counter terrorism or counter extremism, education, and youth, as well as experience monitoring and evaluation such programming.

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1300 Pennsylvania Ave., NW
Washington, D.C. 20523
Tel: (202) 712-0000
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ATTACHMENT B

ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE - SAMPLE BUDGET

The following object class categories are those required on USAID Form 424A (Section B - Budget Categories):

a. **Personnel**

The category includes the salary of each long-term and short-term, paid position for the total estimated life-of-project, except consultants, and the projected cost-of-living or bonus/merit increase for each position.

b. **Fringe Benefits**

This category includes the amount and percentage of fringe benefits for each headquarters and field personnel identified above. Include here all allowances such as housing, schooling, leave benefits, and other items.

c. **Travel**

This category includes all projected travel, per diem and other related costs for personnel **except** consultants. Include the method by which airfare costs were determined; i.e. quotes for coach and if per-diems are based on established policies.

d. **Equipment**

In accordance with 22 CFR 226, 'equipment' means tangible non-expendable personal property, including exempt property charged directly to the award having a useful life of more than one year and an acquisition cost of $5,000 or more per unit. Information should be included in the application on how pricing was determined for each piece of the equipment.

There are statutory constraints relating to the purchase of agricultural commodities, motor vehicles, pharmaceuticals, pesticides, rubber compounding chemicals and plasticizers, used equipment and fertilizer with USAID project funds. PVOs may obtain specific information on these regulations on USAID Web Site at http://www.usaid.gov/pubs/ads.

e. **Supplies**

In accordance with 22 CFR 226, 'supplies' means all personal property excluding equipment, intangible property, debt instruments and interventions.

There are statutory constraints relating to the purchase of agricultural commodities, motor vehicles, pharmaceuticals, pesticides, rubber compounding chemicals and plasticizers, used equipment and fertilizer with USAID project funds. PVOs can obtain specific information on these regulations on USAID Web Site at http://www.usaid.gov/pubs/ads/300/312/htm.

f. **Contractual Services**

This category is for all subcontracts with organizations, which will provide services to the project and any short- or long-term consultant cost including fees, travel and per-diem. This category is not to be used for sub-s, which should be included in other.

g. **Construction**

Applicants should include all labor and material and supplies for construction projects.

h. **Other**

Applicants are to identify all costs associated with training of project personnel.

Applicants planning to use USAID funds to send project staff or local counterparts for training in the U.S. or a country other than the host country, will be required to follow the guidance on USAID Participant Training Regulations, which may be found on the USAID Web Site http://www.usaid.gov/pubs/ads.

The applicant should provide information on any costs attributed to the project not associated above; i.e. communications, facilities, fuel vehicles, repair, maintenance and insurance.

i. **Indirect Charges**

Include a copy of the Applicant's most recent negotiated indirect cost rate agreement (NICRA) from the cognizant audit agency showing the overhead and/or general administrative rate.

Standard Form 424A, Section C should reflect the Applicant's and other sources' cash contribution to this program. A cash match means that funds are used to support the budget elements discussed above. This does not include volunteer labor from U.S. or host country sources. The cash value of donated equipment or supplies must be documented, etc

A narrative that justifies the costs as appropriate and necessary for the successful completion of the program should be attached to Standard Form 424.

ILLUSTRATIVE COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT BUDGET

Budget Cost Element	Budget Amount US $		Remarks*
Total Direct Labor	$_____		(1)
Salary & Wage		$_____	
Fringe Benefits		$_____	
Allowances		$_____	
Consultants	$_____		(2)
Travel, Transportation & Per Diem	$_____		(3)
Participant Training	$_____		(4)
Other Direct Costs	$_____		(5)
Sub awards (grants and subcontracts)	$_____		(6)
Security Costs	$_____		(7)
Training	$_____		(8)
Procurement (Equipment & Supplies)	$_____		(9)
Indirect Costs	$_____		(10)
Total Amount	**$_____**		

Provide country-specific breakdown as above as per below percentage spread.

PDERS BUDGET	**Year/$ million**	**Year/$ million**	**Year/$ million**	**Year/$ million**	**Year/$ million**
COUNTRY	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
Chad	30.00%	30.00%	30.00%	30.00%	30.00%
Niger	32.00%	32.00%	32.00%	32.00%	32.00%
Burkina Faso	18.00%	18.00%	18.00%	18.00%	18.00%
Mauritania	20.00%	20.00%	20.00%	20.00%	20.00%
Totals	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%

*****Provide detailed breakdown of costs and narrative-indicate page or Annex #

ATTACHMENT C

[RECIPIENT LETTERHEAD]

Date

(RECIPIENT CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE)

To:
Contracting Officer
M/OAA/OCC
USAID

I,_____, _____, as a legally authorized representative
Name (Printed or Typed) Title
of _____ do hereby certify that, to the best of my knowledge
Organization Name
and belief, this organization's management and other employees responsible for their implementation are aware of the requirements placed on the organization by OMB Circulars, and Federal and USAID regulations with respect to the management of, among other things, personnel policies (including salaries), travel and procurement under this agreement and I further certify that the organization is in compliance with those requirements.

I, we, understand that a false, or intentionally misleading, certification could be the cause for possible actions ranging from being found not responsible for this award to suspension or debarment of this organization in accordance with the provisions of USAID Regulation 8.

I, we, further agree to instruct the accounting firm that this organization retains to perform its annual audits, as required by OMB Circular A-133, to include in their review of our internal controls sufficient testing of the implementation of our personnel, travel and procurement policies to confirm compliance with Federal and USAID requirements. The conclusions of that compliance review will be included in the A-133 audit reports submitted to the government.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

_____
Signature

_____
Type or Print Name

_____
Position Title

_____
Date of Execution

ATTACHMENT D

Initial Environmental Examination (IEE) - USAID-WA_Peace_Security_IEE_Amend_092309

ATTACHMENT D

INITIAL ENVIRONMENTAL EXAMINATION
OR
CATEGORICAL EXCLUSION

PROGRAM/ACTIVITY DATA:

Program/Activity Number: Peace and Security Office

Country/Region: West Africa

Program/Activity Title: Promote Conflict Mitigation and Regional Stability

Funding Begin: __2006_____ **Funding End:** 2011 **LOP Amount:** $107,996,000

IEE Prepared By: Moussokoro Kane/Ron F. Ruybal **Current Date:** August 2009

IEE Amendment (Y/N):_Y f "yes", Filename & date of original IEE _624-012; 6/30/2006

Reference Documents (IEEs and amendments for previous SO): 32WARP5 SpO7 Conflict IEE. 09/16/02; IEE amendment, 33 WARP1 SpO7 Conflict amend.doc. 01/22/03.; IEE amendment, 34 USAID/WA PEACE AND SECURITY OFFICE conflict amend. doc. June 29, 2006

ENVIRONMENTAL ACTION RECOMMENDED: (Place X where applicable)
Categorical Exclusion: ___X___ Negative Determination: __X___
Positive Determination:_____ Deferral: _____

ADDITIONAL ELEMENTS: (Place X where applicable)
CONDITIONS ____X_____ PVO/NGO: _____

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS: (please limit to this page whenever possible, or at most two pages without clearances)

This IEE amendment addresses the Peace and Security Office new strategy period from FY 2009 to FY 2011 for the USAID/West Africa Mission. The goal of Peace and Security remains essentially the same, to reduce conflict and the causes of terrorism. To accomplish this Peace and Security Office supports Peace and Security and Governing Justly and Democratically objectives and specifically the following program areas: counter terrorism, conflict mitigation and reconciliation, elections processes, legislative strengthening and anticorruption reforms.

The environmental determination for the new strategy period FY 2009 to FY 2011 is a **Categorical Exclusion** for all activities related to technical assistance, training and education, institutional strengthening, communications and information exchange, policy analysis, and other capacity building work related to the prevention and reduction of conflict and the causes of terrorism. These activities have no effect on the environment and are categorically excluded from further environmental review as per **22 CFR 216.2 (c) (2) (i)**, education, technical assistance, training; **(iii)** analyses, studies academic research workshops or meetings; **(v)** document and information transfers; **(xiv)** studies to develop the capability of recipient countries to engage in development planning.

The Peace and Security Office will provide sub grants and credit for micro enterprise activities in trans-boundary areas that are known to be linked or potentially linked to conflict, and to ECOWAS member countries designated as a priority for the counterterrorism initiatives and Equatorial Guinea. Youth groups as key target groups for the implementation of the Peace component through development counter terrorism activities, will be provided with small in-kind grants involving youth in decision making about their activities, providing training on life and vocational skills, building bridges with other youth and adults and providing opportunities for positive activities that build confidence and self worth in a youth-focused environment. The activities envisioned are small-scale in nature; an illustrative list includes construction and rehabilitation (clinics, schools, latrines, and markets), micro-credit, market gardens, drip irrigation, fruit tree production, processing, water delivery systems, sanitation, textiles, and reforestation. These activities receive a **Negative Determination with conditions as per 22 CFR 216.3 (a) (2) (iii**). The conditions associated with this determination are that all sub grants will follow the Environment Review Form guidelines and other project activities follow technical guidance and procedures contained in the USAID Africa

Bureau/SD, **Environmental Guidelines for Small-Scale Activities in Africa** (EGSSAA) (http://www.encapafrica.org/SmallScaleGuidelines.htm.).

As youth are much less likely to engage in violent and hostile behavior if they are engaged in positive activities, have increased opportunities, and feel connected to their communities, PDEV has decided to support Nigerien youth centers throughout Niamey through small in-kind grants. The purposes of these small grants will be to support a total of 7 youth centers in Niamey which will receive in-kind support to conduct and improve vocational and recreational activities for urban youth.

All implementing Partners applying to implement activities, including micro enterprise, under sub grants, must complete the "Environmental Review Form. The Environmental Review Form presents the environmental issues associated with the proposed activities. It also documents mitigation and monitoring commitments. Its purpose is to allow the applicant and USAID to evaluate the likely environmental impacts of the project. The proposed activity cannot be approved and no "irreversible commitment of resources" can be made until the Environmental Review Form, including any mitigation measures, is approved by the Mission Environmental Officer (MEO) and or Regional Environmental Advisor (REA). These Environmental Review Forms must be summarized and reviewed at least annually by the REA, Mission Director, and BEO.

As required by ADS E204.5.4, the Office staff member responsible for these activities will "actively monitor and evaluate whether the environmental features designed for the activity resulting from the 22 CFR 216 process are being implemented effectively and whether there are new or unforeseen consequences arising during implementation that were not identified and reviewed in accordance with 22 CFR 216."

APPROVAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL ACTION RECOMMENDED: (Type name under signature line)
CLEARANCE:

Mission Director: _____ Date: _____
Henderson Patrick

CONCURRENCE:
Bureau Environnemental
Officer: _____ Date: _____
Approved: _____

Filename: _____ (USAID/W BEO) Disapproved: _____

ADDITIONAL CLEARANCES: (Add as appropriate; type name under signature line)

SO Team Leader: _____ Date: _____
Kevin Sharp

Regional Environmental
Officer: _____ Date: _____
Ron F. Ruybal

follow technical guidance and procedures contained in the USAID Africa Bureau/SD, **Environmental Guidelines for Small-Scale Activities in Africa** (EGSSAA) (http://www.encapafrica.org/SmallScaleGuidelines.htm.).
As youth are much less likely to engage in violent and hostile behavior if they are engaged in positive activities, have increased opportunities, and feel connected to their communities, PDEV has decided to support Nigerien youth centers throughout Niamey through small in-kind grants. The purposes of these small grants will be to support a total of 7 youth centers in Niamey which will receive in-kind support to conduct and improve vocational and recreational activities for urban youth.

As required by ADS E204.5.4, the Office staff member responsible for these activities will "actively monitor and evaluate whether the environmental features designed for the activity resulting from the 22 CFR 216 process are being implemented effectively and whether there are new or unforeseen consequences arising during implementation that were not identified and reviewed in accordance with 22 CFR 216." The scale and scope of some of the activities could necessitate additional environmental review.

APPROVAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL ACTION RECOMMENDED: (Type name under signature line)
CLEARANCE:

Mission Director: Henderson Patrick Date: 8/31/09
Henderson Patrick

CONCURRENCE:
Bureau Environmental Officer: Date: 09/23/09
Approved: X

Filename: _____ (USAID/W BEO) Disapproved: _____

ADDITIONAL CLEARANCES: (Add as appropriate type name under signature line)

SO Team Leader: Date: 8/17/09
Kevin Sharp

Regional Environmental Officer: Date: 8/31/09
Ron F. Ruybal

INITIAL ENVIRONMENTAL EXAMINATION

PROGRAM/ACTIVITY DATA:
Program/Activity Number: Peace and Security
Country/Region: West Africa
Program/Activity Title: Promote conflict mitigation and regional stability

1.0 BACKGROUND AND PROJECT DESCRIPTION

The West Africa Mission (WA) based in Accra, Ghana, was created by USAID as a response to development challenges at the regional level throughout West Africa. This program was authorized in 2000 and had a lifespan through 2008. Subsequently, the Mission developed a Strategy Statement to replace the Strategy Plan. The new plan will end in 2010. WA operates as an independent mission, cooperating assistance with 21 countries[1]. Partners of WA include many intergovernmental organizations, chief of which is the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). WA supports ECOWAS priority programs in the areas of conflict prevention, regional economic integration, policy harmonization, and HIV/AIDS.

The goal of WA is to assist in the development of a politically stable and economically prosperous West Africa. In order to do this the USAID Mission supports five objectives which include:

- Agricultural Productivity and Food Security Enhanced (former SO8) now Agriculture, Natural Resources Office
- Increased Adoption of Selected High Impact health Policies and Approaches (former SO9) now Health Office
- Conserving Productive Landscapes and Livelihoods (former SO10) - removed
- Greater Trade Competitiveness (former SO 11) – now Trade Office
- Promote Conflict Mitigation and Stability (former SO12) – now Peace and Security Office

USAID/WA seeks to integrate the activities of these offices throughout their implementation to produce results that are synergistic – having greater impact than if these activities were undertaken separately without regard to each other.

1.1 Purpose and Scope of IEE

This IEE evaluates activities of the entire WA Peace and Security Office to determine the foreseeable effects of the proposed actions on the environment. The IEE includes all on-going programs and projects previously covered by IEEs for USAID WARP's SpO7, (Conflict Prevention and Mitigation) and SO12 (Conflict Mitigation and Good Governance, now Peace & Security). This includes ongoing activities in Chad and Niger in relation to the Trans Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP), programs in Equatorial Guinea and other past and planned programs in the ECOWAS sub-region, Mauritania (if sanctions are levied), Chad, Sao Tome and Principe and Cameroon,.

1.2 Background

Political stability and security in the region, which are the basis of development as well as US security interests, require conflict prevention and mitigation activities, collaboratively carried out by the public and private sectors. Nowhere is this more evident than in West Africa and the Trans-Sahel where the issues of violent religious extremism and external forces of disruption have become dangerously pronounced and continue to impede stable development. Throughout West Africa, the extractive industries, water access and rights, and land disputes are often the drivers of violent conflict and political instability.

WA proposes both an innovative and pragmatic forward-looking regional approach to promote peace and security, governing justly and democratically and finally reduce the causes of terrorism over the next three to five years. Developing and

[1] The 19 countries supported by USAID/WA include Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chad, Cote d'Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo. Of these countries, 15 are members of ECOWAS (Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo)

reinforcing the capacities of key institutional and civil-society partners, especially ECOWAS, is paramount to promoting peace and conflict resolution in West Africa.

1.3 Description of Activities

Examples of illustrative activities include efforts to further the goals of promoting conflict mitigation and stability in West Africa.

- Projects to expand upon field activities in trans-boundary areas that are known to be linked or potentially linked to conflicts or extremism (Mano River States, Cote d'Ivoire, Burkina Faso, Equatorial Guinea and its neighbors and the trans-Sahel region);
- Projects to promote the equitable distribution of benefits derived from the region's natural resources;
- Programs to support governments, civil society organizations and the media to improve governmental transparency and accountability;
- Programs to create an enabling environment for credible elections through training and technical assistance;
- Programs to further strategic peace building priorities and the goals of promoting conflict mitigation and stability
- Programs to mitigate the Potential for Extremism and terrorism in the Sahel;
- Programs to support early warning and fragility systems to anticipate open conflicts and promote response.

Specific activities supported by USAID/WA to promote conflict mitigation and stability in West African and diminish potential support for extremism in the Sahel.

- Support local and community governance to visibly improve the performance of local level authorities;
- Support target populations to foster relationships with authorities with a focus on information dissemination and outreach;
- Support meaningful engagement of marginalized groups within their communities;
- Increase youth opportunities through social skill training, advocacy and income generating programs for youth in targeted regions and support of community development activities;
- Enhance the capacity of ECOWAS and Civil Society Organizations to respond to latent and open conflicts;
- Support programs that will strengthen elections commissions, civil society organizations, political parties and legislative structures

1.4 PROGRESS MONITORING

Progress will be measured by monitoring the following indicators under the Foreign Assistance Framework outlined below. Indicators and targets for measuring success include the following:

TARGETS

- An effective regional early warning system that explicitly links warning signals to targeted responses by governments or nongovernmental organizations established
- The ECOWAS and/or some member countries capacity in selected key governance areas such as transparency, accountability, communication and elections will be measurably improved.
- Civil-society networks and organizations to promote peace-building, conflict prevention and transparency in the extractive industries and other natural resource disputes will be strengthened.
- Isolated or at risk populations in targeted regions will have new programs established providing job training to youth and improvement of community radio service.
- Civil-society organizations will be strengthened to work with local communities on good governance and decentralization

ILLUSTRATIVE INDICATORS

Counter Terrorism

- Deny Terrorist Sponsorship, Support and Sanctuary
  a. Number of USG funded community development projects completed within the target region/ungoverned spaces
  b. Number of people from at risk groups reached through USG supported counter-terrorism activities

- De-Legitimize Terrorist Ideology
  a. Number of public information campaigns completed by USG
  b. Number of individuals who received USG-assisted training, including management skills and fiscal management, to strengthen local government and/or decentralization

Transnational Crime

- Trafficking in Persons and Migrant Smuggling
  Number of public awareness campaigns about TIP completed

Conflict Mitigation and Reconciliation

- Conflict Mitigation
  a. Number of USG programs supporting a conflict and or fragility early warning system and or response mechanism
  b. Number of people trained in conflict resolution/mitigation skills

Political Competition and Consensus Building

- Election and political processes
  a. Number of domestic election observers trained
  b. Number of election officials trained

Good Governance

- Legislative Functions and Processes
  a. Number of public forums resulting from USG assistance in which national legislatures receiving USG assistance
  b. Number of actions by national legislative committees following targeted USG assistance
  c. Number of executive oversight actions taken by legislature receiving USG assistance

- Anti-Corruption Reform
  Number of persons receiving anti-corruption training

2.0 COUNTRY AND ENVIRONMENTAL INFORMATION (BASELINE INFORMATION)

2.1 Locations Affected

West Africa.

2.2 The environmental procedures established by ECOWAS will be followed.

3.0 EVALUATION OF PROJECT/PROGRAM ISSUES WITH RESPECT TO ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT POTENTIAL

Activities funded under the sub grant, in-kind grants or micro-credit activities of this Office could have an impact on the environment if not conducted in a proper manner. While the activities are yet to be determined, it is therefore recommended that the USAID Africa Bureau's Environmental Guidelines for Small-Scale Activities in Africa (ESGGAA) be used in the design and implementation of the activities. Additional details related to illustrative activities are contained in section 4.0.

4.0 RECOMMENDED THRESHOLD DECISIONS & MITIGATION ACTIONS (INCLUDING MONITORING AND EVALUATION)

4.1 Recommended Threshold Decisions and Conditions

The environmental determination for Peace and Security Office is a **Categorical Exclusion** for all activities related to technical assistance, training and education, institutional strengthening, communications and information exchange, policy analysis, and other capacity building work related to the prevention and reduction of conflict and the causes of terrorism. These activities have no effect on the environment and are categorically excluded from further environmental review as per **22 CFR 216.2 (c) (2) (i)**, education, technical assistance, training; **(iii)** analyses, studies academic research workshops or meetings; **(v)** document and information transfers; **(xiv)** studies to develop the capability of recipient countries to engage in development planning.

Peace and Security Office will also be providing sub grants and credit for micro enterprise activities in trans-boundary areas that are known to be linked or potentially linked to conflict, and to regions designated as a priority for the counterterrorism initiatives (Mano River States, Cote d'Ivoire, the trans-Sahel region). The activities envisioned are small-scale in nature; an illustrative list includes construction and rehabilitation (clinics, schools, latrines, and markets), micro-credit, market gardens, drip irrigation, fruit tree production, processing, water delivery systems, sanitation, textiles, and reforestation. These activities receive a **Negative Determination with conditions as per 22 CFR 216.3 (a) (2) (iii**). The conditions associated with this determination are that all sub grants and other project activities must follow the Environmental Review guidelines and follow technical guidance and procedures contained in the USAID Africa Bureau/SD, **Environmental Guidelines for Small-Scale Activities in Africa** (EGSSAA) (http://www.encapafrica.org/SmallScaleGuidelines.htm.). A summary of the more important conditions associated with planned activities include:

1. Activities in support of agricultural productivity do not include the purchase or application of pesticides. This examination does not cover pesticides, including their procurement, use, transport, storage or disposal. Any pesticide activity proposed under this program would necessitate an amended IEE, including all elements of analysis identified in 22CFR216.3 (b), USAID's Pesticide Procedures.
2. USAID funds will not be used for land conversion from its natural state (i.e. forests, wetlands, grasslands, savannas, coastal zones, etc.) to agricultural productivity zones.
3. No large scale irrigation activities are envisioned in this program. Support for the use of small-scale irrigation systems that may be implemented through manuals, demonstration sites, and other forms of technical assistance and training shall

include irrigation best practices. In addition, close monitoring shall be undertaken to ensure farmers are using the best practice guidance on irrigation.

4. Technical assistance and training in improved agricultural production practices shall include information on conservation of natural resources and biodiversity, and shall promote intensification of agriculture, while discouraging the expansion of agriculture into areas that provide important ecosystem services.
5. Mitigation against adverse environmental impact from trade in natural resource products (including non-timber forest products, timber, charcoal and fuel wood) will be established within plans developed by recipients that are environmentally responsible, socially beneficial and economically viable.

4.2 Mitigation, Monitoring and Evaluation

As required by ADS 204.5.4, the Peace and Security Office and activity implementing partners will "actively monitor and evaluate whether the conditions associated with these activities are being implemented effectively and whether there are new or unforeseen consequences arising during implementation that were not identified and reviewed in accordance with sound environmental management.

All implementing Partners applying to implement activities, including micro enterprise, under sub grants, must complete the "Environmental Review Form. The Environmental Review Form presents the environmental issues associated with the proposed activities. It also documents mitigation and monitoring commitments. Its purpose is to allow the applicant and USAID to evaluate the likely environmental impacts of the project. The proposed activity cannot be approved and no "irreversible commitment of resources" can be made until the Environmental Review Form, including any mitigation measures, is approved by the Mission Environmental Officer (MEO) and or Regional Environmental Officer. These Environmental Review Forms must be summarized and reviewed at least annually by the REA, Mission Director, and BEO.

USAID WA commits itself to incorporating sound environmental review principles and screening, capacity building, monitoring, evaluations, and mitigation procedures specified in this IEE. The SO Team shall also monitor the need for additional environmental review based on IEE recommendations. Peace and Security Office, in collaboration with implementing partners, shall ensure that provisions of the IEE, including the conditions and monitoring set forth herein, are incorporated into all contracts, cooperative agreements, grants and sub-grants, as appropriate.

ATTACHMENT E

STANDARD PROVISIONS FOR U.S. NONGOVERNMENTAL RECIPIENTS as found at http://www.usaid.gov/policy/ads/300/303maa.pdf revised 02/22/2010.

And includes following

HOMELAND SECURITY PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE-12 (HSPD-12) (SEPTEMBER 2006)

In response to the general threat of unauthorized access to federal facilities and information systems, the President issued Homeland Security Presidential Directive-12. HSPD-12 requires all Federal agencies to use a common Personal Identity Verification (PIV) standard when identifying and issuing access rights to users of Federally-controlled facilities and/or Federal Information Systems. USAID is applying the requirements of HSPD-12 to applicable assistance awards. USAID will begin issuing HSPD-12 "smart card" IDs to applicable recipients (and recipient employees), using a phased approach. Effective October 27, 2006, USAID will begin issuing new "smart card" IDs to new recipients (and recipient employees) requiring routine access to USAID controlled facilities and/or access to USAID's information systems. USAID will begin issuance of the new smart card IDs to existing recipients (and existing recipient employees) on October 27, 2007. (Exceptions would include those situations where an existing recipient (or recipient employee) loses or damages his/her existing ID and would need a replacement ID prior to Oct 27, 2007. In those situations, the existing recipient (or recipient employee) would need to follow the PIV processes described below, and be issued one of the new smart cards.)

Accordingly, before a recipient (including a recipient employee) may obtain a USAID ID (new or replacement) authorizing him/her routine access to USAID facilities, or logical access to USAID's information systems, the individual must provide two forms of identity source documents in original form and a passport size photo. One identity source document must be a valid Federal or state government-issued picture ID. (Overseas foreign nationals must comply with the requirements of the Regional Security Office.) USAID/W recipients (and recipient employee) must contact the USAID Security Office to obtain the list of acceptable forms of documentation, and recipients working in overseas Missions must obtain the acceptable documentation list from the Regional Security Officer. Submission of these documents, and related background checks, are mandatory in order for the recipient (or employee) to receive a building access ID, and before access will be granted to any of USAID's information systems. All recipients (or employees) must physically present these two source documents for identity proofing at their USAID/W or Mission Security Briefing. The recipient (or employee) must return any issued building access ID and remote authentication token to USAID custody upon termination of the individual's employment with the recipient or completion of the award, whichever occurs first.

The recipient must comply with all applicable HSPD-12 and PIV procedures, as described above, as well as any subsequent USAID or government-wide HSPD-12 and PIV procedures/policies, including any subsequent applicable USAID General Notices, Office of Security Directives and/or Automated Directives System (ADS) policy directives and required procedures. This includes HSPD-12 procedures established in USAID/Washington and those procedures established by the overseas Regional Security Office. In the event of inconsistencies between this clause and later issued Agency or government-wide HSPD-12 guidance, the most recent issued guidance should take precedence, unless otherwise instructed by the Agreement Officer.

The recipient is required to include this clause in any subawards (including subcontracts) that require the subawardee or subawardee employee to have routine physical access to USAID space or logical access to USAID's information systems.

CENTRAL CONTRACTOR REGISTRATION AND UNIVERSAL IDENTIFIER (OCTOBER 2010)

a. Requirement for Central Contractor Registration (CCR). Unless you are exempted from this requirement under 2 CFR 25.110, you as the recipient must maintain the currency of your information in the CCR until you submit the final financial report required under this award or receive the final payment,

whichever is later. This requires that you review and update the information at least annually after the initial registration, and more frequently if required by changes in your information or another award term.

b. Requirement for Data Universal Numbering System (DUNS) numbers. If you are authorized to make subawards under this award, you:
(1) Must notify potential subrecipients that no entity (see definition in paragraph C of this award term) may receive a subaward from you unless the entity has provided its DUNS number to you.
(2) May not make a subaward to an entity unless the entity has provided its DUNS number to you.

c. Definitions. For purposes of this award term:
(1) Central Contractor Registration (CCR) means the Federal repository into which an entity must provide information required for the conduct of business as a recipient. Additional information about registration procedures may be found at the CCR Internet site (currently at http://www.ccr.gov).

(2) Data Universal Numbering System (DUNS) number means the nine-digit number established and assigned by Dun and Bradstreet, Inc. (D&B) to uniquely identify business entities. A DUNS number may be obtained from D&B by telephone (currently 866-705-5711) or the Internet (currently at http://fedgov.dnb.com/webform).

(3) Entity, as it is used in this award term, means all of the following, as defined at 2 CFR part 25, subpart C:
(i) A Governmental organization, which is a State, local government, or Indian tribe;
(ii) A foreign public entity;
(iii) A domestic or foreign nonprofit organization;
(iv) A domestic or foreign for-profit organization; and
(v) A Federal agency, but only as a subrecipient under an award or subaward to a non-Federal entity.

(4) Subaward:
(i) This term means a legal instrument to provide support for the performance of any portion of the substantive project or program for which you received this award and that you as the recipient award to an eligible subrecipient.
(ii) The term does not include your procurement of property and services needed to carry out the project or program (for further explanation, see Sec. --.210 of the attachment to OMB Circular A-133, "Audits of States, Local Governments, and Non-Profit Organizations").
(iii) A subaward may be provided through any legal agreement, including an agreement that you consider a contract.
(5) Subrecipient means an entity that:
(i) Receives a subaward from you under this award; and
(ii) Is accountable to you for the use of the Federal funds provided by the subaward.

[END OF PROVISION]

REPORTING SUBAWARDS AND EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (OCTOBER 2010)

a. Reporting of first-tier subawards.
(1) Applicability. Unless you are exempt as provided in paragraph d. of this award term, you must report each action that obligates $25,000 or more in Federal funds that does not include Recovery funds (as defined in section 1512(a)(2) of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. 111-5) for a subaward to an entity (see definitions in paragraph e of this award term).

(2) Where and when to report.
(i) You must report each obligating action described in paragraph a.1. of this award term to www.fsrs.gov.
(ii) For subaward information, report no later than the end of the month following the month in which the obligation was made. (For example, if the obligation was made on November 7, 2010, the obligation must be reported by no later than December 31, 2010.)
(3) What to report. You must report the information about each obligating action that the submission instructions posted at www.fsrs.gov specify.

b. Reporting Total Compensation of Recipient Executives.
(1) Applicability and what to report. You must report total compensation for each of your five most highly compensated executives for the preceding completed fiscal year, if –
(i) the total Federal funding authorized to date under this award is $25,000 or more;
(ii) in the preceding fiscal year, you received —
(A) 80 percent or more of your annual gross revenues from Federal procurement contracts (and subcontracts) and Federal financial assistance subject to the Transparency Act, as defined at 2 CFR 170.320 (and subawards); and
(B) $25,000,000 or more in annual gross revenues from Federal procurement contracts (and subcontracts) and Federal financial assistance subject to the Transparency Act, as defined at 2 CFR 170.320 (and subawards); and
(iii) The public does not have access to information about the compensation of the executives through periodic reports filed under section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m(a), 78o(d)) or section 6104 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986. (To determine if the public has access to the compensation information, see the U.S. Security and Exchange Commission total compensation filings at http://www.sec.gov/answers/execomp.htm.)
(2) Where and when to report. You must report executive total compensation described in paragraph b.(1) of this award term:
(i) As part of your registration profile at www.ccr.gov.
(ii) By the end of the month following the month in which this award is made, and annually thereafter.

c. Reporting of Total Compensation of Subrecipient Executives.
(1) Applicability and what to report. Unless you are exempt as provided in paragraph d. of this award term, for each first-tier subrecipient under this award, you shall report the names and total compensation of each of the subrecipient's five most highly compensated executives for the subrecipient's preceding completed fiscal year, if –
(i) in the subrecipient's preceding fiscal year, the subrecipient received—
(A) 80 percent or more of its annual gross revenues from Federal procurement contracts (and subcontracts) and Federal financial assistance subject to the Transparency Act, as defined at 2 CFR 170.320 (and subawards); and
(B) $25,000,000 or more in annual gross revenues from Federal procurement contracts (and subcontracts), and Federal financial assistance subject to the Transparency Act (and subawards); and ii. The public does not have access to information about the compensation of the executives through periodic reports filed under section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m(a), 78o(d)) or section 6104 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986. (To determine if the public has access to the compensation information, see the U.S. Security and Exchange Commission total compensation filings at http://www.sec.gov/answers/execomp.htm.)
(2) Where and when to report. You must report subrecipient executive total compensation described in paragraph c.(1) of this award term:
(i) To the recipient.
(ii) By the end of the month following the month during which you make the subaward. For example, if a subaward is obligated on any date during the month of October of a given year (i.e., between October 1 and 31), you must report any required compensation information of the subrecipient by November 30 of that year.

d. Exemptions
If, in the previous tax year, you had gross income, from all sources, under $300,000, you are exempt from the requirements to report:
(1) subawards, and
(2) the total compensation of the five most highly compensated executives of any subrecipient.

e. Definitions. For purposes of this award term:
(1) Entity means all of the following, as defined in 2 CFR part 25:
(i) A Governmental organization, which is a State, local government, or Indian tribe;
(ii) A foreign public entity;
(iii) A domestic or foreign nonprofit organization;

(iv) A domestic or foreign for-profit organization;
(v) A Federal agency, but only as a subrecipient under an award or subaward to a non-Federal entity.
(2) Executive means officers, managing partners, or any other employees in management positions.
(3) Subaward:
(i) This term means a legal instrument to provide support for the performance of any portion of the substantive project or program for which you received this award and that you as the recipient award to an eligible subrecipient.
(ii) The term does not include your procurement of property and services needed to carry out the project or program (for further explanation, see Sec. --.210 of the attachment to OMB Circular A-133, "Audits of States, Local Governments, and Non- Profit Organizations").
(iii) A subaward may be provided through any legal agreement, including an agreement that you or a subrecipient considers a contract.
(4) Subrecipient means an entity that:
(i) Receives a subaward from you (the recipient) under this award; and
(ii) Is accountable to you for the use of the Federal funds provided by the subaward.
(5) Total compensation means the cash and noncash dollar value earned by the executive during the recipient's or subrecipient's preceding fiscal year and includes the following (for more information see 17 CFR 229.402(c)(2)):
(i) Salary and bonus.
(ii) Awards of stock, stock options, and stock appreciation rights. Use the dollar amount recognized for financial statement reporting purposes with respect to the fiscal year in accordance with the Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 123 (Revised 2004) (FAS 123R), Shared Based Payments.
(iii) Earnings for services under non-equity incentive plans. This does not include group life, health, hospitalization or medical reimbursement plans that do not discriminate in favor of executives, and are available generally to all salaried employees.
(iv) Change in pension value. This is the change in present value of defined benefit and actuarial pension plans.
(v) Above-market earnings on deferred compensation which is not tax qualified.
(vi) Other compensation, if the aggregate value of all such other compensation (e.g. severance, termination payments, value of life insurance paid on behalf of the employee, perquisites or property) for the executive exceeds $10,000.

[END OF PROVISION]

TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS (OCTOBER 2010)

a. Provisions applicable to a recipient that is a private entity.
(1) You as the recipient, your employees, subrecipients under this award, and subrecipients' employees may not—
(i) Engage in severe forms of trafficking in persons during the period of time that the award is in effect;
(ii) Procure a commercial sex act during the period of time that the award is in effect; or
(iii) Use forced labor in the performance of the award or subawards under the award.
(2) We as the Federal awarding agency may unilaterally terminate this award, without penalty, if you or a subrecipient that is a private entity —
(i) Is determined to have violated a prohibition in paragraph a. (1) of this award term; or
(ii) Has an employee who is determined by the agency official authorized to terminate the award to have violated a prohibition in paragraph a. (1) of this award term through conduct that is either—
(A) Associated with performance under this award; or
(B) Imputed to you or the subrecipient using the standards and due process for imputing the conduct of an individual to an organization that are provided in 2 CFR part 180, ''OMB Guidelines to Agencies on Governmentwide Debarment and Suspension (Nonprocurement),'' as implemented by our agency at 22 CFR 208 or its superseding Part in 2 CFR.

b. Provisions applicable to a recipient other than a private entity.
(1) We as the Federal awarding agency may unilaterally terminate this award, without penalty, if a

subrecipient that is a private entity—
(i) Is determined to have violated an applicable prohibition in paragraph a. (1) of this award term; or
(ii) Has an employee who is determined by the agency official authorized to terminate the award to have violated an applicable prohibition in paragraph a. (1) of this award term through conduct that is either—
(A) Associated with performance under this award; or
(B) Imputed to the subrecipient using the standards and due process for imputing the conduct of an individual to an organization that are provided in 2 CFR part 180, ‘‘OMB Guidelines to Agencies on Governmentwide Debarment and Suspension (Nonprocurement),’’ as implemented by our agency at 22 CFR 208 or its superseding Part in 2 CFR.

c. Provisions applicable to any recipient.
(1) You must inform us immediately of any information you receive from any source alleging a violation of a prohibition in paragraph a. (1) of this award term.
(2) Our right to terminate unilaterally that is described in paragraph a. (2) or b of this section:
(i) Implements section 106(g) of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (TVPA), as amended (22 U.S.C. 7104(g)), and
(ii) Is in addition to all other remedies for noncompliance that are available to us under this award.
(3) You must include the requirements of paragraph a. (1) of this award term in any subaward you make to a private entity.

d. Definitions. For purposes of this provision:
(1) ‘‘Employee’’ means either:
(i) An individual employed by you or a subrecipient who is engaged in the performance of the project or program under this award; or
(ii) Another person engaged in the performance of the project or program under this award and not compensated by you including, but not limited to, a volunteer or individual whose services are contributed by a third party as an in-kind contribution toward cost sharing or matching requirements.
(2) ‘‘Forced labor’’ means labor obtained by any of the following methods: the recruitment, harboring, transportation, provision, or obtaining of a person for labor or services, through the use of force, fraud, or coercion for the purpose of subjection to involuntary servitude, peonage, debt bondage, or slavery.
(3) ‘‘Private entity’’:
(i) Means any entity other than a State, local government, Indian tribe, or foreign public entity, as those terms are defined in 2 CFR 175.25(b).
(ii) Includes:
(A) A nonprofit organization, including any nonprofit institution of higher education, hospital, or tribal organization other than one included in the definition of Indian tribe at 2 CFR 175.25(b).
(B) A for-profit organization.
(4) ‘‘Severe forms of trafficking in persons,’’ ‘‘commercial sex act,’’ and ‘‘coercion’’ have the meanings given at section 103 of the TVPA, as amended (22 U.S.C. 7102).

[END OF PROVISION]